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Abstract 
This thesis uses theories of social exclusion and resistance to investigate the survival 
strategies of Bulgarian Gypsies and their involvement within the non-gover=ental 
organisation (NGO) sector. It addresses the relevance of these theories to our 
understanding of social inequality in the light of findings that point not only towards new 
possibilities for resistance within the NGO sector, but also towards the reinforcement of 
structural inequality. The dialectic of compliance and resistance on the part of Gypsies 
within NGOs, as identified in the case study, opens up for fresh debate theories 'from 
below'. This in turn helps unravel some of the benefits and drawbacks of the NGO 
strategy at the national as well as international level as one for both integration and for 
political self-assertion. 
The implications these findings have for an understanding of the use of social exclusion 
theory and NGO strategies in policy design are argued to be fundamental. Theories of 
hidden resistance need to be considered in order to go beyond the restrictive view of 
'social exclusion' as a condition characterised by 'isolation', 'backwardness' and/or 
'deviancy'. The thesis argues therefore that social exclusion must be problematised and 
interrogated to a greater extent, both as a concept and as a generic tool for policy making. 
This is important in order that we do not lose sight of the structural causes of social 
inequality and perhaps most importantly, the question of responsibility. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis uses theories of social exclusion and resistance to investigate responses to 
changing patterns of social inequality in the East European transition with particular 
reference to Bulgarian Gypsy communities. ' As an introduction this chapter sets out the 
purpose of the thesis and deals largely with methodological issues. The transition in 
Eastern Europe with its implications of changing social inequality are firstly introduced 
in order to place into context the subsequent discussion of social exclusion, non- 
governmental organisation (NGO) strategies of inclusion and ideas of resistance. 
Practical and theoretical questions about the choice of methodology used in this thesis 
are then raised with particular reference to interviewing and participant observation. The 
extent to which such methods are reliable and valid are explored in the final part of the 
chapter in terms of the specific problems encountered during my fieldwork. 
In recent years the dimensions of social inequality have been increasing quantitatively 
and changing qualitatively both in the 'developed' and the 'developing' countries. The 
number of households and individuals living in conditions of relative poverty has been 
on the increase globally since the 1980s. ' This has been fuelled by a number of factors 
1 Throughout this thesis, I refer to this minority of Europe as Gypsies and as one entity unless specified otherwise. I 
am aware of the negative connotations attached to the use of 'Gypsy', which has caused huge debates among the 
Gypsy intelligentsia across Europe. In Bulgaria, for example, during a conference in November 1997, the debate 
centred on whether to use the term 'Cigani' (the externally imposed pejorative label), or 'Roma' (the official self- 
proclaimed name). Marushiakova and Popov draw attention to the fact that although 'Roma! are the only Gypsy 
community living in Bulgaria; it is not the generalising self-appellation for all Gypsies. Not all Gypsies in Bulgaria 
accept the appellation of Roma, and even many of those who use it in an official capacity still use'Cigani' informally. 
Rather than getting entangled into such debates, however, and in order to avoid confusion, I persist in the use of the 
term 'Gypsy' simply to convey their generic name. 
2 In Europe according to official estimates it was estimated that by 1988 there were approximately 18 million 
households and 52 million individuals living below the poverty line. Although by the 1990s the figure was estimated 
at 44 million individuals (16 per cent) this was still an increase from 12 per cent of the population in 1975. The 
poverty threshold is held at 50 per cent of the equivalent mean per capita national expenditure, Eurostat, Europe in 
Figures, 4th edition, 1995. p. 236 and M. Gaudier "Pauvretds, Indgalitds, Exclusions: Le Nouveau des Approches 
Th6oriques et des Pratiques Sociales", Sirie Bibliographique - Institut International dbudes Sociales, 17,1993. p. 
10 
including economic problems resulting in a changing economic, social, political and 
demographic environment, and the ideological shift towards a neo-liberal agenda. 
Growing poverty and widening social inequality has signalled to governments and policy 
makers world-wide, a renewed concern with social instability and limits on social 
welfare. 
Rapid regime change in Eastern Europe followed by the implementation of neo-liberal 
market reform can be seen as an aspect of this global recession. It has given rise to 
economic collapse, rapid increases in levels of poverty, and a plethora of changing social 
needs in Eastern Europe, based on unequal access not only to new wealth but also to 
diminishing resources. ' In Bulgaria, where the reform process has been far from dynamic 
and with one of the lowest rates of foreign direct investment since 1989 patterns of 
increasing poverty and social inequality have been particularly acute. This has opened up 
questions about the causes of these social inequalities that appear to run much deeper 
than just being temporary side effects of economic shock therapy. The rapidity with 
which these inequalities have surfaced has been especially evident in the case of 
minorities and especially Gypsies. " Gypsies in Eastern Europe have been particularly 
hard-hit by the double blow of economic decline and rising social tension and are 
perceived by government and society in general as both a threat to and a drain on 
diminishing resources. 
47. In the 'majority world' the situation is even more serious. In 1985 the World Bank estimated that the number of 
poor in developing countries was nearly 2 billion (50 per cent of the population). World Bank, World Development 
Report 1990: Poverty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990. By the late 1990s this situation had deteriorated 
further, where according to the UNDP, of the 4 billion people in developing countries, nearly 60 per cent lacked basic 
sanitation and more than 30 per cent did not have access to clean water. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1998, 
quoted in Wolfgang Sachs, "The Discovery of Poverty", New Internationalist, 232, June, 1992. 
3 Data published by institutions such as UNICEF, the World Bank and the European Commission form the basis for 
the majority of discussion on the transition, the implications of which I discuss in chapter 3. 
4 The nature of Gypsy oppression generally and in specific reference to the Communist and post-Communist periods 
in Eastern Europe is explored in chapter 4. 
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1.2 Social exclusion theory and the transition 
Theories of social exclusion, which have been developed in the West, are increasingly 
shaping current thinking about events in Eastern Europe. Existing class analysis based 
on the hierarchical pattern of 'up/down' social divisions has been challenged by 
dichotomies of 'in/out. ' The adoption of social exclusion theory has injected into the 
poverty debate with renewed resonance notions of deprivation and isolation. These 
factors are increasingly considered as of equal, if not of more importance to monetary or 
production based indicators. ' 
Poverty based analyses of social inequality rest on ideas of relative and absolute poverty, 
which, in turn, rely upon definitions of 'minimum' or 'subsistence' level of living. 
Relevant indicators are then used to show the level of social disparity within a given 
society or region. The Luxembourg Income Study database, a co-operative research 
project with a membership that includes countries from four continents (Europe, 
America, Asia and Oceania) rests, for example, on a commitment to providing data on 
income-based inequality. ' However, social analysts are increasingly inclined to perceive 
poverty-based analysis as too narrow and out-moded. Robert Walker in his discussion on 
poverty and social exclusion in Europe, argues that "the traditional concept of poverty 
smacks [ ... ] of a late Victorian liberal view of society", and 
"with its focus on the lack of 
5 Mayer and Jenkins, for example, claim that their findings based on research carried out in the US revealed that only 
24 per cent of material hardship was caused by low income alone and that other factors of age, family size and 
composition for example come into play. Mayer and Jenkins "Poverty and the Distribution of Material Hardship", 
Journal ofHuman Resources 24 (1), 1989. 
6 The LIS is partly funded by the Centre for Population Poverty and Policy studies. Its concem with income based 
inequality is evident in the LIS Working papers, which typically cover topics such as: income distribution; inequality, 
and poverty. The LIS database also informs research at a more general level, such as B. Buhmarm et aL "Equivalence 
Scales, Well-Being, Inequality, and Poverty: Sensitivity Estimates Across Ten Countries Using The Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) Database", The Review of Income and Wealth, 34 (2), June, 1988. 
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disposable income, does not take account of the denial, or non-realisation, of 
citizenship rights. "' 
This growing distrust of static poverty indicators has encouraged policy makers at the 
national and international level to develop a new approach to measuring and interpreting 
social inequality. A Commission for the European Communities (CEC) document 
entitled Towards a Europe of Solidarity - Intensifying the Fight Against Social 
Exclusion, Fostering Integration sums this up: 
[debates] on social exclusion point towards an important change over the past 15 years in 
the nature of the challenge itself- the problem is now not only one of disparity between the 
top and bottom of the social scale (up1down), but also between those comfortably placed 
within society and those on theftinge (inloUt). 8 
Ironically, however, this redefinition is itself primarily a top-down process whereby 
social policy makers and those in positions of power are shaping a new language of 
social exclusion that draws increasingly on the discourse of human rights and less on 
concepts of distribution, exploitation and poverty. The indicators of 'well-being', now 
typical of the social exclusion approach, do still include the measurement of income but 
in conjunction with such factors as housing, work, health and education. These are 
correlated in order to make comments on the degree of social or economic participation 
for certain groups within society. While broadening the way in which social inequality is 
measured and conceptualised, it has posed a series of intriguing methodological and 
analytical problems. 
7 Robert Walker is Professor of Social Policy Research at Loughborough University. R. Walker "Poverty and Social 
Exclusion in Europe. " In Alan Walker and Carol Walker (eds. ), Britain Divided: The Growth of Social Exclusion in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Child Poverty Action Group Ltd, London, 1997. pp. 48-49. 
8 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Europe of Solidarity, Intensijying the Fight Against Social 
Erclusion, Fostering Integration, COM (92) 542,1992. p. 7. 
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Nevertheless, the adoption of social exclusion theory by government agencies and policy 
makers has proved to be a relatively smooth process in that it refrains from a 
commitment to any one theory of class, gender or race, instead incorporating aspects 
from all of them. Readings, in his discussion of the changing foundations of Western 
knowledge, which he identifies through the changing role of the University, argues that 
the question of marginalisation is one example of how we have moved, 
ftom vertical models of dominance to a more structuralist account in terms of center and 
periphery. Instead of speaking ofpower in terms of vertical ascendancy of the rulers over 
the dominated (the classical model of class domination), we speak of multiple marginalised 
positions in relation to a hegemonic order. This allows relations of power among 
transverse groups (groups that included members of all social classes, such as women or 
homosexuals) to be mapped'. 
The apparent neutrality that underpins this post-modern approach can soon give way to 
political and ideological manipulation. By locating the causes of inequality in vague 
abstract forces and perhaps more significantly in the nature of the groups or individuals 
themselves, national and international policy makers are able to subtly remove 
responsibility away from themselves, from multilateral institutions and subsequently 
from national governments. 
The rapidity with which the concept of social exclusion has entered official and popular 
discourse has encouraged governments to search for accessible and immediate 'solutions'. 
The existing non-governmental and, in particular, voluntary sector in the West and its 
application to the 'developing' world has proved to be a suitable model for those 
practitioners in Eastern Europe embarking on policies of 'participation', 'self-help' and 
'community development. Each of these strategies are laden with conceptual baggage 
and have roots that lie outside NGO theory. However, in the move towards finding 
immediate and popular remedies to problems of 'social exclusion', the NGO sector and 
9 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996. 
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its emphasis on 'bottom-up' participation and grass roots activities has often become the 
fanswer' to a whole array of problems ranging from social, economic, political to cultural. 
Western donor agencies and policy makers in Eastern Europe have largely supported the 
NGO sector in the belief that participation 'from below' can help nurture an active civil 
society and consolidate a genuine democracy. 
This thesis reviews the concept of social exclusion and asks whether it contains internal 
contradictions and carries ideological overtones by exploring the extent to which it has 
positive or negative implications for the groups it claims to benefit. It does this by 
asking: 
1. First, how successfully does social exclusion theory help us to understand the core 
processes or situations it identifies, , i. e. has it been correct in its prognosis that groups 
will perpetuate their own poverty and isolation if not given access to mainstream societal 
institutions? An analysis of the function of NGOs for Gypsies in the Bulgarian context is 
central to this. Their use of this sector for specific ends and the nature of the relationship 
that is subsequently forged between the international donors and the Gypsy related 
foundations at the ground level indicates how the NGO sector for Gypsies is at once 
restrictive and enabling. 
2. Second, there is the problem of what this theory might fail to explain; in particular, 
does it account for the contradictions that are emerging in terms of both resistance and 
participation on the part of those groups defined as excluded? That the NGO sector 
during the transition has developed into a site of both conflict and incorporation for 
many Gypsies highlights the validity of this question and further raises the possibility 
that 'incorporation from below' has formed an important post-1989 Gypsy survival 
strategy both within this sector and the wider context. 
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The thesis addresses these two questions by connecting the following four analyses: 
1. A critical discussion of the concept of social exclusion and how its emergence and 
use in transition societies in popular discourse may have marginalised concepts of 
class and power. 
2. A critical analysis of the role of NGOs and their rise in importance in post-communist 
transition. 
3. An evaluation of resistance theories 'from below' and how they could relate to Gypsy 
responses during the transition. 
4. A report of those NGOs working with Gypsies in Bulgaria based upon fieldwork in 
that country. ' 0 
1.3 Gypsies and the NGO sector 
Gypsies of Eastern Europe cover a wide variety of different ethnic groups that can be 
divided along various different lines, ranging from lifestyle and occupation to religion. 
Much research has been carried out over time by either anthropologists or linguists who 
have explored the rich complexities of different Gypsy groups. Stewart has recently 
published an account of his ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Hungary in the 1980s 
with one group of Gypsies, the Rom, which serves to undermine the often over-simplistic 
view of Gypsies. " In Bulgaria alone there are numerous Romany dialects, which Kenrick 
10 In the context of the debates surrounding the question of what should be included and conversely what should be 
excluded from the definition of a non governmental organisation, NGOs are taken in this thesis to mean all those non- 
profit organisations that have established themselves as separate from the governmental structure and which rest on 
some form of private funding, whether it be through domestic or foreign sources. Within this broad framework the 
focus of my study is on those NGOs who have at least as one of their main concerns issues specifically to do with 
Gypsies. For the purpose of this thesis, these did not include those organisations which defined themselves as 
businesses or those which were rooted in the Pentecostal Church. Although both did directly deal with Gypsy issues 
and for many were a vital source of empowerment, they posed questions that extended beyond the scope of this study. 
11 Stewart explains how the Rom form part of the Vlach Gypsies who constitute 20 per cent of the Gypsy population 
in Hungary and are generally seen as the worst kind by 'ordinary' Hungarians and officials. The Vlach Romany- 
speaking Gypsies had come over from Transylvania and the Romanian principalities in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and gradually dispersed and settled around the major industrial towns. Stewart highlights the 
contradictions in Rom culture. Although lacking a consciously held ethnic identity, their language holds together their 
community and helps establish a shared identity. Shared social activity and the ideology of nurture for the Rom in 
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uses to distinguish between different types of Gypsies. " His work complements that of 
Marushiakova and Popov, who in their comprehensive analysis based on decades of 
fieldwork, describe all the variety of groups of Gypsies in great detail. " 
Although the study of Gypsies has grown in popularity in recent years, especially in the 
context of Eastern Europe, knowledge about their daily existence still remains shrouded 
in obscurity. In spite of (or because of) this, Gypsies are proving to be ever popular 
among Western donors and NGOs in Eastern Europe, so much so that for many of the 
NGOs in Eastern Europe, which rely on external funding it has become almost a 
necessity to include Gypsies (however superficially) into their programmes. "' While the 
growing NGO sector has signalled to the government a potential threat, for many 
activists the NGO sector has become the embodiment of, or perhaps a vehicle for, the 
Gypsy cause. By developing a critique of social exclusion theory building on existing 
theories of 'hidden resistance, and in applying this to the situation of Gypsies within the 
Bulgarian NGO sector the thesis hopes to substantiate the following four hypotheses: 
1. The continued survival of Gypsies as a distinct ethnic group, coupled with the active 
self-organisation of educated Gypsies within the NGO sector, reveals that, contrary to 
popular misconception, Gypsies are not by definition isolated, passive or de-politicised. 
I lungary overrides conventional ideas of descent and inheritance of character. This emphasis on the present rather 
than on the past makes it possible for someone of non-Rom origin to become a Roma if they learn the language and 
partake in the shared values. Michael Stewart, The Time of the Gypsies, Westview Press, Oxford, 1997. p. 9-11 
12 Donald Kenrick, Morphology and Lexicon of the Romany Dialect of Kotel, Bulgaria. Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of London, 1969. 
13 Elena Marushiakova and Vessel in Popov, Gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria, Studien zur Tsganelogi und Folklovistik 18, 
Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1997. They depict Gypsy groups that are separated along several different lines: religion; 
occupation; lifestyle; external labelling; self identification and so forth. 
14 Marushiakova and Popov, The Gypsy Minority in Bulgaria - Policy and Community Development, Sofia, 
forthcoming. 
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2. The strategy of inclusion for Gypsies in Eastern Europe through the NGO sector is a 
vastly complex procedure which, at the formal level, holds within it both the potential for 
effective bottom-up integration as well as continued top-down assimilation. 
3. Gypsies involved within the NGO sector have been able to 'manipulate' NGO rhetoric 
and develop strategies for survival that rest on aspects of both compliance and resistance. 
4. Given that Gypsies are not by definition isolated, and that they play an ambiguous role 
within the NGO sector, theories of social exclusion do not adequately account for the 
experiences of Gypsies in Bulgaria. 
Evaluating both formal and informal responses to the transition underpins the discussion 
on Gypsies and the NGO sector in Bulgaria. While critically analysing both liberal and 
resistance interpretations of Gypsy responses, I question the formal distinction that exists 
between 'everyday resistance' and the strategies of the NGO sector. " The possibility of 
there being a hidden transcript within the NGO sector is explored whereby Western 
concepts of human rights and civil society, coupled with NGO strategies of 'bottom-up 
participation' are seemingly 'played with' by those active within it. 'Everyday resistance' 
is therefore not necessarily some external seething underworld of anti-social behaviour 
but is intertwined into the very survival strategies of Gypsies, including their 
participation in the formal realm of the third sector. " The exploration of informal 
resistance, whatever form this may take, is set within a more general critique of the 
extent to which the NGO sector does indeed offer the solution to 'social exclusion'. 
15 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1976; Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, London, 1990. Ideas of resistance within the NGO sector using Scott as a reference are 
discussed in Katherine Pinnock, "The NGO sector and Gypsy Resistance in Bulgaria", REERC Discussion Paper, 2, 
University of Wolverhampton, 1998. 
16 The NGO sector is often referred to as the 'Third Sectoe, whereby the first is the public or state sector and the 
second the private sector. 
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The thesis therefore contributes not only to Romani studies but to the wider debate aimed 
at elucidating an understanding of social inequality and questions of social agency. What 
this thesis does not claim to do is to offer an ethnographic account of Gypsies and their 
various organisations in Bulgaria, although this does at times form part of the analysis. 
Chapter 2 explores the conceptual and practical evolution of social exclusion, taking into 
consideration the question of resistance and the role of NGOs. Chapter 3 explores the 
implications of using social exclusion theory for understanding changing patterns of 
social inequality during the 'transition', with special reference to Bulgaria. It examines 
the empirical problems that inevitably plague such a study, where statistical data on 
social inequality remains problematic and often unreliable. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
development of official policy regarding Gypsies in Eastern Europe, with a special focus 
on Bulgaria, as an example of a group traditionally defined as 'marginalised' or as 
suffering from 'social exclusion'. This gives us an indication of the way in which, as a 
minority group, Gypsies have been subject to systematic and institutionalised oppression 
and of the ambiguous repercussions that arise when they are included into existing 
protective legal frameworks. Chapter 5 offers a review of both international and national 
NGOs with special reference to Bulgaria and illustrates the complexities of the debates 
that surround the use of NGOs as an alternative to the state and as a means for 
integration both at the national and international levels. 
As an extension of this discussion on NGOs and closely based on the fieldwork 
discussed below, chapters 6,7 and 8 present the core findings of this thesis. Chapter 6 
sets out the formal and informal ways in which Gypsies have been responding to their 
treatment as a socially excluded group during the transition in Bulgaria, comparing 
everyday survival strategies with the more acceptable response of working within the 
NGO sector. Chapter 7 explores the implications of the different ways in which these 
responses are and can be interpreted, with special reference to liberal and resistance 
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readings and the idea of public and hidden transcripts. In chapter 8a Gypsy-led 
foundation in Bulgaria is taken as a case study in order to explore in closer detail the 
interaction of these formal and informal transcripts. In particular, it explores the way in 
which many of those within the sector appear to simultaneously comply with and resist 
against the NGO rationale and wider concepts of integration. The implications these 
findings have for an understanding of the use of social exclusion theory in policy design 
are argued to be fundamental; namely the groups normally considered as isolated, 
backward and defined as socially excluded are very much intertwined with society's 
structures. 
The thesis concludes therefore in chapter 9 that, given the problems and possibilities of 
resistance and compliance within the NGO sector, social exclusion and the NGO strategy 
of inclusion must be problematised and interrogated to a greater extent, both as concepts 
and as generic tools for policy making in order that we do not lose sight of the causes of 
social inequality and, most importantly, the question of responsibility. In particular, the 
resemblance of social exclusion theory to those of marginality, the underclass and culture 
of poverty poses a real possibility that assumptions of backwardness, deviancy and 
welfare dependency still inform mainstream policy debates today regarding groups 
defined as'socially excluded'. 
1.4 Methodology 
This section evaluates existing research methods and thereby sets into context the 
approach chosen for this study. This takes the form of a discussion on general issues to 
do with statistics including the use of a case study and the strategy of triangulation. 
More specifically it addresses the problems and benefits of firstly the interview method 
and secondly the participant observation method, both in theory and in practice. 
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Gypsies in Eastern Europe, and in particular, Bulgaria are taken as the 'excluded' group 
in this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, they represent a topical example of a group 
generally perceived by the public and Western commentators as an excluded and 
stigmatised group, who, above all, partly exclude themselves. Secondly, Gypsies 
collectively represent the largest and the most stigmatised ethnic group in Europe, mostly 
concentrated in the countries that lie in Eastern Europe. Thirdly, as a relatively 
understudied country within Eastern Europe, and given the fact that it has the largest 
proportion of Gypsies living within its borders, Bulgaria presented itself as an important 
and valid country for such a focused study. This choice was enhanced further by 
opportunities for extensive access brought about by links forged between my host 
university and the University of Rousse, Bulgaria. 
In contrast to the traditional anthropological approach, I take a top-down approach 
towards Gypsies in Bulgaria. In a similar vein to Nader, who in 'reinventing 
anthropology' posed the question, "What if [.. ] anthropologists were to study the 
colonizers, rather than the colonized, the culture of power rather than the culture of the 
powerless, the culture of affluence rather than the culture of Poverty? ", I focus on the 
affluent field of 'positive' activity, , i. e. the NGO sector, in order to address the question 
of both social exclusion and social inclusion. " The participation of Gypsies within the 
NGO sector represents for many human right activists a pro-active response on the part 
of the Gypsies themselves. In particular, it is heralded as a key weapon in the fight to 
break the vicious 'cycle of deprivation. '18 However, my research into Gypsies and NGOs 
in Bulgaria revealed a number of interesting problems, not only about the role of the 
17 L. Nader "Up the Anthropologist - Perspectives Gained from Studying Up. " In D. Hymes (ed. ) Reinventing 
Anthropology, Random I louse, New York, 1969. p. 298. 
18 The'cycle of deprivation' was a concept that first gained currency in Britain and the USA during the 1980s and was 
a term used by a number of scholars to describe and account for the apparent transmitting of dependency from one 
generation to the next. See for example Charles Murray, Losing Ground, Basic Books, New York, 1984; Susanne 
MacGregor, The Politics of Poverty, Longman, London, 1981 and Michael Rutter and Nicola Madge, Cycles of 
Disadvantage, I Ieinemann, London, 1976. 
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sector itself as an effective tool for the integration of Gypsies, but also its role within 
wider strategies of inclusion. 
My research involved a number of stages and took on a number of forms, namely, the 
use of case study, formal and informal interviewing, and participant observation. As well 
as the importance of face-to-face contact, this approach also proved vital for the 
collection of normally inaccessible documentation (such as NGO pamphlets, reports, 
project proposals, self-evaluation records, and other published materials, for example 
regional statistics). More specifically, I was able to triangulate my research strategy. " By 
making use of interviews, participant observation, available literature and discussions 
with other interested parties I was able to cross-check any data gathered in the interview 
and so explore multiple aspects of a single empirical entity. "' As raised by Miller, this 
strategy of triangulation assumes that there is an objective reality, a reality that is better 
revealed when subject to closer scrutiny. " At a more general level, my interview data 
and observations form the qualitative part of a wider empirical analysis of the NGO 
sector and Gypsies during the transition. 
In terms of the sequence these methods took, I first carried out a broad survey of social 
inequality across Eastern Europe. As preparation for my fieldwork, I also undertook 
lessons in Russian and Bulgarian language and began to familiarise myself with 'post- 
Communist' societies, which involved a working trip to Russia. Trips to Bulgaria were 
then planned. Before coming to Bulgaria I was able to acquire lists of NGOs working 
19 Triangulation refers to the process of multiple mapping, whereby a particular observation or finding is subject to 
scrutiny from more than one source. It was first formalised as a research strategy by N. K. Denzin, Sociological 
Methods: A Sourcebook, McGraw-I lill, New York, 1978. 
20 In the course of this thesis I take care to distinguish between the information that I was able to cross-check and that 
which I was not. 
21 Gale Miller "Building Bridges The Possibility of Analytic Dialogue Between Ethnography, Conversation Analysis 
and Foucault. " In David Silverman (ed. ), Qualitative Research Theory, Method and Practice, Sage Publications, 
London, 1998. p. 25. 
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with Gypsies from various sources such as the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti issues 
(CPRSI) at the OSCE, the Gypsy Research Centre in Paris, and existing contacts in 
Bulgaria. These, together with contacts I collected during the course of my fieldwork, 
provided me with a good cross section sample of 'successful' Gypsy-related NGOs in 
Bulgaria. 
The second stage consisted of two short trips to Bulgaria, the first for a period of 3 weeks 
and the second for I week. During these early stages I made various contacts with 
Gypsies and non-Gypsies working within the NGO sector, including Marushiakova and 
Popov from whom I obtained valuable advice. " This was an essential stage in my 
research for it allowed me to seek out key NGOs and to assess what kind of approach 
was appropriate in terms of the type of questions, their sequencing and how tight or loose 
they would be. " 
My subsequent fieldwork over a period of 3 months represented the final stage in my 
research. Building on existing contacts and knowledge I carried out formal interviews, 
conversation as interviews and periods of participant observation in the following 
locations: Sofia, Plovdiv, Sliven and Rousse (see Figure 1.1). 1 undertook my research in 
a number of different settings, such as NGO seminars, an international conference, and 
meetings with various professionals whose work involved contact with Gypsies. "' The 
bulk of my time, however, was spent with interviewing members of Gypsy and Gadjo- 
led foundations who were operating within the NGO sector. " 
22 They have researched and written extensively oil Gypsies in Bulgaria (see bibliography). 
23 Briggs, in his discussion of the interview as a methodology, stresses the importance for an introductory period of 
'passive research', which allows the researcher to explore and prepare for more in-depth fieldwork. C. L. Briggs, 
Learning How to Ask, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. 
24 Such as a director of a'spccial school', a prison officer, a police officer, and a representative of the social services. 
25 See Appendix 2 for full listing of interviews. 'Gadjo' is a generic term used by Gypsies to refer to all those who are 
non-Gypsies. The term 'Gadjo' takes on a variety of forms, such as 'Gajo', 'Gaje' or 'Gorgio' depending on regional 
context and dialect. Its specific meaning also changes from one context to another. For example, it can mean 
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1.5 Methodology and statistics 
Any discussion on methodology needs to include an awareness of the wider debates that 
permeate our understanding and use of statistics. Quantitative methods, based on large 
scale standardised surveys and questionnaires, tend to be held up as 'scientific' and 
therefore regarded as reliable and valid. However, official statistics based on quantitative 
methods are not immune from accusations of unreliability. First, the way in which data is 
gathered is seen as not always entirely representative. Second, quantitative data 
collection relies on artificial settings (on what people say, rather than what people do) 
and therefore it reduces meaning to only that which is observable. " Third, quantitative 
methods are particularly prone to political manipulation given their 'scientific' basis. 
In contrast, qualitative data is held up by many as a more reliable alternative to 
quantitative methods. It is perceived as providing the necessary contextual information 
that often remains undetected in quantitative research. Second, it provides more insight 
into human behaviour. Third, it allows for an insider's view on the individuals, groups or 
societies in question, and finally, it enables more of an input into the hypothesis, thus 
being less abstract. " However, qualitative methods are equally open to attack. The most 
common complaint made about qualitative methods is that they are too specific. The fact 
that they are carried out in a particular place, at a particular time, and under particular 
circumstances can render the study atypical and thus make generalisations only tentative. 
While the schism between quantitative and qualitative data is a familiar one, in the 
context of Eastern Europe the question of reliability and validity goes much deeper. 
Statisticians in Eastern Europe trying to track the 'transition' are confronted with a 
26 Paul Atkinson and Martyn Harnmersly, "Ethnography and Participant Observation. " In Norman K. Denzin and Y. 
S. Lincoln (eds. ), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, London, 1994. 
27 Egon G. Guba and Yvonne S. Lincoln, "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. " In Denzin and Lincoln 
(eds. ), ibid. p. 106. 
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number of obstacles. While facing the obviously difficult task of measuring a society in 
flux, they are also having to undergo a conceptual shift in line with the West in terms of 
their methods of gathering and collating statistics. Their task of providing valid and 
reliable statistics is made all the more difficult by a sharp decline in money and resources 
available to them. Their position is undermined further by a general suspicion of official 
statistics on the part of the population as a whole in both Eastern and Western Europe. 
In terms of Gypsies, the problem of accurate measurement is even more problematic. 
The inconsistencies in claims over the numbers of Gypsies illustrates this well. 
According to the Gypsy Research Centre in Paris, Gypsies in Bulgaria number between 
700,000 and 800,000 people. This contrasts with the more modest estimation of about 
500,000, which is generally taken as a more realistic figure and was agreed upon at the 
seminar "Aspects of the Ethnocultural Situation in Bulgaria" (November 8-10 1991, 
Sofia). ̀ The results of the 1992 census, however, appeared for many to put both these 
claims to rest with its low figure of 313,326 (3.69 per cent of the total populations as 
compared with 9.43 per cent for the Turks). However, for others this represented more a 
flaw in census data collection, especially regarding Gypsies, rather than a reflection of 
faults in other estimates. The inconsistencies that plague attempts at measuring the 
population size of Gypsies lie with a number of problems, the most important being that 
of the self-identification of Gypsies. In a hostile environment many are reluctant to 
reveal themselves officially as Gypsies instead declaring themselves as either Turkish or 
Bulgarian. In this way, they remain under-represented in census reports, yet at the same 
time run the risk of being over-emphasised in non-official estimates. 29 
28 D. Vasileva, "Conference Report", International Migration Review, 26 (4), 1992. pp. 1457-1561. 
29 See for example, Colin Clark, "Counting Backwards: The RomaNumbers Game' in Central and Eastern Europe". 
Radical Statistics, 69, Autumn, 1998. 
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In light of the current situation in Eastern Europe where there has been a transformation 
in both the political system and in the system of measurement, the drawbacks of 
unreliable quantitative data suitable for cross-country comparison is of particular 
significance. Institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations (UN), continue 
to produce comparative studies on the economic situation across Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union despite the obvious difficulties with inconsistent statistical 
methods. Rather than drawing attention to the most deprived aspects of the transition, 
these large scale reports therefore serve only to skim the surface. " Other institutions, 
such as UNICEF, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Luxembourg 
Income Study Project, however, appear to be more rigorous and critical in their mapping 
of the transition. 
It would therefore be self-defeating to discard existing quantitative data altogether. 
Indeed, many ethnographers and researchers in general reject the positivist stance that 
quantitative statistics are the only legitimate methods, rather than the principle of 
quantitative methodology per se. " In a similar vein, this thesis, in recognising the 
distinct lack of reliable empirical data, the complexity of Gypsy problems and their 
responses coupled with the unstable nature of the NGO sector, carefully draws on 
available data, but attempts to reach a middle ground by combining it with a thorough 
qualitative study carried out at the ground level. 
Nevertheless these complexities coupled with the closeness of the Gypsy communities, 
presented a series of methodological problems. Yet, these problems themselves also 
served to shed light on a series of interesting questions such as: authenticity (gaining 
30 For example, in the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) National Human Development Report for 
Bulgaria, less than a third of the report is dedicated to issues surrounding 'The Society in Transition'. Within this only 
4 pages contain discussion on the NGO sector, and less still, only one paragraph is left for 'the Roma, UNDP, The 
State of Transition and Transition ofthe State, UNDP, Sofia, 1998. 
31 Atkinson and Hammersly, op. cit. p. 251. 
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access to the 'real' or 'hidden' transcript); cultural practices (, i. e. the use of the 
interview); and the reliability and validity of statistics, whether they be qualitative or 
quantitative. These theoretical and practical complexities reinforced the need to 'study 
up' as well as to 'study down'. " In other words, I needed to examine the interaction of 
both the formal and informal worlds of the NGO sector, and relate my own qualitative 
findings to existing quantitative data. Ultimately, therefore, this study attempts to fill in 
gaps left by inadequate official and non-official data, especially in terms of Gypsies and 
their involvement with the NGO sector. 
1.6 The interview method in theory 
As with the general debates on methodology, views on interviewing tend to stretch to 
two extremes. The objectivist (or positivist) school of thought takes the position that the 
ultimate goal of interviewing is to grasp the truth. The objectivist ideal, therefore, is the 
'pure' interview, which would provide a'mirror reflection' of reality. The other extreme 
view is the 'relativist' view most recently taken up by the social constructionists (or post- 
modernists), who argue that there is no objective truth'out there', rendering the interview 
meaningless. To the social constructionist, the interview is nothing more than, "an 
interaction between the interviewer and interview subject in which both participants 
create and construct narrative versions of the social world. " " Silverstein (1981), for 
example, argues that an over reliance on interviews frustrates theoretical progress. He 
goes on to argue that as a research tool, the interview suppresses precisely the type of 
data needed, and serves only to mislead the researcher into thinking that responses can be 
analysed simply in terms of a referential examination of surface forms. ' 
32 1 felen B. Schwartsman, Ethnography in Organisations, Qualitative Research Methods Series 27, Sage University 
Paper, Sage Publications, London, 1993. p. 45. 
33 Jody Miller and Barry Glassner, "The 'Inside' and the 'Outside': Finding Realities in Interviews. " In Silverman, op. 
cit. P. 99. 
34 Cited in Briggs, op. cit. p. 118. 
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Briggs attempts to bridge these two extremes by viewing the interview as a political and 
'native metacommunicative event', yet without making it redundant. " He makes the 
subtle distinction between the interview as a neutral research tool and the interview as a 
specific cultural and ideological practice. "Basically, interviews are concerned with 
finding answers to 'our' questions, not 'theirs'. " " By building on the anthropological 
discourse of the 1960s and 1970s, that demanded greater reflexivity within the research 
situation, Briggs calls for a process of reflection in the task of interpreting the data. " 
Indeed, it has become increasingly plausible for many researchers that findings are 
'created' through the interaction of inquirer and phenomenon rather than discovered 
through objective observation, "as they really are, and as they really work. " " Taking this 
as his starting point he embarks on a fruitful discussion revealing the full potential that 
can be gleaned from an interview, if, and only if, one fully considers its cultural 
implications. 
Briggs problematises the interview as a cultural practice for a variety of reasons. Firstly, 
when interviewing people from different cultural backgrounds, the interviewer often 
makes errors when s/he fails to be in tune with how the cultural group in question 
communicate among themselves. Secondly, the interviewer must recognise that the 
interview restricts normal social interaction, and as a result s/he must ask who is allowed 
or prevented from participating in the interview process. " Thirdly, messages other than 
the spoken word need to be understood and interpreted, such as gestures, intonation and 
expression, coupled with 'non-ordinary' speech, such as jokes and proverbs. Finally, and 
35 Ibid. p. 47. 
36 Ibid. P. 124. 
37 Ibid. P. I 19. 
38 Guba and Lincoln, op. cit. p. 107. 
39 For example due to factors, such as availability, linguistic compctencc, status within the workplace, and so forth. 
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tied in with all of these points, is the significance of the way in which the interviewer 
poses or frames the question. 
The importance of Brigg's discussion of the interview, as a cultural as well as research 
process, must not be underestimated. In re-evaluating its cultural assumptions, yet still 
valuing its role as a research tool, he encourages the interviewer to be more aware of his 
or her own role within the research process. This self-conscious referential element to the 
process of interviewing, and indeed other qualitative methods, is a theme that runs 
throughout this study. 
1.7 Interviewing in practice 
The distinction between standardised interviewing and open-ended (or conversation 
based) interviews is an illustration of how the wider debates penetrate practice at the 
ground level. These two types of interviewing are set up in opposition to each other. 
Standardised interviews tend to lean towards the quantitative ideal of reflecting an 
objective reality in that, by definition, they cover a larger number of interviewees and 
therefore increase reliability and thus validity. In contrast, the flexible approach of open- 
ended interviews rely more on a small scale project, associated with the qualitative 
approach. The emphasis here is on depth rather than breadth, making the possibility of 
generalisation more problematic, yet at the same time, making it more likely that pre- 
judgements will be avoided. 
The type of interviews I carried out recognised the problems with and importance of both 
these types of interview methods. In total I interviewed members of 25 NGOs (some 
more in-depth than others). I used a loose but structured interview approach, which had 
two purposes. The first was to gain first hand information about the nature of the NGO 
sector and the involvement of different groups in it. A set of questions, which I asked 
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every interviewee working within the NGO sector (, i. e. factual details about the NGO 
and its projects) formed the standardised part of the interview. My second purpose, was 
to gain insights into how this information was expressed and how the issues they raised 
were defined. Following on from the 'factual' basis there was a freer discussion on issues 
and ideas. As a result, I have been able to put together a typology of NGOs working 
with Gypsies, as well as having some insight into their motives, hopes and fears. 
My preliminary interviews with Gypsy and Gadjo NGO leaders in Bulgaria were carried 
out in March 1997. This coincided with the intervening period between the student led 
protests that had just recently taken place across Bulgaria and the oncoming elections in 
April of that year that had been conceded by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Using 
a model adapted from Schwartzman and based on my preliminary interviews I was able 
to identify more clearly the potentially most useful areas of research that could be 
focused on for my third extended visit. 
Figure 1.2 draws attention to a number of interesting focus areas. For example, the high 
level of interaction within the workplace indicated to me the need to secure some kind of 
'work placement' to allow for participant observation as well as for interviews. Also, 
there appeared to be regular contact between NGO workers and the local Gypsies rather 
than through the NGO leaders, which highlighted the need to form close links with the 
workers as well as with the more obvious leader figures. 
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Figntre 1.2 The Communication Contexts Grid: Relations between different actors 
workina with GvDsies within the NGO sector in Bulp-aria. 40 
Local NGO Project NGO leaders Partner NGOs Donor agencies 
Gypsies Workers 
Local 
Gypsies I. Tight knit, I. Interaction via 1. When locals come Not applicable I. Through arranged 
kinship / projects, and voluntar) into office visits and 'tours'. 
community participation of locals 
level 2. Office, street 2. In the office 2. Street or seminars 
2. Home, work, 
street level 
3. All the time 3. Often 3. Not as often 3. Seldom 
INGO I. Close knit 1. Close but tense I. Formal and LScepticism and 
Project interaction at work 2. Office, social informal dependency 
Workers 2. Office, social events 2. Seminars, 2. Seminars and 
events workshops workshops 
3. Everyday 3. Everyday 3. Often 3. Not very often 
INGO 
leaders 1. Mixture of I. Collaboration I. Close ties, 
rivalryand and support, dependency 
companionship2. hierarchical2. 
Conferences and Each 2. Formal meetings, 
seminars3. Regularly others'offices, tel. /fax 
tel. /fax3. 3. Not very often 
Regularly 
I 
KEY: 1. How 2. Where/in what situation 3. Frequency 
The visible links that existed between partner NGOs was also an important factor to 
consider, in that contact with one NGO leader could on the one hand open up a vast 
network of other NGOs, yet on the other hand close off a whole section of 'rival' NGOs. 
Finally, the distance that clearly existed between the donors and the NGOs and in turn 
the Gypsy communities implied that this was an area of particular interest. If only at a 
practical level, this observation served to emphasise the need to seek a variety of ways of 
gaining information about the role of the donor other than just through the respective 
NGO. 
40 Based on a model by Schwartzman, who devised it to identify useful areas of research in human service programs. 
II. B. Schwartzman "The Ethnographic Evaluation of Iluman Service Programs", Anthropological Quarterly, 56, 
1983. p. 183 Fig. 1. 
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Since my first visit in March, the April 1997 elections had secured a change in 
Government and a period of brief optimism had ensued. However, by the autumn, with 
the prospect of a harsh winter and an escalating economic crisis, only partially bridled by 
the fixing of the Bulgarian Leva to the German Mark, disillusionment was gradually 
seeping in. This bleak setting did not hamper the rapidly growing NGO sector, however, 
and gaining access to it in terms of arranging interviews with leaders and workers was 
not as difficult as I had anticipated. Firstly, the NGO sector was already established and 
quite visible. Secondly, the NGOs were generally willing to talk with me. Reasons for 
this include the fact that I was from the West which meant I represented a potentially 
useful contact, for example, in seeking out future sources of funding. "' Thirdly, I was a 
young woman and so did not represent an obvious threat or rival. Finally and tied in with 
the latter point, was their need as NGOs to promote a (positive) public profile to 
interested parties , i. e. displaying a willingness to co-operate and communicate. 
"' 
The interview would take place according to the arrangements made by the interviewee: I 
would let them decide a time and place most convenient for them. " This most commonly 
involved going to their place of work; if not, we would meet in public places, such as 
cafes. I would begin by introducing myself and explaining my purpose. I would then 
pose a series of descriptive questions about the NGO, for example, when it was set up, its 
main aims, current projects, personnel involved and other NGOs they were linked with. 
From this a more general discussion would evolve, based on more structural questions, 
that would allow me to adapt my questions accordingly, probing deeper on some points 
41 This was not withstanding that from the outset I was always very clear with them that my purpose was to carry out 
research for my PhD and that I was entirely independent of any funding bodies in the UK or elsewhere. 
42 For one of my interviews with a Gypsy NGO in Sliven, they had invited a local journalist to sit in on the interview. 
By publicising themselves through the media, it was clear that they had also wanted to benefit from this encounter. 
43 Although the sophistication of the content and process of interviewing required the use of an interpreter (except in 
those cases where the interviewee could speak English) I did possess a basic knowledge of Bulgarian which helped 
me in more informal interactions. 
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or leading on to other questions with others. "" The interview would last on average about 
an hour and I would wind up by asking them about their hopes and fears for the future, 
for Gypsies in general and then specifically for their NGO. 
Briggs, in his discussion on the interview as a two way process highlights that the 
researcher must take into account the changing interactional goals of both the interviewer 
and interviewee during the course of the interview. " Indeed, my motivation for the 
interview did not necessarily correspond with that of the interviewee, thus reducing the 
potential for 'explicit transmission of data'. My intention was to find out how the NGO 
worked and what their perception was of its value and role within the NGO sector and, 
further still, its impact on Gypsies in general. In contrast, the motivation of the NGO 
leader was not necessarily concerned with transmitting this information. In some cases 
their intention was to present themselves, above all, in a positive light, i. e. to impress me 
and nurture some kind of profitable link. In other cases, the motivation for the 
interviewee was to have the opportunity to discharge their frustration about the everyday 
struggles and obstacles they face as an individual and as part of the NGO. 
The extent to which personal biography and experience influences the research role and 
progress is another point to consider, as briefly discussed earlier. " I was a young white 
woman, from 'the West' and, perhaps most significantly, not a Gypsy. All of these factors 
taken together presented someone who was at once vulnerable, given my youth, yet 
privileged given my background. These factors had ambiguous repercussions. My age in 
44 Spradley outlines three types of ethnographic questions: descriptive, structural and contrast. lie breaks each of 
these down further. The different kinds of structural questions were of particular relevance, which included, the 
verification question, used to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis; the over term question, which would be a specific 
question about an issue already raised; and the included term question, which uses an expression of the interviewee to 
ask a question. James P.. Spradley, The Ethnographic Interview, I lolt, Reinhart and Winston, New York, 1979. p. 60. 
45 Briggs, op. cit. 
46 Robert G. Burgess, In the Field -An Introduction to Field Research, Contemporary Social Research 8, London, 
New York, 4th edition, 1990. p. 88. 
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most cases worked in my favour, where people I came into contact with were inclined to 
'take me under their wing'. Yet, on a few occasions, my age and, thus apparent lack of 
experience, nurtured a degree of scepticism. Coming from the West was also a factor that 
influenced how I was perceived. With most of my interviews, I was confronted with 
requests forhelp', mainly in the form of helping them forge links with Western donors. 
Ultimately, however, it was my identity as a Gadjo that caused me the greatest concern. 
However, contrary to popular belief, antagonism towards Gadjos on the part of Gypsies 
did not, in most cases, materialise. This is perhaps largely due to the fact that most of the 
Gypsies I came into contact with had plentiful experience of relations with 'Westerners' 
and were in ready contact with Gadjos on a daily basis. 
In the light of this, the need to consider the interaction of the two different motives, . i. e. 
that of the interviewer and of the interviewee, was essential. Furthermore, it was 
necessary to consider the context in which this interaction was taking place, in terms of 
how external factors influenced my interpretation of events and, in turn, how it affected 
the nature of their response. For example, the bulk of my interviews took place in the 
months immediately leading up to winter. This meant that for the majority of NGOs their 
concern was primarily with the immediate practical survival for Gypsies, which tended 
to take precedence over more long term projects. Also, for many NGOs, funded projects 
were coming to an end, or had just recently been completed. This would result in an 
emphasis placed during the interview on issues surrounding funding and the problems 
associated with it. 
Briggs also draws attention to the location of the interview as a factor to consider. " In 
most cases they took place in the NGO office, at the request of the interviewee. We 
47 Briggs, op. cit. 
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would normally be in a private place, whether it be a side or back room. This may have 
hindered the interviewee to some extent, in that it would have been more difficult to 
reflect clearly on the workings of the office when sitting within its walls. Nevertheless, 
these NGOs were generally user-friendly and visitors were a common occurrence. 
Therefore, if there were any obstacles to a thorough interview it was more to do with 
being distracted, rather than feeling uncomfortable or unable to talk. 
The flexibility of the interview and my awareness of the shifting motivations on the part 
of myself and the interviewee allowed for an analysis of the interview at two levels: what 
they were saying and the significance of how they said it. In particular, by drawing on 
the exceptions, , i. e. when the interviewee departed from communicative norms of the 
conversation as a whole, it was possible to analyse the form as a means of exploring the 
content. For example, with some NGOs and significantly those run entirely by non- 
Gypsies, the interview became nothing more than a quasi-lecture on their part, where 
project 'successes' were reeled off as set out on their pamphlet almost word for word. 
This confident monologue pointed towards the distinct possibility that such NGOs were 
not quite so responsive to 'bottom-up' agencies as they liked to claim. However, it also 
indicated a typical behaviour pattern explicit in all NGOs regardless of whether they 
were Gypsy or Gadjo led. The grant application procedures that underpinned the survival 
of most foundations appeared to have engendered a pattern of focusing on 'successes' 
rather than acknowledging problems. 
1.8 Participant observation in theory 
Participant observation in a number of settings, and in particular with a Gypsy-led 
foundation formed a key part of my fieldwork. This type of research is generally taken to 
mean the engagement of a researcher in a particular social context. Their role is to 
experience, understand and then to explain it for a 'scientific' purpose. The Chicago 
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School of Social Research and in particular, Robert Park, first introduced to students the 
possibility of participant observation as a research methodology. By emphasising an 
inductive approach to research, whereby no firm assumptions existed prior to the 
fieldwork, it served to challenge a fundamental premise to the positivist scientific ideal, 
that is, the testing of a hypothesis. " Becker's definition of participant observation 
provided the basic understanding to which most researchers subscribed when working 'in 
the field': 
The participant observer gathers data by participating in the daily life of the group in 
question or organisation he [sic] studies. He watches the people he is studying to see what 
situations they ordinarily meet and how they behave in them. He enters into conversation 
with some or all of the participants in these situations and discovers their interpretations of 
the events he has observed. 49 
Its definition has since expanded in a number of directions. First, participant observation 
has become a catch-all term used to explain a combination of methods and techniques, 
namely: social interaction; direct observation; formal and informal interviewing; 
systematic counting; and the collection of documents or artefacts. " Second, researchers 
have developed a more profound understanding of the retrospective nature of participant 
observation in terms of the need to explicitly take into account the role of the 
researcher. 5' Burgess argues a point that is now regarded as essential to the effective 
carrying out of participant participation, that is, the recognition on the part of the 
researcher that s/he is part of the context that is being observed and, therefore, inevitably 
impacts upon the data. 5' As with the interview, it is the interaction between the 
48 Tim May, Social Research Issues, Methods and Process, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993. pp. 111-112. 
49 11. S. Becker, "Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation", American Sociological Review, 23 (6), 
1958. p. 652. 
50 George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (eds. ), Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader, Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, London, 1969. p. 1. 
51 Morris S. Schwartz and Charlotte Green Schwartz, "Problems in Participant Observation. " In McCall and 
Simmons, ibid. 
52 Burgess, op. cit. p. 80. 
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researcher and the participants that yields the data rather than a simple transmission of 
data. 
Due to this responsive element, proponents of participant observation view it as the least 
likely out of all the qualitative methods, of being biased, unreliable or invalid. Another 
fundamental benefit of this type of methodology is that the researcher can study social 
processes as well as static situations. " Unlike survey methods, or even the interview, 
participant observation can go beyond snap-shot images, and allow for the exploration of 
a group or an organisation over a period of time. This general level of understanding of 
participant observation has been broken down further into a spectrum of degrees. 
Schwartz and Schwartz present a continuum of participation from passive to active. ' 
Equally influential has been the typology proposed by Gold, who outlines four "ideal 
typical field roles": the complete participant; the participant-as-observer; the observer-as- 
participant; the complete observer. " These 'field roles' are not taken as fixed, but as 
constantly shifting in the course of the research process. For most researchers, myself 
included, the two most common field roles adopted are those of the participant-as- 
observer and the observer-as-participant. This allows for the effective blending of an 
insider's view, with that of an outsider. 
Critiques of participant observation as a research method have developed that mainly see 
it as a romantic attempt 'to get close', which, it is argued, gives rise to whole series of 
ethical problems. This positivist critique rests on the idea that for any data to be valid, or 
scientific, it must remain untainted. The impact of the participant-observer on the 
subjects in question, therefore, is considered as detrimental to the transmission of 'pure' 
53 McCall and Simmons, op. cit. p. 2. 54 Schwartz and Schwartz, op. cit. p. 94. 
56 Raymond L. Gold, "Roles in Sociological Field Observation", Social Forces, 36 (3), 1958. 
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data. " Stemming from this argument is the other popular critique which accuses the 
researcher opening themselves to the risk of 'going native', thereby sacrificing the 
required objectivity that is central to unbiased data collection and interpretation. 
Questions fundamental to qualitative methods in general are just as resonant here as with 
the ethnographic interview, 
[participant oberservation] cannot he used to study past events; its ability to discriminate 
among rival hypotheses is weak by comparison with the experiment; and, in contrast, to the 
social survey, it is poor at dealing with large scale cases such as big organisalions or 
national societies. 57 
However, the increasing emphasis laid on the continual process of reflection and 
alteration in the research process serves to defend the role of the participant observer to a 
large extent. The researcher considers, reflects, develops and modifies impressions and 
theories from an informed position. " This is further backed up by Gold's continuum of 
field roles that show the relative stages at which the researcher can become involved or 
remain detached depending on the context. Therefore, rather than as a reason for 
dismissing such methods altogether, the benefits and criticisms of participant observation 
should be taken together in order to encourage the use of multiple methods that consider 
both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. 
1.9 Participant observation in practice 
A case study formed an important part of the analysis and was seen as a necessary 
methodological device given that existing studies of Gypsies in the NGO sector have so 
far been fairly limited. A focused case study allowed for a closer examination of the 
many variables at work within this setting and the connections between them. It also 
offered a coherent framework within which multiple research methods could be applied. 
56 May, op. cit. p. 130 
67 M. I lammersley and R. Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice, Tavistock, London, 1983. p. 237. 
58 May, op. cit. pp. 131-32. 
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Participant observation formed the main basis for this case study, which involved 
working with a foundation over a period of two weeks. 
The foundation was situated in the heart of the largest Gypsy mahala in the Bulgarian 
capital, Sofia. Based on advice from Marushiakova and Popov, I took up the opportunity 
for closer involvement with this foundation. It arose from the interview, during which the 
director of the foundation invited me to come to the office 'to work! (without pay) in 
order that I take a closer look. It was clear from the outset that he was keen to have some 
kind of control over my visit. He employed a number of strategies in order to achieve 
this such as: specifying that he would co-ordinate all my future visits to the ghetto; 
assigning me specific tasks; and inviting me to certain social events. During the course of 
these two weeks I was able to observe a number of behaviour pattems on the part of the 
NGO leader and his staff. For example, the strategies to exert control that he employed 
with me were ones he frequently used with his staff. 
Ultimately, the NGO leader was keen for me to see how a NGO 'really worked' and was 
relatively open with me, to the point of asking me for feedback whether it be negative or 
positive. This willingness to be open, in terms of problems as well as successes, laid the 
necessary groundwork for more effective participant observation. This was further 
enhanced by a close relationship I struck up with the main administrator, a trilingual 
Gypsy woman, fluent in Bulgarian, Romany and English. Her insider's knowledge, 
coupled with my own observations and interactions, enabled me, in spite of being an 
obvious outsider, to gain greater insight into the everyday workings of this NGO. In 
terms of this particular relationship, my status as an outsider was advantageous. She was 
able initially to relate to me, as she herself had had to come into the 'ghetto' from outside, 
having been brought up in an integrated estate on the other side of Sofia. Furthermore, 
like me, she had, at first, experienced difficulties with the Romany language. Being an 
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outsider was beneficial on a number of other occasions too. For example, the other 
'outsider', , i. e. the Gadjo employee, also displayed evidence of 
being able to relate to me. 
This enabled me to gain some insight into how she perceived her own role within the 
Gypsy dominated workplace and in particular how she related with the others. 
Unlike the Gadjo employee, however, I did not pose a threat to the others, as such, but 
more represented an object of intrigue. Rather than intruding into their territory, I was 
welcomed as someone who appeared to show an unbiased interest in their work. " 
Although I was there to carry out my research, I was not a representative from within the 
NGO sector. My status as impartial observer from their point of view was made clear 
from the start. My overt observer status shaped my relations with the staff in such a way 
that they took on the role of both respondents and informants. Therefore, while getting 
on with their own work, the staff members would take time, when appropriate, to explain 
to me various operations or activities as they occurred. As the days passed, and as far as 
my language allowed me, I became less of an 'observer' and more submerged into the 
workplace. We ate, joked and worked together. I caught the same buses to and from 
work as the others, worked for the same hours (from 9arn until 6/7pm) and joined in 
whenever possible, such as in the writing of project proposals and sitting in on meetings. 
Throughout the entire length of my research in Bulgaria, my status shifted from 
'participant-as-observer' to 'observer-as-participant' depending on the contexts, whether 
they be formal, such as seminars, or informal, as in social events. For example, a one-off 
seminar organised by three partner NGOs required that I took on the role of observer-as- 
participant, in that I was primarily an observer, who had the occasional opportunity to 
59 Liebow too makes this point in his discussion on being an outsider. In his research with 'Negro street corner men', 
conducted in the 1960s, he noted that being an outsider was at times beneficial. Liebow was not considered a 
competitor, thus facilitating his observational work. Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Street Corner 
Afen, Little Brown, Boston Massachusetts, 1967. 
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participate. I did not share the hotel in which they were all staying and, due to the large 
scale of the event, the variety of attendees and the plenary nature of its presentation, my 
presence had little impact. There were times, however, when I did actively participate, 
such as in the workshops and in the social events, which provided me closer contact with 
some of the participants. 'O 
I also had extended contact with two other NGOs, but, unlike with the Romani Bah 
Foundation, this did not constitute formal participant observation as such. Although I 
undertook interviews and had regular contact with both the Foundation for Regional 
Development and to a lesser extent the United Roma Union, I was never formally invited 
to 'work with' them. Instead, I tended to visit on a more informal basis. I would observe 
in and around the office, attend seminars, occasionally dine with them, or go with them 
on trips, some of which were part of their normal working day, and others which were 
specially organised as 'expeditions' (out to villages or to ghettos). This would involve me 
talking to workers and users of these NGOs on a casual basis (either through an 
interpreter or with someone there who could speak English). 
Common to all my extensive contacts with NGOs was that I tended to work closely with 
just one of the members associated with the foundation in question. This meant that the 
information I was receiving and interpreting was being filtered through one individual's 
perspective. I was seeing how the NGO worked for them, according to their view. 
However, I was also conscious of this and accounted for it. I did not take their 
perspective as wholly representative and attempted to forge links with other staff 
members and to relate their comments to general observations I was making. 
60 This seminar is discussed in detail in section 12 of chapter 6. 
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1.10 Conclusions 
Using a qualitative approach, whether it be through participant observation or 
interviewing, as a way of understanding and interpreting Gypsy responses to the 
transition does not in itself invalidate, nor indeed validate the research findings. One 
must be cautious of unwittingly equating experience (, i. e. being in Bulgaria) with 
authenticity. " At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that collecting 'stories' is 
one of the few resources open to researchers in this area. Miller and Glassner, while 
agreeing with Silverman that interviewers need not resort to 'romanticism', argue that, 
"what matters is to understand how and where the stories are produced, which sort of 
stories they are, and how we can put them to honest and intelligent use in theorising 
about social life. " " In the context of my research, there are many stories to report, but to 
ensure their reliability and validity it is important to untangle both the various obstacles 
and insights that formed the essence of my fieldwork and its interpretation. I 
For interviewing to be reliable, it is generally considered that the same results would 
have to be gained by an independent observer if repeated, and to be valid, the interviewer 
must yield the 'correct answer' or put another way, observe and measure that which was 
intended. " However, the emphasis in qualitative methods on the interviewee using their 
own frame of reference makes the usual criteria of reliability and validity difficult to 
apply. This does not imply that qualitative field studies can legitimately remain immune 
from accusation of unreliability and invalidity, but that different sets of criteria have to 
be adopted. 
61 Silverman in his discussion on qualitative data warns us that we need to be cautious about the'romantic' impulse to 
identify 'experience' with 'authenticity'. David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Afethodsfor Analysing Talk 
Text and Interaction, Sage Publications, London, 1993. 
62 Miller and Glassner, op. cit. p. I 11 
63 Raymond L. Gorden, Interviewing Strategy, Techniques and Tactics, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1969; 
Jerome Kirk and Marc L. Miller, Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research, Qualitative Research Methods 
Series 1, Sage University Paper, Sage Publications, London, 1986. p. 19. 
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It is therefore important that I draw attention to the series of practical and analytical 
problems that I encountered during the course of my fieldwork: First, the distinct lack of 
substantial and reliable empirical data on Gypsies and their activities meant that it was 
difficult to get a broad picture of the situation and to rise above anecdotal evidence (a 
common critique of small scale quantitative research). 
Second, as already addressed, there was the difficulty of the double outsider looking in, , 
i. e. I was non-Gypsy and non-Bulgarian which rendered me in a possibly suspicious 
position. For example, an executive director of one NGO was openly suspicious of me 
and made cryptic comments about the ignorance of outsiders. " In most cases, however, I 
had a warm welcome and in some cases was able to build up trust. The other side of the 
coin of course is that in such a position I was able to be more objective (especially 
important in this highly fraught world of NGO power politics), and in some cases relate 
better with other 'outsiders'. 
Third, there was the language barrier. Relying on an interpreter carried with it specific 
problems of its own. " Receiving information second hand inevitably leads to the risk of 
distortion and bias however competent the interpreter might be. The use of an interpreter 
proved most problematic in those cases where I was interviewing a Gypsy-led NGO with 
an interpreter from outside the Gypsy community. Many of my most fruitful exchanges 
were with Gypsies within the NGO sector who could speak English fluently. 
Fourth, the extent to which I was able to gain access to the real, or authentic, 
mechanisms of these NGOs was not as straightforward as it first appeared. Getting 
beyond the NGO's well-rehearsed song is a major task. Part of this was the difficulty of 
64 Interview :B (1) 17.3.98 
65 1 had a mixture of Gypsy and non-Gypsy interpreters from a variety of backgrounds. 
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talking to spokespeople who had vested interests, creating the need to disentangle 
political rhetoric from valid points. Spradley describes this as 'translation competence', 
which he uses to refer to the ethnographically undesirable tendency of informants to 
provide 'pre-packaged, party line [ ... ] answers' to questions posed 
by the researcher. " 
Rather, than an impenetrable barrier, however, it forces the researcher to rethink 
interview tactics. In my case, this led to freeing up the interview process further and 
complementing it with other sources of information as discussed above. 
Finally, the limited time scale, problems of language and my NGO approach meant I had 
direct access to only one particular strand of Gypsies, , i. e. mainly those who were 
educated. My research did not intend to produce an ethnography of Gypsy NGOs, nor to 
cover the entire spectrum of Gypsy NGOs, but to focus on the most dynamic NGOs 
working in this area. In addressing the question of NGO strategies providing the solution 
to social exclusion it was necessary to examine those NGOs in particular, which were 
generally taken as successful. Rather than adopting a form of "NGO tourism", which 
Stubbs argues does not acknowledge its method of selection and therefore falls risk of 
misrepresentation and bias, I consciously selected key NGOs in order to unravel some of 
the criteria that underpins apparently 'successful' projects of participation and community 
development. " 
Ultimately, the NGO sector provided me with a sound basis for my fieldwork and a vital 
source of insight. It was both extremely topical and it enabled me access to an intriguing 
area of activity during the 'transition', of which Gypsies have been a defining part. By 
using my fieldwork to complement and interrogate, rather than replace existing data, 1 
66 Spradley, op. cit. 67 1'au I Stubbs, Developing an Evaluation Modelfor Grass roots Social Reconstruction and Peace-Building Projects. 
Mimeo, ISPRU, 1996. 
45 
have tried to create a foundation from which to develop an analysis that explores the 
wider nature of social exclusion theory and its use in policy design. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SOCIAL EXCLUSION: THE CONCEPT 
2.1 Introduction 
Social exclusion theory seeks to explain a variety of scenarios in which individuals, or 
entire social groups are defined as being 'excluded' from vital social, economic and 
political processes. The emphasis on relational rather than distributional issues has 
shaped a literature that attempts to describe and account for movements into and out of 
certain key areas of social activity with little discussion on income redistribution. The 
areas which individuals or groups are described as excluded from are almost indefinite, 
such as: goods and services; a livelihood; the labour market; land; security; human 
rights; macro-economic development strategy; social services/welfare; consumer culture; 
political choice; bases for popular action; and an understanding of what is going on. The 
causes of social exclusion are sought through a multiple exploration of both external 
factors and personal attributes. Depending on the research interest, the excluded may be 
identified according t6 their level of political participation and social interaction, the 
degree to which they have been educated, their spatial location, their ethnic origin, or 
their health status. 
This multidimensional approach enables social exclusion theorists to place a vast number 
of diverse groups under one umbrella, from the disabled, and single parents, to the 
homeless, and Gypsies. As a result, social exclusion is valued not only for its ability to 
"offer valuable insights for the analysis of the links between poverty, productive 
employment, and social integration", but also for its scope to explore the relations 
between different social groups. ' In the words of the International Institute for Labour 
Studies and the UNDP, social exclusion is used in order, 
1 Charles Gore et. al. "Markets, Citizenship and Social Exclusion. " In Gerry Rodgers et al. (eds. ) Social Exclusiom 
Rhetoric Reality Responses, International Institute for Labour Studies and UNDP, Geneva, 1995. p. 12. 
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to capture the inter-relationships between the material and non-material aspects of 
deprivation; to provide a better understanding of the way they interact with the 
processes of economic growth; and to relate them to the concepts ofparticipation and 
social solidarity [ ... 
]. 2 
In the light of recent philosophical developments, namely the post-modern rejection of 
objective analysis in favour of the need to recognise a whole series of subjective 'truths', 
the social exclusion approach of drawing together a diverse range of oppressions has 
proved popular for many theorists. ' Reinforced by on-going debates that claim we have 
witnessed the triumph of the liberal order and so reached 'the end of history', and coupled 
with heightened concerns about economic crises, nationalist wars and social instability, 
this has provided the necessary fertile environment for such a broad concept as social 
exclusion to live and grow. " It is argued that while rendering insufficient traditional 
criteria for measurement, these forces can prevent the development of reliable 
alternatives. Nevertheless, strategies of inclusion have emerged as the 'answer' to social 
exclusion and slogans of 'equality through inclusion' are increasingly influential at the 
level of government policy in the West, and in the development of NGO strategies in 
post-1989 Eastern Europe. 5 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion on the concept of poverty and class analysis 
in order to show the context out of which social exclusion has grown. The theoretical 
roots of social exclusion are then explored drawing on debates about marginality, the 
2 Rodgers et al. (eds. ), op. cit. p. vi. 
3 For example, Gerry Rodgers. et al, Overcoming Exclusion: Livelihood and Rights in Economic and Social 
Development, International Labour Organisation, UNDP, Geneva, 1994; G. Rodgers, C. Gore and J. B. Figeiredo 
(eds. ), Social Exclusion: Rhetoric Reality Responses, International Institute for Labour Studies and UNDP, Geneva, 
1995; Natalia Tchernina, Economic Transition and Social Exclusion in Russia, Research Series 108, International 
Institute for Labour Studies and UNDP, Geneva, 1996. 
4 See for example Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, Free Press of Glencoe, Illonois, 1960; and more recently Francis 
Fukuyama, The End offfistory and The Last Man, I lamish Hamilton, London, 1992. 
5 E. g. The Guardian, September 22nd 1998. p. 19. The UK Government, in setting up a Social Exclusion Unit, and in 
launching the Third Way are explicitly using policies of inclusion as their main strategy against inequality. Likewise, 
in the countries of Eastern Europe, increasing support of the NGO sector implies a similar concern with finding ways 
to include 'excluded' groups. 
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underclass and culture of poverty. The current use of social exclusion theory and reasons 
for its apparent superiority over theories of poverty and class are then examined in the 
light of both its benefits and drawbacks. Formal responses to 'social exclusion' are 
addressed next in terms of the various strategies of inclusion that have been adopted by 
governments and policy makers, with special reference to the NGO sector in Eastern 
Europe. Finally, we suggest that one of the key problems with social exclusion theory is 
its failure to explain, or account for the possibility of resistance on the part of those 
groups dismissed as excluded. 
2.2 The concept of poverty and class analysis 
The analysis of poverty took on particular significance towards the end of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century, with the move away from traditional 
views of blaming the poor towards a more systematic approach of its definition and 
measurement. ' Booth and Rowntree in Britain were key thinkers at the turn of the 
century with their 'scientific' investigations into poverty! Booth's study of London 
distinguished between 'poor' and 'very poor' and rested on detailed house-to-house 
investigations. Rowntree, greatly influenced by Booth, took this approach one step 
further. He also investigated primary and secondary poverty, but was more precise in 
terms of pinpointing a minimum income necessary for 'physical efficiency. He 
considered factors of calorie intake, shelter and household sundries for the setting of a 
poverty line. Published in 1901, the results of Rowntree served to confirm Booth's earlier 
claim that poverty afflicted substantial numbers in Britain. Not only did these early 
investigations of poverty serve to offer more realistic accounts of the poor in terms of 
their actual numbers, they also changed the way in which poverty was defined. Most 
6 Robert I lolman, Poverty - Explanations ofSocial Deprivation, Martin Robertson, London, 1978. 
7 Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People, Vol. 1 Williams and Norgate, 1889, and Seebohm Rowntree, 
Poverty: A Study of Town Life, Macmillan, 190 1, cited in Holman, ibid. 
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significantly, Booth and Rowntree triggered a poverty debate that moved the emphasis 
away form personal failure towards a more structural analysis. ' 
However structured the analysis of poverty became, the emphasis on individualism has 
also remained embedded in the discourse of liberal democracy in Europe. Two key 
political trends emerged, however, which challenged this liberal agenda, namely, the 
Marxist tradition and the social democratic tradition. Although they both emphasised the 
importance of class and of wealth redistribution, their ideas of how to tackle inequality 
differed greatly. The Marxist approach to poverty and inequality rests on the belief that 
in order for genuine equality to be achieved the political economy of capitalism must 
first be abolished. The social democratic tradition, on the other hand emphasises the role 
of the state within the capitalist model in providing solutions to poverty. Its goal 
therefore is reform rather than revolution. 
The economic difficulties of capitalism during the inter-war years had major 
repercussions in terms of rising levels of mass poverty and in turn how it was to be 
addressed. For many it served to confirm Marxist predictions about the inherent 
contradictions of capitalism. However, the economic boom in the West in the immediate 
post-war period helped to restore a general faith in capitalism and thus in the social 
democratic tradition of reform. But despite economic growth, mass poverty on a global 
scale remained a feature of the post-war period. Its measurement usually took the form of 
comparative statistical estimates of per-capita income, which were then compared to the 
advanced world. The emergence of this vertical comparison meant that, in the words of 
8 Bound by their time, both Booth and Rowntree believed that many of the poor were individually responsible for 
their poverty. Booth expressed contempt with their vices of drink, laziness and bad company, and Rowntree argued 
that the poor would have had more of an income if they had chosen not to waste it. However, their overriding concern 
was not so much with laying the blame with the poor, but with finding effective ways of measuring poverty. 
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Sachs, "poverty was used to define whole peoples, not according to what they are and 
want to be, but according to what they lack and are expected to become". ' 
This laid the groundwork for a shift in policy approach towards poverty that rested on 
ideas of 'economic development' and reform, rather than on analyses of oppressive 
structures. By the late 1960s, however, it was clear that programmes of 'economic 
development' were not working. Out of this emerged new attempts at measuring poverty 
not so much in terms of per capita income, but in terms of 'quality of life'. "' In the 
subsequent context of gradual economic decline and ever widening social inequality 
within as well as between countries, major explanations of poverty reverted back to 
individual deficiencies and cultural deprivations, coupled with an acknowledgement of 
failings within social services. Ideas of the underclass, marginality and social exclusion 
have all been part of this distinct shift away from structural analyses of class inequality, 
poverty and redistribution. 
2.3 Social exclusion and its theoretical roots 
The concept of social exclusion finds its origins in a number of theoretical traditions and 
consequently has within it a number of discourses. Levitas in her study of the use of the 
concept of social exclusion in British government policy, identifies three separate 
discourses within the overall social exclusion approach: a redistributionist discourse, 
developed in British critical social policy, whose prime concern is with poverty; a moral 
underclass discourse, which centres on the moral and behavioural delinquency of the 
excluded themselves; and a social integrationist discourse whose central focus is on paid 
work. " While intellectually it is possible to distinguish equally between these three 
9 Wolfgang Sachs, "The Discovery of Poverty", New Internationalist, 232, June, 1992. p. 8. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ruth Levitas, The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion andNew Labour, Macmillan, London, 1998. 
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different types of social exclusion discourse, in popular policy terms the moral 
underclass discourse seems to be the most dominant. 
For the purposes of this thesis therefore, I will focus on the evolution of the second 
discourse for the following two reasons. Firstly, the question of Gypsy survival in 
contemporary Bulgaria rests upon structures of oppression that rely on their association 
with ideas of 'backwardness' and 'deviancy'; the very essence of the 'moral underclass 
discourse'. Secondly, this particular strand of social exclusion theory potentially has the 
most questionable political implications, in terms of the possible detrimental effect it can 
have on the oppressed groups in question; yet it is the one that holds most strongly in 
popular discourse. 
The most often cited origin of social exclusion theory in terms of its moral impetus lies 
with French welfare thought during the 1960s and 1970s. " It was in 1974 that the 
specific phraseology of social exclusion was first officially used in France. Lenoir, the 
then State Secretary of Social Action under the Gaullist Chirac government, coined the 
phrase of social exclusion to refer to various categories of people who remained 
unprotected by social insurance. These included 'mentally and physically handicapped, 
suicidal, aged invalids, substance users, delinquents, single parents, marginal, asocial and 
other social misfits. "' The apparently stigmatising element to this definition of the 
socially excluded as 'misfits' did not initially earn it wide appeal, although it did 
influence on-going debates about welfare dependency and the nature of 'new' poverty. 
While the concern of the French government was one informed by a Republican sense of 
social solidarity and citizenship, in the rest of Europe commentators turned their 
12 See for example, Paul Spicker, "Exclusion", Journal of Common Market Studies, 35 (1), March, 1997. 
13 Quoted in Gore, op. cit. p. 1. 
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attention more towards the effects that technological change and economic restructuring 
were having on poverty. More recently, however, with the idea of social exclusion 
entering into mainstream debates we have seen a gradual shift across Europe away from 
an exclusive analysis of poverty to one that also emphasises citizenship and the role of 
personal attributes: 
Lack of finance may cause people to withdraw into their families and into themselves, 
while a criminal record, immigrant status or homelessness may preclude someone from 
work and self-sufficiency, therehy precipitating someform ofpoverly. 14 
The causes of poverty in this case seem to be subtly distanced from a structural analysis 
to one that homes in on local causes and personal factors. Though it would be misleading 
to dismiss entirely the structural element to social exclusion theory at the same time it 
serves to reveal some of the key problems with this type of analysis. There are three 
levels of structural analysis to social exclusion theory. First, social exclusion theory rests 
on the analysis of the relations between the individual or groups and the market. 
Although at first sight promising, this approach seems to be informed more by a political 
concern over the limits of welfare provision than by any concern with tackling the 
structural causes of inequality. 
Second, social exclusion theory rests on the identification of local factors as possible 
causes. This can allow a multi-dimensional approach, but it can also lead to an 
incoherent framework which treats the causes of poverty as a series of otherwise 
disconnected events and symptoms. In order that the causes of inequality be understood, 
i. e. that at the most basic level it is a product of a conflict of interests, critics of social 
exclusion argue that it is necessary to acknowledge as primary the structural obstacles 
14 Robert Walker, "Poverty and Social Exclusion in Europe. " In Alan Walker and Carol Walker (eds. ) Britain Divided 
- The Growth of Social Exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s, CPAG, London, 1997. p. 64. This description of social 
exclusion highlights clearly how the adjusted starting point avoids the fundamental question of why certain groups 
lack finance, commit crime, emigrate, or become homeless in the first place. 
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inherent in a class society that prevent certain groups from competing equally. By failing 
to recognise this, social exclusion theory may therefore run the risk of preventing rather 
than enhancing the development of a coherent framework of analysis. 
Finally, and partly tied in with this lies the most controversial element to social exclusion 
theory; that is, the emphasis for many actors on the 'excluded' individual or group in 
question rather than on the structural obstacles to inequality. Although framed within a 
discourse of 'democracy', 'participation', and/or 'integration', social exclusion theory can 
ultimately help to place the responsibility of poverty back with the individual. Therefore, 
rather than dealing with, for example, the reasons for uneven unemployment, strategies 
are designed to simply encourage the 'socially excluded' to help themselves out of 
poverty. Although this may involve sophisticated and complex procedures that operate at 
a number of levels, the principle remains that it is the 'socially excluded' themselves who 
must ultimately be targeted. These three elements to social exclusion theory, the concern 
with welfare limits, the identification of local factors, the emphasis on the individual, all 
indicate a clear link with earlier theories of the underclass, marginality, and the culture of 
poverty. 
2.4 Marginality and the underclass. 
Though it has been claimed that social exclusion theory offers an alternative to 
discredited theories such as that of 'marginality' and 'the underclass', it is precisely these 
theories that have contributed to the rationale that lies behind its current use. " Spicker, 
for example, sees the popular definition of social exclusion as resting on the idea of there 
being an "absence of social relationships and obligations [implying] that people do not 
15 For example, John Hills, the head of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE in his paper 
"Researching Social Exclusion" at the one-day conference Social Exclusion and the City, convened by Professor Chris 
I larnnctt, Kings College London and the Royal Geographical Society, 29 October 1998. 
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share fully the dominant norms of society. " In much the same way, he notes, that 
44marginal" people are seen as being "alienated from the dominant social context. "" 
Indeed at a rhetorical level, the pairing of exclusion with marginality is explicit. 
Kennett's discussion on exclusion in the 'new Europe' reveals the ease with which 
concepts of marginality and social exclusion are used in conjunction with poverty; "the 
increase in the number of marginal households has been accompanied by a rise in tile 
most extreme and visible form of poverty and exclusion. "" The interchangeable use of 
marginality and exclusion can also be found in official European Community 
documents: 
For some years now we have used the terms 'marginalization' and 'social exclusion' to 
denote the severestforms ofpoverty. Marginalization describes people living on the edge 
of society while the socially excluded have been shut out completely from conventional 
social norms. " 
Government officials in the West have also been known to have used both the 
terminology of underclass and social exclusion within one context. " In Britain for 
example during a speech to the Tory Reform Group on 24 November 1991, Rt. Hon 
Kenneth Clarke QC MP spoke about, "the growth of a so-called underclass", which he 
saw as representing, "the most formidable challenge to a secure and civilised way of 
life". As a result, he argued, "society cannot afford to alienate and exclude significant 
numbers of the poor, the black and the young. tv20 
16 Spicker, op. cit. p. 135. 
17 Patricia Kennett, "Exclusion, Post-Fordism, and the 'New Europe'. " In Phillip Brown and Rosemary Crompton 
(eds. ) A New Europe? - Economic Restructuring and Social Exclusion, UCL Press, London, 1994. p. 26. 
'a Economic and Social Consultative Assembly, Poverty, European Communities Economic and Social Committce, 
Brussels, 1989. Ch. 7. Quoted in Spicker, op. cit. p. 136. 
19 A point made by Mark Kleinman, "New Deals, Old Barriers" The Guardian, 30 September, 1998. 
20 Quoted in Carey Oppenheim, Poverty: The Facts, CPAG, London, 1993. p. 20. 
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At a theoretical level, these concepts all contain, to varying degrees, ideas of isolation, 
backwardness, and a sense of imminent social threat. 'Marginality' was first used as a 
descriptive term applied to the inhabitants of shanty towns in South America in the 
1960s and 1970s. " This theory soon developed and expanded to include aspects other 
than just physical habitation, areas other than South America, and ideas that had roots in 
other discourses. Perlman encapsulates the essence of marginality as one informed by a 
sense of threat and of inevitability: 
The incapacity of the economy to absorb the 'marginals' into the lahourforce accentuated 
the threat of social and political disruption. This contradiction between the dread of 
'growing barbarian masses' in the cities and 1he awareness of its unavoidable existence 
underlies the ideology of marginality. 22 
Underclass theory, rooted in an anxiety over the rapidly expanding urban ghettoised poor 
in 1960s USA, is also concerned with a fear of the masses, not only in terms of their 
threat to the moral and social order, but also in terms of their strain on the welfare state. " 
This view of a dual society as one that threatens the status-quo has informed analysts on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Peterson, writing in the US, for example, argues, "the major 
problem is the way in which a spreading underclass culture is undermining the country's 
productive capacity, family life, social integration, and ultimately, its political 
stability. ""' While in Europe, a similar sentiment is expressed in the Delors White Paper 
on the subject of 'Targeting Specific Groups', which argues that, "the community now 
faces the danger of not only a dual labour market but a dual society. "" Although, 
21 J. E. Perlman, The Myth of Marginality Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro, California University Press, 
California, 1976. p. 92. 
22 ibid. 
23 The strain on welfare is also a major concern for European governments and of social exclusion theorists. A 
conference was held on this subject in 1995 (18-20 October) in Santiago de Compostela, entitled Social Exclusion: A 
Major Challengefor Public Wetfare Services, organised by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions. 
24 P. E. Peterson, "The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox. " In Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson 
(eds. ). The Urban Underclass, Washington Brookings Institute, Washington D. C. 1991. p. 9. 
25 Quoted in Katherine Duffy, Social Exclusion and Human Dignity in Europe: Background Reportfor the Proposed 
Initiative by the Council of Europe, Activity 11 1 b, Steering Committee on Social Policy, CDPS (95)], 1995. p. 36. 
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somewhat diluted in its judgement of the poor, social exclusion theory has within it a 
similar sense of urgency that also permeate fears of a'dual society'. As encapsulated by 
Yepez de Castillo, 
The multiplicity of the forms of exclusion, the ftar it inspires as to possible social 
explosions, the risk of breaking up of social cohesion that it carries, the complexity of the 
social mechanisms at stake make it the great social question of our time. 26 
This perception of threat contrasts with the apparent nullification of the underclass, or 
the marginalised, who, at the same time, are seen as accepting their lot. This raises 
important questions about ideas of poverty and the poor. In particular, the notion that 
marginalised and poverty stricken groups either actively, or with resignation, collude 
with their segregation from basic societal functions provides the basis for the argument 
that there are groups who fall entirely outside of social stratification. Such groups, 
whether they be labelled as socially excluded, marginals or the underclass, are grouped 
together by a series of attributed traits, which, by their nature, diverge from the dominant 
norms. These divergent traits may rest on types of family organisation, community 
values or material aspirations, the point being that they represent a departure from 
important moral norms. " Desel's participation theory, for example, rests on the 
presumption that the marginalisation of certain groups is caused by a lack of internal 
organisation and therefore political participation. This, he argues, pushes the group in 
question entirely off the social scale. Hence, the 'marginals' "populate a piece of land 
which is no-man's land. "" 
26 Duffy, op. cit. p. 33. 
27 Ibid. pp. 3-4. This has similar overtones to the views expressed by Charles Murray, who, in the Sunday Times, 
defined the characteristics of the 'underclass' as follows: high rates of illegitimacy, of crime and of drop-out from the 
labour market. 26 November 1989. See also Ruth Lister (ed. ), Charles Murray and the Underclass: The Developing 
Debate, lEA Health and Welfare Unit, London, 1996. 
28 Quoted by Perlman, op. cit. p. 119. 
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Matthews, too, in his discussion on poverty in the former Soviet Union, draws explicitly 
on this idea of isolation and detachment: "Separated from the whole world, and from one 
another, [ ... ] [the poor] are deprived of the right to education and skills, to enjoy culture, 
move about, [ ... ] to 
labour, enjoy proper food, medical services, housing [ ... ]. "" Since 
the collapse of Communism, concerns with poverty groups have escalated, giving rise to 
debates on poverty culture, such as with Chernina, who discusses poverty in Russia as a 
social phenomenon. Her argument, too, rests on an understanding of poverty as 
something characterised by "solitude, [and] a loss by the individual of social bonds. "" 
Germani has explored the extent to which there is a direct relationship between 
marginality, social stratification and poverty. " In the same manner as Desel, he 
distinguishes between the lower classes and those 'outcasts' who, on the margins of 
society, do not partake in social stratification. Unlike Desel, however, he views 
marginality as a factor inextricably tied to modernisation, in that the social, economic, 
and political forces of modemisation have necessitated the existence of marginal groups, 
i. e. the persistent sectors of the population that are perceived as segregated, excluded and 
marginalised from full participation in society. The incapacity of a system to absorb the 
totality of its population is seen by Germani as a direct result of the particular type of a 
given socio-economic order. " Germani's stance as one concerned more with structural 
causes reflects a shift in analysis whereby marginality is seen as more a result of the 
socio-economic order, rather than a product of the negative qualities innate to 
'marginals'. 
29 Mervyn Matthews, Poverty in the Soviet Union, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1986. p. 188. 
30 N. V. Chernina, "Poverty as a Social Phenomenon in Russian Society", Russian Sociological Review, July/August 
1995. pp. 13-14. 
31 Gino Germani, Marginality, Transaction Books, New Jersey, 1980. 
32 Ibid. P. 12. 
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A number of other philosophers and scholars have touched upon ideas of marginality as 
part of their wider work, in their attempt to account for factors other than class. For 
example in Capital Marx distinguished between the 'relative surplus population' or 'an 
industrial reserve army' which are seen as performing a vital function in capitalist society 
and all those groups defined as marginal who do not meet the basic requirements of a 
class. " In Marxian terms successful capitalist development rested upon the existence of 
4relative surplus army', i. e. 'great masses' of available labour which through its 
expansion or contraction helped regulate the general movement of wages. Marx therefore 
was able to explain unemployment, underemployment and poverty as necessary features 
of capitalism rather than as rooted in individual morality. However, Marx's 
'lumpenproletariat' did not form part of this analysis and contained moralistic overtones 
whereby the "lowest sediment of the relative surplus-population" consisted of 
"vagabonds, criminals and prostitutes"" and were defined as "the dangerous class, the 
social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off the lowest layers of the old society. "" 
Marx was clearly distinguishing between a specific condition of capitalist development, 
to which class oppression is central, and the condition of marginality. 
Subsequent Marxists however have not necessarily agreed with Marx's idea of a 
'lumpenproletariat' and are keen today to stress causal links between extreme examples 
of poverty and wider patterns of class inequality. Indeed, studies have been carried out 
that attempt to illustrate that there is little empirical evidence to support the cultural 
interpretation of an 'underclass' in whatever terms it may be expressed. For example, a 
study carried out in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, in Britain, of attitudes of families who were 
33 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, Penguin Classics, Middlesex, 1990 (original 1887). 
Chapter 25, section 4. 
34 lhid. 
35 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party. " In Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 
Lawrence and Wishart, Moscow and London, 1950. p. 42. 
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long term unemployed and on benefit draws an important distinction between monetary 
income and societal aspirations, 
[they] are in no sense a detached and isolated group cut offftom the rest of society. They 
are just the same people as the rest of our population, with the same culture and 
aspirations but with simply no money to be able to share in the activities andpossessions 
of everyday life with the rest of the population. 36 
Other theorists however have dismissed class altogether. Influenced by Weber's theory of 
life chances, Murphy's analysis on monopolisation, for example, uses the term 'closure' 
to refer to the process of subordination, whereby one group monopolises advantages by 
closing off opportunities to another group of outsiders. " Dickie-Clark argues along 
similar lines, "the dominant group may encourage subordinates to adopt some of their 
attitudes, but, if they want to stay dominant, they can't permit the subordinate strata to 
share in their powers or opportunities. "" In these cases, the oppression of certain groups 
is seen as nothing more than a by-product of power relations. Whatever the context, the 
implication, however, is always the same. In the words of Morris, "the creation of a 
residual category of the underclass [ ... ] is a response which confines attention to a limited 
social grouping, allowing perceptions of the rest of society to remain largely 
undisturbed. " " 
The defining of 'socially excluded' groups as those who stand outside of all previous 
analyses, whether they be class, power, or social stratification, has opened the way for 
theories that can legitimately lay the bulk of responsibility with the oppressed groups 
themselves. Perlman, for example, in her discussion on the myths of marginality has 
36 J. Bradshaw and H. Holmes, Living on the Edge: A Study of the Living Standards of Families on Benefit in Tyne 
and Wear, Tyneside, CPAG, 1989, quoted in Oppenheim, op. cit. p. 24. 
37 Raymond Murphy, Social Closure-The Theory of Monopolisation and Exclusion, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988. 
38 Quoted in Perlman, op. cit. p. 102. 
39 Lydia Morris, Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship, Routledge, London and New York, 
1994. p. 157. 
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identified various schools of thought within the victim-blaming tradition. The 
'Traditional ity/Modernization school', for example, argues that marginality occurs 
because rural migrants lack 'modern' attitudes and behaviour, which rests on the idea of 
backwardness. Likewise the 'Ethnographic school' attributes marginality to the 
persistence of rural customs in an otherwise urban setting, which suggests not only 
backwardness, but also an element of deviancy. " These approaches in their emphasis on 
the customs and qualities of the groups in question reveal an affinity with the debates on 
culture of poverty. 
2.5 The culture of poverty 
As a concept, the culture of poverty was first introduced by Oscar Lewis, in 1959, with 
his book of Mexican case studies. He defined 'culture of poverty' as a cross-cultural 
'regularity' transcending regional, rural-urban and national differences. He argued that 
"a culture of poverty is thus a design for living within the constraints of poverty, passed 
down from generation to generation, thereby achieving stability and persistence. "" In 
this scenario, a culture of poverty arises out of a combination of the following factors: 
high rate of unemployment, low pay and little formal organisation coupled with the 
imposed view that poverty is a result of inferiority and personal inadequacy. It was not 
until 1963, and the publication of The Other America written by Michael Harrington, 
that this concept entered mainstream debate and took on explicit ideological overtones. "' 
He used the culture of poverty thesis as a tool to appeal for social reform, yet at the same 
time his emphasis on poverty culture as a mode of behaviour learned within the 
community had ambiguous implications for shaping a particular view of the poor. 
40 Perlman, op. cit. pp. 106-8. 
41 Cited in Alf Hannerz, Soulside -Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community, Columbia University Press, NY and 
London, 1969. pp. 178-180. 
42 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States, Penguin Books, Middlesex and Baltimore, 
1963. 
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The growing ethnographic interest in urban poverty cultures, gave rise most significantly 
to a cluster of studies on 'ghetto culture'. The 'ghetto' was a term originally used in 
Venice in the early 16th century and then throughout Europe to describe the restricted 
areas to which Jews were formally confined. In the twentieth century it was most 
famously applied to inner cities or slums in the USA, and is still used today to describe 
not only the geographical location of poor segregated quarters, but also to depict the 
nature of the community who live there. " As with culture of poverty theories, the theory 
of ghetto culture has a specific ideological premise: 
By pointing particularly to non-adaptive, not to say immoral behaviour among the poor, 
they have often been able to re e responsibility for life at the bottom of society. If Ifus 
promiscuity, births out of wedlock, alcoholism, conspicuous consumption, and 
unemployment (defined as voluntary) are parts of a cultural heritage, it could beheld that 
the culture ofpoverty causes poverty, rather than the other way round. 44 
Hannerz, in his study of the Winston Street neighbourhood of Washington DC between 
1966-68, tackled the question of how far inhabitants were constrained by the nature of 
the situation they were in, or whether they acted in accordance to their culture and 
circumstances. He emphasised the situational as well as cultural elements to their 
oppression, and also stressed that mainstream values were in fact transmitted in the 
ghetto and that the poor did share mainstream ideals. " Maclead, in his study of young 
people in a low income neighbourhood in the USA in the 1980s, went one step further. 
His work explicitly shifted the emphasis from individual deficits to structural inequality, 
where he took the features associated with so-called poverty culture and placed them into 
the very structures of class society. " 
43 Harrington, op. cit. pp. 11-12. There are clear parallels between the association of ghettos with the black 
underclass in the USA during the 1960s and the current concern over Gypsy ghettos in Eastern Europe. 
44 1 lannerz, op. cit. p. 180. 
45 ibid. 
46 Jay Maclead, Ain't No Alakin'It - Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighbourhood, Westview Press, 
Boulder, Oxford, 1995 (reprint of 1987). See also Paul Willis, Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Gel 
Working Class Jobs, Saxon I louse, Farnborough, 1977. 
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Ultimately, both these studies reveal that the culture of poverty thesis can have racist 
overtones, where cultural deprivation, or absence of mainstream culture was used in 
conjunction with ideas of moral dissolution and a socially undeserving black 
underclass. " The equating of race to poverty culture, or lack of culture, and in turn to 
factors of poverty, such as unemployment, low wages and crowded quarters, served, and 
continues to serve an explicit ideological function. Although not explicit in social 
exclusion theory, the implications of inevitability and backwardness for certain groups 
are also there. In the case of Gypsies in Eastern Europe, similar assumptions are made 
about lack of culture, and moral dissolution. At a societal level at least, Gypsies in 
Eastern Europe are regarded most extremely as parasites, who deserve their fate. 
Although it does not use such extreme language, the liberal response to 'social exclusion' 
and its strategy of inclusion does imply a similar sentiment, that, unless Gypsies 'show 
willing', they will continue to perpetuate their own exclusion. 
Underpinning this approach is an emphasis on individual agency that, although it may 
seem promising, has ambiguous ideological implications. Social exclusion theorists 
argue that the oppressed are agents of social change. However, investing the 'socially 
excluded' with the potential for social change in this sense could also serve to justify the 
argument that ultimately it is their own fault if inclusion strategies fail to work. It 
becomes apparent, therefore, that the ideological content of the idea of 'culture of 
poverty' and 'the underclass' are not so far removed from theories of social exclusion as 
might at first sight appear. For example MacPherson's discussion on 'social exclusion' 
and in particular exclusion from markets in Peru identifies two types of market: those 
from which people are excluded because they do not have sufficient resources (income, 
47 Maclead, op. cit. p. 241. 
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productive capacity), and those from which groups are excluded even though they have 
the appropriate resources. This takes into consideration both the personal attributes of the 
excluded groups and the structures that prevent able and willing groups. However, in his 
discussion on exclusion and civil society, it is the personal attributes of the excluded that 
ultimately take precedence outweighing the structural obstacles to social and political 
change: 
People respond to social exclusion in various ways. These can range ftonz passivity, shame 
and despair on the one hand, through to group action to reverse the process of exclusion, 
or to alter political circumstances [j The most common response is passivity. In many 
cases of the studies socially excluded groups experienced a sense of worthlessness, or 
impotence which makes their social exclusion even more complete. Tj In general the case 
studies report social exclusion as most often associated with resignation and a sense of 
worthlessness, which paralyses action rather than producing resistance. 413 
Despite these controversial beginnings, the concept of social exclusion has evolved out 
of the view that openly stigmatises excluded groups into a conceptual tool that has been 
injected into nearly every sphere of social analysis and across different national contexts. 
In a relatively short period of time, social exclusion theory has become hugely popular 
among Western policy makers and analysts even at the international level to provide a 
framework for describing 'new` patterns of poverty, deprivation, and social 
disadvantage. "' For example, the 1993 Symposium on Poverty, which explicitly 
addressed the question of social exclusion, expressed a concern with low level 
participation and marginalisation, 
The deepening of social inequalities, labour market segmentation, and changes in the 
quantity and quality of jobs are now occurring in all countries - in the developed 
economies as well as in countries undertaking economic reform or undergoing economic 
48 Stewart MacPherson, "Social Exclusion - Review Article", Journal ofSocial Policy, 26 (4), 1997. p. 539. The view 
that responses to social exclusion lie on a continuum, coupled with the possibilities for resistance are discussed in 
relation to Gypsies during the transition in chapter 7. 
49 Natalia Tchernina, Economic Transilion andSocial Exclusion in Russia, Research Series 108, International institute 
for Labour Studies and UNDP, Geneva, 1996. Also, Rodgers et. aL, op. cit. 
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transition. These changes are marked by varying degrees of participation or 
marginalisation of different groups and individuals in civil andpolitical society. 50 
The theory of marginality clearly still has a role to play in policy making on social 
exclusion. This reveals the roots of 'new' approaches to social exclusion and exposes the 
continuation of 'old' concerns. The use of social exclusion serves to keep the focus of 
analysis on the poor, rather than on the structures of social inequality. Indeed, Perlman's 
critique of marginality theory over twenty years ago still holds today, where marginality, 
or as most recently labelled, social exclusion, "based on a set of loosely related rather 
ambiguous hypotheses", acts as a shield to existing ideological debates. "
2.6 The benefits of social exclusion theory 
The theory of social exclusion is presented as offering the necessary next step on from 
poverty analysis and has rapidly taken centre stage in government policy welcomed for 
its flexibility and multidimensional framework. " The adoption of social exclusion theory 
is seen as a timely response to the changing face of Europe, where both the creation of a 
European single market, and the collapse of Eastern Europe has opened up new 
competitive pressures coupled with latent national and minority conflicts. " This is 
illustrated in the massive growth of research projects commissioned by multilateral 
institutions aimed at measuring and analysing the phenomena of social exclusion. 
International institutions, such as the European Social and Economic Research Council, 
the ILO, and the UNDP, coupled with national bodies, such as the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation in the UK, appear to be the key players in the search for 'solutions' to social 
50 Quoted in Rodgers et at, op. cit. Preface. p. v. 
51 Perlman, op. cit. p. 9 1. 
52 Ajit Bhalla and Frederic Lapeyre argue, for example, that the multifaceted nature of social exclusion theory goes 
beyond the restrictive economic bias of poverty based analysis "Social Exclusion: Towards an Analytical and 
Operational Framework" Development and Change, 28,1997. pp. 413-433. 
53 Argued in Brown and Crompton (eds. ), op. cit. pp. 1-5. 
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exclusion, which are shaping new research agendas across Europe. " The suspicion 
exists, however, as Berghman puts it that, social exclusion theory offers a means by 
which EU members can convey a sense of moral concern, yet at the same time avoid the 
problems which the idea of poverty seemed to create. " 
Analyses that rely exclusively on ideas of poverty have been rejected by social exclusion 
theorists on a number of counts. First, it is seen as static and too restrictive in its reliance 
on snap shots of income and household data. Social exclusion theory is seen as adding to 
poverty analysis, in terms of addressing the dynamics, processes and changes of 
deprivation over time. " Second, the fact that poverty is often defined according to a 
'minimum' or 'subsistence' level of living makes it open to political manipulation. 
Depending on where the poverty line is placed, producers of statistics can adjust the 
number of people counted as poor according to different political objectives. Most 
importantly, however, it is the connection of poverty with class analysis, that has posed 
the biggest challenge to its use as a valid conceptual and empirical tool. " 
Although there has been a development of a multidimensional approach within poverty 
and class analyses, " social exclusion theory is still regarded by its proponents as going 
54 For example, a number of studies aimed at reviewing the concept of social exclusion were commissioned by the 
UNDP/IILS project, which, taking on board researchers from all corners of the globe, covered less developed 
countries, and newly industrialising ones as well as economies in transition. Rodgers et. al., op. cit. 
55 J. Berghman, "The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion in Europe: Two Paradoxes for Researchers", 
paper presented at the Seminar on the Measurement andAnalysis ofSocial Exclusion, Bath, 1994, cited by Bhalla and 
Lapeyre, op. cit. p. 417. 
56 This was a point made by John I lills in his paper "Researching Social Exclusion", op. cit. 
57 Pahl, for example, wrote that in modern societies, 'class as a concept is ceasing to do any useful work for 
sociology. ' "is the Emperor Naked? Some Comments on the Adequacy of Sociological Theory in Urban and Regional 
Research", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 13,1989, quoted in John 11. Goldthorpe and 
Gordon Marshell, "The Promising Future of Class Analysis: A Response to Recent Critiques", Sociology, 26 (3), 
1992. p. 381. 
58 See for example, Sen's idea of poverty are based on core factors of production and economic classes, but also deal 
with concepts of entitlement and capabilities. Amartya K. Sen, Food and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and 
Deprivation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, quoted by Bhalla and Lapeyre, op cit. See also, A. K. Sen, Inequality 
Reexamined, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992. In the words of Cohen, "Capability lies, causally, between income or 
primary goods or resources on the one hand and utility or welfare on the other. " G. A. Cohen, "Amartya Sen's 
Unequal World - Review", New Left Review. 203, Janurary/February, 1994. p. 119. Likewise, Townsend's study of 
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beyond such theories in a number of useful ways. First, social exclusion theory is seen to 
address the dynamics of poverty and deprivation over time; second, it deals with the 
question of agency; third, it raises the question of which groups are doing the excluding; 
and finally, it is seen as a means of exploring the exact nature of what it is that certain 
individuals and groups are being excluded from. " The multi-layered phenomenon of 
social exclusion is seen as evidence of the need for a similarly all-pervasive concept. 
Aspects of social exclusion are not only seen as multiple, but as mutually reinforcing: 
anomalous exclusion from the 'mainstream', or the 'majority'. This includes political 
processes, the community, citizenship rights, coupled with the labour market and private 
property; unequal or deprived access to dominant modes of participation, production, 
consumption, and adequate public services; the denial of a self-ascribed identity, 
prohibiting minority groups from the right to articulate a distinct cultural identity and 
remain valued; in-built self-sustaining mechanisms of marginality, or self- 
marginal isation. This identifies status inferiority as undermining self-help. " 
From this, causes of social exclusion have been identified and organised into the 
following inter-connecting categories: situation, socialisation, and structure. Situational 
factors include the contemporary characteristics of a given group in terms of the ways in 
which actual living conditions restrict access to vital resources, such as, time, money, 
and channels of communication. Social exclusion as a product of socialisation identifies 
a variety of different influences ranging from family and friends to wider society. These 
are perceived as shaping a given group's (cultural) identity and behaviour, which inhibits 
poverty analysis at the international level rccognised the way in which economic factors had repercussions for wider 
patterns of inequality. His study rested on ideas of relative deprivation, which he saw as comprising of two parts: 
material deprivation and social deprivation. Peter Townsend, The International Analysis of Poverty, I larvester 
Wheatsheaf, London, 1993. Duncan, et al., in their eight country study of poverty dynamics, were also keen to 
address relative deprivation and to highlight extensive mobility among the poor. Gerg J. Duncan, B. Gustafsson et 
al., "Poverty Dynamics in Eight Countries", Journal of Population Economics, 6,1993. 
59 Rodgers et. al., op. cit., Duffy, op. cit., Brown and Crompton (eds. ), op. cit. 
60 Germani, op. cit. p. 18. 
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or enhances certain characteristics that are either inappropriate or conducive to dominant 
modes of social or political participation. " Finally, structural factors that contribute to 
social exclusion are identified in the political institutions of government and the 
mechanisms of decision making. It is argued that these are configured to deny certain 
groups such as women or minorities the same opportunities and benefits as accorded to 
other groups. 
This multi-layered approach towards social exclusion opens the way for research to be 
carried out in a wide variety of contexts and otherwise disconnected disciplines. For 
example the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly on 28th January 1998 declared 
its support of the Council of Europe's project on Human Dignity and Social Exclusion 
and called for action in a number of policy areas. These included granting equal status to 
social and human rights, anti-poverty measures, literacy campaigns, improved housing 
policies, training programmes and provision of free medical care. " 
2.7 The problems of social exclusion theory 
However, a series of problems emerge with the use of such an approach. Firstly, the 
question that needs to be asked is what can we know about a society as a whole if we 
know that it is one characterised by social exclusion rather than by poverty? Presumably, 
we begin with the assumption that there is something to which people by right belong, 
but from which some are excluded. This feeds into the idea that we live in a European 
social democratic tradition of egalitarian citizenship where, "society is seen as a set of 
61 For example a survey was carried out in September 1984 throughout Kent, UK on all known women and children 
'travellers', which revealed a positive correlation between the poor living conditions (where sites often lacked in basic 
facilities such as electricity and water supplies and rubbish disposal) and a higher than national average perinatal and 
infant mortality rate. Interestingly, their conclusions drew on factors of inadequate immunisation and preventative 
care especially among the more mobile travellers rather than on wider structural factors of inequality. This served 
subtly to place the blame on their particular chosen lifestyles. Jan Pahl and Michael Vaile, "Health and Health Care 
Among Travellers", Journal ofSocial Policy, 17 (2), 1988. 
62 Cathie Burton Call to Combat Social Exclusion, 1998 <http: //www. coe. fr/cp/98/54aper cent2898per cent29. htn1> 
(accessed November 1998) 
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collectives bound together by sets of mutual rights and obligations that are rooted in 
some moral order. "" From this, comes the idea that society is undergoing a 
fragmentation of social cohesion, or of the moral order, which expressed in apparently 
neutral language describes how certain groups are finding themselves distanced from the 
centre of activity and are in situations of dependency. 
The current use of social exclusion theory therefore tends to rest on the articulation of 
groups defined according to their degree of participation in different societal spheres, 
whether it be welfare, employment or education. Once 'excluded groups' have been 
identified, their plight is then described in terms of the denial of basic human rights, or as 
a breach of the social contract between the state and its citizens. ' Despite claims 
otherwise it can therefore be seen to signal a subtle re-focus away from structural causes 
of poverty to the 'personal qualities' of the poor. Brown and Compton reflect this shift; 
The dominantforms of social exclusion within most European countries are based not on 
political, or legal restrictions, limiting access to civil rights, education, or professional 
occupations, but on the outcome of ostensibly universal criteria of achievement, reflecting 
personal qualities, efforts and attributes. 65 
Apathy is a common factor taken by social exclusion theorists to account for the 
apparent self-perpetuation of social exclusion. Most notably, there have been a number 
of studies carried out in recent years concerned with evaluating the level of participation 
in politics during the transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These 
show that those on a low-income; those with a low level of education; " those who work 
63 N. Warner, "A Sad Song for Europe" The Guardian, 30 October, 1996. 
64 Walker, op. cit. p. 68. 
65 Brown and Crompton (eds. ), op. cit. 
66 M. Wyman, S. White et al. for example, identify the following features of demobilisation in post-communist 
societies: low level of interest in politics (to which they ascribe education as a contributing factor); low income 
(which they see as connected with education and the level of satisfaction); and age (the young are seen as less likely 
than older to participate), Tublic Opinion Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections" Europe-Asia 
Siudies, 47(4), 1994. p. 594. 
69 
in the informal sector; " and those who are traditionally associated with non-participation 
such as ethnic minorities and other 'socially excluded' groups are less likely than others 
to be politically mobilised. " Although they do not explicitly address the concept of 
social exclusion, the implications of these arguments have been taken on board by social 
exclusion theorists. 
Following on from this initial question (of what we can know about a society if it is one 
defined as characterised by social exclusion) is a second set of issues that emerge with 
the use of such indicators. Firstly, the emphasis on their attributes rather than on the 
structures of inequality subtly betrays, as argued earlier, a sympathy with theories of 
underclass and marginality. Secondly, there are specific examples of national 
governments excluding certain groups from political participation, but these do not 
necessarily translate into a general process of social exclusion. " Finally, the question of 
apathy is itself problematic in that far from reflecting inactivity, non-voting, or non- 
participation it could represent a deliberate withdrawal from, if not resistance to, formal 
67 McAllister et al. draw parallels with the West in their identification of groups who appear, more than others, to lack 
political interest. Groups of comparative youth, with fewer educational attainments, and with a weak sense of political 
efficacy were identified as having a greater tendency than most to withdraw from conventional participation. lan 
McAllister, Richard Rose and Stephen White, How Russia Votes, Chatham House Publishers, Chathcm NJ, 1997. p. 
604. Together with Rose they refer to activity in the informal sector as displaying disproportionate features that are 
non-conducive to conventional political participation. Devoid of legal prowess, 'uncivil entrepreneurs' are often 
denied access to resources to make capital investments necessary for the employment of large numbers of workers. 
This results in an underdevelopment of trade unions (reflected in plummeting trade union membership) Richard Rose, 
"Toward a Civil Economy", Journal ofDemocracy, 3(2) April, 1992. p. 16. 
68 Pacek with his discussion on macroeconomic factors offers more specific socio-economic explanations. lie 
observes that "there has been a huge decline in voter participation with a concomitant rise in unemployment and fall 
in real salaries. " I lere, the stress is on the economic environment, rather than the groups themselves . Wade et al. in 
their discussion of the Polish 1991 elections, found similar evidence: turnout was suppressed in districts with lower 
personal incomes and higher unemployment. A. C. Pacek, "Macroeconomic conditions and Electoral Politics in East 
Central Europe", American Journal of Political Science, 38 (3), August, 1994. p. 730 and L. L. Wade, A. J. Groth and 
P. Lavelle, "Estimating Participation and Party Voting in Poland: The 1991 Parliamentary Elections", East European 
Politics and Society, 8 (1), Winter, 1994. p. 105. 
69 For example. in Bulgaria the Law on Political Parties (1991) prohibits the establishment of any political party on 
ethnic or religious grounds, which specifically excludes ethnic or religious minorities from representing themselves in 
the political arena. However, rather than being an aspect of a wider campaign to 'exclude' ethnic and religious groups 
in general, it represents a specific political agenda of preventing or at least attempting to limit possible Turkish 
irredentism. 
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political structures. " Ultimately, it seems that notions of social isolation and dislocation 
reinforce the negative associations of 'marginality' and 'exclusion', which form the 
backbone to popular policy. 7' 
A third issue is how far, if at all, it is possible to measure the extent to which social 
exclusion theory does offer more than poverty and class analyses. Social exclusion is no 
less prone to political manipulation than measurements of poverty. Government agencies 
can favour some more positive aspects, such as education, at the expense of other more 
revealing indicators, such as income distribution, thus giving a distorted picture. Further 
to this, poverty as a concept need be no less dynamic than that of social exclusion as 
displayed in the growth in work on poverty that explore its multidimensional aspects (see 
footnote 57 in chapter 2). Furthermore, that social exclusion theorists continue to rely on 
traditional indicators of income and inequality as well as indicators of participation and 
satisfaction, reveals that social exclusion in itself is not measurably distinct from existing 
dimensions of poverty and deprivation. 
A fourth issue lies with the popular use of social exclusion, which although can help 
identify specific examples of exclusion, is ultimately used as, above all, a generic 
conceptual tool. The Commission of the European Communities, for example, reported 
the different forms that social exclusion takes from one country to another, as if it were 
some ever-present force. Whereas in some countries social exclusion may manifest itself 
through problems of immigrants and refugees, the CEC argues that in others, it may be 
70 See for example, T. Cross and R. B. Stater, "The 1996 Elections - The Real Victor was Black Voter Apathy", 
Journal offIlacks in Higher Education, 14,1996. 
71 The reliance on ideas of isolation is reflected in the type of solutions sought i. e. they rest on the premise of finding 
ways to help adapt disadvantaged groups to external factors. For example, the basis of the European Social Fund (an 
agency of the European Union) rests on the following objectives: to regenerate designated areas affected by industrial 
decline; to combat long term unemployment; to assist young people into work, help those exposed to exclusion from 
the labour market, and promote equal opportunities for men and women; adapt the work force to industrial changes 
and to changes in production systems; and to facilitate development and structural adjustment of vulnerable rural 
areas. Corporate Enterprise Centre, Eurofund - Regional and European Funding Support, 1,1998. 
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in terms of long term unemployment . 
71 The use of passive language here is particularly 
interesting and reveals a neutrality that contradicts their claims elsewhere that social 
exclusion analysis rests on the question of agency. For example, Maclouf, in his 
discussion on social exclusion, sees it as a product of 'divergent processes', the exact 
nature of which he fails to explain: 
People who may or may not resemble each other, similar or dissimilar groups, tend to 
gather together. But the inequality of 'ýprqfiit-sharing " of resources and goods with its ever- 
renewed dynamics produces new differentiations [and these dynamics] are cut across by 
divergent processes which tend towards integration or anomie, towards the social 
formation ofa community or its disintegration. 73 
Although the selling point of social exclusion theory is its equal consideration of 
sociological, political and economic factors, its reluctance to commit itself to any one 
strategy prevents it from articulating coherent policy responses. As a result, the multitude 
of inclusion packages that have since been adopted within both governmental and non- 
governmental spheres have had little impact on the wider structures of social inequality. 
2.8 The responses 
Social exclusion and its strategy of inclusion has increasingly informed international and 
national responses to mounting poverty and long-term unemployment in Western 
Europe. "' The multidimensional analysis of exclusion, and the stress placed on 
encouraging participation for those excluded has invested the NGO sector with a specific 
role to play. The European Commission, the Council of Europe, the International Labour 
72 Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Towards a Europe ofSolidarity, Intensifying the Fight Against 
Social Exclusion, Fostering Integration, COM (92) 542 final, 1992. p. 32. 
73 p. Maclouf "Etat ct Cohdsion" Recherche et Privisions, 38,1994, quoted in P. Strobel, "From Poverty to 
Exclusion: A Wage Earning Society or a Society of Human Rights? ", International Social Science Review, 48 (2), 
1996. 
74 At the European level, this is evident in the publication of such documents as: Duffy, op. cit., and CEC op. cit. A 
series of conferences also reflect the same theme: Towards Solidarity in Europe, Lille May 1991 -, Building Blocks for 
a Social Europe, Rotterdam, November 1991; Combating Social Exclusion, Fostering Integration, Brussels, April 
1992; Building Europe through Solidarity, Oporto, 1992. At the national level, the British government has not been 
alone in adopting the slogan of'social exclusion' with its setting up of the Social Exclusion Unit. 
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Organisation and the United Nations Development Project, to name but a few, have all 
adopted social exclusion and the promotion of NGOs as central to their social policy 
agendas. While some have been more critical in their use of social exclusion than others, 
overall it signals a move away from policies concerned primarily with income 
redistribution towards a search for alternative and more acceptable ways of helping to 
include or re-integrate the poor. This less controversial and more subtle approach has 
earned it a wide appeal, from governments at the top down to social research institutes 
working at the ground level. 
However, the UK government in 1994 raised doubts about the usefulness of the concept 
of social exclusion: 
It is very doubtful whether the idea [.. ] of an integration plan for all the excluded is 
practical, not least because there is no generally accepted definition of social exclusion, let 
alone reliable evidence about the most effective way to tackle its causes. " 
Levitas in her critique of the use of the concept of 'social exclusion' in Britain goes one 
step further to argue that successful inclusion, if at all possible, would not in itself secure 
the answer to inequality, 
The term social exclusion presumes that inclusion is beneficial, but it is salutary to 
remember that even if the unemployed, women, ethnic minorities and disabled people 
achieve equal opportunities in the lahour market, this will still mean participation in a 
capitalist economy driven by profit, based upon exploitation andjundamentally divided hy 
ClasS. 76 
The evasion of class and power as implicit to ideas of inclusion seems to pose the most 
significant problem. Social exclusion theorists tend to emphasise macroeconomic 
growth, incentives and individual skill development in their search for solutions, i. e. the 
75 Commission of the European Communities, European Social Policy -A Way Forwardfor the Union. Vols I and 2, 
White Paper, COM (95) 94 final. p. 268 
76 Levitas, op. cit. pp. 187-188. 
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non-educated can be educated, the isolated can be encouraged to re-integrate and the 
insecure can be given new confidence. Although for many of those who use the social 
exclusion concept the need for social democratic redistribution within the existing socio- 
economic order is seen as an intrinsic part of this process of inclusion, the implication 
remains that, by focusing on equipping the excluded, those in positions of power go 
unchallenged. 
The strategies of inclusion that have emerged from this have fed on ideas of community 
development and urban regeneration. Although local initiatives are seen as an important 
source for self-help and increased employability, social exclusion theory suggests a more 
integrated approach that considers 'inclusion' at all levels of society. For example, the 
action programme by the European Commission for the period 1995-1997 rested on the 
following five fields of action: promoting integration into working life; improving 
vocational training; preventing redundancies; promoting the creation of new jobs; and 
helping to achieve solidarity in vulnerable districts and among the most vulnerable 
groups. " In practice, however, as pointed out by Kleinman in his critique of the British 
government's Social Exclusion Unit, inclusion strategies tend to be restricted to localised 
initiatives. " 
Western Governments, with their heightened concerns over welfare provision, have been 
keen to explore new ways of refining the selection, or targeting process. Definitions of 
who is and who is not eligible have been tightened in recent years in order to make the 
welfare system more cost-effective. Resting on a distinction between 'deserving' and 
'non-deserving' poor, the displacement of universal welfare provision with the 'social 
safety net' has served subtly to deny certain groups their right to social protection. 
77 European Commission, "Big Bosses Act Against Exclusion", Social Europe Magazine, 1, Scptember, 1995. 
78 Kleinman. op. cit. 
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Concepts of citizenship have been central to this, where social obligations as well as 
social rights have been used to prioritise the interests of certain groups at the expense of 
others. Masked by the rhetoric of anti-exclusion policy responses, however, which claim 
to counteract the "tearing of the social fabric", this dismantling of universal welfare has 
passed by with little political obstruction. 79 
Partly dictated by economic collapse and partly by the prescriptions implicit in the 
World Bank and IMF 'technical assistance', concerns over welfare spending and with 
finding ways to promote alternative sources of social security have also underpinned 
government policy in Eastern Europe since 1989. " The emphasis placed by post- 
communist governments on a new system of minimum social safety nets has been 
actively encouraged by Western advisors who, especially in the early stages of reform 
and in the light of the rise of mass poverty, were quick to promote the need for more 
'efficient' methods for defining and measuring 'the most vulnerable' groups in order to 
enhance targeting and so reduce pressure on welfare spending. The essence of this 
agenda is displayed in the advice offered by Wapenhaus in 1990 regarding reform in 
Eastern Europe: 
Social benefits should befinancially affordable and leave economic incentives undistorted, 
while providing adequate support and protection to the most vulnerable population 
groups. Tasks in this area include the need to scale back and target the system ofpervasive 
consumer subsidies, reform health and education services, develop an efficient housing 
system that allows for labor mobility, provide unemployment compensation, and establish 
social security systems compatihle with the needfor labor mobility in a market economy. " 
79 Gore, op. cit. p. 2. For example the Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion has taken a social 
rights approach where its 1994 official document talks specifically of rights in terms of housing, education etc. Also 
the CEC document argues that social exclusion stems from "inadequacies or weaknesses in the services offered and 
policies pursued in these various policy areasý', op. cit. 1992. p. 8. 
80 The World Bank defined 'technical assistance' as "any activity that enhances human and institutional capabilities 
through the transfer, adaptation, and use of knowledge, skills and technology". Laura Wallace, "Reshaping Technical 
Assistance", Finance and Development, 27 (4), December 1990. 
81 Willi Wapenhans (the then Vice President of the World Bank's Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region), 
"The Challenge of Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe", Finance and Development, 27 (4), December, 1990. p. 4. 
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Despite there being an overall consensus on state withdrawal in both Western and 
Eastern Europe, strategies of inclusion differ from one context to another, according to 
whether the emphasis is placed on the first, second or third sectors. Silver's model of 
social exclusion, in which she outlines three ideological paradigms: solidarity 
(republicanism); specialisation (liberalism); and monopoly (social democracy) presents a 
framework for analysing specific political traditions that have informed different policy 
responses of inclusion. " In the republican context we might expect that social exclusion 
will manifest itself in the breaking of social bonds between the individual and society, 
where society in the Rousseau sense is taken as some external, moral and normative 
order. In this scenario integration is the inverse of exclusion and insertion is the process 
by which to attain it. The liberal model implies that exclusion is a consequence of 
specialisation whereby group boundaries impede on individual freedom to participate in 
social exchanges. Exclusion in this sense is a form of discrimination and in order for this 
to be challenged market competition needs to be nurtured and individual rights protected. 
Finally, in the social democratic sense, the excluded are simultaneously outsiders and 
dominated in that the interplay of class, status and power serve the interests of the 
included. The remedy in this case is the extension of citizenship to enable equal 
participation. 
2.9 The NGO strategy in Eastern Europe 
Although these various responses have slightly different emphases, they are all rooted in 
some concept of active citizenship. In Eastern Europe this is a particularly salient issue, 
where processes of political and economic 'transition' appear to be shaping new models 
of citizenship. Social exclusion theorists see much potential in this for promoting the 
interests of the 'excluded'. Solutions to problems of exclusion in Eastern Europe are 
82 Hilary Silver, "Social Exclusion and Social Solidarity: Three Paradigms", International Labour Review, 133, (5-6), 
1995. 
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sought not only by advocates of the poor through the extension of rights to include 
vulnerable groups, such as ethnic minorities or street children, but also through the 
building of an inclusive NGO sector. " 
The emphasis on the role of NGOs while praised for its inclusionary potential is also part 
of the more general shift away from universal state welfare. Even in the very early stages 
of reform it was possible to identify in World Bank and IMF programmes a keen support 
for the building of an NGO sector. It was believed that NGOs would not only offer a 
proactive bottom-up framework, but also offer an alternative means of distributing aid 
more fairly to those most severely in need. "' 
However, in finding ways to limit the 'social costs' of the 'transition', and to encourage 
the development of civil society, policy makers in the West have invested the newly 
emerging NGO sector in Eastern Europe with a huge and difficult task. Most significant, 
however, as discussed later in chapter 5, has been the emphasis placed on its ability to 
'include' excluded groups. Its role at the ground level has earned it a reputation of being 
an appropriate means of seeking out 'the needy' and for enabling their active participation 
through community development. With its emphasis on bottom-up initiatives and on 
programmes of self-help the NGO sector has provided the ideal policy tool for social 
exclusion theorists. 
Education, in particular, has often been seen as the cornerstone to both NGO and 
government anti-exclusion policy. Numerous policies have emerged that are aimed at 
'limiting social exclusion' through the inclusion of greater numbers of young people into 
83 Council of Europe, Street Children - Stu4y Group on Street Children, Steering Committee on Social Policy, 
Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1994. 
84 See for example, Aubrey Williams, "A Growing Role for NGOs in Development", Finance and Development, op. 
cit.; World Bank, How the World Bank Works With Nongovernmental Organisations, IBRD, WB, Washington D. C., 
1990. 
77 
the schooling system. For example, the Council of Europe's Human Dignity and Social 
Exclusion Project (HDSE) organised a conference in Athens in October 1997 which was 
entirely dedicated to this very subject. Its thrust was to bring together education experts, 
government officials and NGO representatives to explore how education can help 
prevent social exclusion in Europe. It discussed various strategies such as: targeting 
children at risk of exclusion; the use of formal and informal education to fight exclusion; 
85 and the help of NGOs. The strategy of NGOs was also central to a conference 
organised by the Department of Health, Social Welfare and Sports of the Netherlands, 
entitled "The Social Exclusion of Sinti, Rom and Cales (Gypsies): Causes and Cures". 
The aim of the conference was "to analyse causes, processes and patterns of the social 
exclusion of gypsies [sic], and to define preventative and curative inclusionary 
approaches that can be translated into effective policies. "" The activities of NGOs and 
the role of multilateral organisation were taken as important sites for inclusion and 
specialists were invited from this field to participate. 
Implicit in these policy responses is that inclusion represents the positive alternative to 
exclusion. Some exclusion theorists recognise the dangers of such a crude approach, and 
stress that there are many levels of integration that can be pursued. For example, those 
groups who rely on a particular livelihood outside the labour market may experience new 
levels of exclusion if included into formal employment. Likewise, rural-urban migrants 
may be integrated into the process of industrial development but in the process lose 
85 Council of Europe, Education and Social Exclusion, 1997 <http: //www. coe. fr/cp/97/562aper cent2897per 
cent29. htm> (accessed November 1998). See also Cathie Burton, Conference Draws Up Blueprint For Action 
Against Social Exclusion, 1998 <http: //www. coe. fr/cp/98365aper cent2898per cent29. htm> (accessed November 
1998). This gives an account of a conference entitled "Conference on Human Dignity and Social Exclusion", 
organised by the Council of Europe, which took place in Helsinki on 20 May 1998. The key themes addressed were 
education. health, social protection and housing. 
86 Conference programme provided by Pieter Hovens, Department of Ilealth, Social Welfare and Sports, the 
Netherlands. The conference took place on 14-16 December 1998 and was co-organised with the Management of 
Social Transformations (MOST) Programme of UNESCO. 
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aspects of social protection and community support networks. " The other factor often 
left out by social exclusion analysis and strategies of inclusion is the question of 
resistance on the part of those groups defined as 'excluded. 
2.10 The hidden dimension. 
This view of society as one defined by social exclusion rather than by poverty alone rests 
on ideas of isolation or dislocation and as demonstrated in the previous section on 
strategies of integration or reintegration. Such an approach while recognising the 
different degrees of participation that characterise all societies, however, runs the risk of 
leaving out an important dimension; that is the one of resistance. Questions of resistance 
are nothing new and feed into wider debates triggered during the 1960s and 1970s by 
both 'social historians' who acknowledged the need to recognise perspectives from below 
as well as from above, and 'post modernists' who, in their rejection of material 
objectivity, were interested in promoting as equal the 'histories' of subordinated groups. 
This emerging trend of examining 'history from below' opened up possibilities for a more 
sympathetic approach towards oppressed groups in the analysis of their contribution to 
social structures and processes. " By re-focusing the discussion onto the oppressed, rather 
than the oppressors, scholars concerned with 'reclaiming the subject' hoped to reveal 
some of the fundamental problems attached to liberal claims that we as citizens have 
equal stakes in society's structures and its shared culture. 
The recognition of this hidden dimension gave rise to a number of interesting 
possibilities. One of the main implications of this trend lay with the post-modern 
87 Rodgers et al., op. cit. p. 52. 
88 Alex Callinicos, "Marxism and the Crisis in Social I listory. " In John Rees (ed. ), Essays on Historical Materialism, 
Bookmarks, London, 1998. 
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approach and its focus on the subjective histories of the oppressed. Rather than placing 
their analyses within the wider context, their identification of 'subjective histories' served 
to dissolve power of all agency. The problems of disregarding empirical realities and the 
central relevance of 'external' factors is illustrated most explicitly in the work of 
Mitchell. " In his personification of power, he unwittingly, therefore, reveals how his 
own discussion strips power and domination of all meaning. Thus, "domination works 
through actually constructing a seemingly dualistic world"; "power .. seeks to extend 
itseýf and work more economically by producing effects that are cultural or ideological"; 
"power relations continue to acquire their hold over peasants' lives"; "the fixed, self- 
reproducing power.. "; and "power inserts itself' ". In all of these examples, there is no 
clear indication of who, or what is responsible for this 'power', other than itself. 
Other scholars interested in the experiences of oppressed groups, however, have not 
necessarily fallen into this trap of dissolving power of all agency. One such scholar is 
James C. Scott. The bulk of his work has been concerned with the idea that the 
ideological superstructure of class society is one reproduced through a power struggle 
between the dominators and the subordinated acted out through an interplay of public 
and hidden discourses. He defines the hidden transcript as "a host of practices devised to 
exercise [.. ] rights in clandestine ways", acted out by the oppressed and shielded by their 
public transcript of compliance. " "The practice of domination", he argues, "creates the 
hidden transcript" whereby both transcripts come to represent realms of power and 
interest. " Labelled as the "infrapolitics of the powerless", Scott injects the discourse of a 
hidden transcript with subversive tools for ideological resistance. 93 
89 Timothy Mitchell, "Everyday Metaphors of Power", Theory and Society, 19,1990. 
90 Ibid. pp. 547-571. 
91 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, Yale University Press, New I laven, 1985. p. 189. 
92 Ibid p. 27. 
93 Ibid. P. 183. 
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This reading of resistance does carry with it a host of problems as well as important 
insights, which are discussed in section 4 of chapter 7. However, for now let it be said 
that in contrast to post-modem interpretations of a'subjective histories' and, importantly 
to the social exclusion reading of 'isolated' groups, Scott's theory of 'hidden resistance' 
opens up for debate possibilities of rational response on the part of those groups 
dismissed as 'excluded', 'isolated', 'backward' or 'deviant'. This 'missing dimension' to 
social exclusion theory enhances rather than constrains its use, in that it can offer to 
policy makers a more acceptable and convenient conceptual tool to work with. However, 
for many the benefits to social exclusion are observed not so much in what it lacks, but 
in what it gains when compared to the apparent limitations of poverty based analysis. 
2.11 Conclusion 
The concept of social exclusion has served an important function insofar as it has 
incorporated into mainstream agendas groups that have been traditionally restricted to 
specialist analysis. Ideologically, it has provided an acceptable platform from which 
many governments are willing to embark on policies aimed at tackling social 
inequalities, an approach that otherwise would have involved taking some responsibility. 
At the same time, the rapidity with which social exclusion has entered popular political 
discourse, coupled with a growing concern over welfare limits, has indicated the need for 
a closer examination. 
In light of the identification of a possible 'hidden dimension', namely that of 'hidden 
resistance', this chapter has raised a number of interesting theoretical questions about 
social exclusion theory and the policy implications of 'inclusion'. Ultimately, the policy- 
constructed concept of social exclusion, whereby researchers in the field seem to be 
always trying to catch up with, rather than inform, policy agendas has led to the situation 
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in which everyone is talking about social exclusion yet still struggling to define it. "' One 
of the consequences of this has been that various holes have emerged within the social 
exclusion argument. Ultimately the question that needs to be asked is how far it is 
possible to talk of socially excluded groups without addressing the structural causes of 
inequality and the nature of conflict that shapes societal relations. 
Although social exclusion theory is seen by some within the field as necessary for the 
radical re-working of poverty and deprivation analyses, social exclusion theorists 
(including those who claim to take a more critical view of governmental policy) still run 
the risk of simply 'reinventing the wheel', or re-labelling old problems. Rather than 
questioning existing assumptions about poverty and distribution, social exclusion 
theorists continue to reinforce assumptions that underpin more controversial concepts of 
underclass, marginality and culture of poverty. " 
Ultimately the concept of social exclusion remains imprecise and difficult to prove 
empirically. Whereas some use social exclusion to describe behaviour, others use it to 
explain structural elements of inequality. It is not clear whether the 'underclass', or the 
'socially excluded' describe all poor, or sub-groups of the poor. Underpinning the use of 
social exclusion theory, however, is the idea that there are social groups who not only 
fall outside of mainstream society, but, who fall behind the rest of society. This can 
serve to fix the existence of poverty groups as both inevitable and as evidence of their 
own backwardness. As addressed in chapter 4, the logical next stage of such a theory can 
be then to attach inherent attributes to poverty groups such as race or ethnicity. 
94 This particularly came across in the conference discussed above, Social Exclusion and the City, where each speaker 
felt obliged to explain first what they meant by social exclusion. 
95 Spicker, op. cit. 
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The ambiguous implications that arise from a straightforward view of 
exclusion/inclusion are explored in closer detail in the following chapters. In particular, 
chapter 33 addresses the transition as a period in which existing social inequalities under 
Communist society have since been heightened, especially for ethnic groups such as 
Gypsies. While raising questions about the nature of Communist society, latent 
inequalities have also encouraged a concern over the emergence of 'new' poverty groups 
and in particular of growing 'social exclusion'. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TRANSITION AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the nature of social inequality during the 'transition' in Eastern 
Europe and the extent to which the theory of social exclusion presents a useful framework 
for analysing and dealing with these trends. The continuing economic crises in the former 
Communist countries, coupled with signs of global recession, have dampened the 
euphoria of 'revolution' in Eastern Europe and weakened claims about the 'end of history' 
in the West. Social exclusion theory represents one major attempt on the part of policy 
makers to deal with this bleak situation. 
The increasingly high levels of poverty in the 'transition' countries are seen to represent 
'new' dimensions of social exclusion, defined overtly as a consequence of rapid 
'modernisation', in this case market reform, and implicitly a product of cultural 
pathologies on the part of certain'social groups. Despite an overall concern among policy 
makers over the high social costs of the transition, this approach has not always led to a 
fundamental questioning of the market reforms, nor to a useful re-evaluation of existing 
assumptions about the nature of 'Communist' society. The limited approach of social 
exclusion is further undermined by the lack of available reliable data. 
This chapter explores the nature of Communist society before 1989, in terms of the gap 
that existed between the rhetoric of socialism and economic growth and the reality of 
social inequality and economic stagnation. The long term economic crisis that 
precipitated regime change then provides the basis for a discussion on the transition and 
the different types of social inequality that have evolved: falling living standards; 
stretching differentiation between social groups; and the visible existence of 'poverty 
groups. ' Social exclusion theory will be explored in particular reference to the latter 
aspect of social inequality, which forms the final part of this discussion. 
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3.2 Communist society and social inequality 
The Soviet type economy was one that officially ran on the principles of the 
nationalisation of the means of production, economic central planning, centralised 
political power, cultural/national homogenisation and social equality. The extent to which 
these principles remained intact or indeed were ever realised has been the subject of much 
research. The questions of cultural homogenisation and social equality have been 
particularly salient issues given the nationality based break up of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and the rapidity with which extreme patterns of social 
inequality have emerged more generally since the collapse of the Communist regimes. 
Centrally controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Soviet 
empire spanned a vast geographical area covering large parts of both Europe and Asia. 
Historically, Eastern Europe formed a cultural as well as geographical transitional zone 
between the Russian tradition of the concentration of power and the Western tradition of 
the division of power. ' However, after World War 11 a ruthless agenda of 'Sovietisation' 
on the part of the CPSU led to Eastern Europe being situated under the cloak of Russian 
Communist rule. Although the historical and political paths of these East Central 
European countries did vary under Communism, they were initially subject to heavily 
centralised policies administered from Russia through their respective Communist 
governments. Consequently, the Soviet framework of economic, political, and social 
policy was, to varying degrees, a feature common to all the countries of Eastern Europe. ' 
However, it is important to note the differences that did exist between these countries, in 
terms of geography, population, and economic development. Tables 3.1-3.3 highlight 
some of these differences and help place into context the situation of Bulgaria during 
Communism. 
1 George Sch6plin, Politics in Eastern Europe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. 
2 With the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia who took distinctively different paths. 
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rable 3.1. Basic characteristics of Eastem Europe. 
Total Area (sq. km) Urban/ Main ethnic minorities Main 
population Density (inhab. Rural % Religions 
(million) krn sq) 
Czecho- 15,656 127,900 75/25 Poles, Germans, Gypsies, Catholic 50% 
slovakia 
1 
123 Hungarians. Protestant 20% 
Poland 38,600 312,683 60/40 Ukrainians and Catholic 95% 
123 Belorussians. 3 
Hungary 10,277 93,030 60/40 Germans, Slovaks, South Catholic 67% 
110 Slavs, Gypsies, Romanians. Hungarian 
Reformed 22% 
GDR 16,648 108,333 77/23 Sorbs, Russians. Protestant 47% 
154 
Romania 22,680 237,500 51/49 Gypsies, Hungarians. E. Orthodox 70% 
96 Catholic 10% 
Bulgaria 9,010 110,994 66/34 Turks, Gypsies, Pomaks, E. Orthodox 85% 
81 Vlachs. Muslim 10% 
Albania 3,429 28,750 41/59 Greeks, Vlachs, Gypsies, Sunni Muslim 
119 Macedonians. 70%* 
Yugo- 23,841 98,610 (sq. 33/67 Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, E. Orthodox 50% 
slavia miles) Montenegrins, Albanians, Catholic 30% 
(1990) Macedonians. Muslim 9% 
Between 1967-199U, Albania was constitutionally atheist anLI all religion banne(l. 
Compared with countries such as Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia), Hungary, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria is quite 
distinct. Firstly, Bulgaria is situated in the Balkans and like parts of Romania and the 
fonner Yugoslavia, it has had the particular historical experience of having lived under 
the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, Bulgaria has within its borders the largest proportion of 
Turkish and Gypsy populations, having implications for religion and language. Although 
it is predominantly an Christian Eastern Orthodox country it also has a substantial 
Muslim component. Finally, in terms of economic development during the Communist 
3 Post-war minorities in Poland amounted to no more than 1.5% 
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period Bulgaria appeared to sustain state directed development for longer, albeit from a 
lower level. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that overall national income and industrial output in Bulgaria 
between 1985-1989, and 1970-1990 respectively, grew at a faster rate than the more 
advanced countries of Hungary and GDR. Bulgaria was a more agrarian based society, 
which certainly provides one major explanation for the relative growth in output in the 
industrial sector. In terms of its agricultural output, however, the rate of growth was not 
as high as with other countries. This weakness has proved fatal for post-1989 economic 
development. During the 'transition' Bulgaria has fallen behind the more prosperous 
Tront-runner' countries and is now generally considered to be one of the 'laggards' of 
reform, having only just recently embarked on tentative measures of privatisation. 
Table 3.2 Growth of produced national income at constant prices 1980-1989 (1980=100) 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Czechoslovakia 100 109 111 114 117 117 
Poland 100 96 101 103 108 108 
Hungary 100 107 108 112 111 110 
Romania 100 124 133 140 144 133 
Bulgaria 100 120 126 133 136 135 
Source: Eurostat, Counl7y Reports, 1991. 
Table 3.3 Gross industrial and agricultural output for selected countries at constant prices 1970- 
1990(1970=100) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Hungary 100 136.6(l) 161.0 176.8 187.1 187.1 185.2 
125.5 (A) 141.2 146.2 146.8 153.1 151.1 141.3 
GDR 100 136.1 173.8 206.8 219.0 225.9 231.1 - 
122.4 131.0 146.7 146.3 143.2 145.5 - 
Romania 100 184.0 289.0 351.5 384.3 398.1 389.7 - 
137.0 165.0 197.5 170.1 179.8 170.1 165.0 
Bulgaria 100 155 208.9 260.7 281.8 296.0 302.1 - 115.5 120.9 117.4 124.5 124.7 125.2 117.7 
Source: Comecon, 1991. 
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In the countries of Eastern Europe a vertically organised network of powerful, centralised 
bureaucracies underpinned all the respective Communist Party policy agendas. ' Industrial 
production, for example, was planned not as an outcome of free enterprise, but of 
bureaucratic control. At its peak, central planning through a national plan determined 
what should be produced, what methods should be used and what incomes should be 
received in every republic, region, province, district and state farm. ' The emphasis on 
extensive rather than intensive growth and the prioritisation of heavy industry ensured 
quick but short lived economic growth. Although pre-war figures show that between 
1913 and 1940 industrial output in the Soviet Union increased fourfold, the post-war 
situation across Eastern Europe was markedly different. ' Even according to official 
figures at the time, which in themselves were questionable, it was possible to observe that 
the performance of the East European economies between the 1950s and 1980s seemed to 
be on the decline (see Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4 Decline in Performance of the Comecon Bloc according to pre-1989 Official data and 
Concepts 1951-1985 (%) 
1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 
National 10.8 8.5 6.0 7.4 6.4 4.1 3.0 
Income 
Industrial 15.6 10.1 8.3 8.3 7.9 4.7 3.4 
Production 
Agricultural 4.0 4.8 2.1 3.7 1.6 1.0 2.1 
Production 
Source: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran - chienov soveta ekonomicheskoi vzaimopomoshchi, Moscow, 
1989.7 
The tendency of enterprises to hoard their produce, and the state's refusal to support 
production outside of its designated targets has led many to argue that the Soviet 
economy was one defined by shortage. ' The shortage economy and chronic overstaffing 
4 Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: An Historical Interpretation, Radius, London, 1989, p. 139. 
5 There was degree of give and take between agencies and factories, however, and a certain degree of influence could 
be exerted on the setting of targets and prices. Ibid. p. 137. 
6 W. W. Rostow, The Dynamics ofSoviet Society, Mentor, New York, 1963. p. 85. 
7 Cited in M. Haynes and R. Husan, "The State and Market in the Transition Economics: Critical Remarks in the Light 
of Past History and Current Experience", Journal ofEuropean Economic History, 27 (3), Winter, 1999. p. 630. 
a Kornai argues that the 'constant reproduction of shortage' is caused by the fact that there is no seýr-imposed limit to 
the demand for investment resources, thus leading to hoarding which fuels shortages further. Jdnos Kornai, A hidny, 
Kdzgazdasdgi es Jogi, 2nd edition, 1982, cited by Sch6plin, op. cit. p. 79. 
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concealed unemployment to a large extent, and queuing and corruption became features 
of everyday life throughout the Soviet bloc. This manifested itself most visibly in the 
emergence of a second economy. This unofficial economy served to fill many of the gaps 
left by the shortage economy and also helped alleviate some of the abundant waste by 
selling and buying excess equipment and goods. As well as serving this economic 
function, participation in the unofficial second economy placed an extra burden on many 
workers already employed in official sectors. ' 
3.3 Social Policy during Communism 
Social policy under the Communist regime claimed to offer a measure against social 
risks. However, welfare policies, like economic ones, were determined and administered 
from the centre. This meant that decisions on welfare provision were largely inspired by 
political considerations rather than real societal needs dictated by a concern for enhancing 
the stock of 'human capital'. The principles of the Soviet welfare state consisted of 
heavily subsidised food and rent, full employment, relatively high wages of workers (as 
percentage of the average) and the provision of free or cheap health and education 
services. " As in the West, however, this impressive facade of equal opportunity served to 
shield many of its intrinsic limitations. " 
Many citizens experienced a low income, hidden unemployment, a lack of available 
goods, and unequal access to certain benefits and privileges. With economic stagnation 
this situation worsened. In the latter decades of the Soviet regime a number of unofficial 
studies were carried out in the USSR that outlined features of poverty and declining 
living conditions for different sectors of the population. " In the West, also at this time, a 
9 Many argue that its features of barter, economic initiative and so forth were necessary for survival under 
Communism and helped nurture entrepreneurial skills, vital for economic survival during the current period of market 
reform Others go further to argue that the origins of the 'Soviet Mafia! can be found in this second economy. See, for 
example, Caroline Humphrey, "Introduction", Cambridge Anthropology, 18 (2), 1995. 
10 Bob Deacon, "Developments in East European Social Policy", in C. Jones (ed. ), Mew Perspectives on the Weyare 
State in Europe, Routledge, London, 1993. 
11 Medvedev, for example, observed that in the Soviet Union in the mid 1970s, millions of people were still 
experiencing material hardship, receiving pay below the minimum wage, and living in poor and overcrowded housing 
conditions, cited in V. George and N. Manning, Socialism, Social Weyare and the Soviet Union, Routledge, London, 
1980. p. 23. 
12 For example, various Samizdats were distributed within the USSR entitled, "Poverty and Working Conditions in 
Siberia", "Poverty and the Large Family", "Problems Faced by Single Parents", cited in Mervyn Matthews, Poverty in 
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series of studies were published that explored class society and persistent inequality in the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. " These identified three key patterns of 
social inequality during the Soviet regime in both the Soviet Union and the countries of 
Eastern Europe: A gradual decline in living standards for the population as a whole; fixed 
differentials between the ruling 'elite' and the masses and also between men and women, 
and different social classes; and the existence of poverty groups, such as the unemployed 
and the elderly. 
Many studies have tended to focus on the general low living standard experienced by the 
majority of the population. Matthews, for example, tracked the average annual GNP per 
capita growth rates across Eastern Europe between 1965 and 1981 in order to show that 
on average growth began to ease in the late seventies (see Table 3.5). This, he argued, 
showed that the earlier decline of poverty that had previously characterised the Soviet 
regime was now being reversed. For example, in the Soviet Union food costs absorbed 
on average nearly two-thirds of the total family budget. Although a typical indicator of 
poverty in the West in the Soviet context it also reflected the very low cost of housing 
coupled with the provision of free healthcare and education. " On the other hand, 
however, although a minimum wage was in place, it was often rendered meaningless by 
severe shortages or inflation. In Bulgaria, for example, the minimum wage offered little 
protection against poverty, where in 1970 it was a modest 52.6 per cent of the average 
wage, and by 1980 had sunk to 46.6 per cent. " 
the Soviet Union - The Life-Styles of the Under Privileged in Recent Years, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1986. pp. 180-202. 
13 See for example, P. Kende and Z. Strmicka, Equality and Inequality in Eastern Europe, Berg, Leamington Spa, 
1987; David Lane, The End ofSocial Inequality? - Class, Status and Power Under State Socialism, George Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1982; Malcolm Hamilton and Maria Hirszowicz, Class and Inequality in Pre-Industrial, Capitalist 
and Communist Societies, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1987; Mervyrn Matthews, Poverty in the Soviet Union, op. 
cit., 1986; Mervyn Matthews, Privilege in the Soviet Union -A Study of Elite Lifestyles under Communism, George 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1978; W. Wesolowski, "The Notions of Strata and Class in Socialist Society. " In Andre 
Beteille (ed. ), Inequality, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1969. 
14 Matthews, op. cit. 1986. p. 177 
15 Ibid. p. 158. 
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Table 3.5 Average annual GNP per capita growth rates 1965-1981 (at constant prices, 
1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1981 
GDR 3.2 3.8 2.5 2.4 
Czechoslovakia 3.2 2.7 1.3 0.1 
Hungary 2.7 3.0 2.0 0.6 
Poland 3.0 5.7 -0.1 -7.5 
Romania 3.2 5.2 3.0 0.3 
Bulgaria 4.0 3.9 0.9 2.8 
Source: TP. Alton et al. " 
3.4 Patterns of social inequality during Communism 
It was often the case that the quality of state services remained poor and in general fell 
short of securing a good standard of living for the wider population. Further to this, the 
comprehensive welfare system was not so universal in practice as official data claimed it 
to be. It was marred by inefficiency and privilege. In Russia, a not untypical example, 
Matthews revealed large differentials between the ruling 'elite' and the masses. He also 
addressed aspects of poverty for different occupational groups, taking into account factors 
such as gender and age. He argues that although low skilled manual and service workers 
received the lowest wages and transfers this did not guarantee an above-average income 
for white collar workers. Those working in health, culture and agriculture were just as 
likely as unskilled manual workers to find themselves among the poor. " Table 3.6 shows 
that the measure of income inequality in Eastern Europe in the 1980s according to their 
Gini Coefficients was not quite so removed from similar measures in the West. However, 
as with all data, but especially in this context, figures on income inequality are not always 
entirely accurate in that monetary income is only part of total economic resources, where 
incomes in kind, services supplied free of charge and various exchanges also play an 
important role. 
16 Cited in Matthews, Poverty in the Soviet Union, op. cit. p. 157. Although GNP per capita does not give a an 
indication of inequality in income distribution, Matthews uses it to examine overall patterns of deprivation. 
17 Ibid; Matthews, Privilege in the Soviet Union, op. cit. 
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United Kingdom 29.7 
Thefigures refer to the distribution of individuals byper capitafamily income. 
Source: A. Atkinson and J. Micklewright (1991). "3 
Taking this into account, Hamilton and Hirszowicz argued that in a 'shortage' economy it 
was not so much differential income that divided social groups, but more the unequal 
distribution of consumer goods and privileges. " They argued that access to scarce 
products was one of the major components in standards of living under Communism. 
Lane noted that the distribution of income in industry was becoming more equal, 
therefore, like Hamilton and Hirszowicz, he also stressed the importance of analysing the 
unequal distribution of payment received in kind or transfers. " Whether it be in terms of 
pensions, allowances, education, housing subsidy or medical care, social security 
transfers were generally linked with wage income. The allocation of transfers through the 
work place meant that those groups who did not work for the state, such as rural 
peasantry, widows, and the disabled did not receive social provisions of education or 
health care. Also, lower-paid workers were less likely to receive the same level of 
pension, for example, as more well paid workers. 21 
More so in the Soviet Union than in Eastern Europe, a significant gap existed between 
rural/urban incomes in terms of both money income and transfers where the peasantry 
were considerably worse-off than city dwellers. Collectivisation had obliged peasants to 
work under harsh administrative regimes which kept prices and their incomes low. Under 
Communism peasants' incomes in the Soviet Union were less than two thirds of the 
'a Cited in Alastair McAuley, "Economic Justice in Eastern Europe. " In Stein Ringen and Claire Wallace (eds. ), 
Societies in Transition -East Central Europe Today, Vol. 1. Avebury, Aldershot, 1994. p. 32, Table 2. 
19 Access to such goods also meant the possibility of rc-selling them at free-market prices. Hamilton and Hirszowicz, 
op. cit. pp. 240-241. 
20 D. Lane, op. cit 
21 Ibid. p. 59. 
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country's average income and half that earned by urban dwellers. ' Access to social 
security was also a divisive factor for this sector of society. According to official policy, 
peasants were not defined as eligible for free health care and so forth until the late sixties 
and early seventies. Even then, transfers formed less than 10 per cent of their income 
compared to 20 per cent for state employees. 23 
Gender has also been identified as a key indicator of social inequality under Communism. 
Formal participation rates for women in paid full time employment in the Soviet regimes 
were considerably higher than in the West. " This was underpinned by the principle of 
equal wages for women and men. In practice, however, women were more likely than 
men to be employed in lower-paid branches of the economy and to experience 
25 interruptions in career patterns. Furthermore, the labelling of 'women's work' was still 
very much prevalent, such as the caring professions, domestic, retail trade and textiles. 
This was reinforced by the expectation that women were still responsible for housework 
and child care, forming the notorious double burden . 
2' The reinforcement of occupational 
segregation was therefore still in practice, and women were often barred from promotion 
and the first to be dismissed . 
2' As a result, women were less represented among senior 
positions. 28 
The existence of poverty groups, such as the unemployed, and the elderly have also been 
observed as a feature of Communist society. Matthews, for example, discusses the effect 
of low or no pensions in the Soviet Union on the level of poverty for the elderly. One of 
the key responses to this was for retired pensioners to find work elsewhere. " However 
the extent to which this alleviated poverty was not clear cut. According to Matthews, the 
22 M. 1. Goldman, USSR in Crisis: The Failure ofthe Economic System, W. W. Norton, New York, 1983. p. 76. 
23 Ibid. p. 160; D. Lane, op. cit. p. 56. 
24 In the Soviet Union, for example, the formal participation of women was in excess of 80 per cent compared to less 
than 50 per cent in countries like Britain and Germany. Lane, op. cit. p. 76. 
25 Matthews, 1986, op. cit. 
26 This is sometimes referred to as the 'triple burden', if we also consider their role in consumption - it was mainly the 
women who did the queuing and buying. 
27 Barbara Einhom, Cinderella Goes to Market, Verso, London, 1993. p. 24. 
28 E. g. Although the percentage of women in the teaching profession in the Soviet Union was very high (70 per cent), 
only 32 per cent of the heads of middle schools were women. Lane, op. cit., p. 77. 
29 Matthews, op. cit. 1986. pp. 48-5 1. 
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unemployed were also prone to high levels of poverty. Although officially full 
employment had been achieved and unemployment benefit was stopped, unemployment 
remained a reality for many. The most likely types of unemployment were job-changing; 
seasonal unemployment; and pockets of long term unemployed in underdeveloped small 
towns. " Finally, family size was also a factor associated with poverty. In Hungary, 
Kemeny observed that in 1968 a fifth of the population were 'poor' and one-tenth 'very 
poor'. In 1973, he examined family types and concluded that of families with four or 
more children, 83 per cent were 'poor' and 63 per cent 'very poor'. " 
Various theories have emerged that attempt to explain social inequality and the existence 
of poverty during Communism. These generally fall into the following camps: class 
analysis, elite theory, and the role of the centralised party bureaucracy. Class analysts 
rest on the idea that what existed during the Soviet regime was not anything that 
resembled Marx's view of Communism, but instead a form of state capitalism. " Elite 
theorists focus on the system of privilege and the reproduction of wealth for an elite as 
embodied in the 'nomenklatura'. " Finally, others argue that the cause of such inequality, 
or differential 'life chances', lay not so much in class or elite society, but in the 
bureaucratic centralised organs of the state. 34However, it was not until Gorbachev and, in 
particular, the introduction of glas'nost, that people, both in Eastern and Western Europe, 
became more fully aware about the extent and nature of inequality during Communism. 
As Harman writes, glas'nost gave rise to a wealth of information on, 
30 Matthews, op. cit, 1986. pp. 52-54. 
31 1. Kemeny, "Poverty in Hungary", Social Science Information, 18 (2), quoted in D. Lane op. cit. 
32 Milovan Djilas, for example, saw in the new Corm-nunist Party the foundations for a new ruling class, in that it used, 
enjoyed and disposed of national property. M. Djilas, The New Class, Allen and Unwin, London, 1966, cited in Peter 
Calvert, The Concept of Class - An Historical Introduction, St. Martins Press, New York, 1982. 
33 Matthews, 1976, op. cit. Largely based on Jewish 6migr6 reports, Matthews showed how in the early 1970s when 
the average monthly wage was 130 rubles, a Party First Secretary received 900 roubles per month (plus payments in 
kind). Roy Medvedev, also identified a privileged stratum, "While I do not believe that the bureaucracy can be 
described as some kind of class I am forced to agree that those in charge of Soviet society now constitute a definite 
stratum, sharing certain customs and rules of conduct. " Quoted in Kende and Strmiska, op. cit. p. 159. 
34 Hamilton and Hirszowicz, op. cit., "Decisions made at the top about the rate of economic growth, the nature of 
investments, pay differentials, prices paid to farmers for their products play the major part in determining the life 
chances of different occupational groups. " p. 273. 
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widespread corruption, the hold of the mafia, the scale of poverty and prostitution, the 
deterioration of the health services, appalling pollution and immense ecological problems, 
and, by the summer of 1988, on the enormous privileges of the top bureaucrats. " 
Insights into the extent of social inequality during Communism served to reveal that the 
continuation between the former regimes and the post 1989 ones was not just in terms of 
political power. This in itself indicates some of the dangers inherent in the use of 
concepts such as social exclusion which preclude a structural analyses of inequality and 
poverty. 
3.5 Rapid regime change 
In Russia, when Gorbachev came into power he faced a rigid economy that was still in 
need of revitalisation: from 1981 to 1985 economic growth according to the official data 
was a mere 1.7 per cent compared with 4.8 per cent from 1961 to 1970. " His response to 
this was to encourage repressed initiative by allowing greater openness and introducing a 
quasi-market in the form of glas'nost and then perestroika. However, the push factor of 
economic stagnation and the pull factor of relative prosperity in the West meant that these 
reforms had to be far more radical than had been previously anticipated. These entailed 
the development of an internal private sector, the encouragement of foreign investors and 
a deeper involvement in world markets, yet all the time maintaining centralised economic 
planning. "' 
Gorbachev lowered the budget deficit and deterred reforms that risked imposing undue 
burden on the population in an effort to appease the popular demand for improved 
consumer goods. However, this sudden prioritisation of consumption over investment 
had profound implications. The Russian economy declined further and industrial output 
fell. Wage increases fuelled the already crisis situation where incomes grew by 12.9 per 
cent compared with a rise of only 9 per cent for consumer goods. " The shortage of goods 
35 Harman, Chris, "The Storm Breaks", International Socialism, Spring, 46,1990. p. 6. 
36 William Moskoff, Hard Times: Impoverishment and Protest in Perestroika Years of the Soviet Union 1985-1991, 
Sharpe, London/New York, 1993. p. 9. 
37 Lewin, op. cit. p. 14 1. 
38 Moskoff, op. cit. p. 55. 
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was exacerbated by this increase in incomes leading to a situation where there were 
shortages in 1,159 of the 1,200 goods. " As a result the budget deficit and inflation 
escalated causing a monetary and fiscal crisis on a scale never experienced before. The 
much needed change from extensive to intensive growth was obstructed by the 
bureaucratic command economy itself. It was becoming increasingly clear that the state 
bureaucracy in Russia was incompatible with market forces and that the Soviet style 
economy could not continue in the face of alternatives. "' 
The latent inequalities that had underpinned Soviet society across the Soviet bloc began 
to come to the fore as economic and political chaos set in. The fundamental contradiction 
between the policies of glasnost and perestroika, whereby the former provided the legal 
framework for people to express dissatisfaction with the latter, encouraged the 
articulation of popular discontent. Gorbachev's foreign policy towards Eastern Europe of 
allowing them to embark on reforms independent of Russia, which some have called the 
'Sinatra Doctrine', triggered popular protest on a wider scale. Due to a mixture of factors 
rooted in an overall disillusiomnent with Communism ranging from economic decline, 
new political freedoms and mass protest, to increasing pressure from the West and ever 
weakening governments, the regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed one after the other. 
Harman argues, however, that political and social change across Eastern Europe was 
achieved only in a narrow sense. " The continuity of power is most visible in terms of 
political leadership where "the transition from Communist to democratic rule is being 
managed by leaders who were, with few exceptions, not notably uncomfortable under the 
old order, and who frequently were part of its support system. ""' This has certainly been a 
feature of most transitions in Eastern Europe, most notably for the 'laggard' countries of 
South Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Romania. Whereas for the 'forerunner' 
39 Miskoff, op. cit. pp. 14-15. 
40 P. R. Gregory and R. C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, HarperCollins, New York/London, 4th 
edition, 1990. p. 13. 
41 Harman, op. cit. p. 24. 
42 T. A. Baylis, "Plus Va Change? Transition and Continuity Among Eastern European Elites", Communist and Post 
Communist Studies, 27 (3), 1994, quoted in M. Haynes, "Eastern European Transition - Some Practical and Theoretical 
Problems", Economic and Political Weekly, 31 (8), February 24,1996. p. 479. 
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countries the collapse proved fairly swift, for the laggard countries, the transition has 
been extended into a second stage of crises. 
The cumulative collapse of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe were 
triggered by the events of 1989 in Hungary. The opening of its borders, allowing a 
Westward route for GDR citizens precipitated collapse in East Germany. Coupled with 
the visible withdrawal of Gorbachev, Honecker rapidly lost control and was forced to turn 
towards Western Germany. The 'velvet revolution' in Czechoslovakia which followed, 
also ensured a quick regime collapse. In contrast, regime change in South Eastern Europe 
was not so conclusive. The political changes in Romania were renowned for its armed 
conflict and the swift execution of its former Communist leader, Ceausecus and his wife. 
Yet the 'revolution' in Romania has been defined by some as ultimately political rather 
than social. The control of enterprises remained in the same hands as before and decisions 
were still taken by those from the old ruling party. 
Likewise, in Bulgaria, the sudden removal of Zhivkov in November 1989, who had been 
in power for over 30 years, seemed to represent a clear break with the past. Indeed, this 
sudden political crisis did create new opportunities for the opposition to mobilise. 
However, the BCP (later changed to BSP) continued to maintain a single party majority 
within government well into the so-called transition period, initially under the leadership 
of Lukanov, then Popov and finally Zhelev. The crisis in Bulgaria was therefore extended 
over a much longer period punctured with intermittent uprisings, most notably those led 
by the UDF in 1993 and 1996. "' Stoyanov from the UDF was elected president in 
November 1996 and inaugurated in January 1997. Widespread political unrest and mass 
demonstrations in Spring of that year finally forced the BSP led government to concede 
to a general election. Parliamentary elections took place on 19 April 1997, during which 
the UDF-led coalition, for the first time gained an overall majority with 52.2 per cent of 
the votes, securing 57.1 seats, compared with 22 per cent for the BSP, which secured 
43 In 1996 the banking system collapsed, production declined even further, and the national currency was devalued. 
Rumyana Kolarova, "Bulgaria: Could We Regain What We Have Already Lost? " Social Research, 63 (2), Summer, 
1996. 
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them only 23.7 seats. This opened the way for Stoyanov with the UDF-led government 
headed by Ivan Kostov as prime minister to embark on belated economic and political 
refonns. 
3.6 The 'transition' 
Despite the essential continuity of power the rapid regime change signalled to the West 
an opportunity to encourage systemic as well as economic reform. Western market 
capitalism and its relative prosperity represented one of the key pull factors for Western- 
style reforms in Eastern Europe. With the rejection of Communism, the market was taken 
by both West and East European governments as the only available alternative. "' In the 
words of the World Bank, 
The ultimate goal of the transition in countries shedding central planning is to build a 
thriving market economy capable of delivering long-term growth in living standards. Nat 
distinguishes transition from economic reforms in other countries is the systemic change 
involved: reforms must penetrate to thefundamental rules of the game, to the institutions 
that shape behaviour and guide organizations. `5 
The assumption underpinning the work of multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, 
is that Eastern Europe must emulate the West and follow a path towards liberal 
democracy. The injection of free market capitalism into the economies of Eastern Europe, 
coupled with democratic reform is seen as the necessary means by which to achieve 
this. "' 
Choosing the best methods of maximising the factors of production; labour, land and 
capital is the main objective of a free market (such features as high unemployment 
indicates a failure to achieve this). In opposition to the Soviet-style political economy, 
free market theorists locate state intervention as the key obstacle to reaching informed 
and rational choices. It is believed that such choices, in terms of supply and demand, can 
44 The failure of a command economy and the re-introduction of market forces has reflected a world-wide shift 
towards free market or neo-liberal ethics. In the West this trend is identified with the apparent failure of Keynsianism, 
culminating in the rise of Reaganism and Thatcherism. 
45 World Bank, From Plan to Market - World Development Report, Washington D. C., 1996. p. 2. 46 The concept of deMOCTatisation has tended to be restricted to the political sphere and equated with market reform. 
Haynes and Hussan, op. cit. 
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only be made in the context of a market determined price mechanism. According to this 
theory, consumers and producers acting individually through the market and responding 
to price changes are able to determine what should be produced, by what methods and 
how much each shall benefit. Given that consumer satisfaction and hence consumer 
sovereignty is the ideal of free-market theory, the reforms in Eastern Europe have seen a 
reverse in the previous neglect of consumer goods. Intrinsic to this has been the cutting 
back of all state intervention, and with it universal social protection. 47 
Table 3.7 Real Gross Domestic Product in Eastern Europe, 1990-1997 (1989=100) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Czech R. 100 80.8 84.7 79.3 78.6 80.7 84.5 87.7 88.6 
Slovakia 100 97.5 83.4 77.6 74.4 78.0 83.8 89.5 95.3 
Hungary 100 96.5 85.2 82.6 82.0 84.4 86.0 86.7 90.5 
Poland 100 88.4 82.3 84.3 87.6 91.9 98.6 104.5 111.7 
Romania 100 91.8 80.0 72.9 73.9 76.5 81.7 88.0 82.2 
Bulgaria 100 90.9 83.9 79.1 76.2 77.9 79.8 68.2 63.8 
Source: UNIDESIPA and UNEconomic Commissionfor Europe. 48 
To justify this reduced role for the state, free market theorists have fallen back on the 
'invisible hand' of the market to argue that there is an inherent self-correcting mechanism, 
which helps reduce the chances of extreme imbalances. However, with huge drops in 
GDP and real wages (see Tables 3.7 and 3.10), coupled with widening inequalities and a 
growing number of people living in poverty (see Tables 3.13 and 3.14), this clearly has 
not been the case. For Bulgaria this has been particularly acute, whereby in line with 
other South Eastern economies, it has suffered a greater decline in GDP than in other East 
European economies. During 1990-1992, there was a cumulative drop in GDP of 44.2 
per cent in Bulgaria, compared with a drop of 21.5 per cent in Poland and 27.3 per cent in 
Czechoslovakia . 
4' This has meant that in countries like Bulgaria, problems of poverty 
have been particularly severe. According to a 1998 UN report on poverty in Eastern 
47 Gregory and Stuart, op. cit. p. 22. 
48 UN Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe 1995-1996: United Nations, World Economic 
and Social Survey - Trends and Policies in the World Economy, New York, 1996. p. 24. For 1996-1997: Source: 
Wirtschaftslage und Reformprozesse in Mittel-und Osteurope, Sammelband, Berlin, 1998. 
49 Anarcs Solimano, "The Post Socialist Transitions in Comparative Perspective", World Development, 21 (11), 1993. 
p. 1825. 
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Europe, 5 per cent of Bulgarians were measured as absolutely poor and about 50 per cent 
relatively poor. " 
The high social costs of market reform have failed to convince free market advocates that 
there may be alternatives. Indeed, it has been quite the opposite. As Haynes and Husan 
argue, the transition has spelled out a social programme that specifically aims to conserve 
power through these very factors of pseudo-privatisation and a high social burden. " It is 
therefore possible to argue that the 'transition' is a specific aspect of market capitalism, in 
that behind the rhetoric of 'transition' there is an implicit agenda of market expansion into 
Eastern Europe. " In the words of Humphrey, "the terin'transitiow suggests a goal defined 
by the neo-liberal model of capitalist development. "" It can be argued that this is largely 
because the ultimate objective of the market is self-survival, and in order for market 
capitalism to live and grow in the West it must find new markets outside of itself in 
which to expand and exploit. The survival of East European economies is therefore 
essential for the continued growth and expansion of the market in the West. 
3.7 The West and the 'transition' 
The European Union, in particular, has much to gain from ensuring successful 
development in Eastern Europe. In the words of the World Bank, Eastern Europe offers 
the European Union an area of "exceptionally good export markets. ""' Sachs, a leading 
economic adviser during the transition, echoes this sentiment, when he argues that 
50 Cited in the "Vestnik-digest" mailing list. Archived at: <vestnik-digest@Bulgaria. com> (accessed on 20 October 
1998. )
*51 M. Haynes and R. Husan, op. cit. 
52 This is according to the idea that capitalism is an aspect of class society, that is, a society in which class groups 
share common interests based on their common location in the process of production. In a capitalist society there is a 
fundamental divide between those who own the means of production in whatever form, and those whose only asset is 
their labour. The degree of alienation from the control over production signals how far a given population has effective 
control of private or, indeed, 'state property. Under Communism, the degree of alienation was high suggesting that 
effective control of 'collective' property still lay in the hands of a few despite official dogma claiming otherwise. 
Haynes, op. cit. p. 479. 
53 Humphrey, op. cit. p. 9. 
54 World Bank, op. cit. p. 133. The Europe Agreements have allowed the EU to 'take care of marketing' in the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe in order that they gain access to a relatively skilled and cheap labour force. 
That restrictions on certain imports have remained despite the rhetoric of 'opening up, such as the unequal issuing of 
trade tariffs. It appears that the EU have been bold in lifting tariffs for imports into Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union, however, these reduced tariffs do not cover the key industries and exporting agencies of textile, steel, 
agriculture, or energy. EU, The EUEncyclopaedia andDirectory, Europa Publications, London, 2nd edition, 1996. 
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Western Europe will benefit greatly from the transition in terms of gaining access to 
"low-cost skilled labour. "" This underpins his wider vision of East-West relations where 
"outward-oriented trade regimes'ý are seen as the way to "stimulate growth", during 
which "Western Europe [becomes] the logical trading partner for its Eastern 
neighbours. "" 
Although trade between East and West grew massively in the early years of 'transition' 
this has clearly not been as mutually beneficial as at first it may have appeared. The 
composition of trade in terms of input and export has been very uneven. For example, 
some countries in Eastern Europe have seen huge drops in traditionally strong exports 
and others have been forced to import goods that they themselves are abundant in. In 
Bulgaria, for example, the collapse of Comecon was of particular detriment to its food 
industry which was one of its key exporters and heavily dependent on trade within the 
Soviet bloc. Since 1989 Bulgaria has experienced a dramatic decline in processed food, 
with a 85 per cent drop in canned tomatoes. 57 Other major exports such as tobacco and 
wine have also suffered a great deal, where between 1985 and 1997 exports in tobacco 
declined by over two-thirds and wine by nearly a half5' At the same time Bulgaria found 
itself importing produce that had normally been a stronghold in their exports. The most 
notable example of this was with the shift that occurred in the trade of fruits and 
vegetables. While experiencing a large drop in exports in this area as outlined above, by 
1997 Bulgaria had undergone a four-fold increase in the amount of fruits and vegetables 
that they imported. 59 
55 He made this point in specific reference to Poland and its engineering sector, the 'cheapness' of which, he argues, 
makes it an attractive place, "to produce high-value added goods for export to Western Europe". Jeffrey Sachs, 
"Building a Market Economy in Poland", Scientific American, 266 (3), March 1992. p. 25. In a similar manner, Doris 
Hildebrand highlights the business potential in Eastern Europe in her discussion of the necessary business strategy EC 
companies must take when investing in Eastern Europe. At the top of her list of incentives are profit, low production 
costs and wages. D. Hildebrand, "The Restructuring Process in Central and Eastern Europe: Business Strategies for EC 
companies", West European Politics, 15 (2), April, 1992. 
'6 Sachs, op. cit. p. 2 1. 
57 The export of wine in Bulgaria fell by nearly a half between 1985 and 1997. UNDP, National Human Development 
Report Bulgaria 1998: The State of Transition and Transition ofthe State, United Nations Development Project, Sofia, 
1998. pp. 92-93. 
58 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Homepage, <http: //www. unece. org/ead/pub/survey. htrn> 
(accessed November 1998). 
59 Ibid. 
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Undermining all of this is the failure of Western companies to prosper in countries like 
Bulgaria. In 1997 the Belgian-based firm Amylum decided to temporarily close its plant 
for maize processing in Bulgaria in response to the economic downturn. This had been 
one of the largest foreign investors in Bulgaria, when in 1993 it bought the plant for US$ 
20 million. ' Table 3.8 provides us with a more general picture of this uneven balance in 
trade. It tracks the trade patterns of Bulgaria since 1988, and shows an overall increase in 
exports to and imports from Western countries, compared with a huge drop in trade with 
other East European countries. 
Table 3.8 Structure of exports and imports for Bulgaria, by groups of countries, %, in Bulgarian 
leva, 1988-1992. 
Exports Imports 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
EEurope 75.3 76.8 76.4 54.9 24.2 67.9 65.8 68.1 46.4 28.8 
OECD 6.4 8.0 11.9 26.3 42.3 15.5 17.1 21.6 32.8 46.5 
EC 4.6 5.5 7.9 15.7 30.8 9.7 10.3 16.3 20.7 32.6 
EFTA 1.2 1.5 1.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.2 7.8 6.7 
USA 0.2 0.6 1.7 3.4 1.7 0.9 1.5 0.6 2.9 3.0 
Source: Iznos i Vnos (Exports and Imports), Quarterly Bulletin ofthe National Statistical Bulleft . n. 61 
The unequal relationship between East and West is most clearly manifested in the overt 
political role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both of 
which have taken a lead in the 'reconstruction' of Eastern Europe through a series of aid 
and lending programmes. " Their structural adjustment reforms claim to have two central 
objectives: to raise standards of living and to increase individual freedom with the 
protection of individual rights. " The World Bank and the IMF argue that the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have to undergo this 'transition' period, or 
as in the words of Sachs, pass through a 'valley of tears'. " 
60 UNDP, op. cit. p. 93. 
61 Cited in Rumen Dobrinsky et al., "Economic Transition and Industrial Restructuring in Bulgaria", in M. A. 
Landeresmann and 1. P.. Szekely (eds. ), Industrial Restructuring and Trade Orientation in Eastern Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995. p. 237, Table 7.7. 
62 Swift in his discussion on North-South relations argues that the World Bank and the IMF, "are not neutral economic 
mechanisms but contain a powerful bias in favour of global competition, the expansion of capitalism, and corporate 
enterprise. " Richard Swift, "Squeezing the South", New Internationalist, 257, July, 1994. p. 5. 
63 N. Barr and R. W. Harbison, "Hopes, Tears and Transformation", Transition, 5 (8), October, 1994. p. 5. 
" Sachs, op. cit. p. 26. 
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Bulgaria joined the World Bank in September 1990. Since then the World Bank, through 
its financial assistance, has helped shape much of Bulgaria! s subsequent macroeconomic 
policy. Under its first two loans, namely the Technical Assistance Loan (US$17 million) 
in June 1991, and the Structural Adjustment Loan (US$250 million) in August 1991, the 
World Bank gave policy advice and institution building support. Other loans have 
included: US$93 million for an Energy Project in 1993; US$125 million for a Debt and 
Debt Service Reduction Loan in 1994; US$26 million to improve the quality and 
efficiency of health services in 1996; and a US$100 million Financial and Enterprise 
Sector Adjustment Loan in 1997. " These have involved to varying degrees cutting back 
the state, a programme of privatisation and deregulation, and the unleashing of market 
forces. " The implications of this have been rising inflation, a decline in real wages, rising 
income inequality, and a substantial rise in unemployment and poverty (see Tables 3.7- 
3.13). 67 
In order that the 'transition' countries be eligible for large scale aid (i. e. that which 
exceeds emergency relieD, the World Bank and IMF stipulate that they, "must be ready to 
improve their governance through political and economic liberalisation", in line with the 
Western blueprint. " Adherence to Western political models is therefore one of the main 
conditions under which the Bank and IMF operate. " The benefits of transition are seen as 
outweighing the problems, 
65 These figures were taken from the World Bank Web Page, <http: //www. worldbank. org/html/extdr/offrep/eca 
/bgrcb. htm> (accessed September 1997). 
66 There have been various debates about the pace and order of reform, mainly between the 'gradualists' and the 'Big 
Bang theorists'. The latter have been most influential in their encouragement of the simultaneous implementation of the 
following interdependent elements: releasing of prices in order for them to find their equilibfium levels; elimination of 
restrictions on private economic activity; discipline to be imposed on remaining state enterprises; and the 
establishment of price stability. There were variations even within this school of thought, such as Kornai, who talked 
of a 'step-by-step' approach while Sachs referred to reforms in a time span of 3-5 years. 
67 For example, between January 1991 and the end of 1994 food pfices in Bulgaria had increased from 100 to nearly 
3,500. Source: National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, cited by IMF, Bulgaria - Recent Economic Developments, 
IMF Staff Country Report, No. 96/13, February 1996, p. 77. 
r'8 Jeffrey Sachs, "Beyond Bretton Woods-A New Blueprint", The Economist, I October 1994. p. 28. It Was reported 
in the The Financial Times that the IMF saw the need for, "bold and comprehensive reform so as to put in place all the 
main elements of a free-market system from the start", quoted in Ian Jefferies, Socialist Economies and the Transition 
to the Market: A Guide, Routledge, London, 1993. pp. 333-34. 
69 For example, in Bulgaria, the World Bank provided nearly US$100 million funding only on condition that the 
former state-owned enterprises shares would be distributed among fifteen investment funds. These funds, although not 
officially owned by Western financial experts, are certainly staffed by them. 
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the economic benefits of moving into the world market are the benefits of internal market 
liberalisation - writ enormous. Capital, goods, and ideas cross borders in response to 
demand and supply [ .. ] fuellingJaster growth in productivity, trade volumes, and national income. At the same time integration helps lock countries onto thepath toward more-open 
trade, while membership in international institutions spurs domestic institution building. 70 
Table 3.9 Annual Inflation Rate 1990-1997 (CPI annual average % change) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Czech R. 10.8 56.6 11.1 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8 9.5 
Slovakia 10.8 61.2 10.1 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.5 
Hungary 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.4 
Poland 585.8 70.3 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 16.0 
Romania 5.1 161.1 210.4 256.1 136.1 32.3 38.8 145.0 
Bulgaria 26.3 333.5 82.0 73.0 96.3 62.0 123.0 1,049.0 
Source: UNICEF, 1998. 
In a similar manner, the reasons given for the economic crisis in Eastern Europe have 
tended to focus on the way in which market reforms have been implemented rather than 
questioning their initial integrity. Various commentators, for example, have claimed that 
market reforms failed either because they were only half measures, or because those who 
did undertake shock therapy pulled back too soon . 
7' However, as highlighted by Haynes 
and Husan, it has become increasingly clear that more long term factors have contributed 
to this crisis situation. First, the transition began in the context of a short term world 
recession, and against the backdrop of a longer term slow down in the world economy. 
As a result, Western aid and investment has not been as forthcoming as had been hoped. "
Second, the reliance on rapid liberalisation as the answer rested on the flawed assumption 
that such reform would lead to the appropriate supply response. Third, the collapse of 
Comecon has meant the loss of East European's main self-sustaining trade network 
forcing them instead to turn towards Western markets. 73 
70 World Bank, op. cit. p. 132. 
71 The World Bank in its 1996 report, for example, distinguished between those countries that had embraced reform 
and those that did so less effectively, of which Bulgaria was one. Ibid. 
72 The 1995 Human Development Report for Bulgaria acknowledged that foreign investment has been "rather limited" 
stating that "the average investment of the foreign companies registered in [Bulgaria] is merely US$ 1000". UNDP, 
Bulgaria: Human Development Report, Sofia, 1995. p. 2. 
73 Haynes and Husan, op. cit. 
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The practical difficulty of measuring the transition has also presented problems for 
governments and analysts for dealing with the crisis. In Bulgaria, for example, the 
parliament rejected the 1997 report of the National Statistic Institute and replaced its 
chief on the basis that the report had relied on 'inauthentic' data about the state of the real 
sector and the 'grey economy. According to UN data, the share of the 'grey economy' in 
Bulgaria is 16.8 per cent. Unconfirmed figures of Bulgarian experts, however, claim that 
it accounts for 45-60 per cent of the country's economy. Such huge discrepancies reveal 
the problems that have underpinned both official and unofficial attempts at explaining the 
'transition!. This does not detract from the fact that, ultimately, the economic crisis is a 
product of both long term economic decline and unequal relations between East and 
West. The 'transition' is a period of market reform characterised by economic crisis and 
growing social inequality. 
3.8 Social inequality during the 'transition' 
We have seen that social inequality was already a feature of Communist society, but since 
1989 this has been further fuelled by the large social burden imposed by market reform. 
As a result, social inequality on a huge scale has become a defining feature of the 
'transition!. Problems of measuring inequality have complicated the process of 
interpretation in terms of reaching a consensus about how best to measure living 
standards during the Soviet era and how to then translate this effectively to the post 1989 
situation. UNICEF, for example, note the following obstacles to reliable survey data in 
Eastern Europe: the increasing number of small firms and self-employed, which are often 
excluded from earnings surveys; increasing complexity of social security benefits, 
especially in terms of means tested benefits; the introduction of personal income tax 
which may prevent accurate reporting of incomes in household surveys; high inflation, 
which may render data on annual incomes meaningless; and the changed relationship 
between the citizen and the state which may in itself reduce the willingness to co-operate 
with official enquiries. "' On the other hand, they observe a number of improvements. 
74 UNICEF note an overall drop in response rates in the countries of Eastern Europe. UNICEF, Educationfor All? The 
MONEE Project CEE/CIS/Baltics, Regional Monitoring Report, No. 5,1998. p. 4. 
105 
Data more accurately represent the distribution of economic welfare with price 
liberalisation and the removal of subsidies. Statistical offices have also extended the 
coverage of surveys to groups previously ignored. Although this has enhanced 
comparability with the West, the adoption of new concepts and methodologies has 
reduced its ability to compare meaningfully with pre-reform sources. " This section 
attempts to unravel some of these complexities in its exploration of some of the more 
general trends of social inequality during the 'transition'. 
It was generally agreed that the releasing of market forces in the aftermath of Communist 
collapse required some degree of social protection but there were disputes as to its extent. 
In Russia, Gorbachev had already set the standard in the early years ofperestroika, when 
he proclaimed that: "socialism has nothing to do with equalising, " and outlined the new 
'socialist' criteria for distributing social benefits, "from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his work. "" This served to lay the legitimating foundations for a 
process of withdrawal of state protection throughout Eastern Europe, as Hungarian 
Finance Minister, LaJos Bokros remarked, "The universal entitlement will have to go. "" 
Coupled with rising inflation, a decline in real incomes, rising income inequality, and a 
substantial rise in unemployment, this welfare retreat signalled the need for securing 
some alternative forms of compensation. Rather than representing a concern with social 
justice, however, moves to provide some form of social safety net were more informed by 
the political concern of protecting market reform. In the words of Chu and Gupta: "For 
market reforms to be politically viable, adverse impacts on vulnerable segments of 
society must be mitigated. "" 
Various problems have emerged that pose obstacles to the effective implementation of a 
reduced welfare policy. First, there is popular expectation: where the old command 
75 UNICEF, op. cit. 
76 Quoted by Deacon, op. cit. p. 182. 
77 Lajos Bokros (interview with), "Hungarian Finance Minister Lajos Bokros Explains his Package", Transition, 6 (5- 
6) May/June, 1995. p. 13. OECD News Release, Beyond 2000: The New Social Policy Agenda, 1995. 
78 Ke-Young Chu and Sanjeev Gupta, "Protecting the Poor-Social Safety Nets During Transition", Finance and 
Development, 30 (2), June, 1993. p. 24. 
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economies failed the new market ones have been expected to succeed. Second, past 
neglect of effective targeting has provided weak foundations for the development of new 
style means tested benefits. Third, new problems of marketisation have presented a 
specific set of problems, such as declining real wages and high unemployment (see 
Tables 3.10 and 3.11). 
Table 3.10 Real Wages 1989-1996 (1989=100) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Czech R. 100 93.6 68.9 76.0 78.8 84.9 92.2 100.4 
Slovakia 100 94.2 67.3 72.6 69.2 71.4 75.3 81.9 
Hungary 100 94.3 87.7 86.5 83.1 89.1 78.2 74.3 
Poland 100 75.6 75.4 73.3 71.2 71.6 73.7 77.9 
Romania 100 105.2 88.9 77.3 64.4 64.6 72.7 79.8 
Bulgaria 100 111.5 68.0 76.7 77.6 63.7 60.2 49.6 
Source: UNICEF, 1998. 
Finally, the lack of money available has imposed severe limitations on government 
spending in this area. " In many respects the new system of social welfare is one very 
much shaped by a neo-liberal reaction to the perceived failures of the old system. Other 
factors have also played a part, such as, which political party is in power; the extent of 
influence of the Catholic/Orthodox church; and the extent of support from multilateral 
agencies. " 
Table 3.11 Annual registered unemployment rate, 1989-1997 (%) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Czech R. - 0.3 2.6 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.1 
Slovakia - 0.6 6.6 11.4 12.7 14.4 13.8 12.6 
Hungary 0.4 0.8 8.5 12.3 12.1 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.4 
Poland - 6.1 11.8 13.6 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.6 - 
Romania - - 3.0 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.3 - 
Bulgaria - - 13.2 15.8 14.0 11.4 11.1 12.5 
Source: UNICEF, 1998. 
Structural adjustment represented the answer for many transition advisors, who sought 
ways of correlating market reform with social security provision. This could only be 
79 Deacon, op. cit. p. 184. 
80 ]bid. pp. 194-197 
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done, it was argued, by fimdamentally changing the ground rules of production and 
exchange. "' According to Gary McManon structural adjustment policy ultimately rests on 
a commitment to capitalist markets, 
A [structural adjustment policy] generally consists of a devaluation of the currency, a 
reduction of government subsidies to firms, an attempt to get rid of or reduce the anti- 
export bias of the economy, some liberalisation of the labour market so as to reduce real 
wages, a reduction of the government deficit, and an assortment of other policies which 
will make the economy more reliant on prices or capitalist markets. " 
Demery and Addison in their support of structural adjustment policy praise its long term 
benefits of alleviating poverty over the adverse short terms effect of aggravating it. The 
solution, they argue, is to increase the productive capacity of the poor to the greatest 
extent possible by relying less on transfer payments, e. g. income support, 
Insofar as the poor are economically active, a potential exists for raising their primary 
incomes through their direct involvement in the process ofstructural adjustment. Benefits 
may also extend to some of the non-working poor who receive transfers from family 
members who work"' 
The argument rests on finding ways to encourage the most impoverished to help 
themselves, such as by enhancing their access to productive assets; raising their return on 
assets; improving their employment opportunity; ensuring their access to education and 
health services; and, as a last resort, supplementing their incomes with transfers. " It is 
anticipated that such an approach would not only alleviate extreme poverty, but also 
increase overall output and productivity, therefore, proving consistent with the aims of 
structural adjustment, 
[IJI structural adjustment reduces prices distortions, enhances competition, and erodes 
monopoly profits and economic rents, the incomes of the wealthy are likely to fall and 
those of the poor to rise [.. ] if[it] ultimately promotes economic growth, the alleviation of 
poverty will undoubtedly be an easierproposition. 85 
a' This was an argument that had already been applied to the Third World situation. L. Demery and T. Addison, "The 
Alleviation of Poverty under Structural Adjustment", A World Bank Publication, Washington D. C. 1987. p. 2. 
82 Gary McManon, "Structural Adjustment with a Human Face -A Comment on Adelman and Taylor", The Journal of 
Development Studies, 28 (1), October, 199 1. p. 150. 
83 Demerey and Addison, op. cit. p. 3. 
84 Ibid. In the light of huge devaluation that has destroyed life savings, tackling the pension problem has been a major 
concern. This has led to such suggestions as raising the retirement age. S. Gupta and R. Hagemann, "Social Protection 
During Russia's Economic Transformation", Finance and Development, 31 (4), December, 1994. p. 17. 
85 Demery and Addison, op. cit., p. 5. 
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In the light of diminishing resources and increasing poverty, structural adjustment 
policies are portrayed as saviours in that they enable governments to secure the maximum 
benefit from limited allocations, 
the inconsistency between increasing transfers to the poor and cutting government budgets 
must be resolved b restructuring such transfers to maximise the benefits for those in Y 
greatest need, while reducing benefits to the better off. 86 
This has encouraged a focus on ideas of a social safety net in order to ensure some kind 
of protection, however limited, to those considered most in need. " Although never 
intended for long term use, the social safety net has replaced principles of universalism 
and is increasingly being relied upon in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. "
The logic of this argument rests on the assumption that the poor need to become more 
productive and less dependent on welfare. This is also the premise of social exclusion 
theory and its strategies of inclusion which articulate the need for improved targeting of 
excluded groups. Rather than offering a conceptual framework that tackles social 
inequality head on, social exclusion theory rests upon ideas of self-help to promote 
'inclusioiV. Consequently, the concept of social exclusion has proved a useful ally to the 
social-safety net approach and its commitment to the selective assistance of only the 
'most vulnerable'. 
In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the term'social safety net'has been used in 
a loose sense to encompass a variety of limited social protection measures and social 
services. Sometimes the emphasis is on specific circumstances connected with structural 
adjustment policies or with measures to help those through 'short-term stress'. Chu and 
86 Demerey and Addison, op. cit. p. 35. 
87 The idea of a social safety net was an original component of Beveridge's welfare which stated the need for a system 
of means-tested benefits to secure a safety net for the minority whose needs are not met by the wider scheme. Designed 
at a time when full employment appeared achievable, the safety net was not intended for long term use. M. Hill, 
Understanding Social Policy, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 5th edition, 1997. p. 26. 
88 Not all social policy reform advice, however, favour only social safety nets. See for example Barr and Harbison, op. 
cit. For a discussion on the conflicts that have emerged between European and US camps inside the World Bank 
relating to issues of social welfare, see Bob Deacon, Global Social Policy: International Organisations and the Future 
of Weý(are, Sage Publications, London, 1997. 
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Gupta, for example, argue that benefits should be limited to families with low per capita 
incomes, but quickly emphasise their reluctance towards benefits in principle: "Even if a 
mechanism to monitor household incomes is devised, these benefits can create work 
disincentives. "" The failures of state subsidies under Communism to adequately and 
fairly meet the social needs of the population has been used to reinforce this argument 
against universal state intervention. Chu and Gupta, for example, argue that, 
Since high-income households often consume more of these subsidised product than low- 
income households do, subsidies provide more benefits in absolute terms to high-income 
than to low-income households. "" 
The 1996 IMF report in its explanation of the rationale behind the social safety net in 
Eastern Europe is reminiscent of anti-welfare arguments in the 1940/50s. The report 
emphasised "avoiding distortions of labour supply" by finding "short term" remedies 
only to those "individuals adversely affected". " The so-called challenge of avoiding 
'transformation traps' in Eastern Europe and the Western tendency to find ways of 
distinguishing between deserving and non-deserving poor has led to an approach based 
on a hierarchy of priorities and a language of 'targeting'. " Milanovic, however, points 
out that even if perfect targeting is achieved in Eastern Europe, transfers for the poor 
would only just bring them up to the poverty line. " 
As a consequence, the massive drop in income for the majority of the population, the 
growing differentiation between social groups and the rapid growth in extreme poverty 
for certain groups have all been reduced to mere "short term difficulties", which 
according to Cahill need not "put into question the necessity for and wisdom of economic 
89 Chu and Gupta, op. cit. p. 26. However, in 1985 a study was carried out into the myths of persistence poverty, 
which argued that poverty programmes of social assistance did not necessarily generate dependency. This was 
demonstrated through the relatively weak links between the welfare status of the parents and that of their children. 
Mary Corcoran, et al., "Myth and Reality: The Causes and Persistence of Poverty", Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 4 (4), 1985. pp. 516-536. 
90 Chu and Gupta, op. cit. p. 26. 
91 IMF, World Economic Outlook, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Washington, May, 1996. p. 83. 
92 See for example, Richard Portes, "Transformation Traps", 7he Economic Journal, 104, September, 1994. 
93 Branco Milanovic, "A Cost of Transition: 50 million New Poor and Growing Inequality", Transition, 5 (8) October, 
1994. p. 2. 
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reform. "' This 'wisdom', however, has failed to adequately explain or deal with these 
continuing problems of poverty and social inequality. Further still, the rhetoric of making 
the system 'cost effective' whereby only 'vulnerable' groups are targeted has clearly led to 
a series of problems, not least of which has been the failure to address growing social 
inequality. The arbitrary distinction between eligible/ineligible has led to the 
discrimination and stigmatisation of certain groups. Means testing benefits and increased 
administrative needs have added to rather than saved on costs to social spending. 
Furthermore, rather than leading to a re-evaluation of the transition and market reform, 
the persistence of poverty has instead confirmed for many analysts that it is forces of 
social exclusion, rather than of market capitalism, that represent the greatest challenge to 
society and its progress. 
3.9 Declining living standards 
The nature of social inequality in Eastern Europe during the transition has evolved as an 
extension of patterns that existed under Communism namely: declining living standards; 
stretching social differentiation; and the increasing visibility of poverty groups. Declining 
living standards has most obviously been tied to market reform and its implications of 
economic contraction and rapid inflation. Although measuring the scale of this decline 
has proved problematic, the scale of falling living standards can be detected in general 
terrns along a number of lines. 
First has been the massive increase in unemployment. By 1994,10-15 per cent of the 
labour force in Eastern Europe lacked work and over 40 per cent of these had been 
jobless for more than year. " According to figures produced by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), between October 1990 and June 1992, enterprises across Eastern 
Europe cut total employment by 15 per cent, and in mid-1992,55 per cent of all 
94 C. Cahill, "From Marx to Market", The OECD Observer, 182, June/July, 1993. p. 13. Pro-market reforms did 
acknowledge, however reluctantly, that the governments were likely to face difficult implementation issues entailing 
substantial economic and social costs, but saw these as only initial and superficial consequences that would fade in the 
long term. W. Wapenhaus "The Challenge of Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe", Finance and Development, 27 
(4), December, 1991, pp. 2-5. 
95 0. Blanchard et al., "Unemployment in Eastern Europe", Finance and Development, 31 (4), Dec. 1994. p. 7. Despite 
this, Sachs stuck to his argument that unemployment insurance was not worthy of implementation in that it easily 
outpaced budgetary realities. Sachs, op. cit., 1992. pp. 21-22. 
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establishments estimated that they could produce current levels of output with fewer 
workers. " As Table 3.11 indicates the rise in unemployment has been particularly acute 
for a country like Bulgaria. " 
Compared to many transition economies the Bulgarian experience is often seen as 
unusual insofar as unemployment soared very quickly to levels higher than elsewhere and 
subsequently has remained at comparatively high levels. The raw data on unemployment, 
however, tell only part of the story. Many of the unemployed in Bulgaria are considered 
as long term unemployed, a feature common to most other 'transition! economies, which, 
as discussed below, have been identified as forming a new pocket of poverty. There is 
also a clear regional disparity between rates of unemployment in Bulgaria. " 
Table 3.12 Number of those entitled to unemployment benefit in the Rousse region of Bulgaria 
1993-1995. 
1993 1994 1995 
Registered unemployed 27,366 18,870 15,093 
entitled to benefits 
Registered unemployed not 38,810 37,340 41,509 
entitled to benefits 
Source: Regional Employment Office, Rousse, 1995 
In Rousse, the registered unemployed stood as high as 20.7 per cent in 1993, compared 
with 8.8 per cent in Sofia. " Further to this, an increasing number of these registered 
unemployed are being denied compensation. Table 3.12, based on figures recorded by the 
Employment Bureau for the Rousse region of Bulgaria, shows how the number of those 
eligible for claiming benefit has declined, and conversely, how the numbers of those not 
entitled to benefits has increased. 
96 ILO, World of Work, 2, February, 1993. p. 2. 
97 In Bulgaria, an unemployed worker is someone considered to be of working age, who has not signed a work 
contract, who does not exercise any kind of paid activity, and who is registered with an employment office as seeking 
work. 
98 See also Donald W. Buckwalter, "Spatial Inequality, Foreign Investment, and Economic Transition in Bulgaria", 
Professional Geographer, 47 (3), 1995. 
99 Garabed Minassian and Stoyan Totev, "The Bulgarian Economy in Transition -Regional Aftereffects", Eastern 
European Economics, 34 (3), May/June, 1996. p. 64, Table 11. 
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Second has been the drop in real wages, which is another significant factor to consider in 
analysing the overall decline in living standards (see Table 3.10). The 1998 Human 
Development Report revealed that between 1990 and 1998 the real income of Bulgarian 
households had declined by 65.6 per cent. One of the implications of this was that 
although the availability of many consumer goods has drastically improved the 
purchasing power of the population almost halved between 1992 and 1996. "' 
Rising unemployment coupled with declining real wages has contributed to increasing 
rates of absolute poverty (see Tables 3.13 and 3.14). "' In particular reference to Bulgaria, 
Table 14 shows how the number of people with incomes below the social standard 
minimum has risen to nearly four fifths of the population and the number of people with 
an income below the minimum living standard has reached two thirds of the population. 
This is also reflected in the share of income spent of foodstuffs which, now that former 
state guarantees have been removed, is a useful indicator for measuring poverty. In 
Bulgaria the proportion of income spent on foodstuffs has been on the increase from 
some 36 per cent at the beginning of 1993, to 51.2 per cent at the end of 1996, to a further 
55.9 per cent at the end of 1997. "' 
100 UNDP, 1998, op. cit. p. 44. See also, LJNDP, 1995, op. cit. 
101 The setting of a poverty line is central to any analysis on poverty and inequality. In high inflation countries, 
poverty lines are inflation-adjusted on a regular basis, however, as Fields articulates in reference to the transition 
economics of Eastern Europe, "we must not increase the poverty line by the rate of economic growth for this would 
lose the notion of poverty as a state of absolute economic deprivation" Gary S. Fields, "Poverty and Income 
Distribution - Data for Measuring Poverty and Inequality Changes in the Developing Countries", Journal of 
Development Economics, 44,1994. pp. 90-9 1. 
102 LjNDp, Op. Cit. 1998, p. 44. 
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Table 3.13 Poverty headcount (%) and total number of poor (in millions) in Eastern Europe, 
1987-1994 
Poverty headcount (%) Total number of poor (millions) 
1987/88 1993/94 1987-88 1993/4 
Czech R. 0 <1 0 0.1 
Slovakia 0 <1 0 0 
Hungary <1 3 0.1 0.3 
Poland 6 19 2.1 7.4 
Romania 6 39 1.3 8.9 
Bulgaria 2 33 0.1 2.9 
Source: World Bank, 1996.103 
Table 3.14 Impoverishment of the population in Bulgaria 1990-1994 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Population with income below: 
Minimum social standard -%* 37 57 62 65 88 
Minimum living standard - %* - - 38 43 67 
Population with income below: 
50% of the average wage -%8 10 19 19.5 - 
Calculated on the basis of the consumer 'shopping basket' containing 497 items in thefirst place and 496 
in the second but with varying quantities ofgoods and services. 
Source: LWDP, 1998. 
Third has been changing mortality and morbidity rates, which offer another indication of 
the rising levels of both relative and absolute poverty. Cornia, for example, in specific 
reference to the transition in Eastern Europe, notes that, "sharply reduced food intake 
compounded by greater dietary imbalances and by the deterioration of hygiene, sanitation 
and housing conditions have [ ... ] likely affected mortality by weakening resistance to 
disease. """ In Bulgaria evidence of this could be seen in the changing pattern of meat and 
dairy consumption whereby for the general population it has shrunk. As a result, 
morbidity rates have been on the increase. For example between 1980-1990 the annual 
illness from tuberculosis in Bulgaria fell from 37.0 to 25.1 per hundred thousand. 
However, from 1991, the annual rate began to increase reaching 38.0 per hundred 
thousand in 1993. "' 
103 The poverty line is SPPP 120 per person per month at 1990 prices. Branco Milanovic, "Income, Inequality and 
Poverty during the Transition", World Bank Research Paper Series, No. 11, Washington D. C., World Bank, 1996. 
104 G. A. Cornia, "Poverty, Food Consumption, and Nutrition During the Transition to the Market Economy in Eastern 
Europe", American Economic Review AEA Papers and Proceedings, 84 (2), May, 1994. 
105 UNDP, op. cit., 1995. p. 54. 
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Finally, and perhaps one of the most revealing indicators of declining living standards has 
been an overall decline in the natural increase rate in Bulgaria. Between the periods 1986- 
1990 and 1991-1993 there was a drop in the birth rate from 12.7 to 10.4. Combined with 
a rising death rate from 11.9 between 1986-1990 to 12.6 between 1991-1993 these two 
trends have resulted in, for the first time since 1900, an overall decline in the natural 
increase rate (-2.2 between 1991-1993, compared with 0.8 for 1986-1990). This stood in 
stark contrast to the period between 1900 and 1985, during which the natural increase rate 
had never sunk below 0.8, which during this period maintained an average increase rate 
of 10.3. "' 
3.10 Stretching social differentiation 
The drop in overall income, the rise in unemployment, and increasing levels of poverty 
hitting more and more people have been largely put down to the wider economic crisis 
and its implications of rising inflation. The inequalities that lie behind these macro 
figures however are more difficult to explain and justify. Stretching differentiation 
between social groups in terms of personal and household incomes has been a major 
defining aspect of social inequality during the transition. It is estimated that on average 
income inequality across Eastern Europe has increased by around 5/6 Gini points from 24 
in 1987 to 30 in 1993. "' The Gini point measurement offers an accessible and attractive 
framework for displaying differences in levels of social inequality over time and between 
countries. At the same time, if it is not used in conjunction with more specific 
measurements of income differentials, the Gini coefficient indicator runs risk of over- 
simplifying the picture. Taking this into account, a closer examination of income 
distribution is called for. 
In Bulgaria, the increase in income differentiation has been particularly visible. In 1991 
the richest 10 per cent were in receipt of 12 per cent of the total income of the population, 
"a Zahari Karamfilov, "The Demographic Situation in Bulgaria: State, Trends, Prospects", Bulgarian Military Review, 
3 (4), Winter, 1995. p. 73. 
107 Milanovic, 1994, op. cit. pp. 3-4. However, we must be at least a little cautious of such figures, in that during 
surveys people tend to underestimate their incomes, for fear that the information may be misused. 
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which by 1993 had risen to 24 per cent. Meanwhile, the poorest 10 per cent in 1991 were 
in receipt of only 5 per cent of the total national income, which by 1993 had fallen to 3.2 
per cent. "' Nevertheless, for a lower-middle income country, Bulgaria is viewed as 
having relatively low income inequality. For example, using the 1992 Individual Budget 
and Households survey data, complied by the National Statistics Institute (NSI) of 
Bulgaria (n--2,508), Hussan and Peters argue that compared with the OECD Gini 
coefficient average of 34 per cent, the level of income inequality in Bulgaria is relatively 
low, standing at 26 per cent. "' However, a study on the distribution of the income tax 
burden reveals that this feature of low income inequality is rapidly changing. "' 
Table 3.15 shows an overall widening of household income inequality across all the 
countries of Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1995. According to one study, however, it 
is not so much the range of inequality that reveals the intrinsic changes during the 
'transition', but more the predictors and patterns of determination of earnings. "' Vecernik 
finds that the key determinants of disparities in earnings during the transition have 
generally been that of gender and education, rather than of ownership and branch. "' The 
findings of Belava et aL seem to support this, where in Bulgaria traditional indicators of 
inequality are being reversed in terms of the traditional rural/urban divide. In February 
1991 they observed that incomes of rural workers exceeded those of urban workers by 12 
per cent. "' Vecemik also makes the important distinction between per capita income 
calculation and household income disparities where the former all too easily disguises 
inequality within the household. He shows that while inequality of per capita income 
was relatively slight in the countries of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 
1992, the disparities of total household income were much greater. ' 14 
108 UNDP, op. cit. , 1995. P. 
16. 
log Fareed M. A. Hussan and R. Kyle Peters Jr., "The Structure of Incomes and Social Protection During the 
Transition: The Case of Bulgaria, Europe-Asia Studies, 48 (4), 1996. pp. 635-636. 
110 Fareed M. A. Hussan and Zelijko Bogetic, "Effects of Personal Income Tax on Income Distribution: Example from 
Bulgaria", Contemporary Economic Policy, 14 (4), 1996. 
111 Jiri Vecemik, "Incomes in Central Europe: Distributions, Patterns and Perceptions", Journal of European Social 
Policy, 6 (2), 1996. p. 105, Figure 2. Based on the survey, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989. 
112 Ibid, pp. 104-105. 
113 Iskra Beleva, Daniela Bobeva, Silvia Dilova and Asen Mitchkovski, "Bulgaria: Labour Market Trends and 
Policies" in Georg Fischer and Guy Standing (eds. ), Structural Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Labour 
Market and Social Policy Implications, OECD, Paris, 1992. 
114 Ibid. p. 108, Table 3. 
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Table 3.15 Index of income inequality - Gini coefficient of net per capita household income, 
1989-1995 (%) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Czech R. 18.5 20.1 22.2 21.0 21.4 23.4 
Slovakia 19.5 19.1 19.9 20.3 22.9 22.5 
Hungary 21.4 - 20.5 - 23.0 - 
Poland 24.9 23.0 26.0 27.0 29.0 30.0 32.1 
Romania 23.5 22.9 25.6 26.7 28.2 28.4 - 
Bulgaria - 25.0 28.0 32.0 35.0 37.0 38.0 
Source: Unicef 1997. 
3.11 Poverty Groups 
Finally, the emergence of 'poverty groups' has represented for many the most alarming 
indicator of growing social inequality during the transition. This has raised issues about 
those at the 'bottom of the pile', where indicators of sex, age, ethnicity and ability have 
been used to reveal how poverty affects different groups to different degrees. The 
emergence of poverty groups in Eastern Europe has largely been discussed in terms of 
'risk! groups, and include most commonly, young people, the elderly, the disabled, the 
unemployed, and large or single headed family households. "' For example, in Bulgaria, 
the elderly have been particularly hard hit. In February 1997, the average pension 
amounted to less than US$5 per month, when bread cost about US$0.50 and a dozen eggs 
US$1.116 
The long term unemployed are considered as another key risk group. At the beginning of 
1997 the figures for long term unemployment in Bulgaria had decreased slightly, but 
were no less significant standing at 23.1 per cent in January and rising to 30.4 per cent 
by January 1998. "' Of all the age groups youth unemployment is the highest, who are 
more than most prone to long term unemployment. In 1993 more than 45 per cent of all 
115 See Gyorgy Sziraczki and James Windell, "Impact of Employment Restructuring on Disadvantaged Groups in 
Hungary and Bulgaria", International Labour Review, 131 (4-5), 1992. 
116 "Economic Review", FBIS, 22 July 1996, quoted in UNDP, 1998, op. cit. 
117 Based on data from NSI, UNDP, 1998, op. cit. p. 44. The Bulgarian Unemployment Survey (BUS) carried out by a 
team of Bulgarian and American social scientists between 1991 and 1992 revealed that as much as 60 per cent of the 
unemployed had been unemployed for a period of one year. The authors argue that if this were to reflect the total 
volume of unemployment, then in mid-1992,60 per cent of the unemployed in Bulgaria were 'long term unemployed'. 
Derek C. Jones and Takao Kato, "The Nature and the Determinants of Labour Market Transitions in Former 
Communist Economies: Evidence from Bulgaria", Industrial Relations, 36 (2), 1997. p. 235. 
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registered unemployed young persons in Bulgaria were long term unemployed. By 1997, 
this had deteriorated further. Those under the age of 29 accounted for nearly a quarter of 
the total registered unemployed at the beginning of 1997. "' Women are also over 
represented among the unemployed. In Bulgaria the participation rate of women was 
almost 93 per cent in 1989, which in 1991 dropped to about 81 per cent. "' According to 
the Bulgarian NSI, by 1997 this had far from improved, in that women accounted for 54 
per cent of the total registered unemployed. "' 
Ethnic minorities are another group who have suffered disproportionately during the 
transition in terms of unemployment and poverty. Many NGOs established in post-1989 
Eastern Europe, for example, have dedicated themselves to tackling this ethnic dimension 
of social inequality. Various studies have shown that the concentration of ethnic minority 
groups in low or unskilled employment sectors has made them more susceptible to 
unemployment. The Pomaks in Bulgaria, for example, have suffered more than most in 
certain regions from the decline in agriculural and textile production. 121 
Unemployment has been particularly acute for Gypsies across Eastern Europe. The 
privatisation of land, the shut down of obsolete basic industries and the laying off of least 
skilled workers have disproportionately affected Gypsies throughout Eastern Europe. 
Gypsies are experiencing a double blow across Eastern Europe, that caused by: the effects 
of state withdrawal; market reform; and widespread discrimination. "' 
Problems of measurement, and in particular lack of reliable data, have made it difficult to 
assess the exact proportions of Gypsy suffering. However, Table 3.16 gives us some 
indication of the level of impoverishment experienced by Gypsies in Romania, the 
118 UNDP, 1998, op. cit. p. 46. 
119 Sziraczki and Windell, op. cit. p. 477. 
120 UNDp' 1998, op. cit.. p. 46. 
121 Committee for the Defence of Minority Rights (Bulgaria), Annual Report 1995, Inter Ethnic Initiative, Sofia, 1995. 
p. 7. 
122 Jean-Pierre Li6geois and Nicolae Gheorghe, RomaIGypsies: A European Minority, Minority Rights Group 
International Report, 4,1995. 
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country that has the largest number of Gypsies living within its borders, and one that is 
considered as one of the least developed in the region. 
Table 3.16 The number of families living below the minimum level in Romania (1993) 
Decent (DL)% Subsistence (SL)% 
Gypsy Population 80.9 62.9 
Total Population 42.0 16.0 
Source: E. Zamfir and C Zamfir, using the "minimum decent level of living" 
and "subsistence l vel" calculated by the Research Institute of the Quality ofLife. 
In terms of unemployment figures for Gypsies, there are many discrepancies. According 
to official data, unemployment for Gypsies in Bulgaria since 1989 has tended to hover 
around the 60 per cent mark, a figure familiar to most countries in Eastern Europe. 123 
However, there is a widespread rejection of such figures at the ground level, where 
according to Gypsy leaders within the Bulgarian NGO sector, the real figure is much 
higher. Although the validity of their claims was not clear, it was certainly the case that in 
their view official figures were inaccurate, and that unemployment for Gypsies was 
reaching near total in some places. According to one source, the unemployment rate for 
Gypsies in 1997 was considered as high as 80 per cent in some areas compared to the 
national average, 13-14 per cent. Others put it higher at 90 per cent, or even 98-100 per 
cent in some areas. 12" A survey carried out in 1994 (n--939) with Gypsies throughout 
Bulgaria seemed to support these higher estimations, which put the overall 
unemployment figure for Gypsies at 76 per cent, observing, at the same time, sharp 
regional disparities. In Sofia, for example, unemployment for Gypsies stood at 62 per 
125 cent, compared with 81 per cent in rural areas. In terms of disparities within Gypsy 
communities, however, there is considerably less information available. 126 
123 Alain Reyniers, "Gypsy Populations and their Movements within Central and Eastern Europe and Towards some 
OECD Countries", International Migration and Labour Market Policies - Occasional Papers, No. 1, 
OECD/GD(95)20, Paris, 1995. pp. 27-29. 
124 Information gathered during the following interviews (see Appendix 2 for full details): A (5) 20.10.97; A (6) 
20.10.97; and A (7) 21.10.97. 
125 Tomova, op. cit,. p. 71. 
126 Elena and Catalin Zamfir discuss the results of a 1992 survey carried out with Gypsies in Romania, in which they 
found that considerably more women (70 per cent) than men (22.3 per cent) were unemployed. UNICEF, E. Zamfir 
and C. Zamfir, The Romany Population - Socio-Economic Situation, Series: Social Policy No. 8, UNICEF, Bucharest, 
January 1993. 
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These patterns of inequality show an unequal share of deprivation for certain sectors of 
the populations in Eastern Europe during the 'transitiow. It is clear that within the overall 
decline of living standards, increasing polarisation has secured wealth and prosperity for 
a few at the expense of extreme poverty for the rest. Ultimately, Gypsies in Eastern 
Europe are considered as one of the most severely affected groups during the transition 
with the highest numbers living in absolute poverty, some of the highest unemployment 
rates (near 100 per cent in some regions) and low school attendance rates. The concept of 
social exclusion has emerged as one of the main policy driven responses to these 
disturbing trends and claims to offer solutions within the boundaries of the existing socio- 
economic and political framework. 
3.12 Social exclusion during the 'transition' 
The scale of the crisis in the transition economies of Eastern Europe has been huge and in 
this respect is quite unique. During this period we have seen the apparent development of 
class inequality, the roots of which could be detected during Communism. Most notably, 
however, has been the emergence of mass poverty where large sections of the population 
have experienced increased rates of absolute and relative poverty. In the immediate post 
1989 crisis of Eastern Europe, the emphasis of poverty analysis was primarily on the 
rapid rise of unemployment and sharp drops in income. More recently, however, the 
language of analysis has subtly shifted towards the idea of social exclusion, where 
transition analysts are referring more and more to this particular discourse (if not always 
explicitly, or indeed consciously). This can be detected at a rhetorical level in the choice 
of language and terminology being adopted in transition analyses even with those on the 
'left' of the political spectrum. Fraser for example concludes in his discussion of the 'post- 
socialist' age that entire groups are, "being confined to undesirable or poorly paid work or 
being denied access to income-generating labour altogether. 11127 
127 N. Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition: Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age", New Lej? Review, 
212, July/August, 1995. p. 70. 
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The increasing tendency towards ideas of 'isolation' and 'denied access' is also apparent in 
official documents. A 1997 UNDP Human Development Report on Sofia in Bulgaria, for 
example, signals a shift away from an exclusive focus on poverty to one that incorporates 
ideas of 'social isolation' and 'cultural decline'. In a section entitled "Poverty and Social 
Isolation" a number of groups are identified as 'risk groups', including the unemployed, 
single mothers and the disabled. "' At the ground level researchers are more explicitly 
applying ideas of social exclusion to the East European context. For example, in a paper 
presented at the University of Sussex Spring Term Seminar Series, Darwin examined the 
trends in child poverty in Eastern Europe using a social exclusion approach. "' 
In Eastern Europe, too, various reports and analyses are emerging that attempt to 
understand and explain changing papers of social inequality in terms of social exclusion. 
For example, a report by the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) (an international 
NGO based in Hungary) on the plight of Gypsies in Slovakia since 1989 discusses the 
problems they face in terms of linguistic and geographical exclusion. "' They raise the 
important point that the use of the Romani language in mainstream schooling is not seen 
as an important issue despite the recent change in law (adopted by the Slovak Parliament 
in 1995), which renders null and void Article 34 (2) on the use of minority languages for 
those who exceed 20 per cent in a given town or village. This had at least guaranteed, if 
only in principle, the right of a minority to use their language in official communications 
but has since become unenforceable (as from January 1996). 
They also address the geographical location of Gypsies as evidence of their exclusion 
where most are to be found on the outskirts of built up areas often living in very poor 
conditions. They outline three post-Communist trends that have contributed to this: 
Gypsies are now blocked from joining new patterns of migration toward potential 
128 UNDP, Sofia - Human Development Report, LINDP, Sofia, 1997. 
129Judith Darwin, "Child Poverty and Social Exclusion in Eastern Europe", University ofSussex Spring Term Seminar 
Series, 1997. IDS, Report on Seminar Series Web site <http: //www. ids. ac. uk/ids/research/food/ povsem8. html> 
(accessed November 1998). 
130 ERRC, C. Cahn and N. Trehan, "Time of the Skinheads - Denial and Exclusion of Roma in Slovakia", A Report of 
the European Roma Rights Center, No. 3, Budapest, January, 1997. p. 18. 
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employment through the use of location-specific residence permits; there are mythical 
beliefs about Gypsies and housing where it is generally believed that they cannot cope in 
enclosed apartments; and Gypsies are being expelled from their homes by local and 
regional authorities. They offer a coherent argument that pinpoints the cause of the 
problems as lying at least partly in the practices of institutionalised racism. It could be 
argued therefore that the 'exclusion' argument adds little, if at all anything, to this 
analysis. 
As in the West the strength of social exclusion analysis is seen as lying in its emphasis on 
'multiple deprivation' in terms of it covering social, economic, political and cultural 
dimensions of inequality. "' Rodgers, an advocate of social exclusion theory, argues that 
the turn towards social exclusion is a necessary response to the inadequacies of even 
those agencies which are more critical of traditional anti-poverty programmes, such as the 
ILO, 
although much ILO work is critical of the current orthodoxy which argues that poverty 
can he alleviated hy investment in human capital, economic growth via marketforces and 
modest safety netsfor thosefalling hy the way side, no comprehensive macro-development 
strategy has heen devisedforpoverty reduction. 132 
He argues that it is possible to build into the existing growth path the types of jobs to 
which the poor can gain access. In the light of over all economic decline, however, where 
no sectors have been totally immune, the strategy of social inclusion becomes less 
convincing. Ultimately, by locating the solution to poverty in the inclusion of 'poverty 
groups' into the transition process, his criticism, like that of the ILO, only goes so far as 
to address, "the kind of adjustment pursued rather than adjustment per se". 133 
In the context of 'transition! social exclusion analysis is still fairly tentative and rests on a 
mixture of traditional indicators, such as long term unemployment, food consumption, 
and housing, and so-called 'new' dimensions such as degrees of social and political 
131 See for example Colin Lawson, "Book Review - Economic Transition and Social Exclusion in Russia", Journal of 
European Social Policy, 8 (1), 1998. p. 95. 
132 G. Rodgers, "Poverty: Old Problems, New Strategies", World of Work, 7, March, 1994. p. 17. 
133 Sunhil Guha, "Can Structural Adjustment Overcome Unemployment? ", World of Work, 10, December, 1994. p. 8. 
122 
participation. This is particularly significant in the light of moves taken by Western 
institutions to tackle low levels of conventional political participation as a formal 
response to problems of social exclusion. A number of USAID funded projects have been 
introduced to nurture a 'civil society' and enhance participation, which, shrouded in a 
language of neutrality, offer no explicit references to any specific 'excluded groups'. A 
project which covered Eastern Europe and a number of CIS countries entitled Support to 
Political and Social Aspects of the Democratic Process was carried out between 1991 and 
1996. Its chief donor was the US with $24,897,000 and it claimed to provide "support in 
institutionalising the democratic process, including election-related support, assistance to 
a broad range of democratic political parties, support to Trade Unions, and assistance to a 
citizens' network of NGOs involved in the democratic process. "" 
Tchernina's analysis of social exclusion in Russia takes a different approach. Although 
her study is mainly concerned with a Siberian city and some of its surrounding villages, 
its approach reveals an overall shift in analysis of the'transition! in the former Soviet bloc 
away from poverty towards towards concepts of exclusion. Her argument rests on the 
idea that a core-pcriphcry labour market has emerged during transition where those on the 
periphery arc increasingly impoverished. In particular, she notes four 'distinctive 
properties' of social exclusion in the context of transition: the quick dismantling of the 
old society; mass impoverishment; the adherence of some social groups to former 
socialist values; and the inadequate functioning of social protection institutions. "' 
Although all of these features arc indeed real, the extent to which they represent the 
causes of social exclusion as opposed to the symptoms is not self-evident. 
Her discussion extends to an examination of some of the survival strategies of the 
'excluded', such as taking up multiple jobs in the informal sector; broadening work 
capacity; explicit 'non-market' behaviour; and, in the case of the elderly, drawing on 
134 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), SEED Report: Monitoring Country Progress in 
Central and Eastern Europe, 1996. USAID Homepage: <http: //www. info. usaid. gov/> (accessed July 1998) 
135 Natalia Tchemina, Economic Transition and Social Exclusion in Russia, Research Series 108, International 
Institute for Labour Studies and UNDP, Geneva, 1996. p. 2. 
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family reserves and help from relatives and the state. "' In this respect, her work makes 
valid points about the nature of social inequality during the transition. However, if 
compared with existing research on poverty in Russia, such as that of McAuley who 
discusses absolute and relative poverty coupled with needs-based and rights-based 
deprivation, the added depth of social exclusion analysis becomes less clear. "' It could be 
argued that her concept of social exclusion simply describes in a different way already 
existing problems of unemployment and poverty. 
3.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed some of the complexities of analysing and understanding social 
inequality during the transition. There is a clear link between the types of inequality that 
existed during Communism and the 'new' forms of social inequality that have emerged 
since 1989. Macroeconomic decline, coupled with rising unemployment, has reinforced 
latent social inequalities and posed a huge burden on already dwindling welfare 
resources. The emergence of poverty groups, most of whom are defined as falling outside 
of the system altogether has encouraged social exclusion theorists in the West to apply 
their thinking to the 'transition!. However, rather than leading to the development of long 
term thinking in terms of structural causes of social inequality, it has served to encourage 
and justify the implementation of short-term protective measures aimed at 'including' 
excluded groups, whether it be in terms of finding work for the 'genuine' unemployed, or 
improving targeting for the 'undeserving' poor. 
It appears that there is much in common between social exclusion theorists and transition 
analysts. It is certainly no coincidence that the theory of social exclusion has gained 
considerable credibility and political currency since the collapse of the Soviet regimes 
and the onset of market reform. The rationale behind the popular interpretation of the 
transition as an indicator of the 'triumph of liberal democracy, and so the end of history, 
136 Tchemina, op. cit. 
137 Alistair McAuley, "Inequality and Poverty. " In D. Lane (ed. ) Russia in Transition - Politics, Privalisation and 
Inequality, Longman, London, 1995. 
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and the current usage of social exclusion theory to explain widening inequality and 
increasing poverty, are both a product of the move away from class analysis. 
Both 'end of history' and 'social exclusion' theorists argue that class is no longer a relevant 
indicator of development and social inequality. The former's argument is expressed in 
terms of the triumph of one order over its only possible alternative representing the 
apparent end of ideology, and the latter's is in terms of its evasive articulation of multiple 
varieties and 'sources' of exclusion. Neither of these approaches seem to offer much 
potential for a coherent critical vision of the society in which we live. Transition analysts 
run the risk of removing from focus the connection between the political, economic and 
social factors of pre-1989 Eastern Europe and those that have featured since 1989. 
Likewise, social exclusion theorists and their emphasis on the 'excluded' may encourage 
further the shift away from structural explanations of the causes of social inequality that, 
during the transition lie much deeper than mere side effects of market reform. 
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CHAPTER4 
GYPSIES AND OFFICIAL POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE 
4.1 Introduction 
The preliminary analysis of patterns of social inequality during the transition has raised a 
number of important questions about its causes and the implications these have for 
policy responses built around social exclusion. This chapter takes the analysis of social 
exclusion further by examining the official policy approaches towards Gypsies in Eastern 
Europe and in particular Bulgaria in its various phases of development from the Ottoman 
empire up until the present day. Since Gypsies, more than most groups, have been 
labelled as marginalised, or as suffering from 'social exclusion' and, significantly, are 
also defined as at least partly excluding themselves, they represent a valuable test group 
in the discussion on social exclusion. 
The question of Gypsy oppression inevitably falls into wider debates about racism and 
its origins. Hancock writing on Gypsy identity recognises the link between racism and 
Gypsy prejudice, but also draws on a number of other possibilities: 
the association of Roma with the Islamic takeover ofparts of the Christian world; color 
prejudice, specifically the association of darkness with sin; the exclusionary nature of 
Romani culture [.. ]; the unchallengedfunction of the 'gypsies'as a population upon which 
mainstream notions of immorality and lawlessness can be projected and thereby serve to 
define that mainstream's own boundaries; thefact that Roma have no territorial, military, 
political, or economic strength [ .. J; and the fact that the 'gYpsypersona has an - again 
unchallenged - ongoingfunction as a symbol of a simpler, freer time, a representative that 
is becoming more and more attractive in an increasingly complex and regimented world. ' 
The question of the origins of racism has been subject to much debate. The most 
significant of which has been the argument made by a number of commentators that its 
origins are more than is often imagined, and that racism as we know it today is primarily 
1 Ian Hancock, "The Struggle for the Control of Identity", Transitions, 4 (4), September 1997. p. 37. 
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a product of modem capitalist societies. ' If we take Callinicos's definition of racism of 
when, "a group of people is discriminated against on the basis of characteristics which 
are held to be inherent in them as a group", then it is possible to distinguish between the 
general fear and suspicion of strangers characteristic of early responses towards Gypsies 
and the more formal state response later developed towards them. In contrast to a fear of 
difference, modem racism rests on the conviction that, "a certain category of human 
beings cannot be incorporated into the rational order, whatever the effort. "' Ultimately in 
order for racism to thrive human beings must be divided into groups on the basis of 
socially constructed categories and those characteristics which justify discrimination are 
then held to be inherent to the oppressed group. 
A number of 'characteristics' have become associated with Gypsies that are linked with 
negative behaviour, which in turn are defined as inherent to them. C16bert, writing some 
thirty five years ago, described some key elements of these stereotypes, which are just as 
prevalent today, not only in France but across Europe, 
The public has grown into the habit of abusively describing, in France for example, as 
gitans [sic] [.. ], all those people who live a nomad life, who live in caravans, have 
swarthy complexions, and whose women wear multi-coloured dresses, and who in short, 
tellfortunes and live on thefringe ofsociety. 4 
The combination of mythical, romantic imagery and demeaning, negative portrayals of 
Gypsies has helped form an artificial division between the 'genuine Romany' and the 
'bogus Gypsy', allowing for distinctions to be drawn between those Gypsies who deserve 
recognition and those who do not. ' Li6geois too, draws on the dangers of this 
dichotomy, which he argues, "is constantly played with, as the reality is squeezed out by 
2 Alex Callinicos, Race and Class, Bookmarks, London, 1993. 
3 Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cambridge, 199 1, quoted in Callinicos, ibid. p. 19. 
4 Jean-Paul C16bert, The Gypsies, Vista Books, London, 1963. p. xviii. 
5 This has taken on particular significance in the light of more recent fears of immigration in Western Europe. 
127 
the fun folklore of the operetta Gypsy and the disturbing nomadic life of the 
misinterpreted real-life Gypsy. "' Sibley locates this mythical construction of the Gypsy 
as central to the conservation of dominant values; 
[The] possibility that the characterisation ofsocial groups, like Gypsies, may be based on 
myth is rarely considered, particularly in government circles, probably because these 
myths arefunctional, they serve to define the boundaries of the dominant system. ' 
It is possible to explore the causes of Gypsy oppression along a number of lines, 
economic, political, social, and cultural. The emergence of capitalism in the sixteenth 
century and its implications for the building of nation-states has been identified by Acton 
as one of the prime causes for the development of specific anti-Gypsy based state 
policies in Europe. ' Acton identifies a direct link between the emergence of agricultural 
capitalism with its features of private ownership and wage labour and a state campaign 
aimed at the eradication of the 'Gypsy problem'. From this time, Gypsies became the 
target of policies aimed at either their systematic integration, assimilation or banishment 
en masse. ' Acton describes this period of history as the first attempted genocide of 
Gypsies in that by the mid-sixteenth century there were laws in many countries across 
Europe that made it a capital offence merely to be a Gypsy. For Acton this was not 
'some private Gypsy tragedy', but part of the general economic and political history of 
Europe, and indeed, "the defining rite de passage in the maturation of the European 
nation-state. "' 0 
6 Jean-Pierre Li6geois, "Introductory Report", Gypsies in the Locality, Proceedings Report on the Colloquy held in 
Slovakia 15-17 October 1992, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1994. p. 15. 
7 Quoted by Ian Hancock, "The Roots of Inequity: Romani Cultural Rights in their Historical and Social Contexts", 
Immigrants and Minorities, 2 (1), March, 1992. p. 9 
a T'hornas Acton, "Authenticity, Expertise, Scholarship and Politics: Conflicting Goals in Romani Studies", Inaugural 
Lecture Series, The University of Greenwich, June, 1998. 
9 Jean-Pierre Li6geois and Nicolae Gheorghe, Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority, MRG International Report, 4, 
1994. pp. 8-10 
10 Acton, op. cit. pp. 7 -8. 
128 
A slightly different approach regarding the rise of nations is that offered by Gellner. He 
tracks the rise of the 'nation' as a socio-economic unit as primarily a product of 
modemisation. He argues that the modem economy required a powerful, centralised state 
and that the state, in turn, required, "the homogenous cultural branding of its flock" for 
greater efficiency, which wielded with it the need to articulate a new sense of national 
consciousness. " Chaliand, taking elements from both capitalist and modernisation 
schools of thought, argues that up until the formation of the 'nation-state' the question of 
cminorities' as a political issue was of minor importance and, if anything, it was the 
religious differentiation that mattered MoSt. 12 The construction of the 'nation-state', and 
the advent of centralised government within strict political boundaries, then led to 
minorities becoming affairs of the state and representing to those in power 'problems' 
that were in essence political. " Mullerson, too, drawing on this idea of nation-state 
identity but in special reference to Eastern Europe argues that, "the attitude of states to 
minorities depends to a great extent on whether the authorities see in the minorities a 
threat to their national unity and territorial integrity. "" The development of the 'nation- 
state', therefore, had huge implications for how 'outsiders', and in this case, Gypsies, 
were received by European societies at that time. 
4.2 Early experiences of Gypsies in Eastern Europe 
Linguistic, historical and anthropological research has generally been taken to show that 
Gypsies originated in northern India. Agreement over the date of their first arrival into 
south Eastern Europe is not so conclusive and estimates range from the ninth and tenth 
centuries to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, reaching the rest of Europe, it is 
11 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. p. 140. 
12 Gerard Chaliand (ed. ), Minority Peoples in IheAge ofNation-States, Pluto Press, London, 1989. 
13 ibid. 
14 Rein Mullerson, "Minorities in Eastern Europe and the Former USSR: Problems, Tendencies and Protection", The 
Modern Law Review, 56,1993. pp. 796-7. 
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believed, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. " Unlike the emerging capitalist 
countries in the Western part of Europe, countries in Eastern Europe were still largely 
organised around a feudal type of economy. This maintained the need for a large, 
coerced labour force, which took various forms of servitude and in most extreme cases 
entailed the collective and hereditary enslavement of Gypsies. " The process of Gypsy 
sedentarisation therefore began much earlier in Eastern Europe than it did in the West. 
The late development of capitalism in the countries of Eastern Europe during the 
nineteenth century created a specific set of circumstances whereby the process of nation- 
building had to be done in a relatively short period of time and with societies that were 
essentially heterogeneous. The countries of Eastern Europe were made up of a vast 
mosaic of languages and ethnic groups and were not conducive to a smooth evolution of 
national identities or the articulation of clear cut nation-states. The emerging nation-state 
framework proved least compatible with the Gypsy populations of Eastern Europe. 
Gypsies posed a series of problems to the developing capitalist nation-state structure in 
two fundamental ways. First, their visible difference in appearance and ethnic identity 
did not easily fit into the homogenising process required for the effective process of 
nation-building. Their potential alliance with other minorities, coupled with fears about 
their high birth rate served to aggravate a general suspicion of Gypsies. Second, their 
itinerant work patterns and nomadic lifestyle did not conform to, and could be seen to 
pose a threat to, principles of private ownership and wage-labour. Nomadism has over 
time been defined as unproductive and primitive and has been traditionally associated 
with crime, marginality and poverty. Travelling communities as a result have been 
15 Okely belongs to the school of thought which does not agree with this Indian origin thesis, instead arguing that the 
origins of Gypsies are diverse and from within as well as outside of European lands: Judith Okely, The Traveller 
Gypsies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. 
16 Ian Hancock, The Pariah Syndrome, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1987. 
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stigmatised as disorderly and anti-social. " The nature of their nomadic tradition and its 
association with primitive cultures and non-production appeared to clash most visibly 
with the modemising imperative of capitalism. 
The element of threat associated with Gypsy communities, embodied most notably in 
their nomadic tradition, informed a uniform approach towards Gypsies across Europe 
insofar as there has been a common emphasis on some form of enforced sedentarisation. 
The clash between the nation-state and the Gypsy population was revealed most sharply 
during the Communist period in the countries of Eastern Europe. Despite a general 
consensus over the need to eradicate the 'Gypsy way of life' it is important to consider 
the development of individual state policies towards Gypsies even within the Communist 
bloc. 
4.3 Gypsies and Communism 
The population of Gypsies in Eastern Europe at the onset of Communist rule was 
certainly a reduced one, especially in East Germany and Poland. During the Second 
World War, Gypsies in Eastern Europe like the Jews had been subject to the ultimate 
racist campaign of extermination. From 1941 onwards Gypsies found in territories 
occupied by Gen-nany were simply shot. In 1942-1943 Gypsies and those of mixed race 
were interned in Auschwitz-Birkenau, Dachau and Buchenwald. " Kenrick and Puxon 
calculated that nearly 220,000 Gypsies had died in Nazi concentration camps. Lieg6ois 
argues that the figure was much higher, estimating that some 350,000 to 500,000 
Gypsies had been killed, either when they were found, or later in concentration camps. 19 
17 Lucaseen draws attention to some of the problems with these types of analyses that altogether ignore the fact that 
n-dgrant tabour is a widespread phenomenon and that it plays a central role within the tabour market and mainstream 
economic activity. Leo Lucassen, "A Blind Spot: Migratory and Travelling Groups in Western European 
Historiography", International Review ofSocial History, 38,1993. 
'a Li6geois and Gheorghe, op. cit. p. 9. 
19 Quoted in UNHCR, Mark Braham, The Untouchables -A Study of the Roma People of Central and Eastern 
Europe, A Report to the Office of the UN High Con-unissioner for Refugees, 1993. p. 4. 
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With the post-war Communist take over in these countries, reformers had hoped also to 
make Gypsies disappear but through social and cultural assimilation, rather than 
genocide. Comparatively, this seemed to offer better immediate prospects for Gypsies. 
However, it would soon become apparent that Gypsies would also pose a specific 
problem to the Communist mode of development. " 
One of the main appeals of the Soviet empire lay in its claim and at first its apparent 
ability to effectively modernise and homogenise at a relatively quick pace the diverse 
countries of Eastern Europe. As Stewart writes, "what better proof could there be of the 
power of the Communist method of social transformation than the disappearance of the 
Gypsies? "" Despite its rhetoric of international socialism, Communist policy in the 
countries of Eastern Europe was very much concerned with nationalistic modernisation. 
This shaped a contradictory policy framework throughout Communist Eastern Europe. 
At the formal level the Communist ideology appealed to universal truths of equality and 
social justice, yet in practice it rested on implicit nationalism, structural inequality and 
systematic exploitation. 
It is within this context of rapid nationalistic modernisation that the 'backward' or 
'primitive' element of Gypsy culture, such as nomadism took on particular resonance. 
Gypsies and their different attitudes towards wealth, work and good housekeeping were 
20 Asking the question 'why is the Gypsy the scapegoat and not the JewT, Kenedi, in reference to Communist 
Hungary, argues that while anti-Semitism was universal, anti-Gypsy prejudice was the specific 'folly' of the socialist 
system. In a system that prohibited political thinking other than within the prescribed ideology, and which rested on 
social cohesion, anti-Gypsy prejudice, rather than anti-Semitism, provided an accessible route for people to transform 
frustration into aggression without directly attacking the actual causes of this frustration and without running risk of it 
slipping into a political dimension: "people did not argue about whether the gigantic investments by the state are 
justified or how large the military budget might be. They are not lookingfor causation and responsibility in economic 
policy-making [.. ]. Seeing that the cognitive dissonance cannot be eased by criticism of official policies and that the 
lack ofperspectives leading to any change in the system impedes any hopefor transforming the tension for thefuture, 
only the Gypsies can be the target'ý Janos Kenedi, "Why is the Gypsy the Scapegoat and not the Jew? " East European 
Reporter, 2 (1), 1986. pp. II- 12. 
21 Michael Stewart, The Time ofthe Gypsies, Westview Press, Oxford, 1997. p. 5. 
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considered as a major obstacle to the drive of modernisation that characterised the ethos 
of Soviet Communism. In the name of mass industrialisation and social transformation 
Communist governments saw it as necessary to 'raise' Gypsies into the working class by 
effectively mobilising them into the 'socialist work ethic' through fixed employment: 
"By finding their place in the proletariat, the Gypsies would find their place at the heart 
of social life; their age-old exclusion would cease, and so would their distinct identity 
and lifestyle. "' 
In other fields, policy approaches towards Gypsies were also heavily paternalistic and 
marked a distinct concern with total assimilation. In Poland, for example, where most of 
its Gypsy population had perished during the holocaust, the new Communist government 
could more justifiably than most claim that it could build "a nationally and ethnically 
homogeneous state". " It was the first post-war Communist state to try and integrate 
Gypsies voluntarily. However it later adopted more coercive methods. Indeed, references 
to Tolonization' can be found in the literature of this period where although Gypsies 
represented only a small proportion of the population, it was still seen as imperative to 
find ways to assimilate them through the eradication of nomadism. ' During the early 
1950s, cultural activities were also targeted, but rather than banned altogether, they were 
instead state funded and closely monitored. " This, coupled with the prohibition of 
wandering Gypsy communities, and their coercion into permanent employment, was a 
clear initial attempt at controlling rather than eradicating central aspects of Gypsy 
culture. 
22 Stewart, op. cit. p. 6. 
23 Andrzej Mirga, "T'lic Effects of State Assimilation on Polish Gypsies", Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, 3 (2), 
1993. p. 69 
24 Ibid; Jerzy Ficowski The Gypsies in Poland, History and Customs, Interpress Publishers, Yugoslavia, 1990. pp. 38- 
48. 
25 Adam Bartosz, "La Communaut6 Rom en Pologne - La Situation Sociale et Politique", Revue FranVaise des 
Affaires Sociales, 2, January/March, 1992. p. 132. 
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This coercive campaign of assimilation in Poland was characteristic of many countries in 
Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia, however, Ulc sees the development of policy 
towards Gypsies as being inconsistent in the first few decades of Communist rule, which 
he saw as consisting of "a blend of condescension and impatience, of benevolent 
inactivity and calls for radical solutions". Up until the mid-1950s, Gypsies in 
Czechoslovakia escaped any major policy drive and enjoyed relative freedom. The 
official assimilation campaign that began in 1958, marked a change in course however, 
with the introduction of a "Law of Assimilation. " This encouraged an overall shift in 
attitude towards Gypsies, as embodied in the change in media representation of Gypsies, 
from positive to negative. This was partly a product of growing concerns over the 
apparent high birth rate of Gypsies. According to official estimates, in Eastern Slovakia, 
the armual increase of Gypsy population stood at a world record of 5 per cent. " This led 
to various claims such as in the German newspaper Spiegel that Czechoslovakia had 
become by 1968 'the fourth world Gypsy power, surpassed only by Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania and to further dramatic claims that by the turn of the twentieth century the 
number of Gypsies living in Czechoslovakia would have reached one million. " 
The shift in policy approach towards Gypsies was also partly a product of the apparent 
movement of Slovak Gypsies into the Czech region. Their resettlement in the Czech 
lands into concentrated areas heightened concerns over the emergence of ghettos, which 
would, in the view of officials, "perpetuate the backward Gypsy way of life. "" A law on 
permanent settlement was introduced in 1958 entitled 'Act on Permanent Settlement of 
26 Otto Ulc, "Communist National Minority Policy: The Case of the Gypsies in Czechoslovakia", Soviet Studies, 20 
(4) 1964. p. 422. 
27 Ibid. pp. 421-422. 
2'9Prtice mezi cikdnskim obyvatelstvem, UPV, Prague, 1959, quoted by Willy Guy, "Ways of Looking at Roms: The 
Case of Czechoslovakia", in F. Rehfisch (ed. ) Gypsies, Tinkers and Other Travellers, Academic Press, London, 1975. 
p. 214. 
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Nomadic People', which required that all Gypsies be registered and suitable employment 
be found "towards the goal of their becoming orderly, toiling citizens. "" 
The timing of the campaign corresponded with the preparation in Czechoslovakia for the 
transition from a People's Republic to a Socialist Republic (declared in 1960), central to 
which was the perceived need for a cultural revolution. Based on this reasoning the 
government argued in reference to its Gypsy population that "we should never be able to 
proclaim that we had achieved a beneficent cultural revolution if we allowed thousands 
of our fellow creatures to live in a primitive way and without culture. "" In 1961, 
therefore, the Party declared that it would "solve the Gypsy problem by 1970. "', 
However, with enforced settlement and the subsequent growth of encampments, Gypsies 
simply became more visible. 
Ultimately, the percentage of Gypsies engaged in permanent employment was still well 
below the average and data on education offered even more cause for concern. In the 
mid-1960s only 5 per cent of Gypsy children of East Slovakia were completing the eight 
years of compulsory education. " This served to highlight the apparent ineffectiveness of 
assimilative policies, which later led to more extreme, if not desperate, policy 
interventions. In 1967 a new programme of assimilation was declared that would rest on 
full employment and the dispersal of Gypsy hamlets. Running parallel to this was a more 
sinister campaign that aimed to directly counter the high birth rate of Gypsies. Evidence 
has recently come to light of encouraged or forced sterilisation and abortions for Gypsy 
29 Section I of the'Act on Permanent Settlement of Nomadic People', quoted in Ulc, op. cit. p. 426. 
'A radio announcement in Czechoslovakia as cited by Cl6bert, op. cit. p. 2 10. 
31 Zdravotnickj noviny, 15 April 1961, quoted in Ulc, op. cit. p. 424. 
32 Taken from various official sources. Ulc, ibid. p. 430. 
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women in Czechoslovakia, performed in some cases without their knowledge or 
consent. ' 
Although respective governments carried out different degrees of assimilation, a general 
pattern of Communist policy can be detected. Some countries in Eastern Europe did at 
first recognise Gypsies as an ethnic group. However, the bulk of Communist policy 
rested on a definition of Gypsies as a social rather than ethnic group. Within the ideology 
of the post-war people's democratic state, Gypsies in the Eastern Bloc failed to fulfil the 
criteria of the Stalinist definition of a 'nation'. Developed from Stalin's original thesis in 
1913 and adopted throughout Eastern Europe, the 'objective' criteria for a nation 
included: possession of a common origin; possession of its own language and territory; 
possession of common economic; psychological and cultural peculiarities. ' Gypsies not 
fitting into this criteria were instead defined in terms of their lifestyle, religion or 
demographic structure, which enabled governments throughout Eastern Europe to justify 
more easily their harsh assimilative policies. At the same time it enabled the party to 
prevent Gypsies from consolidating some form of national or ethnic consciousness. In 
Hungary, for example, a formal policy statement of 1961 denied Gypsies the status of 
rnational minority', who, instead, were characterised by their 'way of life'. Likewise, 
Gypsies in Czechoslovakia were defined as a people "maintaining a markedly different 
demographic structure. "' This served to underpin the crux of Communist policy aimed 
at the integration of Gypsies into a regular socialist wage-labour. " 
33 D. J. Kostelancik, "The Gypsies of Czechoslovakia: Political and Ideological Considerations in the Development of 
Policy", Studies in Comparative Communism, 22 (4), Winter, 1989. p. 316. Silverman notes that in 1987,36.6 per 
cent of women who were sterilised were Rom, even though they represented only 2-3 per cent of the population. 
Carol Silverman, "Persecution and Politicisation: Roma (Gypsies) of Eastern Europe", Cultural Survival Quarterly, 
Summer, 1995. p. 44. 
34 J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, (1913) Moscow: Progress, 197 1. For a discussion of the relationship 
between Stalin's definition of nation and arguments about 'nation' and 'nation-building in Eastern Europe see, 
M. Haynes, 'Istorikut i idcyata za natsiyata!, Istoricheskipregled, no. 5-6,1998, pp. 218-236. 
35 Quoted in UIc, op. cit. p. 425. 
38 Michael Stewart, "Gypsies, Work and Civil Society", Journal of Communist Studies, 6, June, 1990. pp. 141-42. 
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With the continuation in mainstream policy making of racist assumptions that had long 
been discredited in the West, policies of assimilation in Eastern Europe rarely reached 
their objective of total absorption. Rather than social assimilation for Gypsies, we saw 
increased social differentiation. The difficulties of integration were recognised to a 
certain extent by various Western commentators dealing with general issues of inequality 
and poverty. Matthews, for example, in his study of poverty during the Communist 
period acknowledged that, in Hungary, the Gypsy population (estimated at 320,000 in 
1971), "cannot be easily integrated into a socialist economy. "" Yet, this limited 
reference to Gypsies is as far as most general analyses go. While the emphasis should be 
on the question of why policies of assimilation are problematic, in mainstream literature, 
doubts extend only so far as to acknowledge the existence of problems. For example, the 
self-employed nature of traditional Gypsy occupations is often identified as incompatible 
with conventional employer-employee relations. This has led to the popular argument 
that Gypsy work is peripheral to the key processes of production. However, Stewart 
makes the point that Gypsy labour was an integral part of the working economy during 
Communism, most evident in their ability to 'job-hop'. " 
Ultimately, policies of aggressive assimilation aggravated rather than harmonised ethnic 
relations within Eastern Europe. Liegeois and Gheorghe argue that policies of 
assimilation: have not led to integration nor harmonious co-existence but 
marginalisation; reinforce rejection as the main attitude of society towards 
Roma/Gypsies leading to conflict; and obscure reality by prejudice and stereotypes, 
which continue to shape how the majority relates to Roma/Gypsies. " 
37 Mervyn Matthews, Poverty in the Soviet Union, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1986. p. 165. 
38 Stewart, op. cit. 1990. 
39 Li6gcois and Ghcorghe, op. cit. p. 19. 
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One of the main reasons why assimilation did not always work was the respective 
Communist Parties' lack of knowledge about Gypsies and a total disregard for reality. 
Few background analyses were undertaken and few funds were allocated for settlement 
programmes. Furthermore, contrary to the official line, Gypsies did not represent an 
homogeneous group, but comprised of a multitude of ethnic groupings. This meant that 
Gypsy policies failed. Nomads were either put on the run, or forcibly settled into areas 
that had no basic infrastructure, so exacerbating rather than alleviating problems of 
poverty and social fragmentation. 
4.4 Gypsies during the 'transition' 
With the collapse of Communism in these countries new attempts were made to re- 
evaluate the'Gypsy questioe. Entering the Western world of human rights, governments 
and policy makers in Eastern Europe have been compelled to discuss the Gypsy question 
in a new language of minority rights and 'social integration'. However, in light of 
continued discrimination and heightened tensions between majority and Gypsy 
populations, it is increasingly apparent that this emerging discourse is one still informed 
by earlier assumptions of backwardness and instability associated with the Gypsy threat. 
A profound misunderstanding of Gypsy communities still dominates official discourse 
regarding Gypsies in Eastern Europe, which is manifested most clearly with the 
problems encountered on measuring their numbers. "' The most accepted estimate of 
Gypsy numbers in Europe is that offered by the Gypsy Research Centre, Rene Descartes 
University, Paris (see Table 4.1). " According to this source, Gypsies represent the 
40 See for example, Colin Clark "Counting Backwards: The Roma 'Numbers Game' in Central and Eastern Europe", 
Radical Statislics, 69, Autumn, 1998. 
41 These are the figures used by the Minority Rights Groups in their report on Roma/Gypsies in Europe. Li6geois and 
Gheorghe, op. cit. 
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largest ethnic minority in Europe numbering between 7,000,000 and 8,500,000 most of 
whom live in the Eastern part of Europe and, in particular, the Balkans. Official national 
estimates put the numbers of Gypsies at a much lower figure, which serves to highlight 
some of the methodological and political barriers, such as the types of definition and 
criteria used in collecting and presenting information, that continue to prevent the 
accurate measurement of Gypsy numbers. "' 
Table 4.1 Estimated Gypsy populations in a selection of European countries 1994 (min-max. ). 
Western Europe East Central Europe The Balkans 
France 280 - 340,000 Czech 250 - 300,000 Albania 90-100,000 
Republic 
Germany 110- 130,000 Slovakia 480 - 520,000 Bulgaria 700-800,000 
Italy 90-110,000 Hungary 550 - 600,000 Croatia 30-40,000 
Spain 650 - 800,000 Poland SO- 60,000 Macednia 220 -260,000 
Sweden 15-20,000 Lithuania 3- 4,000 Romania 1,800- 
2,500,000 
UK 90 - 120,000 Slovenia 8-10,000 Serbia- 400 -450,000 
Montenegro 
Source: Gypsy Research Centre, Ren6 Descartes UniversiM, Paris, 1994. 
The inconsistencies that arise when measuring the number of Gypsies in Europe in the 
1990s are not so prevalent when assessing the degree of animosity towards them. Table 
4.2 shows an overall dislike of Gypsies expressed by national majorities, and also gives 
an indication of the kind of negative traits that are commonly associated with them. " The 
distinction between the lower figures for both West and East Germany, coupled with 
42 Liebich notes two different types of problems: From above, such as amalgamation of separate groups, 
fragmentation of existing groups, invention of new ethnic designations, and omission of certain groups, most 
notoriously, that of Gypsies; and from below, such as the type of questions and instructions posed to the respondent, 
conflicting estimates based on incompatible definitions of minority groups between countries; voluntary concealment 
for self-protection, and indefinable identities, which may span more than one rccognised category. Andre Liebich, 
"Minorities in Eastern Europe: Obstacles to a Reliable Count", RFEIRL Research Report, 1 (20), 15 May, 1992. 
43 A survey carried out in Slovakia in 1991 provides us with another example of the degree to which majority 
populations are suspicious of Gypsies. Out of over 2,000 Slovak respondents 768, that is 45,2 per cent, said they 
would like Gypsies to be removed from their area. Viera Bacovi "HI'adanie r6mskej idcntity", Sociologia, 23 (1-2), 
199 1. p. 14 1, Table 1. 
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Spain, and the much higher degrees of expressed animosity in the countries of Eastern 
Europe, give some indication of the different degrees of racism expressed by these two 
parts of Europe. Perhaps most significantly, these figures highlight that the Communist 
governments in Eastern Europe, far from solving the 'Gypsy problem', actually served to 
exacerbate it. 
Table 4.2 Respondents who expressed negative sentiments towards Gypsies in West and East 
European countries, % 199 L" 





East Germany 57 
West Germany 60 
Spain 50 
*Taken from a similar poll conducted in 199 1: did not want Gypsies in their neighbourhood 
Source: Times Mirror Centre, Washington, 1991. 
More so than in the West, the general suspicion and fear of Gypsies in Eastern Europe is 
not formally associated with racism as such, in that Gypsies are not traditionally 
recognised as constituting a different 'race'. "' Anti-Gypsy prejudice therefore, is seen as 
less controversial and one will find it expressed at every level of society, regardless of 
education or socio-economic status. The general sense of insecurity brought about by 
economic decline and the collapse of universal welfare has certainly contributed to 
increasing popular prejudice, in that Gypsies prove to be convenient scapegoats for a 
whole variety of social ills. In particular the widening divide between the majority and 
Gypsy population in terms of living standards, has fuelled further popular claims that 
Gypsies are simply'living-off already limited social security provision. 
" Quoted in Martin Linton, "What Credo do Europeans Recite? Did the Worship of Lenin Destroy God in the East as 
Consumerism did in the West? ", The Guardian, 4 October 199 1. p. 2 1. 
45 In Czechoslovakia for example, it was believed that Gypsies were of the same Aryan stock as Slavs, and therefore 
did not constitute a separate racial group. Reportir (bi-weekly of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists) 1966, no. 
17. Quoted in Ulc, op. cit. p. 425. 
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Hockenos draws particular attention to the sharp growth of far right activities in the early 
years of transition, with specific reference to escalating violence towards Gypsy 
communities. "' Drawing examples from the German Democratic Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, he documents the rise in number of 
violent attacks on Gypsy communities. A PER policy paper on the overall situation of 
Gypsies across Europe highlights a number of factors to consider when analysing the rise 
of racially motivated violence: 
political instability, economic crises, the weakened authority of the basic institutions of the 
state, and the growing right-wing tendencies based on the revival of nationalism [ ... ] fuelled numerous cases of racially motivated violence and scapegoating against the most 
defenceless and despised segment of society: the Roma. " 
Racially motivated violence are the visible signs of a more general uneasiness being 
expressed by the majority population coupled with the continuation of racist institutions, 
such as the network of 'special' schools, that cater for 'socially retarded' children, 
consisting mainly of Gypsies. "' Despite these visible signs of popular anti-Gypsy 
prejudice Li6geois sees the post-Communist period in Eastern Europe as a period of 
indecision on the part of official policy makers. Having lived through various stages of 
systematic policy, which he describes as exclusion, reclusion and inclusion, Gypsies, in 
46 Paul Hockenos, Free to Hate - The Rise ofthe Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, Routledge, London, 1993. 
47 Andrzej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorghe, The Roma in the Twentieth-First Century: A Policy Paper, Project on 
Ethnic Relations, New Jersey, May 1997. p. 11. 
48 The use of long discredited concepts in mainstream discourse in Eastern Europe offers another example of the 
continuation of racists assumptions. Anthropologist and scientists still stress the importance of 'genetic pools', or the 
genetic history' of given peoples in order to understand their cultural behaviour. Kohn argues that the persistence of a 
pseudo scientific approach towards Gypsies is a result of the Romantic tradition in this part of Europe and its concern 
for finding unique spirits: 'Genes are the modem means of expressing this and its popular use was reinforced by the 
suppression of orthodox genetics by Stalin'. See for example, Viktor Bezverkhy's article on Gypsies and Jews in 
Science, 269,7th July 1995, cited by Marek Kohn, The Race Gallery, Jonathan Cape, London, 1995. A number of 
other publications concerned with the genetic makeup of Gypsies have also been published in the West. Bcreczkei, 
for example argues that the higher fertility rate of Gypsies in Eastern Europe is a'racial' trait, which is then taken as 
having implications for an understanding of their higher degree of promiscuity. Tamas Bcreczkei, "r-Selected 
Reproductive Strategies Among Hungarian Gipsics: A Preliminary Analysis, Ethology and Soclobiology, 14,1993; 
Jan Kalanin, Yutaka Takarada ct al. "Gypsy Phenylkctonuria: A Point of Mutation of the Phenylalanine Hydroxylase 
Gene in Gypsy Families from Slovakia", American Journal ofUedical Genetics, 49,1994. 
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this period of indecision now have the chance to participate in the process of articulating 
more flexible practices. "' 
Prejudice, however, has managed to find a place in local policy making. In 
Czechoslovakia in 1993, for example, several cities passed ordinances that gave local 
authorities the right to evict 'troublesome Roma' from their apartments and expel them 
from the cities without court orders. " A draft law aimed specifically at controlling the 
migration of Gypsies submitted by the prosecutor-general to Czechoslovakia in 1992 is 
another example of policies targeted at Gypsies. Its primary concern was to deal with 
"unrest caused by undisciplined groups of migrants" who were identified as 
predominantly Gypsies. " As well as proactive policies aimed at Gypsies, authorities also 
perpetuate discrimination through inaction. Li6geois and Gheorghe, for example, observe 
that "[a] substantial proportion of discrimination is caused by the authorities themselves, 
which fail to penalize racist action against Roma/Gypsies. 9152 Finally, the negative 
stereotyping of Gypsies is reinforced by public figures as well as the media, making it 
possible for political leaders to pronounce Gypsies "socially unadaptable" without fear of 
reproach. " 
This rising anti-Gypsy prejudice in both formal and informal spheres, coupled with the 
rapidly declining social and economic conditions reveals the ambiguity behind the 
positive developments of economic and democratic reform, even in more 'progressive' 
countries like the Czech Republic. Within this overall pattern of growing tension 
between Gypsy and majority populations, it is possible to observe that there have also 
49 Li6geois, op. cit. 1994. pp. 14-15. 
50 Mirga and Gheorghe, op. cit. p. 221. 
51 Quoted by J. Pehe, "Law On Romanies Causes Uproar in Czech Republic", RFEIRL Research Report, 2 (7), 12 
February, 1993. p. 18. 
52 Li6geois and Gheorghe, op. cit. p. 11. 
53 A term used by the Prime Minister of Slovakia in September 1993 in explicit reference to Gypsies at an impromptu 
address to members of his party, cited by Kohn, op. cit. p. 178. 
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been significant differences between countries in terms of their official policies towards 
Gypsies both during Soviet rule and since its collapse. One of the most visible disparities 
within Eastern Europe lies between the countries of Central Europe and those in the 
Balkan Peninsular. The Balkans is one of the most complex areas in Europe, in ternis of 
its ethnic, linguistic and religious composition. Its geographic position is also significant, 
historically being vulnerable to invasion from the Asia Minor and Europe. ' Bulgaria, 
which shares borders with Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Romania and Turkey, forms a 
central part of the Balkan peninsular, and contrasts with central European countries 
insofar as it represents a particular type of official policy shaped by the historical 
development of this region. 
4.5 Gypsies and the process of nation-building in Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian nation is one predominantly made up of ethnic Bulgarians. The Bulgars 
were originally a nomadic central Asian people who, in the seventh century conquered 
(and were later absorbed by) the resident Slavs in what is now present-day Bulgaria 
(formed from territories of the Ottoman Empire in 1878). Latest research shows that 
Gypsies could have first started arriving into this region as far back as the ninth and tenth 
centuries. Although the extact time of their arrival is still not known, it is generally 
believed that by the fourteenth century Gypsies in the Balkans were a well established 
community. " Contemporary Bulgaria is generally considered to consist of four main 
ethno-cultural groups: Bulgarians, Turks, Pomaks (Bulgarian Mohammedans) and 
Gypsies. The first three categories are defined in terms of linguistic and religious 
differences: Bulgarian-speaking Christians are Bulgarian, Turkish-speaking Muslims are 
54 Hugh Poulton, The Balkans - Minorities and States in Conflict, Minority Rights Publications, London, 1991. 55 Carol Silverman, "Bulgarian Gypsies: Adaptation in a Socialist Context", Nomadic Peoples, 21/22,1986; Elena 
Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, "Gypsy Minority in Bulgaria - Literacy, Policy and Community Development 
(1985-1995)",, 41pha, UNESCO, Institute for Education, 1997; and George C. Soulis, "The Gypsies in the Byzantine 
Empire and the Balkans in the Late Middle Ages", Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 15,196 1. 
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Turks, Bulgarian-speaking Muslims are Pomaks. ' In contrast, Gypsies form essentially 
heterogeneous groups in linguistic, ethnic and religious terms. Although not forming an 
homogenous whole, Gypsies are grouped as the second largest minority in Bulgaria. It is 
also possible to identify a number of other smaller minority groups living within 
Bulgarian borders: Armenians, Tartars, Jews, Macedonians, Romanians, Greeks and 
others. 57 
The Bulgarian nation is a relatively recent formation, marked by its liberation from 
Ottoman rule in 1878, and then formal independence in 1908. Historically, Gypsies in 
Bulgaria have experienced three main phases of development that have involved, to 
varying degrees, processes of nation building triggered by the end of Ottoman rule, 
pronounced nationalism, and gradual integration into the Western economy. The first 
major phase of development can be stemmed back to the Ottoman empire. The empire 
spanned large parts of South Eastern Europe for nearly 500 years, from 1453 up until the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. The second phase of development began with the 
liberation of Bulgaria in 1878 and lasted up until 1946 when the Bulgarian Communist 
Party assumed control. The third phase was the period of Communist rule which 
maintained control for over 40 years until its collapse in 1989. 
Information on Gypsies during the Ottoman Empire is largely in the form of detailed tax 
registers recorded by central and local administrations. The main thrust of Ottoman 
policy towards Gypsies was one concerned with the collection of taxes, an obligation to 
which all Gypsies, regardless of faith, were required to fulfil. They had a special status 
under Ottoman rule and were officially defined according to their ethnic origin. Gypsies 
5r' Pomaks are estimated to number in excess of 250,000 (a figure was given by local authorities at the end of 1990 
which stood at 268,971). Poulton, op. cit. pp. 111.118. 
57 Other minorities include: ethnic Albanians, Cherkez (Mongols - an Islamic group from the Ottoman Empire, who 
have become totally assimilated by the Turks), Vlahs (a pastoral people who live south of the Danube and speak a 
form of Romanian) and Sarakatsani (transhumant shepherds who share many traits with the Vlahs). Ibid. 
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as a separate ethnic group, failed to fit into the categories of the faithful (a Muslim 
subject of the Empire) and the rayah (a non-Muslim subject of the Empire). Their 
religion did matter in other ways however, in that all interactions between Christian and 
Muslim Gypsies were banned. Although being Muslim was not enough to secure 
Gypsies the 'faithful' status under the Empire, it sufficed to distinguish them from other 
Christian Gypsies. "
Officially, Gypsies were not persecuted under the Empire, which meant that, ironically, 
their situation compared favourably with the situation for Gypsies in the West at this 
time. There is some evidence of Gypsy slavery (despite there being no official 
recognition of this) under the Ottoman empire. Yet at the same time, this region 
represented a safe haven for many slaves fleeing the neighbouring principalities of 
Wallachia and Moldovia. " The relative protection offered under this regime, meant that 
many Gypsies decided to settle there during this period. It was during this period that 
the system of living in ethnic quarters was established forming the basis for the Gypsy 
quarters, or mahalas, that still exist today in Bulgaria. However, many of these Gypsy 
communities still maintained their traditional occupations and crafts. Although 
information was scarce many others continued to lead nomadic lifestyles. What was also 
possible to discern was that, within the Ottoman Empire the settled Gypsy populations 
were largely concentrated in the present day Bulgarian lands. ' 
Bulgaria's liberation from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, was marked with the end of the 
Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878) and the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano on 3 
March. Initially, this Treaty made Bulgaria one of the largest states in South Eastern 
58 Marushiakova and Popov, "Gypsy Minority", op. cit. pp. 18-20. 
59 Ibid. pp. 20-23; Angus Fraser "The Rom Migrations" Journal ofthe Gypsy Lore Society, 2 (2), 1992. 
60 Ibid. 
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Europe incorporating Macedonia and parts of Thrace within its borders. However, later 
that year the Berlin Congress ruled that Bulgaria be partitioned into three separate states. 
First there was the Principality which maintained its independence. Second, was the 
newly created Eastern Rumelia covering southern Bulgaria including Plovdiv, which was 
subordinated to the Empire. The third partition which included parts of Macedonia and 
Thrace received the worst deal in that its independence was totally relinquished and it 
was once again brought under Turkish control. Bulgaria was thus reduced to a 
principality encompassing the northern region of Bulgaria between the Danube and the 
Balkan range including the Sofia region. 
In 1885 however the principality was re-united with Eastern Rumelia and in 1908 the 
Bulgarian Principality was internationally recognised as a Kingdom, forming the 
Bulgarian state as we know it today. The process of creating a national identity was 
therefore rather a complex and belated one compared with the other more advanced 
countries of Europe. Bulgaria faced the dual task of uniting all those Bulgarians within 
its borders plus claims that substantial parts of the Bulgarian nation were still outside of 
the new Bulgarian borders. It had to embark on a nation-building programme that would 
be both swift and decisive. This was the context from which grew more aggressive 
policies directed towards both Turks and Gypsies. 
Initially, the prime focus of nation-building was to tackle the legacy of Ottoman rule via 
the idea of 'liberation from the Turkish Yoke. ' National campaigns were sporadic and 
mainly rooted in local or religious initiatives and official polices directed specifically 
towards Gypsies were, at this stage, few and far between. With the re-drawing of the 
borders, the emphasis was, at first, on unifying all those Bulgarians who found 
themselves outside Bulgarian borders. The identification and drawing together of all 
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Bulgarians were seen as more important for the realisation of its 'national ideals' than 
the relative 'minor significance' of the Gypsy population. "' 
Post-liberation Bulgarian nation-building was, therefore, largely concerned with 
disassociating itself from the Ottoman empire. This period has been characterised by 
Neuberger as a "Balkan anti-Turkish campaign based on existing ancient enmities 
between these two groups". However, "these purportedly ancient Balkan emnities were 
constructed within the Bulgarian nationalist elite's appropriation of inherently 
ambiguous Western Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment concepts of nationhood". 
The use of 'Enlightenment' European conceptual tools of toleration carried with it, she 
argues, "the assumed superiority of Europe and the Christian world over the 'Oriental 
Barbarism' of the Bulgarian Ottoman past. "' 
As well as the heavy anti-Turkish component to post-liberation nation building, there 
was also the drive towards improving national literacy rates. Mishkova examines the 
phenomenon of literacy growth in Bulgaria during the period between 1878-1912, and 
shows how it was seen as a vehicle for nation building where, "literacy in Bulgaria7' she 
argues "had almost the sole expression of the nation's efforts to elevate its cultural 
standards". " Indeed, during this period, overall literacy rates doubled from about 20 per 
cent in 1893 to over 40 per cent in 1912. However, Table 4.3 shows that when broken 
down into ethnic groups we see an entirely different picture. Gypsies and Turks remained 
largely illiterate, where in 1900 the literacy rate for Gypsies was a fraction of the average 
rate at 1.9 per cent. 64 
61 Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, Gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria, Studien zur Tsganelogi und Folklovistik 18, 
Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1997. p. 174. 
62 Mary Neuberger, "Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Re-Imaging of the Bulgarian Nation (1878-1995)", East 
European Quarterly, 31 (1), March, 1997. pp. 14. 
63 Diana Mishkova, "Literacy and Nation-Building in Bulgaria 1878 -1912", East European Quarterly, 29 (1), 
Spring, 1994. p. 79. 
64 lbid. 
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Table 4.3 Male/female literacy rates by nationalities (mother tongue) of the whole population 
over the age of six, %, 1900 
Nationality Males Females Total 
Greek 55.1 24.0 40.0 
Bulgarian 52.8 16.0 34.5 
Romanian 27.6 3.5 15.8 
Turkish 8.3 2.2 5.3 
Gypsy 3.6 0.2 1.9 
Source: census data, Mishkova. 
Nevertheless, the Gypsy population as a whole was fairly stable and had carved out a 
well defined economic niche maintaining a certain degree of separateness. 6' Some 
Bulgarian Gypsies had long been deeply integrated in the social and economic structure 
of Bulgarian society. The first Bulgarian factory was opened at the end of the nineteenth 
century in the town of Sliven and Gypsies were its first labourers. Sliven became the 
centre of the textile industry of which Gypsies comprised an important part. 66 However, 
popular mistrust of Gypsies coupled with Bulgaria's continued search for a 'pure' 
national identity combined to create a specific set of circumstances that led to dramatic 
attempts at total assimilation. It seems that the objectives of achieving national 
homogeneity simply encouraged Bulgarians to view those who did not immediately fit, 
such as Gypsies, as inhabiting a separate place: "in the eye of the Bulgarian they were 
already unequal, inferior, second-rate. "' 
This view of Gypsies as inherently inferior was reinforced by the idea that they posed a 
major obstacle to the consolidation of a unified Bulgarian nation-state. At the turn of the 
century moves were taken to restrict the voting rights of Gypsies with the 
implementation of a Law for Amendment of the Electoral Law. Non-Christian Gypsies, 
65 Silverman, op. cit. 1986. p. 52 
" Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. p. 33. By 1887, according to an official census, Gypsies in 
Bulgaria amounted to about 57,000 and over 1,000 had settled permanently in Sliven (the latter figure is according to 
an official census taken in 1874). 
67 Aid. p. 174. 
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and all those Gypsies 'who cannot establish residence' were not allowed to vote. " This 
provoked an immediate response and the first Gypsy conference was organised in Vidin 
in 1901. A petition was drawn up and handed to the National Assembly in 1905. The 
lack of response, led to the organisation of the first Gypsy Congress in Sofia in 
December 1905. Having attracted international attention, the Bulgaria National 
Assembly finally conceded and voted in a new Electoral Law. This removed earlier 
restrictions on the voting rights of Gypsies. " The ability of Gypsies to organise and 
protest revealed the extent to which they had secured a firm place within Bulgarian 
society and politics. 
In the light of such events, Gypsy populations at this time were increasingly subject to 
various kinds of investigation and, in particular, ethnographic interest. These were 
concerned with investigating the 'real' Gypsy through linguistic analysis and 
occupational research. " In Bulgaria, this growing interest in 'other' ethnic cultures served 
to fuel concerns over the difficult process of forming an homogeneous national identity. 
The uneven pattern of demographic growth, and in particular, the growing demographic 
weight of Gypsies has, over time, heightened concerns among officials about the'Gypsy 
problem'. However, Table 4.4 shows that this fear of a growing Gypsy population was 
largely unfounded. " 
68 The voting on this law was almost unanimous - 90 of the 96 deputies present voted for it. Marushiakova and 
Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. pp. 29-30. 
69 Donald Kenrick, "History of Bulgarian Roma/Gypsies", Occassional Paper of the Romany Institute, (date 
unknown). 
70 Silverman, op. cit, 1986. This trend is not exclusive to Bulgaria, the same level of interest in Rom linguistics was 
evident in the USA. For example, the setting up of the Gypsy Lore Society in 1888 was founded on earlier 
philological studies on Roma that flourished during the 1860s and 1870s. Angus Fraser, "A Rum Lot", in Matt. T. 
Salo, 100 Years of Gypsy Studies, 5, The Gypsy Lore Society, Cheverly, Maryland, 1990. 
71 Kiril Donkov, "Emichiat surstav na naselenueto na Bulgaria" (The Ethnic Composition of the Bulgarian 
Population"), Statistika, 2,1994. 
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Table 4.4 The population in Bulgaria according to ethnic groups between 1880-1992. " 
Year Total Bulgarian % Turkish % Gypsy % Others % 
(100%) 
1880* 815,951 589,797 (72,3) 158,463 (19,4) 19,549 (2,4) 48,142 (5,9) 
1884* 975,030 681,734 (69,9) 200,498 (20,6) 27,190 (2,8) 65,608 (6,7) 
1900 3,744,283 2,888,219 (77,1) 531,240 (14,2) 89,549 (2,4) 23,5275 (6,3) 
1905 4,035,575 3,184,437 (78,9) 488,010 (12,1) 99,004 (2,4) 26,4124 (6,6) 
1910 4,337,513 3,518,756 (81,1) 465,641 (10, S) 122,296 (2,8) 230,820 (5,3) 
1920 4,846,954 4,036,056 (83,1) 520,339 (10,7) 98,451 (2,0) 192,108 (4,0) 
1926 5,478,740 4,557,706 (83,2) 577,552 (10,5) 134,844 (2, S) 208,638 (3,8) 
1934 6,077,939 5,204,218 (85,6) 591,193 (9,7) 149,385 (2,5) 133,143 (2,2) 
1946 7,029,349 5,903,580 (84,0) 675,500 (9,6) 170,011 (2,4) 280,258 (4,0) 
1956 7,613,709 6,506,541 (85,5) 656,025 (8,6) 197,865 (2,6) 253,278 (3,3) 
1965 8,227,866 7,231,243 (87,9) 780,928 (9,5) 148,874 (1,8) 66,821 (0,8) 
1970 8,514,900 7,447,742 (87,5) 848,835 (10,0) 163,386 (1,9) 54,937 (0,6) 
1974 8,710,049 7,578,499 (87,0) 885,108 (10,2) 169,105 (1,9) 77,337 (0,9) 
1992 8,487,317 7,271,185 (85,7) 800,052 (9,4) 313,396 (3,7) 102,684 (1,2) 
*In the territory ofEastern Rumelia. 
Source: Population censuses and current demographic statistics. 
Using population census and current demographic statistics, Donkov demonstrates that 
changes in ethnic composition during the last century were negligible despite the diverse 
evolution of demographic processes of individual ethnic groups. One explanation he 
offers is that the basic balancing factors of external migration outweighed the natural 
increase of minorities. " Perhaps what is most significant about these figures is the way 
72 Donkov, op. cit. pp. 37-38, Tables I and 2. 
73 Ile phases of Turkish emigration are certainly factors to consider in accounting for the overall decline in the 
Turkish minority. The largest number of Turkish emigrants left Bulgaria between 1949-195 1, where by 1950 it was 
announced that 250,000 Turks had applied to leave. With restrictions from Turkey, however, who closed their 
borders in 1950 and again in 1951, the actual number of Turks who left Bulgaria for Turkey was 155,000. In 1968 a 
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in which they reflect shifts in methodology, in particular, in terms of what definitions 
were used to categorise ethnic groups and how this impacted on their representation in 
census reports. 
For example, it was not until 1900 that ethnic identity was formally recognised in census 
data; up until then they had relied exclusively on religion and mother tongue. This may 
well explain the various shifts in data in terms of the number of those who defined 
themselves as either Gypsies, Bulgarians, Turks or others. Between 1880 and 1956, for 
example, we can see an overall increase in the number of those who identify as Gypsies, 
which at one level may well reflect an increase in the size of their population. At another 
level, it can be seen as a result of new scopes for identifying with their own ethnic 
identity. Between 1956 and 1965 this pattern is reversed, which can be seen as a direct 
result of the removal at this time of the Gypsy category from all official reports, 
including censuses. The large gap between 1974 and 1992 can also be explained by the 
fact that the 1975 census minimised minority figures and that the 1985 census did not 
collect ethnic data at all. 74 
The inter-war period in Bulgaria was a precursor for much of the growth of Gypsy 
participation in mainstream activity after 1945. It was a time when Gypsies were tending 
to settle more into factory work thereby increasing their access to organised labour. This 
period saw the active participation of Gypsies in workers' movements and strikes, 
together with the development of various Gypsy organisations. Many of those Gypsies 
further agreement was reached which allowed for the departure of close relatives of those who had left previously. 
Turkish sources claim that another 130,000 left between 1968-1877. Poulton, op. cit. pp. 119-129. A more long term 
perspective shows that between 1878-1984 a total of 719,836 Turks were reported to have emigrated. Coupled with 
mass Turkish emigration in 1989, where by late August 300,000 Turks had left for Turkey, it was estimated that by 
September 1990, only 70 per cent of the original Turkish population in Bulgaria remained. Darina Vasileva, 
"Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return", International Migration Review, 26 (2), 1992. 
74 Alexander Kolev "Census Taking in a Bulgarian Gypsy Mahala (Ruse, December 1992)", Journal of the Gypsy 
Lore Society, Series 5,4 (1), 1994. 
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who decided to settle at this time did so mainly for economic reasons and tended to settle 
in the existing Gypsy settlements, or mahalas. During the second world war however, 
the situation for Gypsies became more complicated. In line with Nazi-dominated Europe, 
severe restrictions were imposed on Gypsies, who were treated as an element to be 
eradicated. They were forcibly settled and their movements were severely restricted. At 
the same time, many Gypsies served in the army, or worked in labour camps, while 
many others volunteered to join as partisans. " 
The ambiguity of the position of Gypsies during the war in Bulgaria culminated in an 
agreement reached between the Bulgarian Government Commissioner for the Jewish 
Question, Belev, and a special delegate of Germany, SS HauptstUrmfUhrer Daniker. This 
prevented the deportation and surrender of the Bulgarian Jewish population, and 
although no official mention of Gypsies was made, they too were spared. " Bulgaria, 
therefore, was one of the few countries in which most of the Gypsy population survived, 
without there having been any formal recognition of such. The averted deportation of 
these two groups, however, did not secure an era of improved majority -minority 
relations especially where Gypsies were concerned. Instead, the Communist take-over on 
9 September 1944 marked the beginning of a renewed campaign aimed at their total 
absorption. 
4.6 Bulgarian Communist policies towards Gypsies. 
The problems that Gypsies posed to the process of rapid nation-building in the recently 
fonned Bulgarian lands, did not disappear with the coming to power of the Communists. 
As with the general pattern across Eastern Europe, Gypsies in Bulgaria had a very 
specific function within the mode of Communist development. In particular, they were 
7'5 Kenrick, op. cit. 
76 Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. pp. 32-33. 
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seen by Communist governments as a useful yardstick by which to measure the degree of 
social transformation that had been achieved at any given time. 
With the end of World War IL the Fatherland Front, a coalition of opposition parties 
including the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), took power and in 1946 Bulgaria was 
officially declared a People's Republic, the BCP having assumed total control. Under 
BCP rule, Bulgaria underwent rapid industrialisation and agriculture was completely 
collectivised by 1958. The BCP and the Communist controlled Agrarian Union were the 
only permitted political parties until 1989. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, elections 
were based on a single list of candidates. The first few decades for Bulgaria under the 
cloak of Soviet rule and in the shadow of Yugoslavia, have been described as a period of 
'defensive nationalism'. " This short period, shaped by the Soviet model, consisted of 
attempts at establishing Gypsies as an ethnic community within the structure of the 
Bulgarian nation. 
The BCP allowed for the limited development of an active Gypsy intelligentsia, with the 
flourishing of Gypsy theatres, drama groups, music ensembles and newspapers. " 
According to leading Bulgarian scholars at that time, the coming to power of 
Communism was the turning point for Gypsies. Marinov and Georgieva, for example, 
saw the onset of Communism as a force for liberation for Gypsies, who, thanks to the 
actions of the BCP had now become "cultured, advanced and educated"!, The 
assumption was that up until then Gypsies had been 'backward' due to their oppression 
under the Ottoman empire and their exploitation under capitalism. One of the most noted 
successes for Gypsies at this time was the establishment of their own magazine. It 
77 M. Pundeff, "Bulgarian Nationalism", Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Seattle and London, 1969, quoted in 
Lyudmila Dicheva, "The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria - Past and Present", in Paul Brett et al. (eds. ), Europe: Real and 
Imagined, PIC Publishers, Veliko Turnovo, 1998. 
78 Simon Simonov, "The Gypsies: A Re-emerging Minority", Report on Eastern Europe, 25 May, 1990. p. 14 
79 Quoted in Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. p. 52. 
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continued for over a decade but underwent a series of name changes that reflected 
changes within it; namely, that of increasing Soviet intervention. Initially it had the 
Romany name Romano Esi meaning Romany Voice, but towards the end of its career it 
had become Nov put, the Bulgarian for New Way, now a vehicle for Communist 
propaganda and Gypsy assimilation. " 
Of all the ex-Communist states, Bulgaria is generally regarded as having displayed the 
most extreme assimilative policies towards Gypsies. Its attempts at denying the existence 
of Gypsies was most explicit in the 'Revival Process', the premise of which was the 
building of an ethnically homogenous nation-state. It contrasts, for example, with the 
multi-ethnic states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which addressed Gypsies in line 
with other minorities by granting them, if only on paper, 'nationality' status. The 
particularly harsh treatment of Gypsies in Bulgaria, however, went practically unnoticed 
by the international community. Simonov notes various possible reasons for this: the 
tight censorship within Bulgaria, the absence of a strong minority lobby, the mcdia! s 
silence and widespread general discrimination. " 
Although it was generally believed that Bulgarian political life was not focused intensely 
on the personality of Zhivkov, his long running and particular leadership style certainly 
did play a role in Bulgaria! s more extreme nationalist agenda. " Zhivkov successfully 
consolidated his power base within the BCP by establishing a strict regime of 
'democratic centralism'. This was further strengthened when he later enlisted his family 
within the party structure, including his daughter, who, in 1980, became chairwoman of 
80 Kenrick, op. cit. 
a' Simonov, op. cit. pp. 12-13. 
82 For example, Zhivkov introduced a series of Criminal Codes in the 1960s which outlawed the propagating of 'anti- 
democratic and nationalist ideology' such as through 'anti-state agitation and propaganda. ' This was specifically aimed 
at reducing the threat of Macedonian nationalism. Poulton, op. cit. p. 108. 
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the Politburo Commission on Science, Culture and Art. " This nepotistic power structure 
meant that Zhivkov could determine key domestic policies. In terms of the backlash 
against the 'Revival Process', this meant that it was Zhivkov personally whom many 
protesters blamed. " 
The BCP's intent on forging a 'proletarian brotherhood' where both Turks and Gypsies 
would participate in the 'Peoples Front against Capitalism and Fascism' fuelled their 
campaign for nurturing a pure Bulgarian consciousness. " The BCP promoted a 
nationalist campaign that required all minorities, including Gypsies to be absorbed into 
the Bulgarian national ideal. However, according to Silverman Gypsies were still able to 
maintain a distinctive ethnic identity through their ability to adapt and survive in all other 
areas of work, culture and lifestyle, that is, "not in combating discrimination but [by] 
ignoring it. "" 
Thus many Gypsies managed to evade wage-labour structures, instead working 
informally in the second economy. Their ability to survive as an ethnic group was also 
reflected in the fact that up until the 1950s there was still a substantial number of 
Gypsies who were nomadic. This was seen to subvert the Bulgarian world view and 
culture and Gypsies were seen to be evading many of the avenues through which the 
Party exerted control. Those Gypsies who continued to rely on travelling for their 
livelihood however, would be subject to new levels of assimilation policies through the 
banning of nomadism and pfevious cultural 'freedoms'. In 1951 the Theatre Roma was 
closed down and its director Manush Romanov was sent into exile. Music performance, a 
83 P_ J. Crampton, A Short History ofModern Bulgaria, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. pp. 188-89. 
84 Demonstrations against the name-changing campaign which took place in a number of places throughout Bulgaria 
were often directed against the leader himself, Todor Zhivkov. On December 27 1984, for example, in Momchilgrad a 
group of Turks attempted to stonn the town hall, tearing up pictures of Zhivkov. Poulton, op. cit. p. 139. 
85 Neuberger, op. cit. 
86 Silverman, op. cit. , 1986. p. 61. 
155 
vital source of income for many Gypsies, became subject to increasing restriction and 
certain musical instruments were banned altogether. " 
Between 1953 and 1960 it was increasingly difficult for Gypsies in Bulgaria to 'ignore' 
attempts at their assimilation as policies became more aggressive and pervasive. In 1953 
the Gypsy Cultural and Educational Society, which had replaced the Egypt Society set 
up in 1919 and the Gypsy Organisation Badashte established in 1929 was dissolved. The 
194 territorial Romany organisations were also disbanded at this time. " Gypsy trades 
were officially banned and an unofficial name changing campaign was waged against 
Muslim Gypsies, decades before the more well known 'Revival Process' of the late 
1980s. " The BCP were especially concerned with its Muslim Gypsy population, whom 
they feared, had the potential for engaging with the Turkish population in a political as 
well as a religious sense. " Indeed, Kubadinski, a BCP official, in his secret 
memorandum stated that, "a very large percentage of the Gypsies who identify 
themselves with the ethnic Turks act like fanatical Turks" and that their incorporation 
into the Bulgarian nation, "should be evaluated as a strategic task. "" 
Muslim Gypsies were forced to replace their Turkic-Arabic names with Bulgarian ones. 
Gypsy traditional music was banned from public places and even from weddings. These 
policies of assimilation culminated in the 1958 official banning of all references made to 
87 Silverman, op. cit. 1986. 
88 Simonov, op. cit. p. 14. 
89 Although the current government has recently offered an official apology for the Revival Process of the 1980s, no 
such apology has been extended towards Gypsies. Reported in Bulgarian press on 29 July 1997. 
go The concern with separating the Gypsy community from the Turks is evident in a decision (A 10 1) voted in by the 
Politburo of the Central Committee of BCP on April 5 1962 which intended "to curb the negative tendencies [... ] 
among Bulgarian Muslims, Gypsies and Tartars to identify with the Turks C ... ] and to enhance the patriotic education". Quoted in Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. p. 36. In conjunction with this was the Politburo 
decision to prohibit the appointment of Turkish clergymen in villages where there lived a high proportion of Gypsies. 
T. Zang, Destroying Ethnic Identity - Yle Gypsies ofBulgaria. A Helsinki Watch Report, New York, June, 199 1. pp. 
11-12. Earlier examples of similar policies in the Balkans can be traced back to the 183040s, where all Muslim 
Gypsies in Serbia were forced to accept Christianity. Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. p. 173. 91 Quoted in Simonov, op. cit. p. 15. 
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Gypsies as an ethnic group. The 1956 census was the last official document which 
detailed those results explicitly referring to Gypsies. " This led to the peculiar situation 
whereby, during the peak of its reign, the BCP was able to officially announce that 
Gypsies did not exist. There was no mention of Gypsies in the media or academic 
publications, and many Gypsy quarters were surrounded by concrete walls. As part of 
the official 'Revival Process' in the late 1980s, Gypsies would be subject to even tighter 
regulations. For example, an official document on 3 August 1984, forbade the wearing of 
shalvari (traditional Turkish trousers) and the speaking of Romani on the street, in public 
places and institutions. Only Bulgarian was permitted. " 
During its peak however, assimilation was not always viewed as a negative process, but 
one that could benefit both parties. This optimism found a popular voice among the 
Communist intelligentsia who argued that, although forced employment provided for the 
government a vital pivot on which to rest settlement policies, and that Gypsies tended to 
fill the low status, unskilled factory jobs or agricultural work on co-operative farms, they 
were able to benefit from such policies, insofar as gaining access to new arenas of 
productivity and most importantly benefits, such as pensions, medical benefits, vacations 
and bonuses. Also, Gypsies were often able to unofficially supplement their welfare 
benefits and meagre wages with other jobs, such as music performance. Mirga argues 
that, "productivisation thus was a necessary element of their citizenship rights, and a 
condition of their integration into the larger society. "' 
92 Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. 
93 Poulton, op. cit., and Carol Silverman, op. cit. 1995. This also affected Pomaks, Albanians and Muslim Tartars. 
Propagandist articles provide evidence of how all spheres of society were mobilised behind this campaign. What was 
significant about the world of academia for example was what was not said rather than what was; no mention of ethnic 
groups could be found anywhere during this time. For example, Ljubomir Ogrjanov, "The Socialist Development of 
Bulgaria 1956-1986", Bulgarian Historical Revim 4,1986. 
94 Andrzej Mirga, "Roma Territorial Behaviour and State Policy: The Case of the Socialist Countries of East Europe", 
in Michael J. Casimir (ed. ), Mobility and Territoriality, Apamo Rao, Berg. New York/ Oxford, 1992. p. 262. 
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Although enforced sedentarisation formed the cornerstone of Bulgarian policy towards 
Gypsies, it was not as forcible as it had been in countries like Czechoslovakia. Indeed, 
voluntary sedentarisation of Gypsies in Bulgaria was already underway most notably 
among the Kalderasha Gypsies well before the issuing of various government decrees. 
The period leading up to and including the 1950s therefore, saw a second more gradual 
round of mass sedentarisation. It was not a simple process that just effected Kalderasha 
Gypsies, it also involved other small groups like Thracian Kalajdzii and Bivolari. Those 
that had already begun to settle did so voluntarily and had had time to choose a place for 
settlement. This wave of sedentarisation therefore saw the settlement of Gypsies in small 
family groups in villages rather than en masse in mahalas. 
Running parallel with this (between 1958-1980s) however, were policies aimed at 
forcing Gypsies to set up home in new apartment blocks along side Bulgarians. For 
example, on October 9 1978 a decision was reached by the secretary of the Central 
Committee of the BCP entitled "For a Further Improvement of the Work Among 
Bulgarian Gypsies, for a More Active Integration into the Building of a Developed 
Socialist Society". This decision established certain concrete measures, one of which was 
"to gradually eliminate segregated sections and neighbourhoods during the next ten to 
twelve years. "" Although segregation persisted this policy of integration caused a whole 
new set of problems fuelling tension between these two groups. Silverman observed in 
her fieldwork, undertaken during the 1970/80s, that "there amidst concrete terraces, 
playgrounds and the hostile stares of Bulgarian neighbours, they still celebrate open-air 
weddings and baptisms [ ... ] Scattered housing has not prevented Gypsies from 
congregating and celebrating. "" 
95 Quoted in Marushiakova and Popov, Roma (Gypsies), op. cit. p. 38. 
96 Silverman, op. cit., 1985. p. 53. 
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Despite the obvious difficulties that arose out of the contradiction between enforced 
segregation and continued discrimination, Todorov, then member of the BCP Central 
Committee and Chairman of the National Assembly, in a speech in March 1985, felt able 
to state categorically that Bulgaria was a "one-nation state. "" This declaration of a 
homogenous nation-state contradicted data gathered at that time, which up until 1990 
was kept secret. According to a recently disclosed Communist party memorandum, the 
number of Gypsies living in Bulgaria had grown from 198,000 in the 1960s to 523,519 
in the mid-1980s, so officially accounting for 6 per cent of the population. This growing 
birth-rate for Gypsies presented the Communists with a host of problems, indeed the 
memorandum stated that "the Gypsies especially those who are concentrated in compact 
masses [ ... ] present a difficult problem from the cultural, social and ethnic point of 
view". As a result their campaign for assimilation was implemented with renewed 
vigour in the interest of "building a developed socialist society. "" 
The integration of Gypsies into mainstream schooling was one of the key features of the 
assimilative campaign, and one promoted as, above all, improving the lot of Gypsies. In 
its objective of promoting Bulgarian values and culture, it gradually eliminated any 
reference to minority languages or cultures. Alongside Bulgarians, it was compulsory for 
Gypsies and Turks to attend school until the 8th grade. Schooling was carried out in 
Bulgarian and there were no opportunities for teaching to be carried out in minority 
languages or for subjects relevant to these groups to be covered. On the surface, 
therefore, it seemed that all citizens were integrated into the schooling system. However, 
within the classroom, segregation was enforced. More explicit was the network of 
'special schools' that officially were set up for socially and culturally retarded children. 
97 Quoted in Poulton, op. cit. p. 12 1. 
98 Nova Svellina, 5 April 1990, cited by Simonov, op. cit. p. 13. 
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In reality, however, these schools catered mostly for Gypsies. " In these 'special schools' 
the emphasis was, and still is, on vocational rather than academic tuition. This held back 
many children who were prevented from gaining access to a valid school curriculum 
hindering their chances for entering into further education. 
In attempting to ignore Gypsy culture, Bulgarian official policy had the reverse effect to 
that which was intended. Ultimately, the campaign to establish a pure and monolithic 
Bulgarian nation was and never could be realised, for a number of reasons. First, neither 
foreign observers nor the Bulgarian population were convinced that the Gypsies and their 
cultures were non-existent. This was tied in with a general uneasiness on the part of the 
Bulgarian population as a whole regarding the 'revival process'. The 'silent rejection and 
disagreement' of the majority to the 'absurdity' of the forced assimilation of the Turks 
gave the clear message that the population did not believe the 'socialist national model' 
was achievable. 100 
Second, contradictions arose from the sharp contrast between aggressive anti-Gypsy 
policies and attempts to improve their living conditions, which were tied in with the 
more general strategy of including Gypsies into the socialist work ethic. Likewise the 
perceived economic incentives to settle for many Gypsies were rarely met; vital means of 
income and self-support for Gypsies were severed, but no alternative means of survival 
were allowed or indeed made available. This, coupled with the more general crackdown 
on travelling, served to exacerbate rather than to resolve the so-called 'Gypsy problem'. 
Third, Gypsies in Bulgaria have been able to survive as an ethnic and cultural group "by 
fitting into the available social and economic niches in different historical circumstances, 
99 As discussed below, these 'special' schools still exist today. 
100 Dicheva, op. cit. 
160 
[by] leaning on their traditional occupations, [and through] their modified versions or 
completely different ways of subsistence. ""' For example, by continuing to speak their 
language at home, and by Turkish Gypsies using their Muslim names among kin. "' 
Finally, rather than guaranteeing their disappearance the enforced aspect of their 
settlement simply led to the transfer of whole Gypsy communities into segregated areas, 
mahalas, thus making them more visibly distinct. "' One internal BCP report (published 
in 1984) estimated that in the early 1950s there were segregated Gypsy areas in 160 of 
Bulgaria! s 237 cities and in 3,000 of its 5,486 villages. "" In the 1970s, nearly half of all 
Gypsies living in Bulgaria lived in 'urban ghettos' (547 in total). 111 
This failed campaign of total assimilation has formed the foundation for many of the 
'new' problems faced by Gypsies during the transition in Bulgaria. As well as the 
negative repercussions of many being confined to low-skilled sectors, Gypsies have also 
been able to carry with them into the transition positive survival skills that they adopted 
during Communism. Unlike the rest of society, Gypsies have long been practising 
entrepreneurial skills within the second economy and making use of non-material as well 
as material resources. Earlier efforts on the part of the BCP to promote a Gypsy 
intelligentsia has also meant that a strand of educated Gypsies have been able to offer 
leadership in the process of democratisation. 'O' On the whole however, it seems that 
101 Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. p. 165. 
102 Silverman. 1995, op. cit. 
103 Paul Hockenos, Free to Hate: The Rise of the Far Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, Routlcdge, London, 
1993. 
104 Luan Troxel "Bulgaria's Gypsies: Numerically Strong, Politically Weak", RFEIRL Research Report, 10,6 March, 
1992. p. 59. 
105 According to the former Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, quoted in Alain Reynicrs, "Gypsy 
Populations and their Movements within Central and Eastern Europe and Towards some OECD Countries", 
International Migration and Labour Market Policies - Occasional Papers, No. 1, OECD/GD(95)20, Paris, 1995. p. 
17. 
'or' For example, according to the 1992 population census, there were 464 Gypsies with BA degrees and 274 with MA 
degrees. Marushiakova and Popov, however, believe the real figure to be at least twice as high. Marushiakova and 
Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. p. 40. 
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Gypsies are suffering more than most, and although we have seen a change in 
government and in economic relations, the concern with the 'Gypsy problem' has 
remained. 
4.7 Gypsies during the 'transition' in Bulgaria 
Whether official policy towards Gypsies rested on banishment, exclusion, inclusion, 
assimilation or outright genocide, the dominating assumption has always remained the 
same; national and cultural homogenisation. The transition in Bulgaria has proved to be 
no exception. Following the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989, Bulgaria 
embarked on limited market and democratic reform. Due to its geographic location and 
its relative backwardness we have seen that Bulgaria has been beset with protracted 
economic crisis. With the collapse of all former guarantees and the onset of economic 
crisis, we have seen a rise in racial violence, mainly targeted at the Gypsy minority. In 
the context of an overall decline in fertility rates this has been partly a product of fears 
over uneven demographic growth. Bulgarian Gypsies are believed to be multiplying at a 
rate that far exceeds that of Bulgarians, or Turks. Table 4.5, at first sight, appears to 
support the view that Gypsies are increasing at a higher rate in that they are more 
inclined towards larger families, whereby 13 per cent of Gypsies interviewed expressed a 
desire to have 4 children as opposed to 5 per cent for Bulgarians and 4,3 per cent for 
Turks. However, these differences become evened out when the average number of 
desired children is calculated for each of the ethnic groups. "' 
107 Todor Kaloyanov, "Zhelan broi detsa spored etnicheskata prinadlezhnost na naseicnieto" (Desired number of 
children according to ethnic groups), Statislika, 1,1995. Table 2, p. 20. 
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Table 4.5 Desired number of children according to ethnic group, % 1992 
Desired number 
of children 
Bulgarians Turks Gypsies 
1 11,8 11,8 9,4 
2 62,3 58,2 38,2 
3 18,4 23,6 30,7 
4 5,0 4,3 13,1 
5 1,6 0,9 5,1 
6+ 0,9 1,2 3,5 
Average number 2,25 2,28 2,77 
Source: Datafrom a representative national survey conducted in 1992. 
The task of measuring the ethnic composition of Bulgaria dominated official policy 
especially during the Communist period and has also proved problematic during 
transition. The major problem in measuring Gypsy numbers is their ethnic, religious and 
language heterogeneity. Most of the Gypsies in Bulgaria are Muslims, a substantial 
minority are Orthodox Christians and a small minority are Catholics or Protestants. 
Further distinctions exist within these categories, for example, between Turkish Gypsies, 
which refer to those Muslim Gypsies who speak Turkish as their mother tongue and 
identify themselves as Turks, and Muslim Romani-speaking Gypsies who identify 
themselves as Gypsies. Among the Turkish Gypsies there are both Sunnites and Shiites, 
as well as those who are Christian Orthodox, Catholic or Evangelical. "' 
The high Muslim component within Gypsy communities and their tendency to identify 
themselves primarily with Turks has continued to have a number of repercussions. It has 
aroused fears among nationalistic parties over the growing power of Turks within 
Bulgaria, which they see in the high number of 'false' Turks, whether they be in the form 
of Gypsies or Pomaks. As a result, a political distinction between the equating of self- 
identification with ethnic membership on the one hand and the demand for some 
objective criteria on the other has emerged, fuelled by demands on the part of the Turkish 
108 Elena Marushiakova, "Ethnic Identity Among Gypsy Groups in Bulgaria", Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, 2 
(2), 1992. p. 97 
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based Movement for Rights and Freedoms to allow all those who declare themselves as 
Turks to be recognised as such. "' 
In 1989 before the end of Communist rule a secret, or non-announced census was carried 
out by the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. The results of this census revealed some of the 
difficulties inherent in the process of counting minority numbers. "' It showed that there 
were 576,927 Gypsies in Bulgaria (6,45 per cent of the total population), which was 
considerably higher than the figure of 313,396 (3,7 per cent) later reached in the 1992 
census. One explanation for such inconsistencies as addressed earlier is the question of 
methodology. The Ministry of Interior in the 1989 census had depended upon 'external' 
information, in that the census showed "who is considered a Gypsy by the surrounding 
population". This contrasted with the principle of self determination that was used in 
official population censuses. 
In 1992, for the first time since 1975, questions were included in the census 
questionnaires that dealt explicitly with ethnicity, language and religion, which had 
among others, options of Gypsy ethnicity and Romani language. According to the 1992 
census, 822,000 of the country's 8.5 million population had identified themselves as 
Turks, and 288,000 as Gypsies (elsewhere the official figure for Gypsies is reported 
313,396 - 3.7 per cent). "' 829,000 spoke Turkish as their mother tongue and 257,000 
gave Romani as their mother tongue. The Muslim population was 1,078,000 and the 
Christian population 7,373,000. "' The results of a2 per cent sample survey carried out 
by the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute in 1993, put the overall percentage of 
109 Kolev, op. cit. pp. 34-45. 
110 Kornitctat sa UNICEF, Nalsionalen analis na problemile na Bulgarskolo dele I Bulgarskoto senjejslvolo, Sofia, 
1991. 
111 The percentage is based on the figure of 313,386 calculated using the 1992 census total of 8,487,317 Bulgarian 
citizens. 
112 Kolev, op. cit. p. 33. 
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Gypsies throughout Bulgaria even lower, estimated at 3.4 per cent. "' However, as 
already discussed in section 5 of Chapter 1,500,000 (5.9 per cent) is generally taken as 
the most realistic figure. 
Kolev in his analysis of census taking in 1992 in a Bulgarian Gypsy mahala, draws 
attention to some of the complexities inherent to the process of ethnic identification at a 
local level. Gypsies in Bulgaria tend to live in close-knit communities in their own 
neighbourhood, known as mahalas, but are sometimes also referred to as 'ghettos', most 
of which, as discussed above, stem back to the Ottoman empire. These mahalas found on 
the edge of towns or cities, are often poorly resourced with weak infrastructural 
development and low levels of sanitation. According to Kolev's study of one such 
mahala, there were a variety of ethnic groups living there. Out of the 1,000 inhabitants 
most were considered Turkish Gypsies and the rest included Bulgarians (c25), Turks 
(cl5) and Christian Gypsies (00). Although the general consensus among the 
inhabitants was that most of those who lived there were Gypsies, in the census 
questionnaire most Turkish Gypsies declared themselves as Turks, all of whom spoke as 
their mother tongue Turkish. Only 9 out of the 151 Turkish Gypsies in Kolev's 
designated area identified themselves as Gypsies, some of which Kolev described as still 
undergoing the process of 'Turkification!. "' 
Table 4.6 shows how in the 1990s the Turkish identity is just one of many for Gypsies 
living in Bulgaria and that they form a complex and diverse set of communities. Gypsies 
inhabit most parts of the country mostly living in mahalas. Gypsies also form large 
communities in rural areas. Although sparse in some areas, such as the mountainous 
113 These results were part of a survey carried out by the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute entitled Demographic 
Features of Bulgaria 1993. Cited in Garabed Minassian and Stoyan Totev, "The Bulgarian Economy in Transition 
Regional Aftereffects", Eastern European Economics, 34 (3), May/June, 1996. p. 57, Table 5. 
114 Kolev, op. cit. 
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regions of the Rhodepes in the south-west, there are a number of villages in Bulgaria, 
particularly towards the north-east where the entire population consists of Gypsies. 
Official data reflects this uneven distribution of Gypsies across Bulgaria, although 
different sources tend to disagree about the exact dimensions this may take. "5 
Table 4.7 shows that in the early years of reform, Gypsies were a convenient scapegoat 
for Bulgaria's social problems. According to opinion polls carried out in 1994 and in 
1997 by the Bulgarian Helsinki Conunittee, Gypsy prejudice may have diffused in some 
areas but certainly not in others. Out of 1,000 ethnic Bulgarians, 84 per cent of the 
respondents in 1994 and 84 per cent in 1997 believed that Gypsies were 'lazy and 
irresponsible'. 85 per cent and 80 per cent respectively believed that Gypsies could not be 
'trusted or relied upon'. Finally 59 per cent in 1994 and 68 per cent in 1997 said that they 
would not live in the same neighbourhood as Gypsies. "' 
The extent to which such surveys accurately reflect the attitudes of all Bulgarians is, of 
course, debatable and they may even underestimate them. However, what these figures 
serve to demonstrate is that far from Communism solving the 'Gypsy problem' they 
served only to exacerbate it, and even well into transition it has yet to be resolved. 
115 The 1992 census suggested that in the Montana region, 9.1 per cent of the population were Gypsies as opposed to 
0.3 per cent in the city of Sofia, however, according to the 1993 survey Gypsies amounted to no more than 5.5 per 
cent in Montana and 0.9 per cent in Sofia. 
116 Krassitriir Kanev, "Dynamics of Inter-Ethnic Tensions in Bulgaria and the Balkans", Balkan Forum, 4 (2), June 
1996. pp. 213-252. 
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Table 4.6 Examples of Gypsy communities in Bulgaria according to self-identification. 
Group names rkleaning and characteristics 
Lifestyle 
Jerlii from Turkish - local, living in one and the same place, sedentary 
Kaldarasi/Kardarasi from Romanian - cauldron, nomadic 
Laesi/Laesri/Lajnest/Lajines from Romanian - wanderers, nomadic 
Katunari from Bulgarian - wanderers and tent-dwellers, nomadic 
Religion 
Dassikane Roma Bulgarian Gypsies, Christian 
Xoraxane/Xoroxane Turkish Gypsies. Three types: Muslim who speak Romanes; Muslim 
who speak Turkish; Christians who speak Romanes (in the latter case 
Turkish implies the historical practice of Islam) 
Common Group Origin 
Agupti/Gjupti From Egypt 
Wallachian From what was Wallachia 
Serbian From Serbia 
_Hungarian 
From Hungary 
Based on IOC21ities, regions 
Kotlenski Tsigani Gypsies from Kotel 
Gradeski Tsigani Gypsies from Gradets 
Occupation 
Kalajdzii Tinsmiths. At least four different groups are identified as tinsmiths so 
this category needs to be used in conjunction with other more general 
names. 
Grebeneri Comb-makers. As with the tinsmiths this is used in some cases even 
when the group no longer practices this profession. 
Property statUS/p2rticularities 
Zlatari Gold (in Bulgarian) 
Lovari Affluence/money (deriving from love in Romanes) 






Varbanesti Varban's children 
Unknown origin 
Ficiri Self-appellation of settled Roma in the Loznitsa mahala in Stara 
Zagora 
Source: Marushiakova (1992), Marushiakova and Popov (1997) 
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Table 4.7 Attitudes of Bulgarian population towards Gypsies, % 199 1. 




black marketers 75 
liars 70 
drifters 67 
Source: National Institute of Youth Studies, May 1991. 
Perhaps more revealing (although less explicitly so) are those reports that describe 
Gypsies as forming a new kind of underclass. One Bulgarian report on the situation of 
Gypsies since 1989 argued that, "the Roma are becoming increasingly isolated and are 
gradually dropping out of 'our world'. As a result, they are in practice being left behind 
in all social areas, education, culture, socio-economic and political life. ""' Although 
conditions for Gypsies have seriously deteriorated, this type of analysis serves to 
equivocate the issue and opens the way for discussions on Gypsies that feed on 
traditional stereotypes. 
For example, in a discussion of Gypsy 'trader tourism' in Bulgaria, Konstantinov uses 
language such as 'abnormal practices' and 'deviancy' to describe their economic survival 
strategies. He implies that Gypsies are inherently prone to marginalisation and argues 
that they naturally inhabit this marginal condition, "the desire to get out of their living 
situation is not evident" and that furthermore the reasons why Gypsies carry out such 
practices are above all for 'egotistical' ends of "material gain, gratification and 
excitement and not having to share a global sense of responsibility. ""' Marushiakova 
and Popov are extremely wary of such approaches that portray all Gypsies as a 
117 Ilona Tomova, The Gypsies in the Transition Period, International Centre for Minority Studies and Inter Cultural 
Relations, Sofia, 1995. p. 19. 118 Yulian Konstantinov, "Hunting for Gaps Through Boundaries: Gypsy Tactics for Economic Survival in the 
Context of the Second Phase of Post-Totalitarian Changes in Bulgaria (1994-)", Innovation, 7 (3), 1994. pp. 234-244. 
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'destructuralised', 'marginalised' or 'abnormal' community, who have no ethno-cultural 
traditions. Such an approach, they argue, reinforces the idea that there is a 'Gypsy 
problem' of their own making to be solved. "' 
In Bulgaria, we have witnessed, since 1989, the development of a new model of inter- 
ethnic relations which are still, to a large extent, based on existing assumptions of 
Bulgarian supremacy and the perceived need for self-protection against the external 
threat of Turkey or the internal threat of minorities. The so-called process of 
democratisation is the new medium through which policy agendas are being formulated. 
The extent to which minorities have direct access to this process of decision making 
however, remains debatable. For Gypsy NGO leaders and advocates in the field, the 
transition, therefore, represents mixed blessings. Some have expressed a bitterness 
towards the new levels of poverty and high unemployment, which they associate entirely 
with the transition. There was a strong sense of nostalgia for many of them, who harked 
back to Communist days and the basic rights, they believed, it had guaranteed. On the 
other hand, many were keen to emphasise the positive repercussions of the transition, 
especially the new political and cultural freedoms, which for Gypsies represented a 
significant break from previous aggressive assimilation policies. 
The consequences of years of assimilation have not only been detrimental to the well- 
being and cultural validity of Gypsies, but also to the Gadjo's understanding of them. It 
is often the case that the non-Gypsy population have little understanding of Gypsies and 
have no inclination to rectify this. "' Schooling is an area in which this has been most 
119 Marushiakova and Popov, op. cit. 1997. 
120 An interview with a worker at the Social Services revealed an ignorance concerning the Gypsies she dealt with. 
Her official language of facts and figures often gave way to a simmering frustration. Her sense of irritation and 
animosity towards Gypsies was littered throughout the course of the interview but was expressed most vividly after it 
had drawn to a close. She explained how the conflicts that arose at the workplace were caused by Gypsy clients, who 
on their part, she argued, expected to be given social assistance without showing any motivation to work. Although 
she spoke of various initiatives that encouraged Gypsies to learn to read and write, her assumption remained that 
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apparent. Schooling is still seen as an important site of integration during the transition, 
whereby in 1990 the literacy rate for Gypsies was still only 13 per cent. "' The issue of 
schooling reveals one of the most basic contradictions in strategies of inclusion and 
integration. On the one hand, reformers and proponents of integration encourage the 
participation of Gypsies into formal schooling, expressing concerns over high drop-out 
rates. Their argument rests on the assumption that all it takes for Gypsies to be included 
is to ensure that the school system is more open to them. On the other hand, Gypsies are 
still implicitly regarded as ultimately inferior and as not capable of reaching the same 
academic potential as the rest of the population. Tomova's report embodies this paradox, 
in which she argues, "mechanisms to make schools more attractive to [Gypsy] children 
should include additional lessons in music, dance and the visual arts [ ... ] driving, motor 
mechanics, cosmetics, sewing and pattern making. ""' This tendency towards promoting 
only vocational skills for Gypsies is especially prominent in the high number of 'special 
schools' that still exist throughout Bulgaria. These 'special schools' remain separate from 
mainstream schools and not only reinforce artificial divisions between the majority 
population and Gypsies, but also the stereotype that Gypsies are 'backward'. 
The first 'Special School' in Bulgaria was set up in Plovdiv in 1969. It aimed at offering 
professional training and a reduced general curriculum for pupils who were 'retarded' in 
one way or another. There are now over 30 special schools in Bulgaria with about 18,000 
pupils in all. About 90 per cent of them are Gypsies. According to Stefan Chemev, the 
ultimately it was Gypsies themselves who were to blame. Interview 24.10.97. However, some individuals working 
behind the scenes in the world of social policy, often discredited and stereotyped as anti-Gypsy, were surprisingly 
well informed and aware of issues normally ignored by the general population. For example, an interview I carried out 
with the Head Prison Warder of the only woman's prison in Bulgaria, revealed a character who expressed a deep 
concern with learning about the culture of his inmates, the majority of whom were Gypsies. However, while kccn to 
discuss the complex ethnic groups that make up Gypsies in Bulgaria, he still believed that 'they' were a peculiar 
people who were instinctively separate from 'us' and that crime committed by a Gypsy was a 'Gypsy crime'. Interview 
21.10.97 
121 Bulgarian Telegraph Association and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1990. 
122 Tomova, op. cit. P. 86. 
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Bulgarian Deputy Minister for Lower Education, before 1979 only 10-15 per cent of 
Gypsies who completed the 8th grade went onto secondary schools. Since 1979 (and the 
implementation of special schools) he claims this figure has risen to 25-30 per cent. 
Now, he argues, it is the case that 70-80 per cent of the Gypsy students who attend 
'special schools' graduate, all of whom receive a certificate saying they have technical 
skills. 123 
However, an interview with the director of such a school revealed that pupils on 
graduating have little chance of getting a job or continuing in education. '2' This school 
also offered insights into other types of problems implicit to this policy of segregation. 
Situated in one of the Gypsy mahalas on the outskirts of a large town, this 'special 
school' was inhabiting a disused building that had recently been evacuated by the 
previous occupiers due to sinking foundations. The semi-derelict appearance on the 
outside was not extended to its interior. Although there were broken windows and no 
heating, there were pictures on the wall and an abundance of plants. During the course of 
the interview I was able to extract details about the nature of the school and its day to 
day running. At the same time I was able to catch glimpses of some of the undercurrents 
that fed into the more general treatment of Gypsies in these schools. 
The school catered for pupils aged from 6 to 16 years with a total number of 197 and on 
average 10 pupils per class. The school curriculum, in line with state policy, displayed a 
distinct lack of general curriculum subjects. The stipulation is that there must be nine 
hours of Bulgarian language, two lessons of craft work, and three lessons of physical 
123 Cited in Zang, op. cit. pp. 32-34. 
124 Interview: 10.3.97. ne interview was arranged for me by a friend, whose husband was a teacher there. It was part 
of a more general visit and took place in her office before classes began. This visit was worthwhile insofar as it 
enabled me to get a sense of the atmosphere and general attitudes within the school, together with obtaining specific 
information on pupil composition and selection criteria. However, given that I was welcomed as a special guest and 
that my visit was pre-planned, coupled with the fact that this was the only special school I was able to visit, meant that 
any observations I made could only be tentative. 
171 
education per week. Eleven year old pupils are taught at the kindergarten level for two 
years and language learning is fairly basic, involving the alphabet and reading short 
texts. Pupils are tested termly, using criteria set by state inspectors. The level of 
intervention from external inspectors, invests this type of schooling with a formal 
legitimacy. However, it does not distract from the obvious discrimination that these 
schools reinforce: the segregation of Gypsy pupils from mainstream schooling. 
Over three-quarters (150) of the pupils were Turkish Gypsies and nearly a fifth (36) were 
Bulgarian Gypsies, the remaining 5 per cent (11) being 'ethnic Bulgarians. Despite the 
over representation of Gypsy pupils this was not reflected in the composition of the staff, 
all of whom were non-Gypsies. "' The director explained that this was not a Gypsy 
school by definition, but a school for children who were either 'socially or mentally' 
retarded. Her interchangeable use of these terms suggested that her distinction between 
these very different labels was blurred. While implying a lack of proper medical 
definition, this did not prevent her from confidently claiming that according to their 
school's criteria only about 20 per cent of her pupils were socially retarded the rest were 
diagnosed as mentally retarded. * 
The director spoke of problems of high absenteeism, laying the blame on traditional 
stereotypes, such as early marriages or family commitments outside of school. Beyond 
this, however, she also located the source of obstacles to them finding work afterwards 
with their disabilities'. The child is assessed according to his/her IQ, which is backed up 
by an examination carried out by a team of specialists, psychologists and teachers, 
organised bi-annually by the regional education office. The assessment involves looking 
at family history, general condition, language ability, any hearing difficulties, and 
125 When I asked why there were no Gypsy members of staff, she answered that the majority of Gypsies do not have 
sufficient training or education. 
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'psychiatric' state. Pupils who are seen as needing this assessment are identified by either 
teachers or parents. One of the most common factors taken as a suitable indication is 
repeated failure at school. Having been shown a recent example of an assessment form 
for such a case, it was possible to observe that there were many ambiguities surrounding 
such diagnosis. In this case, the diagnosis was borderline, but the final recommendation 
was that the child in question should attend this school. The justification for this were 
signs that the child displayed 'an inability to think logically', in spite of having 'a sense of 
time, space and orientation'. 
The director admitted that most of the pupils there were borderline cases and that 
"ironically, it was the eleven ethnic Bulgarians who were most 'severely handicapped". 
The general nature of this assessment whereby assumptions are made about the 'psychic 
state' of a child seemed to point towards a hidden racist agenda. The implicit use of 
pseudo-science within this realm of 'special' schools to make judgements about racial 
groups is an attempt to justify or at best to deflect from the racist essence inherent to 
processes of selection. This is some indication of the extent to which assumptions that 
underpinned the Revival Period are still evident in today's new democratic Bulgaria. "" 
In contrast to this overt regressive treatment of Gypsies, the Bulgarian state has 
attempted to embark on other more 'progressive' programmes aimed at improving the lot 
of Gypsies. However, these programmes often remain ill-informed, unprepared, sporadic 
and demonstrate little evidence of thorough preparation or follow-up projects. As a result 
they often fail to be implemented in the first place, or if they do get implemented, fail to 
126 The world of (pseudo-) science offered a strong ally to Communist policy during the height of ethnic assimilation 
in its objective of denying the existence of all ethnic groups. A study of Bulgarian skulls undertaken during its peak 
concluded that "It should be pointed out that craniometric characteristics of the country's population do not manifest 
essential differences in the different regions, which demonstrates the ethnic homogeneity of the Bulgarian people. " D. 
Kadanov, S. Mutafov, The Human Skull in a Medico-Anthropological Aspect, Bulgarian Academy of Science, Soria, 
1984, quoted in M. Kohn, op. cit. p. 190. 
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fulfil original objectives thus remaining just 'one-offs'. For example, in 1993-4 the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs embarked on a pilot programme in Stolipinovo, a 
Gypsy neighbourhood in Plovdiv, for the development of literacy, professional 
qualifications and employment among the Gypsy population. Unofficially it was 
admitted that it had failed to reach most of its targets. Only a few dozen people gained 
employment which was not even permanent, and participation in training courses had 
deprived Gypsies of unemployment benefits leaving many participants in fact worse off. 
Despite its obvious ineffectiveness, plans were still made to carry out similar projects in 
other cities throughout Bulgaria. "' 
Given that special schools are still very much in existence, the function of state-led 
initiatives in other areas remains superficial; simply to give the impression that the 
Bulgarian government are abiding by human rights guidelines. Therefore, little is 
achieved in terms of tackling the big ongoing problems that remain entrenched in the 
very operation of its political economy. The desire to keep minority groups in their place 
continues to form the back bone of much policy design. Ultimately, the 'Gypsy problem' 
has threaded its way through the different phases of Bulgarian social policy despite shifts 
in rhetoric. 
4.8 Gypsies and the new framework of minority rights 
In the post-1989 situation, Bulgaria, alongside the rest of Eastern Europe, has found 
itself thrust onto the Western dominated international scene. In this new context, 
previous assimilative progrannnes aimed at minorities have been frowned upon, and 
replaced by approaches that emphasise the link between rights of ethnic minorities (civil, 
political, social) and their access to livelihood and markets. The framework of 
127 Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit. p. 4. 
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international human rights has been seen as pivotal for achieving "stability, democratic 
security and peace" in Europe. 128 
Against the backdrop of mounting ethnic tension and rising fear over minority 
nationalism in Eastern Europe since 1989, there has been a revival of the minority 
question. 1211 The Balkans peninsular is especially seen as a trouble spot, where, in the 
words of Roudometof, "the close geographic proximity of ethnic minorities with their 
external homelands and (in some cases) their high birth rates" have intensified the 
'structural strain' on this region. "' Policies of anti-immigration in the West however, 
dramatically undercut the West's apparent selfless concern with such problems. "The 
aim, in short, " as worded in the Report of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, "should be to improve the 'quality of life' in migration-producing countries 
for the sake of such improvements, but also for the reduction in pressures on 
international migration. ""' Tightening migration laws have had particularly damaging 
ramifications for the status of Gypsies, who, more than most, are perceived as a key 
potential threat. 132 Yaron Matras directly attacks the implicit agenda of West European 
policies towards Gypsies, which he argues "are still about keeping Gypsies out" and that 
128 Preamble, of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, infra n. 2., Council of Europe, 
Framework Conventionfor the Protection ofNational Minorities, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1995. p. 5. 
129 See Martyn Rady, "Minority Rights and Self-determination in Contemporary Eastern Europe", Slavonic and East 
European Review, 71 (4), October 1993. Nationalism in the 'East' is seen by commentators in the West as one 
dictated by emotional and unpredictable ties of kinship. This sentiment was expressed at a conference held in the 
presence of the Commissioner of National Minorities during which anxious concerns over nationalism in Eastern 
Europe were being voiced by a number of scholars and practitioners. Minority Rights in the 'New' Europe, 
International conference organised by the Department of Legal Studies, University of Central Lancashire, The 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London, 29 November 1996. 
130 Victor Roudometof, "The Consolidation of National Minorities in South Eastern Europe", Journal ofPolitical and 
Military Sociology, 24, Winter 1996. p. 190. 
131 The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe - Roma (Gypsies) in the CSCE Region, Report of the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities, Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials, 1993. p. 11 
132 Charlemagne notes targetting by the French media of East European Gypsy immigants with examples from Le 
Monde which described them as 'beggers' (23.3.1991) and LExpress which described them as 'reproducing like 
rabbits' (22.10.1992). Jacqueline Charlemagne, Migrations Est-Ouest: Le Cas Des Tsiganes, Laboratoire de 
Sociologie Juridque Paris 11 - CNRS, Convention FAS, No. 75 1084 9 1, December 1992. p. 58 
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"securing human rights in the East simply happens to figure in this very short-term and 
narrow minded selfish calculation. "" 
The number of those Gypsies who do migrate, or seek asylum in Western Europe are 
considered numerically far more significant than they actually are. " The New York 
Times, for example, reported that in 1992 alone some 130,000 Romanian and Bulgarian 
citizens sought asylum in Germany, most of whom were Gypsies. "' The media's ability 
to hype up the issue of Gypsy migration into an 'invasion' has helped to encourage this 
misleading image of Gypsies and has fuelled irrational concerns over migration 
control. "' Leading West European countries, faced with an apparent 'influx' of 
immigrants from Eastern Europe, are keen to distinguish between 'genuine' political 
refugees and 'bogus' economic migrants. This allows them legitimately to impose stiffer 
regulations for the majority of incomers, yet still stick to the claim that they are 
upholding human rights. 
The Copenhagen Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1990) devoted 
considerable attention to minority issues and in 1992 the Council of Europe opened for 
signature the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. This Charter 
seemed promising in that it promoted the use of regional or minority language in private 
133 Yaron Matras, "Book Review of PER'Thc Roma in the 21st Century: A Policy Paper. " In Jctske Mijs (ed. ) 0 
Drom International, pilot edition, 1998. 
134 Reynicr argues that the westward movements of Gypsies have coincided with a much larger general exodus of 
nationals in Central and Eastern Europe and that if movements attributable to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia are 
not considered then the general index of Gypsy emigration from Central and Eastern Europe lies between 2.5-4.6 pcr 
1,000 inhabitants (this figure is the ratio of the total number involved in the 1960-1992 flows to the estimated total 
Gypsy population). When compared with the emigration index for the rest of the population of Central and Eastern 
Europe which has been estimated to be 8.4 per 1,000 (for the period 1946-1982), it seems, therefore, that contrary to 
popular belief Gypsies have a lesser tendency than most to migrate westwards. Reyniers, op. cit. p. I S. 
135 The New York Times, 7 February 1993. 
136 ne response of the British government officials and the media to the arrival of a few hundred Gypsies from the 
Czech Republic in October 1997 is just one example of how heightened concerns quickly escalated into hysteria over 
westbound migration. Tabloids, as well as more 'liberal' newspapers, such as The Guardian and the The Independent 
fed irrational concerns over a'tidal wave'of Gypsies flooding into Britain from Eastern Europe. Immigration officials 
imprisoned many of the newly arrived refugees, which was deemed legitimate by the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, 
who claimed that he did not see them as anything other than just 'economic refugees' 
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and public life as an inalienable right. However, it failed to deal explicitly with non- 
territorial languages such as Romani. Rather than explicitly addressing the issue of 
Gypsies head-on, governmental agencies have subsumed them into a wider discussion on 
minority rights. Part Il ("Objectives and Principles"), for example, only implicitly deals 
with issues relevant to Gypsies, with its vague reference to "languages deprived of 
territory" (Article 7.5). "' 
The emphasis on language is also a tactic used in the Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities. "' The Convention is the first ever legally binding multilateral 
instrument devoted to the protection of national minorities. It stresses the use of 
language, equal access to education and the full participation of minorities in every 
sphere of life but, again fails to offer specifics. Wheatly is disappointed by the limited 
provisions offered to Eastern Europe by the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, 
It is unlikely that such a minimalist approach to the granting of national minority rights 
and exhortation ofthe inclusion of the national minority rights into the public sphere of the 
State willprovide a basisfor the solution of long standing ethnic disputes. "' 
Until minorities can take part in the very process of dialogue, Wheatly argues that any 
achievement of a genuine, pluralist, multi-ethnic state remains illusory. 
Moves towards incorporating the rights of Gypsies have been held back over disputes 
about definition, and subsequently have been implemented, if at all, in a haphazard 
fashion. It seems that in winning certain rights, Gypsies are forced to concede others. 
137 j. P. Li6gcois, Roma, Gypsies, Travellers, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1994. p. 28 1. 
138 Opened for signature on I February 1995. Council of Europe, Human Rights, A Continuing Challengefor the 
Council ofEurope, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1995. pp. 46-47. 
139 Stephen Wheatly, "National Minorities and the Emerging Human Right to Political Inclusion and Dialogue", East 
European Human Rights Review, 2 (2), 1997. p. 15 1. 
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Both Gheorghe and Acton address the contradictions that emerge when trying to 
implement legal protection for Gypsies at the local, national and international levels. In 
particular they stress the importance of acknowledging that rights for Gypsies can be 
formulated in a number of ways such as: 'indigenous peoples'; 'ethnic minorities'; 
'national minorities'; 'international minority'; or 'transnational minority'. "" 
In addition, Gypsy rights have been incorporated into existing legal frameworks often in 
a subsidiary fashion reinforced by a passive rather than active approach. Positive 
measures on the part of governments promoting Gypsy identity, culture, and equality, 
beyond the passive prevention of discrimination are rarely encouraged. The 
incorporation of Gypsies into the human rights framework has therefore been a 
controlled and limited process, and has served to shield the breaching of fundamental 
rights elsewhere. In the light of this, the acquisition of certain rights at the formal level, 
although important symbolically, does not necessarily translate into political and social 
change at the ground level. 
Problems soon emerge, for example, with the very process of defining national 
minorities, especially for the Gypsy populations of Eastern Europe. In the context of 
post-1989 Bulgaria we have seen that it has become increasingly apparent that Gypsies 
do not constitute a uniform and homogenous community, and do not organise under one 
banner. "" Calls on behalf of Gypsies to unite and form a cohesive political force are 
often futile. According to Mirga the divisions between Gypsies go deep, and individual 
140 Nicolae Gheorghe, "The Social Construction of Romani Identity. " In T. Acton (ed. ) Gypsy Politics and Traveller 
Identity, University of Hertfordshire Press, Hatfield, 1997; Acton, 1998, op. cit.; and N. Gheorghe and T. Acton 
"Dealing with Multiculturality: Minority, Ethnic, National and Human Rights. " In Council of Europe (ed. ), Gypsies in 
the Locality, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1994. 
141 Marushiakova and Popov, "Gypsy Minority", op. cit. In an interview with Toni Shishmanova C (2) 18.3.1997 
director, Partnersfor Democratic Change, Sofia, she explained that in her work, which involves a broad cross scction 
of minorities, it is always Gypsies who display the most internal tensions, usually triggered by religious or political 
allegiances. 
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Gypsy groups, in the interest of self-preservation, are concerned with maintaining some 
kind of 'purity'. Joining together with other Gypsy groups is seen by some as potentially 
diluting, demeaning and non-productive. Mirga, in his analysis of territorial behaviour 
among peripatetic groups, argues that the socio-economic unit tends to be the main 
source of conflict among Gypsy groups. Although Gypsies have devised various patterns 
for avoiding conflict, such as one group leaving the area, or some groups developing new 
skills to access new niches, problems of decreasing demand, a growing Gypsy 
population, and the overall stigmatisation of Gypsies under a single stereotype have led 
to heightened tensions among certain groups of Gypsies within Bulgaria. "" The 
representation of Gypsies and other minorities within the framework of human rights is 
therefore vital in terms of laying important groundwork for Gypsy political organisation 
and for gaining international recognition. 
4.9 International frameworks and policy making in Bulgaria 
The promotion of international policy agendas, frameworks and conventions have 
influenced the Bulgarian national policy agenda especially in terms of their approach 
towards Gypsies. "" Since 1989 the Bulgarian government has taken the official line that 
minority groups now have the scope for developing and articulating some degree of 
ethnic autonomy. The new Constitution composed in 1991 stipulated in Article 6 
paragraph 2 that there is to be no "limitations of the rights or privileges based on ethnic 
belonging. " The passive nature of this recommendation was later updated in November 
1992 when it allowed for "certain socially justified privileges for 'groups of citizens' 
142 Mirga in Casimir, op. cit. pp. 65-67 
143 This has even penetrated university teaching. A new MA course on intercultural dialogue was introduced at Soria 
University in 1998, which includes subjects on Gypsies in order to promote awareness among new academics about 
relations between ethnic and cultural minorities in Bulgaria. A media and minority course has already been taught in 
the faculty of journalism for some years. This slight shift within university education towards minority issues, 
however, is just a small step, in that explicit anti-Gypsy prejudice remains the norm. Milica Pesic, "Soria Study 
Addresses Racial Splits", Times Higher, 16 November 1998. 
179 
who are in 'an unfavourable social situation'. """ There have been some advances made 
in the field of education for Turks and also in some cases for the Gypsy population. 
Optional classes of 'mother-tongue' education have been introduced, aimed mostly at 
Turks, including a programme allowing 400 Turkish students to train as teachers. "" In 
specific reference to Gypsies, the Decree 232 of 10 December 1991 outlines that the 
teaching of the Romani language (Romanes) be allowed for 4 hours per week as an 
optional subject. "" 
As a result, according to Demitri Iliev, a phonologist who specialises in Romany 
linguistics and who works for an NGO in Sofia, some 3,000 Gypsy classes in Romanes 
have become available, supplemented by Romany textbooks published by the Ministry 
of Education, such as "Romani Alfabeta" (The Romani Alphabet) and "Az ucha 
Bulgarski Ezik" (I Learn the Bulgarian Language). ` Allowances have also been made in 
the realm of media production where newspapers and radio programmes in minority 
languages representing minority voices are more freely broadcast and distributed. '" This, 
together with new legal freedoms for minorities, such as the passing of a law in 1990 
which gave Muslims and other religious minorities the right to paid leave during their 
religious holidays seemed to paint a promising picture. 
144 Marushiakova and Popov, "Gypsy Minority", op. cit. pp. 2-3. 
145 Kanev, op. cit. p. 2. 
146 Marushiakova, op. cit, 1994. p. 112. 
147 Interview with Demitri Iliev (17.3.1997), the co-author (with Khristo Kyuchukov) of these textbooks. Kcnrick, a 
proficient linguist in Romanes, however, stresses the difficulty of standardising this language which, he estimates 
consists of at least 50 dialects in Bulgaria alone. Donald Kenrick, "The Gypsies of Bulgaria Before and After the 10th 
of November". paper presented to Y7ie Gypsy Lore Society Conference, July, 199 1. p. 4 
148 Interview with Savolina Danova B (1) 17.3.97 Human Rights Project(HRP), Sofia. As well as monitoring human 
rights abuses and offering legal assistance to Gypsies, the HRP have contributed to setting up training programmes to 
help Gypsies set themselves up with radio broadcasts. The Baptist Church has also played an important role in 
helping Gypsies to set up their own radio programmes. For example, "Words of Ilope" is a radio programme set up 
by two Gypsy brothers in October 1996, the main content of which is the preaching of John's Gospel. T. Thomas, 
"Bulgaria Trip Report", February 22-26 1997, unpublished. p. 1. 
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The potential far reaching implications of these changes, however, are not so clear cut. 
The 1991 Constitution was preceded by two new laws which were implemented in the 
aftermath of Communist collapse. From March 1990 the right to choose freely one's own 
name was restored and amnesty was ensured for those imprisoned during the 'Revival 
Process' and from November 1990 freedom of assembly and association was allowed. ", 
However, the Law on Political Parties, adopted by Parliament in April 1990, formed a 
counter current to these changes. Its main thrust prohibits the registration of political 
parties along ethnic or religious lines. Article 3. paragraph 2 reads "No Political party 
can be constituted [ ... ] on a religious or ethnic 
basis ( ... ]", which has strong assimilative 
overtones. "O Nevertheless, Gueorgiev a prominent Gypsy leader and one time BSP MP, 
is keen to support this law for he sees it as important that Gypsies join with existing 
party politics rather than set themselves in opposition to them. "' The counter argument 
expressed by other Gypsy leaders is that it allows for Gypsies to be manipulated by the 
political parties, which are not concerned with supporting Gypsy interests. 152 
With Bulgaria finding itself on a new and a seemingly more accessible European playing 
field, the BSP government was keen to reduce any potential threats to future membership 
of the European Union. November 1991 saw Bulgaria's ratification of the first Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the BSP, which 
granted citizens the right to individual petitions. In May 1992 the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was also ratified. By 
September 1992 this was put into force and was immediately used by members of the 
Gypsy community to file a complaint about human rights abuses in Bulgaria. "' A 
149 Kanev, op. cit. 
150 Angela Kocze, The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe: Legal Remedies or Invisibility?, Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights - Contact Point for Roma and Sind Issues (CPRSI), Warsaw, March-May, 1996. p. 18 "51 He is leader of the Confederation of Roma in Bulgaria, Sof ia set up in 1993. Interview A (1) 4.3.97. 
152 This was a view expressed by the leader of the Romani Bah Foundation. Interview D (2) 17.9.97. 
153 Kanev, op. cit. 
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statement on xenophobic acts made by the Ministry of the Interior in April 1995 
demonstrated their eagerness to be seen as committed to the welfare of the more 
vulnerable groups within their borders, while at the same time not spelling out any 
specific policies: 
The Ministry of the Interior is firmly resolved to take all the necessary measures in 
exercising its lawful powers to uncover and prevent such acts [of vandalism, xenophobia 
and anti-Semitism], to maintain public order and safeguard the citizens' rights and 
freedoms. 
We will not tolerate any attempt to discredit the aspiration of the Republic of Bulgaria to 
equal, honourable membership of the European and global community. "' 
In line with these various agreements and in the light of declarations made by Western 
states, such as the US State Department's report in 1996 that identified "the degrading 
treatment of Gypsies as one of the most serious violations of human rights in Bulgaria", 
Bulgaria must assure its Westem'neighbours' that it is serious about the protection of its 
minority populations. "' The UDF government elected in 1997, therefore, went one step 
further and signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
in October of that year, but has yet to ratify it. Although its main thrust is directed 
towards the Turkish minority, it also has implications for the Gypsy minority. 
One example of the Bulgarian government being more supportive of Gypsy rights was its 
agreement to partake in a round table aimed at addressing the Roma question in 
Bulgaria. "' The Round Table was organised by the Human Rights Project, a type B 
NGO, on October 3 1998 in order to discuss a programme draft entitled "For Equal 
Participation of the Roma in Bulgarian society". "' The overall aim was to work out a 
154 BTA news agency, Sofia, 20 April, 1995. 
155 BBC News, 10 May, 1996. 
156 Radio Free Europe, Bulgaria, 14 January, 1999. 
157 The HRP also helped put together the initial programme draft based on input from Gypsy organisations 
throughout Bulgaria. 
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new social contract between the Bulgarian Roma and the Bulgarian government. 
Representatives of the Bulgarian government were present, including Mr. Vcsselin 
Metodiev, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Education, and members of the National 
Council on Ethnic and Demographic Questions at the Council of Ministers and the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Commission. Leaders from Romani political movements 
and NGOs were also present, coupled with Bulgarian human rights NGOs and 
journalists. 
The European Roma Rights Centre, however, viewed this roundtable as little more than a 
political gesture on the part of the government who are keen to be seen as supporting the 
Gypsy population in the light of upcoming elections. "' Similar conclusions could be 
drawn from the latest Government initiative in Sofia regarding the establishment of a 
database for Gypsies in 10 surrounding towns. Led by Dr. Antonii Galabov from the 
Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the hope is to make this 
database a reliable source of information for policy making. 159 Ultimately, however, until 
the UDF signs the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and makes 
legally binding all those conventions that have already been signed, such initiatives as 
these will remain superficial. "' 
Ultimately we have to ask whether by the inclusion of their rights into existing 
frameworks and with the signing by governments of various international conventions, 
the interests of Gypsies are genuinely represented. Structural obstacles to equality, made 
worse by market reform, continue to perpetuate unemployment and poverty. In this 
context, attempts to incorporate the interests of Gypsies into the process of 
158 European Roma Rights Centre, Press Release "Round Table on the Ronuz Question in Bulgaria. " October 5 1998. 
159 Radio Free Europe, op. cit. 
160 E. Marushiakova, "Cultural Traditions of the Gypsies in Present-Day Bulgaria and the Attitude of the Central and 
Local Authorities Toward Them. " In Council of Europe, Gypsies in the Locality, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 
1994. 
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democratisation, have at best remained problematic. It is oflcn the case that in national 
contexts issues specific to Gypsies are only taken on board in pre-elcction fcvcr in an 
attempt to win votes, only to be dropped immediately after. '" The motivations for 
improving safeguards against xenophobia and racism at the national level therefore 
appear to be dominated by government aspirations for entering into relations with 
Western Europe. 
4.10 ConcIusion 
Bulgaria offers a useful case study for tracking the evolution of official policy towards 
Gypsies in line with its particular economic, political and social development. Living in 
the Balkans, Gypsies have experienced three key phases of development, Ottoman rule, 
national independence and Communism. Processes of nation-building which 
characterised post-liberation development, coupled with the Communist drive towards 
modernisation, posed particular problems for the formal acceptance of Gypsies into 
Bulgarian society as a distinct ethnic group. The collapse of Communism has seen the re- 
framing of the 'Gypsy question' into a new model of development. Rather than 
assimilative and paternalistic policies towards Gypsies, policies of inclusion are now 
defined in terms of minority rights framed within the democratic language of integration 
and participation. 
Many activists recognise the importance of placing Gypsy rights alongside other 
minority rights. However, problems persist in terms of their definition and the 
articulation of appropriate rights. Undermined by inconsistency and the implementation 
of discriminatory policies elsewhere, the 'inclusion' of Gypsies into the framework of 
human rights, has offered only a partial solution to their so-called exclusion. While at a 
161 During an interview with Vcntzislave Mishev, A (2) 12.3.97 leader of the Roma Foundation (a small scale NGO 
based in Rousse), he spoke of how on numerous occasions his foundation had been approached by political parties, 
but only during pre-election campaigns. 
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rhetorical level the 'Gypsy question' may have changed considerably, the types of 
solutions that are called for have changed relatively little. Indeed, at one end of the 
spectrum there is evidence that for some actors the solution to the 'Gypsy question' 
remains that of assimilation. However, at the other end of the spectrum lics the belief that 
the discourse on human and minority rights creates the necessary space for articulating 
the struggle for a recognition of multicultural rights. The following chapter draws on 
these debates in its analysis of the NGO sector in Eastern Europe as one of the key 
responses to the'Gypsy question'since 1989. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STRATEGIES OF INCLUSION: THE NGO SECTOR 
5.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapters demonstrate strategies of inclusion for Gypsies, whether it be in 
the form of enforced assimilation or integration are nothing new. With respect to Gypsies 
throughout Europe it is policies that they arc very familiar with and, in most cases, wary 
of However, the promotion by international institutions and Western governments of a 
seemingly progressive, people-centrcd, strategy of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) with its working premise of participation, 'bottom-up' agency and community 
development, seems to represent a new approach to inclusion and one that many Icading 
Gypsies are eagerly subscribing to. We can see the involvement of Gypsies in the NGO 
sector as part of a wider on-going process of cultural and political mobilisation, as 
identified by Gheorghe and Acton. They see mobilisation in whatever form as an 
inevitable response on tile part of Gypsy elites to the liegemonic process of 
homogenisation inherent to the framework of 'national cultures'. In this respect, they 
argue that post-Communist developments in Eastern Europe in terms of new rights in 
areas of cultural self-organisation have provided "a new and promising context for 
experiments with Romany ethnic culture. "' 
Indeed, if we take the plethora of NGOs riding on the wave of foreign finance as a 
suitable indication of cultural and political mobilisation it appears that a new age of civil 
participation is emerging in Bulgaria and indeed across all the countries of the former 
Communist bloc. However, while opening up new avenues for proactive self-help for the 
'Gypsy elite', the NGO sector does not in itself secure the participation of all Gypsies. 
Further still, as a tool for mobilisation it is laden down with conceptual and ideological 
Nicolae Ghcorghe, Introductory Report, "Dealing with Multiculturality: Minority. Ethnic. National and I luniall 
Rights", Council of Europe (ed. ). Qvl)sies in Me Localitv. Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1994. pp. 95-97. 
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baggage coupled with the practical problems of implementation and legitimacy. As a 
result, we have to be cautious of the all too common practice of linking NGOs with 
democracy and/or civil society. As we shall show, for Gypsies in Eastern Europe in 
general and Bulgaria in particular the link between NGOs and democracy (or civil 
society) is not always clear nor indeed entirely relevant to their situation. 
An analysis of the key issues that surround the NGO debate forms the essence of this 
chapter, which will provide the necessary groundwork for a more focused discussion ill 
chapters 6-8 on the ideological and practical implications of adopting an NGO strategy 
for Gypsies in Bulgaria. Beginning with a broad analysis of the general debates and 
difficulties of the NGO sector and its translation to tile post-1989 East European context, 
and in particular Bulgaria, we then explore the role of NGOs on the international scene. 
From this basis it will then be possible in tile proceeding chapters to question the 
assumptions that underpin support for NGOs on two counts: first, by showing that the 
problem that Gypsies in Eastern Europe face is not necessarily one of social exclusion; 
and second, by questioning tile assumption that NGOs provide tile 'answer' for excluded 
groups through participation. 
5.2 The NGO debate: Changing rationale and meanings 
We have argued that although the precise form of social inequality can change as a 
product of society's structures it has been an ever present factor in tile societies of 
Eastern Europe before and since the transition. In these terms it can be argued that by 
working within rather than against this framework, NGOs (even those which from tile 
outset may seek to challenge unequal structures) rarely penetrate the structures of 
inequality to any great depth. Ultimately, 'participation' as practised within tile NGO 
sector aims to mobilisc local communities rather than wider society and some see this as 
its virtues. As Hayward puts it, "serious mass participation has failed largely because it 
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runs counter to the aims of the most dominant [ ... ] mass participation has therefore been 
little, if at all, tried. "' But the daily obstacles that the NGO sector are confronted with 
disguise problems that go to the very heart of the political economic structure in which it 
operates. The NGO sector can be seen most crudely as a hegemonic device in that it 
allows for some degree of autonomous activity, yet ultimately is allowed in order to help 
maintain the status quo. Of course, within this there is a whole range of possible 
activities some of which have more radical potential than others. 
The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and its devastating impact of rising poverty and 
social inequality has raised acute concerns among national and international 
policyrnakers in terms of finding appropriate policy responses. The framework out of 
which the concept of social exclusion has emerged (i. e. the idea of a residual category) is 
also informing (both directly and indirectly) policy initiatives in Eastern Europe. It is 
possible to observe a tendency towards ideas of integration and equal rights at the 
expense of any questioning of the validity of market reform. In this context the existing 
NGO sector represents a particularly attractive model with its working premise of 
participation and community development, coupled with its claims to offering a 
refreshing alternative to the stifling bureaucracy of government. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been a leading actor in the 
'transition' and with its recent development of the Human Development Index laid the 
necessary groundwork for promoting the NGO sector. This index offers a 'composite 
summary indicator' of development, which takes into account such factors as literacy, 
longevity and standard of living. Their concern in line with conventional 'liberal wisdom' 
rests on the belief that NGOs can enhance human capabilities and ensure that people 
Quoted in Rachel Hinton, "NGOs as Agents of Change? The Case of the Bhutanese Refugee Programme", 
Cambridge Anthropology, 19 (1), 1996. p. 34. 
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make full use of them, thus helping individuals to help themselves. ' In this way NGOs 
are eagerly held up as a key element of 'human development' having, in their view, a 
comparative advantage over government or profit making agencies as 'instruments of 
civil society'. " 
As well as their contribution to civil society, NGOs are praised for their potential as 
service providers. Public-goods theory suggests that NGOs exist to 'fill in the gaps' left 
by state welfare, a variation of the 'goverrunent-failure' theory. ' The Council of Europe 
also subscribes to this view of NGOs. In their discussion on street children, NGOs were 
proposed as 'essential' and as "[filling] the gap" left by official authorities. ' The intention 
is for NGOs to counterbalance problems of unequal access caused by inadequate state 
cover. Another example of this particular view of NGOs, but from quite a different 
source is that presented by Dieke Buijs. ' He sees the setting up of a development (or 
participatory) project as the answer to inadequate welfare provision brought about by 
three types of 'access problems': first, lack of sufficient coverage of services; second, the 
price that one has to pay for services may be too high (for a family the education of their 
children means losing a part of their labour power); and third, service institutions are 
often not attuned to lower social strata (pressure for quick results often means that they 
3 See for example Fowler's discussion which notes how from the early 1990s the aid system has created a link 
between the third sector and civil society through the adoption of 'good governance' as a development objective and 
political condition for assistance. Alan Fowler, "Wither the Third Sector? A Response to Estelle James", Volunlas: 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations, 9 (3), 1998. p. 206. 
4 Peter J. Spiro, "New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organisations in International Decision-Making 
Institutions", The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1995. 
5 Susan A. Ostrander, "The Problem of Poverty and Why Philanthropy Neglects it. " In Virginia. A. Ilodgkinson, 
Richard. W. Lyman et al., (eds. ), The Future of the Non-Profit Sector, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, London, 
1989; Henry flansmann, "Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organisation. " In W. W. Powell (ed. ), The NonProfit 
Sector -A Research Handbook Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1987; Helmut K. Anheier, 
"Indigenous Voluntary Associations, Nonprofits, and Development in Africa. " In Powell (ed. ), ibid. 
6 Council of Europe, Street Children - Study Group on Street Children, Steering Committee on Social Policy, Council 
of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1994. 
7 Dieke Buijs, "On Admittance, Access, Cooperation and Participation: the Basic Concepts of the 'Access and 
Participation' Research. " In Benno GaIJart and D. BuiJi (eds. ) Participation of the Poor in Development - Contributions to a Seminar, Leiden Development Studies, 2,1982. 
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direct themselves to more approachable groups with the least problems). The 
development project, he argues, offers a means to overcome these 'access problems' in 
that it adapts itself to the situation of the lower social strata and is able to seek out, 
together with the community, alternative routes to services. 
The idea of finding ways to co-operate with those of the community who are 'denied 
access', and allowing them to participate forms one of the central defining aspects of the 
NGO rationale. However, the vagueness and inter-changeability of the concepts 'access' 
and 'participation' serve to reveal the dangers of relying on them to solve problems of 
'social exclusion. Studies were undertaken in developing countries during the 1970s and 
1980s in an attempt to resolve some of these ambiguities, where specific thresholds for 
access, such as geographical, financial and cultural distances, were identified. ' This 
multi-layered approach to analysing the ways in which certain groups were 'distanced' 
from important fields of activity has partly informed current exclusion theory and its 
evolving NGO strategy. 
Current support for NGOs at the formal level tends to rest on a commitment to fighting 
social exclusion. Given the broad appeal of this theory support comes from a variety of 
different disciplines and practitioners, injecting this sector with a multitude of agendas 
and functions according to who it is adopted for and by. The ambiguity of the 
expectations placed upon the NGO sector comes across in its literature, which, produced 
by both donors and participants, rests on a set of assumptions that often contradict each 
other. For example, a study evaluating the impact of NGOs on rural poverty alleviation 
in Bangladesh noted that, "With one voice they go to the poor with something to offer; 
8 For example, 11. Y. Buijs, Access and Participation, ICA-Publicatie, 33, Leiden, 1979. 
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with another they say that the poor should stand on their own feet. "' Eastes, Binney el al. 
in their study of the erosion of legitimacy of the NGO sector in the West discuss the 
problems that arise from the dilemma between the claim that NGOs are at once 
independent of the state, yet reliant on government support. " Burgess, too, draws 
attention to an obvious contradiction, this time with the NGO sector in Eastern Europe, 
where he notes that NGOs are celebrated as both a force for change and a basis for 
tradition. " 
5.3 Participation 'from below' 
The question of 'change' versus 'tradition' is an on-going, yet relatively under studied 
aspect of the NGO sector. In devising strategies of inclusion, NGOs are increasingly 
resting on traditional ideas of participation, which are 'polished up' with 'new' politically 
correct concepts of 'integration' and 'conflict resolution'. Multilateral institutions like the 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) have led the way 
in championing these concepts. UNRISD began working with ideas of 'participation' in 
the 1970s. Their stated objective was to find ways of allowing 'the disadvantaged' to 
participate actively rather than passively in the advancement and control of their own 
interests and livelihood. The traditional stages of participation included: information 
sharing; consultation; decision making; and what is considered as the most advanced, 
initiating action. " 
9 M. Stiefal and M. Wolfe, A Voice for the Excluded - Popular Participation in Development: Utopia or Necessity?, 
Zed Books Ltd (UNRISD), London and New Jersey, 1994. p. 208. 
10 Carroll L. Estes, Elizabeth A. Binney and Linda A. Bergthold, "flow the Legitimacy of the Sector I las Eroded. " 
In Ilodgkinson, Lyman et al. op. cit. There has been a recent surge within the NGO literature on the question of the 
NGO's closeness to funders and also on the question of the NGO becoming a substitute for governments. See for 
example, Fowler, op. cit. 
11 Adam Burgess, Divided Europe: The New Domination ofthe East, Pluto Press, London, 1997. 
12 Sarnual Paul, Community Participation in Development Projects - the World Bank Experience, World Bank 
Discussion Papers No. 6, Washington D. C. 1987. 
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The idea of participation as developed here has also formed the backbone to the work of 
many academics and practitioners currently studying and using social exclusion theory. 
Steifel and Wolfe however, are keen to draw attention to the dangers of taking on board 
concepts from a particular era and geographical context without radically re-working 
them first, 
to what extent is the renewed currency of participation as a bannerword a cyclical 
phenomenon fuelled by the need of politicians and experts to offer sonlelhing apparently 
new, inarked by the saine evasions and ambiguities as in the 1960s and 1970s? 13 
As the title of their book suggests -A Voice for the Excluded - Popular Participation in 
Development: Utopia or Necessity? - Steifel and Wolfe do not discount participation 
altogether. However, their findings that the transition from non-participation to 
participation is not linear, that there are structural limits to participation, such as national 
policy, and that there are disparities in rationalities between the different social actors, 
have led them to argue that there is a need to re-evaluate this 'pseudo-participatory 
rhetoric'. Hinton too, warns us of the complexity of this term, which in its simplification 
is vulnerable to abuse. In her discussion of NGOs in Bhutan, she points out that those 
who claim to use the strategy of participation often fail to distinguish between individual 
involvement and that of the community. Each serves a different purpose, the former aims 
to achieve a psychological impact of personal empowerment, while the latter is seen as 
merely a means to an end. "' 
While portrayed as a neutral tool, participation can be used to serve political and 
economic ends. Rifkin in her study of community participation in health programmes 
argues that the participation process operates on a continuum governed by the specifics 
of a given community and its interactions with formal structures. Whether the motivation 
13 Steifal and Wolfe, op. cit. p. 196. 
U Hinton, op. cit. 
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behind the project is at one end of the scale to improve health service delivery or at the 
other end to empower the poor ultimately determines the practices and outcomes of a 
project. " Woelk in his study of the use of participation in health programmes, goes so far 
as to argue that "fostering the rhetoric of community participation suited the ruling 
classes to create the illusion of democracy. "" 
GaIjart and Buijs outline four different goals of participation, which to a large extent 
supports Woelk's argument: first, while giving the impression of democracy, 
participation can be used to make a given community accept a 'new idea' through 
consultation; second, it can lead to co-operation in the economic sphere; third, self-help 
as part of participation can be used to justify beneficiaries contributing to the costs of a 
project; and fourth, participants can become members of an association of a set of rules 
in terms of contributions and rewards. " In a similar vein, Paul draws attention to a World 
Bank restricted circulation document designed for internal use only which clearly 
outlines one goal of the World Bank - to use community participation primarily in order 
to retrieve some of the high costs. " 
Although by the end of the 1980s, the World Bank was showing increasing interest in the 
use of NGOs in their projects and finances world-wide, there was still at this time little 
reference made to empowerment or capacity building in World Bank Policy documents. " 
However, by the end of the 1990s their support of NGO related projects had increased 
15 Susan B. Rifkin, "Lessons From Community Participation in Health Programmes", Health Policy and Planning, 1 
(3) 1986. pp. 240-249. 
16 B. G. Woelk, "Cultural and Structural Influences in the Creation of Participation in Community Ilealth 
Prograrnmes", Social Science and Medicine, 35 (4), 1992. p. 420. 
17 GaIjart and Buijs, op. cit. 
18 IBRD, OMS, No. 2.25 "Cost Recovery Policies for Public Sector Projects: General Aspects", Paul, op. cit. 
19 Between 1988 and 1990, the number of Bank-supported projects involving NGOs had more than tripled. Aubrey 
Williams (a WB staff member), "A Growing Role for NGOs in Development", Finance and Development, December, 
27 (4), 1990. 
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further still and with it, it seems the development of a more sophisticated approach. " 
Nevertheless, internal documents such as the one above, with its clear emphasis on the 
outcomes of participation rather than on the process of empowerment itself suggest that 
the World Bank approach ultimately falls at the extreme end of Rifkin's continuum. 
These studies all serve to reveal the complexities and different ideological uses that 
underpin the concept of participation. The very nature of participatory methods is that 
they take a long time, i. e. the need to build trust and to work with multiple actors. The 
long-term emphasis, however, conflicts with the high-turnover and short term contracts 
of 'projects' that structure the NGO approach. This highlights that the NGO sector cannot 
in itself hold 'the answer', but instead offers just one aspect of participation. 
Another debate that permeates the world of NGOs is how far they merely reproduce 
existing social inequalities. Various studies attempt to evaluate the impact of NGOs in 
different situations many of which reveal that those community members who need most 
help are often those that continue to be left out. For example, Robinson in his study of 
rural poverty alleviation NGOs in India revealed that "the destitute, the handicapped and 
the chronically sick, who constituted the poorest stratum of rural society, were invariably 
beyond the reach of economic programmes, " and as a result "conditions of the poorest 
have not changed dramatically. " " This reveals a problem not only of ineffectiveness but 
of reproducing the unequal structure of rural and also urban society. 
20According to World Bank figures, between 1973-1988 only 6 per cent of Bank financed projects involved NGOs, in 
1993 this had risen to over a third and by 1994 to nearly a half Although this was maintained into the financial year 
of 1995, but soon after the total number of Bank supported projects with NGO involvement began to drop reported at 
38 per cent in 1997. The World Bank Group web site entitled "For Non-governmental Organizations/Civil Society", 
<http: //www. worldbank. orglhtml/extdr/forngovs/htm> (accessed January 1999). 
21 M. A. Robinson, Evaluating the Impact ofNGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation: India Case Study, London, Overseas 
Development Institute, 199 1. p. 119. 
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The negative aspects of- NGO ineffectiveness; crisis in legitimacy; the reproduction of 
inequality; the ambiguity and vagueness of the concepts; and their potential for 
manipulation, coupled with the positive aspects of. contributing to civil society; 
representing potential alternatives to the state; having scope for filling in gaps left by 
inadequate state welfare; and having a higher degree of responsiveness to local 
communities with possibilities for their direct involvement, are some of the factors that 
feed into the following discussion on the application of NGO strategies to the specific 
situation of Gypsies in Bulgaria. 
5.4 The application of NGO strategies to Eastern Europe 
The parameters of the arguments about NGOs and their role in development and 
participation shift according to their context. In the US, debates continue to thrive about 
what criteria is best for distinguishing between nonprofits, charities, and philanthropy. 
This is further complicated by factors of commercialisation and links with governmental 
structures. In the East European context this theoretical concern with defining NGOs is 
replaced with a more practical concern about effectiveness and accountability. The 
structure of external and more specifically Western funding imposes a whole new set of 
pressures on emerging organisations, who, faced with the obligation to justify and 
qualify their funding, have to produce evidence of 'results' even in those cases where the 
projects have been relatively short lived. " The enforced emphasis on meeting the 
requirements of their donors, was a point being made in the 1980s with NGOs in Africa, 
"NGO organisational structures just seem to have emerged from their (funding) history 
rather than being appropriately designed for the purpose of micro-development. f123 
22 For example, in line with Western criteria, the European Roma Rights Centre, I lungary, one of the few donor 
agencies within Eastern Europe, offers 12 month funding for NGO projects with 'anticipated short-term impact'. 
ERRC web site <http: //www. errc. org> (accessed November 1998). 
23 Alan Fowler, "Building Partnerships between Northern and Southern Development NGOs: Issues for the Nineties", 
Journal ofSID, 23,1988, quoted in Hinton, op. cit. p. 44. 
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Despite obvious differences between national contexts, similarities have been sought 
between countries in the Third World and the 'transition' countries of Eastern Europe, not 
so much in identifying potential problems, but in order to justify the application of 
development concepts from the former to the latter. Evidence of this was apparent during 
my fieldwork in Bulgaria. More established NGOs were beginning to embark on family 
planning projects and encouraging locals to set up small scale co-oPeratives - 
programmes originally designed for 'developing' countries. One particular NGO was 
taking direct lessons from an NGO in India, with whom they had established links via a 
Dutch grant-making foundation. "' A representative of the Indian NGO had been to visit 
their Bulgarian partners on a number of occasions giving advice and support. This, 
coupled with Rifkin's study, which shows how participation strategies grow out of 
specific situations, raises some interesting questions about the extent to which such 
strategies as participation and community development can be universally applied. " 
Perhaps, more importantly, it forces us to address the social, political and economic 
context in which NGO 'inclusion' strategies are implemented in order to understand fully 
their effectiveness. Transition in Eastern Europe and in particular Bulgaria is specifically 
about the adoption of a market economy and all that it entails. Yet, the specificity of this 
context does not preclude the use of NGO strategies as developed in Third World 
countries in terms of alleviating extreme poverty and helping in areas of employment and 
education. Sethi, for example, in his discussion of some of the obstacles NGOs have to 
deal with in India reveal issues that are also relevant to NGOs in Bulgaria. He observes 
that: first, NGOs often remained small and operated in restricted areas; second, that 
NGOs were dependent on external funding, and so had to accept programmes that suited 
24 Information provided in their reports and through general contact. B (3) 
25 Rifkin, op. cit. 
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funding requirements rather than local needs; and third, that there was a distinct lack of 
understanding on the part of surrounding political actors. " 
5.5 Western intervention 
As discussed in chapter 3 the extent of economic decline in Eastern Europe, and in 
particular Bulgaria, has been vast and has had huge implications for widening social 
inequality. This is a factor that must be taken into account when considering the different 
roles open to NGOs in Eastern Europe. The combination of an increase in demand 
brought about the collapse of welfare and of employment with the lack of available 
resources for a strong NGO sector, coupled with the popular argument that Eastern 
Europe has to 'learn' again about civil society, those in the West have been painted a 
rather dismal picture about the state of Eastern Europe. While reluctant to deny the 
extent of these problems, it is still interesting to point out that for many of those active 
within the Bulgarian NGO sector the prospect is not quite so desperate. Whether this can 
be put down to false optimism or to a genuine belief that the NGO can work is not for 
this thesis to say. However, what is certain is that economic collapse coupled with new 
political freedoms has intensified the paradox whereby the NGO sector renowned for its 
commitment to local grass root initiatives must almost entirely rely on external top-down 
funding. This dependency carries with it the drawbacks mentioned above, especially the 
issue of the lack of freedom and autonomy on the part of the NGO itself. 
Western funding is the main characteristic of the NGO sector in Eastern Europe. 
However, given the huge gap in wealth between the countries of Western and Eastern 
Europe the nature of this funding is asymmetrical. For the impoverished economies of 
Eastern Europe relatively small-scale Western funding represents a large and vital source 
26 Harsh Sethi, "Groups in New: Politics and Transformation", Economic and Political Weekly, 19 (7), 1984. pp. 305- 
316. 
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of financial support. As a result, institutions such as the EU, can confidently implement 
various projects specifically for Eastern Europe without having to put up too much 
capital. Altogether for 1997 the total funding made available for all the countries of 
Eastern Europe was just under ECU 140 million, or 100 million pounds. Funding is 
allocated through various departments in the following areas: European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) Emergency Humanitarian aid to the people of Central and 
Eastern European countries (ECU 98 million for 1997); Relations with Central and 
Eastern Europe countries - Aid for economic restructuring of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (Phare) and Programme for Democracy in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (supporting NGOs is a fundamental aspect of this with an emphasis on 
the 'transfer of expertise and experience between partner NGOs' - ECU 30 million for 
1997 plus ECU 11.5 million designed especially for the development of civil society). " 
Increasing concern over accession of Eastern Europe to the EU adds another dimension 
to this issue of funding. The European Commission, it seems, is being pushed internally 
to adopt a more cautious and strategic (i. e. selective) approach to funding NGOs based 
on who is and who is not to be considered at this stage for EU accession. In the words of 
Lester, "Whereas the original objective was to promote democracy in the candidate 
countries through NGO funding, all funding now has to be seen in the context of the 
Commission's agenda for the accession. " " The overlap between politics and economics 
is most explicit in this case, which serves to validate those funding bodies who claim to 
stand outside of conventional party politics. 
27 EC, Digest of Community Resources Available for Financing the Activities of NGOs and Other Governmental 
andlor Decentralised Bodies Representing Civil Society in the Fields of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian 
Aid. VII/207/97 EN, 1997. 
28 Colin Norman Walker (ed. ), "NGOs Have a Role to Play in Building a Civil Society", European Dialogue, The 
European Commission bi-monthly magazine for Central Europe and the Baltics, March-April, No. 2,1998 
<http: //europa. cu. iny/en/comm/dg I0/infcom/eur-dial/frameset- backlist. html> (accessed May 1998). 
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5.6 Soros funding 
Private channels of Western funding are often heralded as welcome alternatives to 
bureaucratic government-led ventures. The US based Soros Foundation, in particular, is 
seen as progressive if compared to those donors that are closely tied to governmental 
structures, such as the Project on Ethnic Relations or USAID. Supporters of Soros go so 
far as to claim that it represents a "positive example of a different way of giving aid to 
Eastern Europe" in its distinctive emphasis on "genuine localism'5.29 Soros, to a large 
extent, has distributed its funding more widely in the form of nation-wide networks of 
independent institutions, which, run by 'locals', are able to give advice and support 
training programmes, scholarships and fellowships. This differs strongly from more 
conventional agencies, such as USAID. Although it does have offices in Eastern Europe 
they are staffed by North Americans, rather than locals. Soros also appear to be a little 
more forthcoming in its allocation of funds. However, standing at an annual total of 
US$17 million in 1991 for the entire region of Eastern Europe, its scope for enabling 
profound change is still rather limited. " 
Furthermore, we have to question the very philosophy of Soros which is similar to the 
paternalism of its apparently lesser respected US counterparts. Burgess, for example, 
rebuffs claims that Soros is a different kind of American interventist. The emphasis on 
instilling 'civil society', he argues, is still there and is one that the likes of the World 
Bank and IMF are also latching on to. By focusing on the vulnerable and ideas of 
bottom-up decentralisation, Burgess argues that the Soros approach is nothing more than 
an attempt to 'go above' criticism in its crusade for the establishment of civil society, 
which he describes as a "catch all euphemism for shaping the East in the image of the 
29 Thomas Carothers, "Aiding PostCommunist Societies: A Better Way? " Problems of Post-Communism. September- 
October, 1996. Website <http: //www. ceip. org/people/ caroaid. htm> (accessed April 1997). 
30 R. Beshel, Conference Reporl: The Role of US Foundations in East/Central Europe, Ford Foundation, New York, 
1991, quoted in Susan L. Q. Flaherty, "Philanthropy Without Borders: US Private Foundation Activity in Eastern 
Europe", Voluntus, 3,1992. 
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West. "" Indeed, ironically the main sources of Soros' funding can be seen to contradict 
his highly publicised ideological commitment to Popper's 'open society' in that the 
acquisition and accumulation of his wealth as a hedge fund manager predominantly 
rested on the active participation in the very capitalist political economy that underpins 
existing inequalities in Eastern Europe; 32 a contradiction that has become more apparent 
as his own disillusionment with the instability of market capitalism has grown even as 
his business works within it. 33 
However, while it is important to assess the governing philosophy of such institutions, 
one must also be careful to avoid falling into the trap of over-simplifying 'Western 
intervention'. The idea that there is an agenda on the part of 'the West' fails to address the 
multiple actors that are involved at different levels of the economic, social and political 
relations that connect both these parts of Europe and, indeed, the USA. ' It is possible to 
observe, for example, that the methodology of Soros is in fact marginally different from 
more mainstream and government oriented North American foundations, such as Project 
on Ethnic Relations. In recent years Soros' sponsorship of Gypsy NGOs has included 
support for advocacy organisations which often are critical of other NGOs receiving 
Soros' support. Soros, in line with its commitment to encouraging autonomy among 
disadvantaged groups, regards this as a creative, rather than destructive tension. 
31 Burgess, op. cit. p. 166. 
32 Even though some would argue that Popper's idea of an 'open society' is compatible with an inequality generating 
capitalism. in that its 'openness' allows for reform and struggle from within. 
33 See for example, George Soros (interview with), "The International Financial Crisis - Interview", Challenge, 42 (2), 
March-April 1999. in which he expresses a concern with the market, seeing it as imposing a major threat to open 
societies. 
34 See for example, Bob Deacon, Global Social policy: International Organisations and the Future of Welfare, 
SAGE, London, 1997. 
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5.7 NGOs in Eastern Europe: Traditions and development. 
As the previous section demonstrates, the translation of NGOs to the post 1989 East 
European context has had various repercussions, not least of which has been the heavy 
influence of its Western financiers. Those working within the indigenous NGO sector 
together with East European governments are also keen to play up the value of the pre- 
Communist traditions of voluntarism and charity organisations, which they argue add a 
depth and credibility to the emerging NGO. sector in Eastern Europe. This search into tile 
past allows for those involved within the NGO sector to talk of a 'rebirth' or a 
'renaissance' of civil society. 
According to many reports, Eastern Europe is undergoing a 'renaissance' of the third 
sector. " This does have some resonance when we consider the rate of growth in numbers 
of NGOs for two of the most prosperous countries in Eastern Europe, Hungary and the 
former Czechoslovakia. In Hungary, for example, there was an increase from 400 
registered foundations in 1989 to 6,000 in 1991. Likewise, in the former Czechoslovakia, 
over 9,000 NGOs emerged between 1989 and 1992. " However, if we compare NGOs 
per head of population with the UK, which has a very strong NGO sector, it is possible to 
observe that the number of NGOs in Eastern Europe remains relatively small. In 1990 
the UK had some 350,000 NGOs and 172,000 registered charities, which even with its 
population of nearly 60 million meant that there was 0.3 NGOs to every person, i. e. one 
NGO for every three hundred people. In contrast, the number of NGOs per head of 
population in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1991 was 0.06, i. e. there was one 
NGO for every 6 thousand people in each of these countries. 
35 Randall J. Davis, The Rebirth of the Nonprofit Sector in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, Center for Civil Society 
International, Washington, 1996. 
36 Frank Laczko, "Social Policy and the Third Sector in East-Central Europe. " In Stein Ringcn and Wallace (eds. ), 
Societies in Transition: East-Central Europe Today, Vol. 1, Avebury and Aldershot, 1994. 
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Although small in number, NGOs in Eastern Europe consist of a huge range of diverse 
organisations including non-profitable, voluntary and charitable organisations. They 
operate at different levels, some with more funding than others, some with national 
structures, others more localised, some overtly political, while others are based on 
specific cultural agendas. The kind of issues that these NGOs work with range from 
health, housing and education, to culture, religion and the environment. It is easy to see, 
therefore, how the heterogeneous nature of this emerging sector in Eastern Europe and 
its emphasis on multidimensional approaches lends itself easily to social exclusion 
theory. 
5.8 Traditions of voluntarism in Eastern Europe 
An increasingly common approach to analysing NGOs in Eastern Europe is to track their 
evolution and subsequent nullification under Communism where pre-war traditions of 
voluntary and charity organisations are used as a reference point. " Laczko, for example, 
draws attention to the existence of over 14,000 voluntary association in pre-war Hungary 
and bemoans their subsequent destruction under Communism, during which only the 
Red Cross was allowed officially to exist. " Various factors have been presented to 
explain why voluntarism across Eastern Europe underwent a huge decline during the 
Communist period. While the banning of all non-governmental activity in most countries 
by the Communist Party remained an obvious factor, others have also been explored. 
First, there is the idea that the obligation to 'volunteer' for official state organisations, 
such as the Youth section in its various forms, together with state intervention in any 
kind of association, killed any desire for 'volunteering'. The lack of time is another 
factor, where a mixture of working, queuing, and participating in the second economy, 
37 Helmut K. Anheier and Eckhard Priller, "The Non-Profit Sector in East Germany Before and After Reunification", 
Voluntus, 2 (1) 1991, Davis, op. cit. 
38 Laczko, op. cit. 
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together with domestic duties, literally prevented people from taking on extra activities. 
Third, a general mistrust of institutions and of each other brought about by the 
encouragement of spying on neighbours, coupled with a reliance on the state for 
provision of welfare meant that society in general was unwilling to look towards 
voluntarism or community organisations for meeting shared needs. Of course, there were 
always exceptions. However, since 1989, the legacy of the Communist regime combined 
with a lack of resources, inadequate legal structures, and lack of legitimacy has created 
weak foundations on which to build a NGO sector. 
Western donors have attempted to counteract this by setting up funds aimed specifically 
at the NGO sector. The EU, for example, has three programmes aimed specifically at the 
development of NGOs: LIEN (Link Inter-European NGOs) is the main branch of this 
programme, which aims to provide support via NGOs to social assistance operations for 
urban and rural population groups at risk and with little, if any, access to other forms of 
aid (ECU 10 million for 1996,1997). Partnership and Institution Building is designed to 
help sustainable grass roots initiatives and reinforce the resources of private or public 
non-profit organisations, particularly those involved in economic activity (ECU II 
million 1996, ECU 10 million 1997). Finally, there is Democracy, which has its own 
budget and although voted through by Parliament is co-ordinated by Phare. It supports 
projects aimed at promoting respect for democratic principles and procedures in 
government, parliamentary and administrative bodies and various groups in society, such 
as professional bodies, associations, and the media (ECU 10 million 1996,1997). " By 
1994, the EU had already committed ECU 4.3 billion to the Phare programme, which 
holds NGO development as a specific focus of its assistance. EU Funding for the 
'development of civil society' in Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia 
39 EC. op. cit. pp. 86-7. 
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and Lithuania amounted to a total of ECU 11,500,000 with ECU 1.5 million given to 
Bulgarian NGOs. "' In the spring of 1997, The Phare Civil Society Development 
Foundation allocated 880,000 ECU to Bulgaria, which were distributed through a 
number of NGOs based on a combination of humanitarian aid and self-help initiatives. "' 
5.9 Obstacles to the NGO sector 
The NGO sector across Eastern Europe represents a hive of activity and is comprised of 
a multitude of agendas. However, the combination of external and internal constraints 
within the specific context of transition in Eastern Europe has posed serious impediments 
to the development of a solid working NGO sector. An on-going survey carried out since 
1990 by the Regional Environmental Center (REQ for Central and Eastern Europe 
revealed that problems of under assistance and poor relations with governments permeate 
the NGO sector across Eastern Europe. Out of 3,000 environmental NGOs in Central and 
Eastern Europe 62 per cent responded to the questionnaire. The majority of these (about 
75 per cent) reported unstable, poor or very poor finances, with nearly half of individual 
annual NGO budgets amounting to no more than US$ 1,000. The number who claimed to 
have no or at best poor relations with government was very high. The survey also 
revealed that NGOs were concentrated in the more prosperous countries, that of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. As a result, NGOs in the other less 
prosperous countries of Eastern Europe remained relatively neglected. The main findings 
were that the NGOs covered in the survey were entirely dependent on external funding 
for the continuation of their work. The report concluded that "assistance is going in the 
right direction, but the problems are still not fully solved. We need NGOs to solve them, 
and they still need our help. "" The emphasis in this report was that the NGOs 
4c' EC, op. cit. 
41 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), National Human Development Report - Bulgaria 1998. The 
State of Transition and the Transition of the State, LJNDP, Sofia, 1998. 
42 Regional Environment Center (REC), Problems, Progress and Possibilities: A Needs Assessment of Environmental 
NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe, REC, I lungary, 1998. 
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themselves should be responsible for solving societal problems, in this case 
environmental ones. The report's focus on the poor finances of most NGOs drew 
attention to practical problems of dependency. However, by simply identifying a series 
of obstacles that NGOs need to overcome, the report seemed to refrain from any direct 
tackling of the more fundamental problems brought about by the unequal nature of the 
relationship between NGOs and their donors. 
Problems associated with NGOs in Eastern Europe and the structure of external funding 
are qualified by the donors in a number of ways. The responsibility for failures is often 
placed with the country involved rather than with the donors themselves. Western donors 
attempt to justify their marginal impact in practical terms with the counter-promotion of 
the Western ideal: a model of development, which they generously allow countries of 
Eastern Europe to follow. In the eyes of the donors, the day to day survival of NGOs and 
their degree of effectiveness essentially lies with the NGOs themselves. The logic of the 
argument is that, given the current state of economic collapse and the relative lack of 
experience, NGOs in Eastern Europe have a long way to go yet. Various 'reasons' are 
given as to why targets are not met and why NGOs fail to meet expectations. The legacy 
of Communism and the transition are taken as the leading reasons for NGO failures, 
which allow for projections, however ill-informed, to be made about future 
improvement. The implication is that current problems are simply 'teething' ones and 
accepted as an inevitable 'part of the process' of a painful, albeit necessary, phase of 
development. 
Another popular argument that ties in with this is the idea that NGOs, in order to be 
successful, have to undergo a learning curve. This makes the introduction of remedies a 
conceivable task. In the view to securing the building blocks for a solid, working NGO 
sector, leaders are encouraged to partake in training courses with themes, such as 'how to 
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run an NGO' and 'conflict resolution'. The problems inherent in the sector such as: its 
ambiguous relationship to the government and business sectors; its insecure place within 
the socio-economic order; and the implications of cultural colonisation, are removed 
from the equation or dealt with only via superficial measures. As a consequence, the 
specific set of problems associated with programmes of inclusion is lost among the more 
general problems outlined above. 
In many cases, NGOs have been restricted by an increasing burden being placed on them 
to act as distributors for emergency development aid. These responsibilities are 
increasingly dictating the agendas of NGOs in Eastern Europe. "' This channelling of 
development aid reduces the role of NGOs to little more than 'delivery mechanisms', 
which organisations like the Red Cross are only too keen to take advantage of In 
Bulgaria, regional project leaders from the Bulgarian Red Cross have adopted this view 
of NGOs, and they were happy to explain to me the relative ease with which they can 
now distribute aid to Gypsy communities, since the establishment of Gypsy NGOs in 
their area. "" 
Contrary to popular belief, this almost enforced dependency is not compensated for in 
terms of actual financial input. Grant making and funding from abroad, coupled with 
foreign direct investment, has been relatively modest during the 'transition'. "' The United 
States is one of the key sources of funding for NGOs in Eastern Europe, yet, of the 7,000 
active US foundations, there are little more than one hundred foundations which are 
seriously interested in grant making in this area. "' Prominent foundations, such as the 
43 This is already the case in the 'Third World', where according to Clark 'Northern' NGOs collectively transfer to the 
'South' more than the World Bank. John Clark, Democratising Development, Earthscan Publications, London, 1991. 
44 Interviews (Appendix 2): D (5) 19.9.97, D (5) 7.10.97 
45 Lazcko, op. cit. 
46 Flaherty, op. cit. 
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Ford Foundation, have proved popular for many NGOs across Eastern Europe and 
indeed among those included in my study. They have served to counteract some of the 
negative feelings harboured by East European citizens who have not failed to notice the 
lack of formal investment on the part of governments. But even Ford, a large donor 
foundation, has not been willing to commit more than 2 per cent of their annual grant- 
making budget to projects (normally scholarly exchanges and academic fellowships) to 
this region. "' The scarcity of foundations willing to commit large amounts of money to 
Eastern Europe can partly be explained by the fact that public support for NGOs in their 
own countries has been dwindling. Despite an acknowledged increase in demand on 
NGOs, respondents to a survey in the USA overwhelmingly agreed that NGOs should 
not receive special treatment, such as tax advantages, and only 18 per cent indicated 
support for protecting the non-profit sector specifically. "' 
This dwindling of support for NGOs in the USA coupled with cut-backs in federal 
funding to non-profit organisation during the 1980s raises some interesting questions 
about the nature of the relationship between private and state activity. The most 
commonly held view of the relationship between the state and NGO activity is that while 
offering an alternative to the state, the NGO sector ultimately relies upon government 
support in order to fulfil its task of 'serving the needy'. " As government support for 
NGOs declines it appears that the inclination on the part of the public to contribute to 
NGOs also declines. The reasons for this go beyond the scope of this discussion. 
Nevertheless, in terms of support for East European funding, it is important to consider 
both the internal factors of economic decline and growing inequality, and the external 
factors of declining public support for NGOs in the West. 
47 Flaherty, op. cit. 
48 Carroll L. Estes et al., op. cit. This survey, carried out in 1988, was taken from data produced by the Institute for 
I lealth and Ageing, which gathered information on attitudes regarding the changing roles of non-profit, for profit and 
public service sectors in the USA. 
49 Virginia Hodgkinson, "Key Challenges Facing the Non-Profit Sector. " In Hodgkinson et al., op. cit. 
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Although the West is keen to encourage the development of 'civil society' and 
'democracy' in the transition economies of Eastern Europe, there is a distinct reluctance 
on the part of Western foundations and institutions to carry the entire burden of real long 
term change. Faced with a legitimation crisis in their own country, and with the view of 
Eastern Europe as a 'burden, US foundations, in particular, receive little public support 
and are reduced to only a limited role. Ultimately, the response of Western foundations 
has been slow and their message remains that they can offer only marginal support. For 
those in Eastern Europe on the receiving end, this has meant that NGO funding forms 
only a fraction of the institutional support that is required. 
One of the main consequences of this reduction in the outward flow of finance to NGOs 
abroad has been an increase in internal divisions within the East European NGO sector. 
As competition for funding between NGOs tightens, internal rivalry is aggravated. This 
has contributed to external scepticism and so to a crisis in legitimacy. Reports of 
corruption and patronage are rife. Wunker, for example, argued that at the start of the 
transition up to half of all foundations in Poland and Hungary were illicit, profit 
distributing tax shelters. " This view of the NGO sector as a seething world of corruption 
is a popular one and has nurtured a popular scepticism about how far the NGO sector 
really does represent an increase in voluntarism and altruism. 
5.10 NGOs in Bulgaria: Traditions and development 
The weakness of the economy coupled with the particular legacy of Communism has 
meant that compared with other parts of Eastern Europe, the NGO sector in Bulgaria has 
remained relatively small scale and narrow in scope. A major factor to consider when 
50 Stephen Wunker, "The Promise of Non-Profits in Poland and Hungary: An Analysis of Third Sector Renassiance", 
I'olunlus, 2 (2). 199 1. 
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discussing NGOs in Bulgaria in the 1990s is the context of major institutional crisis, and 
a weakening of central government. Since the collapse of Communism, the new external 
sponsors of the Bulgarian state, i. e. governments in the West, have shown a preference 
for a rather weak central governmental authority, in contrast to the former CPSU's 
preference for a strong central state. As a result, a vast array of private players have 
emerged which can be categorised into broadly two types: private business and non- 
profit NGOs. The first of these consists of a multitude of activities, some of which are 
seen as more corrupt than others, such as private insurance and security firms. The link 
of private business with growing corruption in Bulgarian society has been identified for 
example with the growing number of ex-professional sportsmen who are finding 
economic niches in 'Bulgaria's murky underworld'. " Like the NGO sector, this type of 
activity is dominated by Bulgarians, but it also involves Gypsies as customers, victims 
and perpetrators. 
In contrast, many see the emergence of non-profit NGOs as examples of some of the 
more positive repercussions of state withdrawal. The NGO sector comprises a multitude 
of different organisations ranging from charities, philanthropic organisations, to 
businesses and those rooted in different churches, such as the Pentecostal Church. 
Despite these vast differences, NGOs in Bulgaria are taken collectively as having strong 
historical traditions and as offering an alternative to the illegality and corruption 
associated with the activities mentioned above. For some, the tradition of philanthropy 
can be traced back to the national revival in the nineteenth century. " Others go as far 
back as the Ottoman empire. Nikolov, for example, argues that the Christian faith and the 
Bulgarian language were preserved under Ottoman rule mainly because of donations 
51 See for example, Victor Gome7_ "An Underworld of Wrestlers", News of note Across the Region, Transition, 9 
August 1996. p. 2. This reports on how Dzhamov, president of the Bulgarian Wrestling Federation i  Bulgaria, was 
arrested in 1996 for running rackets related to his insurance firm. 52 UNDP. op. cit. 
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made by individuals and communities, which funded the building and maintenance of 
schools, churches and 'chitalishta' (community centres with library facilities). These 
"emerging positive traditions", he writes, "were then entirely abandoned with the coming 
to power of the BCP. " In his evaluation of NGO in the latter years of the 1980s, Nikolov 
puts the emphasis on the vacuum left by the Communist period, an essential aspect of 
which, he argues, was the destruction of the Christian faith; a faith, he argues that was a 
"proven motivation for serving others". " 
Any nonprofit, charitable, or philanthropic activity presupposes the existence of 
personalities and institutions capable of donating resources to benefit all the population of 
deprived members of the community. There are simply no such individuals, organisations 
and institutions under socialism. 54 
However, this vacuum was not all-pervasive, as a number of underground organisations 
existed in Bulgaria during the 1980s, of which Gypsies were also a part. An interview 
with a member of an established NGO in Sliven, for example, revealed that he had been 
involved with the establishment of an illegal NGO in 1979, whose work involved the 
promotion of education and culture of Gypsies. " Likewise, Snavely locates the roots of 
the current NGO sector not so much in some pre-Communist ideal but as emerging 
during the very height of Communist control. He argues that the environmental protests 
of Rousse in 1987 opened up potential for unofficial outlets of political expression. ' 
Tlie development of quasi-NGO activity under Communism was due to a series of 
factors, which serve to contradict, in many ways, the popularly held view that 'civil 
society' did not exist under Communism. First, and in terms of the Gypsy involvement, 
53 S. Nikolov. "The Emerging Nonprofit Sector in Bulgaria: Its Historical Dimensions. " In K. McCarthy, V. 
I lodgkinson and R. Sumariwalla (eds. ), The Nonprojit Sector in the Global Community, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 
1992. p. 345. 
54 lbid, p. 336. 
55 Interviewee: A (6) 20.10.97. 
56 K. Snavely and Udey Rcsai, "Bulgaria's Non-Profit Sector: The Search for Form, Purpose, and Legitimacy", 
V61untus. 6 (1) 1995. pp. 23-33. 
210 
there had been a conscious move by the Communist Party to nurture a Gypsy 
intelligentsia in order "to create loyal supporters and instruments for the dispersal of 
Communist ideology among Gypsies. "" This had the effect of forming an intellectual 
base from which autonomous Gypsy organisation could develop. Second, and more 
generally, there had been the emergence of quasi-non governmental endowments in 
Bulgaria based on patterns in the West, especially the USA. These endowments 
flourished in the 1970s as part of the 1,300 years celebration of Bulgarian statehood. 
Finally, the 1970s saw the introduction of a reduced five day working week, which freed 
up time for many individuals. This meant that workers could now pursue other activities. 
Although for some this consisted of participation in the second economy, for others it 
allowed scope for organisational activities. " 
Therefore, the question of the extent to which the Communist legacy is to blame for the 
weak NGO sector is not quite so straightforward as it might appear at first sight. Various 
features of the transition, together with the NGO structure itself, were also placing 
serious restrictions on the effectiveness of NGOs since 1989. In Bulgaria, the situation 
was even more precarious. As one of the poorest countries in Eastern Europe, with one 
of the highest inflation rates, largest public debt and one of the lowest rates of foreign 
direct investment, Bulgaria suffered from particularly high levels of uneven 
unemployment. Excessive demands had been placed on a withering welfare state, and the 
NGO sector as yet did not have the capacity to deliver social services on any scale. As a 
result of this and in particular in response to the crisis of 1996/97, a high proportion of 
Western funding in Bulgaria was directed into the area of humanitarian aid. The Open 
Society Fund and its network of Open Society clubs formed a backbone to the campaign 
57 Nlarushiakova and Popov. The Gypsy Minority in Bulgaria - Policy and Community Development, Sofia 
(forthcoming). 
58 Nikolov. op. cit. 
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for humanitarian assistance with the injection of US$1,225,000 in 1997 and US$10 
million for 1998. This provided school feeding programmes, medical supplies, 'structural 
components linking relief with development' and micro-credits. "' Despite such financial 
investment, its emphasis on emergency aid meant that such efforts represented temporary 
and therefore only superficial remedies. 
My fieldwork, which covered a selection of Gypsy and Gadjo-NGOs across Bulgaria 
revealed that the various problems that had emerged corresponded with those 
experienced elsewhere in Eastern Europe. ' It was evident that the problems they faced 
%vere those that underpinned the NGO sector in general. First, Bulgarian NGOs were 
often accused of under representing the communities they claimed to be working with. A 
freelancejournalist working in Sliven, and along time supporter of Gypsy interests, was 
very cynical about the 'new power of projects', as she called it, where 'Project' had 
become the newbuzz word'in the Gypsy NGO sector. This project-bound approach was 
mainly a symptom of the NGO structure of funding. It led to the situation whereby the 
project all too easily became the prime concern, overriding direct concerns with the 
Gypsy communities themselves. 
Second, and related to this, were accusations of corruption leading to distrust. NGO 
leaders and their obvious display of wealth were particularly vulnerable to such attacks, 
which, as discussed in section 9 of Chapter 6, led to attempts at the reconciliation of 
private gain with the promotion of public welfare. Tbird, internal conflicts caused by 
personal/ party politics and limited external funding permeated the Bulgarian NGO 
sector. On a number of occasions during my fieldwork, I witnessed open resentment 
between organisations and individuals, to the extent that, at times, it prevented me from 
59 UNDP. op. cit. 
60 Davis. op. cit.. Anheier and Priller, op. cit.. Wunker, op. cit. 
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gaining immediate access to certain foundations. In Sliven, for example, the URU were 
concerned with directing my research away from rival NGOs and attempted (without 
success) to select the NGOs with whom I should meet. 
A lack of a coherent strategy arose from this where initiatives remained localised and 
structural links with the government were, on the whole, inadequate. During my 
fieldwork it was apparent that there was little co-ordination between NGOs, in terms of 
long, or short term strategies. Those who had succeeded in securing funding for projects 
were often reluctant to share relevant information. Rather than sharing information, it 
was generally the case that, unless formal links had been established, little was known 
about the activities of other NGOs. That this lack of coherent strategy then served to 
hinder relations with local government was a concern raised at a seminar, as examined in 
chapter 6. 
Finally, and at a more general level, with NGOs being increasingly subsumed into the 
rhetoric of social exclusion there was a risk that strategies over-emphasised the search 
for finding ways to include 'excluded' groups into the mainstream, whether it be via 
schooling, training, or proper housing. At the heart of such strategies lay abstract 
concepts of 'civil society' and 'democracy', which all too easily resulted in a lack of 
consideration for the value of existing cultures. For those NGOs that had developed from 
outside Gypsy conununities, their links with Gypsies were often distant and as a result 
they displayed only a limited awareness of the complexities of Gypsy ethnicity and 
culture. 
5.11 The legal framework in Bulgaria 
The practical problems of the transition coupled with the particular difficulties associated 
with the NGO structure, were further undermined by an ambiguous legal framework. 
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Two types of law existed in Bulgaria that provided the legal framework for NGO 
activity, whether intentionally or otherwise. " There was the basic law that defined 
organisational forms and the tax law. The basic law entitled Law on Persons and Family 
established in 1949 during the very early stages of Communist control, was concerned as 
much with restrictions as with rights for the individual and the family. In terms of its 
impact during Communism on the scope for organisation within the 'Third Sector, it 
served to authorise the creation of 'juridical persons with non-economic purpose', which 
could be translated to mean associations and foundations. Although, a definition of 'non- 
economic'was not provided, in Bulgaria it was, and still is, generally understood to stand 
for all non profit activity outside of the business and industrial sectors. Under 
Communism, the meaning was more limited and as discussed above allowed only for the 
existence of state led initiatives in the form of quasi-non governmental endowments. 
Since 1989, the use of the basic law broadened significantly and now provides the legal 
foundation for the existence of most NGOs. However, the assumption, as under 
Communism, remains that as voluntary organisations, NGOs are, by definition, 
disengaged from business-like ventures. " This clearly gave rise to a series of problems: 
firstly, the question of what factors must be considered to determine the voluntary status 
of an NGO; and, secondly the question of whether the legal basis is removed if profit- 
making were taking place. 
The tax laws were more specific and helped to define more clearly the scope of the third 
sector. These include the general laws on Income Tax and Local Taxes and Fees. There 
is a 30 per cent income tax rate (10 per cent less than the basic corporate tax) for "legal 
entities without state or municipal participation whose annual profits are Lv I million or 
6' Snavely and Resai, op. cit. 
62 Ibid 
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less. "" Generally, tax-deductible contributions are granted to non-labour related income 
(e. g. crafts, commerce, rent). Public organisations (i. e. non-state), also receive a reduced 
20 per cent tax rate on business earnings, as opposed to 40 per cent. Up to 20 per cent of 
such income donated to 'institutions of an ideal purpose' is taken from income tax. But 
what constituted an 'ideal purpose' was legally vague and its interpretation has changed 
over time. The Law for Local Taxes and Fees undermines philanthropy potential in that 
it restricts individual donations of property with a 60 per cent local fee. This restriction 
on donating contrasts sharply with a more focused move taken in 1990 by the Council of 
Ministers to encourage the development of the NGO sector. They issued a decree that 
exempted foundations from certain taxes including import tax. This led to a series of 
much publicised scandals whereby, under the guise of a foundation status, a number of 
individuals imported cigarettes and alcohol to resell. By 1992 this decree had been 
withdrawn, but scepticism had set in. " 
In its vagueness, Bulgarian law proved adaptable to the post 1989 situation, in that 
certain types of professional or cultural organisations were able to exist legally. 
However, this vagueness was also counterproductive and risked inhibiting the growth of 
a valid, working NGO sector. Indeed, the lack of any legal requirement for a NGO to 
register with a government authority led to the situation whereby many of the smaller 
non profits had only a semi-legal status. Any group of six individuals could register and 
start a NGO. In the case of some of the NGOs I met, this flexibility in law allowed for 
accusations to be made about rivals, who claimed that they were not legal and therefore 
were invalid. To obtain a formal legal status NGOs had to register with the courts, but 
court records did not supply a separate accounting of NGOs. This, together with the high 
63 UNDP. op cit. 
64 Ibid.; Snavely and Resai, op. cit. 
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turnover of NGOs within the third sector, made it extremely difficult to assess exactly 
how many NGOs there were at any one time. 
According to a survey carried out in 1997 by the Union of Bulgarian Foundations and 
Associations (UBFA) there were approximately 4,600 organisations registered as 
associations or foundations under the Bulgarian Persons and Family Law. It is believed 
that only a third of them were in operation, while the remaining two-thirds existed only 
on paper. ' A substantial proportion of these NGOs were registered with the UBFA in 
March of that year, numbering at 1,094. " Most of the organisations consisted of 
foundations, including both grant making and operating bodies. 13.5 per cent of the total 
number had the promotion of Bulgarian culture as their main activity, often with heavy 
overtones of patriotism and an emphasis on (Orthodox) Christian values. " This 
contrasted sharply with only two NGOs which were registered as promoting Turkish or 
Muslim interests. Other types of NGOs registered included business and professional 
associations, together with clubs, societies and unions. The kinds of issues covered 
ranged from environmental protection, human rights, economic reform, culture and 
education to specific groups such as women, children at risk, and minorities. The total 
number of Gypsy NGOs registered with the UBFA in 1997 was 30 (2.7 per cent). 
However, this was not a true depiction of the number of Gypsy NGOs operating within 
this sector. Many of the NGOs that I had met had chosen not to register with the UBFA, 
preferring to keep their autonomy. In terms of the religious content there were also many 
more NGOs in operation that represented Muslim as well as Christian interests. 
65 UNDP, op. cit. 
66 UBFA. 0. Lipovski (ed. ), Directory ofNon-governmental Organisations in Bulgaria, UBFA, Sofia, 1997. 
67 This concentration in cultural and education issues was also evident in the 1993 UBFA directory. 
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The existence of a few large NGOs gave rise to a series of inequalities in terrns of 
finance and organisational capacities. A huge gap existed between a few 'peak' NGOs 
and the general bulk of smaller foundations. These larger NGOs, with the exception of 
Open Society (Soros), all had their roots in the Communist period. This served to fuel 
early scepticism about the role and function of NGOs in Bulgaria. For example, the Kiril 
and Methodius Foundation, the second largest NGO in Bulgaria, was the reformed 
Ludmilla Zhivkova Foundation, established by the Communist Party in 198 1. The role of 
this NGO and others like it was to sponsor "credible and well-developed educational and 
cultural programmes. "' However, accusations of corruption and greed were even more 
common and scarred the public face of these more prominent NGOs. 
Coupled with this organisational inequality was that of regional inequality. Most of the 
NGOs were concentrated in the capital, although there has been a gradual outward spread 
in recent years. Nevertheless, whole geographic areas, such as North-West Bulgaria, still 
remain beyond the reach of most Western donors. " In the light of such inequalities 
which fuelled existing scepticism, NGOs increasingly looked towards the international 
scene for support and recognition. For many, the international arena offered more scope 
for initiative and creativity. The next section deals with the interaction of national and 
international NGOs working with Gypsies in the search for a way into the framework of 
human and minority rights. 
5.12 Gyps), NGOs on the international scene. 
The spread of NGOs from the national to the international scene had huge implications 
for their own perceived roles and for the setting of agendas in international relations. The 
elevation of NGOs onto the international level also opened up new avenues for certain 
68 Snavcly and Resai, op. cit. 
69 UNDP. op. cit. 
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groups that otherwise remain divided by national boundaries. Gypsies are a good 
example of a group who maximised this new NGO dimension for the development of 
their own transnational agendas. " The existing human and minority frameworks has 
largely been the way in for many leading Gypsy activists seeking official recognition at 
the international level. 
It is important to examine how far international norms served to set outer limits for NGO 
activity and to question how much input there actually was at this level from minority 
groups and in particular Gypsies themselves. 'Me way in which Gypsy rights were 'fitted' 
into an existing human rights framework, and the main assumptions that continued to 
underpin human rights are explored in order to understand why such a framework did not 
always work in the interests of Gypsies and indeed minority groups in general. 
As the largest ethnic minority of Europe, Gypsies on the international scene are first and 
foremost seeking official recognition of their ethnic identity a part of which entails 
establishing safeguards and minority rights guarantees. What is crucial here is that a 
more precise concept is developed of those national minorities that are dispersed across 
states and to assess the possible implications for Gypsies. Categorising Gypsies as 
&stateless' is self-defeating for it restricts them from certain rights, yet fixing them 
territorially removes their capacity to maintain a trarisnational identity. One suggested 
point of departure, as proposed by the Council of Europe, was the concept of 'non- 
territorial languages', but this failed to tackle issues of culture and identity. 
Gheorghe, a leading Romanian Gypsy activist and academic, taking this view argues that 
faced with scarce resources and with a need for a new resource (i. e. collective rights as a 
70 Jean-Pierre Liegeois and Nicolac Ghcorghe. RomalQypsies: A European Alinority, Minority Rights Group 
International Report, 4,1995. 
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distinct minority), Gypsies need to identify themselves in collective terms, to crystallise 
their ethnic identity and to 'play with' their multiple identities in relation to current 
symbols at national or transnational levels. " As discussed in section 8 of Chapter 4, 
these identities, he argues, can include 'indigenous people', 'ethnic minorities', 'national 
minorities' or a 'transnational minority'. For the development of a coherent Roma 
ideology and ethnicity, however, he stresses that Gypsies need to overcome internal 
disputes. There are problems with each of these identities, which is why Acton, in his 
Inaugural Lecture, supported this notion of 'playing with' multiple identities rather than 
resting with just one, 
When one demands status as a national minorily, one implicitly concedes and recognises 
the rights of the national majority to determine that status. When one demands full 
citizenship, one implicitly concedes the right of the state to define and exclude non-cilizzens. 
When one demands international minority status, one concedes the right ofgovernments to 
get together and strike bargains about others' human rights without consulting them. In 
short, all of these 'citizenship' and 'minority rights' approaches function to shore up the 
legitimacy of ethnic majoritarianism and the nation-state. 72 
Or, put another way, whether a minority group is defined in terms of 'nationalities', 
4peoples', 'minorities', or 'indigenous populations' the end result is essentially the same 
that "in order to obtain recognition of the claim to cultural identity [ ... ] the claimant must 
accept the terms of the dialogue. ""' The role of Gypsy organisations in this process of 
identity formation is crucial, but not the sum total of available options. This is 
particularly evident in light of their limited input, actually and potentially, into decision 
making at the international level. International Gypsy NGOs, such as the International 
Romani Union (IRU), Roma Centre for Social Intervention and Studies, The Federation 
71 Nicolac Gheorghe, "Roma - Gypsy Ethnicity in Eastern Europe", Social Research, 58 (4), Winter 1991; N. 
Gheorghe, "The Social construction of Romani Identity. " In T. Acton (ed. ), Gypsy Politics and Traveller Identity, 
University of Hertfordshire Press. Hatfield, 1997. 
72 Thomas Acton, "Authenticity, Expertise, Scholarship and Politics: Conflicting Goals in Romani Studies", 
Inaugural Lecture Series, The University of Greenwich, June 1998. p. 11. 
73 Ian Brownlie. *The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law. " In J. Crawford (ed. ), The Rights of Peoples, 
Clarendon Paperbacks. Oxford, 1992. pp. 5-6. 
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of the Romanian Roma, and Romani Criss (members of the IRU and the Standing 
Conference for Co-operation and Co-ordination of Roma Associations in Europe) have 
had a variety of roles including consultation/advisory positions and pressure groups. For 
example, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), based in Hungary, is an 
international NGO aimed specifically at monitoring human right abuses of Gypsies 
across Europe and co-operates with NGOs at national and local levels. The Federation of 
the Romanian Roma and Romani Criss are also active in this field. They have openly 
condemned recent attacks on Gypsy homes and families in Romania and criticised 
authorities for implicitly encouraging such acts of violence. " It is the IRU, however, that 
is most often cited as the success story for Gypsy NGOs trying to gain recognition on the 
international scene. 
5.13 The International Roma Union (IRU) 
In 1979, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations formally recognised the 
IRU as a non-governmental organisation with consultative status. The ideological and 
practical implications of this move have rarely been critically analysed, thereby allowing 
the UN to boast of its progress as regards the recognition of Gypsies on the world stage. 
Symbolically, for the IRU their elevation in status was a positive move as they were now 
in a better position to represent Gypsy interests on an international level. Furthermore, 
they now had access to meetings of the sub-commission. The IRU have even been able 
to transcend their symbolic role on occasions with the issuing of public declarations. In 
September 1991, for example, they raised the issue that Gypsy rights within a European 
dimension must fall into wider issues of national minorities. " Gypsy communities, they 
argued, must be recognised as distinct ethnic entities and political subjects in each 
nation-state, and that they should be treated equally alongside other minorities. This has 
74 Wgeois and Gheorghe, op. cit. 
75 C. Auzias. 'Les Roms et le Processus d'ifelsinki", in Les Familles Roms dEurope de VEst, Alize production, 1992. 
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contributed to the gradual dismantling of some of the prejudices against Gypsies at tile 
governmental level, who, seeing that Gypsies have no homeland, have been reluctant to 
concede that Gypsies constitute national minorities. The IRU in this respect was part of a 
more general movement towards articulating new identities for Gypsies. 
Tile IRU have also been instrumental in the development of numerous Gypsy projects 
and initiatives across Europe. These have ranged from propositions to send IRU 
members to the countries of former Yugoslavia with a view to participating in the peace 
process and verifying that international standards of human rights, specifically for 
Gypsies, were being met, to actual collaboration with Helsinki Watch in gathering 
information on rates of increasing violence against Gypsies. From this the IRU has been 
in a more informed and credible position to propose ideas, such as the adoption of more 
rigorous laws to combat racial violence and the increased intervention of an Ombudsman 
to deal with Gypsy complaints made against government procedures. " However, due to 
the restraints of the UN, the extent to which the IRU has been able to implement their 
proposals is negligible. 
The TRU have also been crucial to the establishment of Romani Summer Schools, which 
partly funded by UNESCO, have been running annually since 1989. " They generally 
consist of courses on Romani language, history and culture with different foci, such as 
journalism, development of a Roma Encyclopaedia and Romani linguistics. Such 
ventures as these have led to huge claims being made about the potential for Roma 
solidarity, such as those made by Courthiade, the organiser of the 1993 Summer School, 
who WTites: 
76 Auzias. op. cit. 
7'r Belgrade (1989), Vienna (1990), Helsinki (1991). Rome (1992), Sangonis (1993 and 1994). Marcel Courthiade 
"The Romani Summer School: Already a Tradition. " In J. P.. Lidgeois (ed. ) Interface 16, Universitd Rend Descartes, 
Paris. November. 1994. 
221 
We believe that participants came away with a strengthened awareness of Romani dignity, 
conceptually better armed in the fields of politics, law and administration [ ... I better 
prepared to share their knowledge with their own people, particularly in the 
/a/brementioned/fields but also in terms of increased solidarity. 78 
Indeed, there have been positive repercussions where a lucky few from the 1993 session 
were able to participate in various international political and diplomatic activities, such 
as the Seville Congress supported by the EU (May 1994), the Hearing at the Council of 
Europe (July), and the CSCE seminar on the Roma in Warsaw (September). "' However, 
the extent to which summer schools are open to all Gypsies is debatable and, therefore, 
we have to question the extent to which these courses are fairly represented. 
Gypsy NGOs on the international scene are leading the way in other areas too. Some 
NGOs are attempting to nurture an autonomous mode of communication, for example, 
with the publication of Gypsy journals and newsletters. "' Interface, published by the 
Gypsy Research Centre with the assistance of the Commission of the European 
Communities, and the Task-Force Human Resources, Education, Training and Youth, is 
a good example of an information newsletter that is distributed throughout countries in 
Eastern and Western Europe. This newsletter enables exchange and allows for 
networking in the development of Gypsy projects and research. Projects include raising 
awareness among teachers of Gypsies and assessing teaching material in this area 
coupled with training mediators and setting up a network for inter-school experience 
exchange. 
At the international as well as at the local and national levels, the role of the 'mediator' is 
seen as vital. The project "Profile and Function of the Gypsy Mediator", proposed by 
78 Courthiade. op. cit. p. 3 
79 N1. Courthiade, "Training for Publication. " In Lidgeois (ed. ) Interface 16, op. cit., 1994. 
80 Jean-Pierre Lidgeois. Roma, Gypsies, Travellers, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg. 1994. 
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Association Romano Lil, aimed at all Member-States, puts into practice the objective of 
training and employing Gypsy mediators as set out in the Resolution adopted by the 
Ministers of Education in 1989. It stresses the need to provide the different partners 
involved (administrative bodies and Gypsy NGOs) with the working tools and guidance 
they require, based on a working dialogue between the different working groups. This 
ideal of the Gypsy mediator is expressed in the actions and wishes of Fatima Hartmann, 
a Gypsy teacher in Germany, who writes, 
I try to serve as a mediator hetween the two cultures, for example knowing pupils' 
prohlems, how teachers react, the children's social situation, the reasons hehind irregular 
attendance, talking to parents to try to create links hetween Romani traditions and the 
demands of Gadjo society, so that one day the two cultures may reach a degree of mutual 
understanding, acceptance, respect from the majority for the minority and vice versa 
wiihoul having to renounce its own identity. 81 
The human rights approach is often seen as the most effective framework within which 
to bring together cultures without renouncing either, and was the strategy most 
commonly adopted by Gypsy NGOs in Bulgaria at all their levels of operation. However, 
the good work as described above is not so much a product of the human rights 
framework, but of the way in which it has been creatively used by those working within 
it. Ultimately, problems associated with 'negative equality' continue to hold back the 
pursuit of Gypsy rights in that passive measures tend to outweigh proactive ones, thus 
diffusing the impetus for implementing specific texts on Gypsies. This can have various 
implications for Gypsies especially those who still rely on their travelling tradition both 
economically and culturally. As discussed in section 8 of Chapter 4, the grounding of 
Gypsy rights alongside more general ones does not in itself guarantee the cultural 
survival of Gypsy communities and it is this context in which Gypsy NGOs inevitably 
find themselves whether at the international, national or local level. 
a' Fatima Hartmann, "Information File: Germany - Roma participation in school provision. " In Lidgcois (ed. ) 
Interface 16, op. cit. p. 17. 
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At the formal level, the development of Gypsy NGOs both nationally and internationally 
has run parallel'to the human rights framework rather than penetrating it in that the 
relationship between multilateral bodies and Gypsy NGOs has so far been largely one 
directional and characterised by the imposed adaptation on the part of the Gypsy to 
multilateral norms. However, as discussed above in section 12, at the informal level the 
picture is slightly different. The idea of 'playing with' identities suggests that the creative 
use of existing frameworks should be the focus of action in order to avoid the situation 
whereby in colluding with state and inter-state structures Gypsy NGOs have to sacrifice 
aspects of their cultural distinctiveness; the very essence of their existence that they are 
aspiring to protect. 
5.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed the complexity of the debates that surround the NGO sector, 
both generally and in relation to the specific contexts of Eastern Europe and Bulgaria. 
Negative aspects of NGO ineffectiveness, crises in legitimacy, the reproduction of 
inequality, the ambiguity and vagueness of the concepts, and their potential for 
manipulation work alongside and in conjunction with more positive aspects of 
contributing to civil society, representing potential alternatives to the state, having scope 
for filling in gaps left by inadequate state welfare, and having a higher degree of 
responsiveness to local communities with possibilities for their direct involvement. 
Underpinning these complexities is the belief on the part of dominant society that the 
NGO sector offers a means of drawing together a whole set of disparate and desperate 
groups, who are seen as falling outside of society, whether it be the poor, the uneducated, 
or in this case specifically Gypsies. 
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Strategies of inclusion as a defining feature of NGO activity rest on an articulation of 
excluded groups, and so we have to ask what the criteria are that deten-nine which groups 
are targeted. The NGO approach and its role at the ground level is taken as an 
appropriate means of seeking out 'the needy' and for enabling active participation, 
community development and the empowerment of these 'excluded' groups. This raises a 
whole set of issues about the use and promotion of philanthropy and voluntarism as a 
complement, if not alternative to the state for meeting social needs. First, the rhetoric of 
social exclusion allows for governments to rely on the NGO sector for 'filling the gap' 
left by welfare withdrawal. Second, the value attributed to NGOs and their impact on 
community development is evident in the popular use of NGOs as an indicator of 
democracy and the existence of civil society. But, we have to ask: how far do NGOs 
really achieve active participation, and is this an adequate alternative to state structures, 
or further still a suitable indication of democracy? 
Third, the emphasis on NGOs and inclusion strategies, while providing important 
avenues for some bottom-up activity, do so at the expense of more long term and 
systemic anti-poverty strategies. In many cases, mismanagement and lack of coherent 
methods, coupled with deflecting attention away from the state, means that NGOs can 
serve to disadvantage rather than empower those groups they claim to be representing. 
As developed in the next three chapters, the contradictions of 'inclusion' can be seen to 
be embodied in the conflict between the liberal ideal of the NGO sector and its lived 
reality. Gypsy NGOs at the national and local level are increasingly finding new ways of 
'playing with' Western concepts of 'integration' and 'civil society', revealed most lucidly 
in the case of Gypsy NGOs in Bulgaria. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE MISSING DIMENSION: GYPSY RESPONSES TO THE 'TRANSITION' IN 
BULGARIA 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined some of the difficulties inherent to the NGO sector as a 
whole. This has opened up to question the effectiveness of NGOs as a tool for integration 
for Gypsies in Bulgaria. This chapter extends its critique of the NGO sector, to that of 
social exclusion theory. As discussed in section 10 of Chapter 2, one of the key problems 
with social exclusion theory is its failure to explain, or account for the possibility of 
resistance on the part of those groups dismissed as powerless, isolated and excluded. The 
following discussion draws on a number of strategies adopted by Gypsies in Bulgaria, 
which rest on aspects of both compliance and resistance, illustrating that far from 
I)ackward'or'isolated', Gypsies within the NGO sector are proving to be important social 
and political actors during transition. 
Gypsies are responding to the transition using a variety of survival strategies, some more 
public and 'acceptable' than others, such as political organisation, cultural development 
and more recently participation in NGO sector. The previous chapter discussed the 
premise on which the NGO sector works by drawing on the various debates about NGO 
activity as a means of active participation and social change. This chapter reveals and 
challenges a series of assumptions about Gypsies and the NGO sector. Namely that: the 
group in question forms a homogenous block; secondly, that they all live a life excluded 
from the mainstream; and thirdly, that integration as defined by Gadjos is their wanted 
outcome. In fact, Gypsies constitute a complex array of different ethnic groups and are 
inextricably tied with macro society in a complex set of mutual relations whether they be 
economic, cultural or social. Further still, integration and its underlying principle of 
disappearance, is not necessarily what they want. Therefore, the extent to which NGOs 
represent genuine participation is still open to question. 
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On a more informal level, lesser known survival strategies on the part of Gypsies have 
been in existence for much longer and have had no such recognition. This chapter 
examines the features of both informal and formal Gypsy responses to the transition in 
order to bring to light, and validate responses all too readily dismissed as evidence of 
'inadaptability', and to show that the NGO sector as a strategy of inclusion is not as 
foolproof as Western institutions would like us to believe. Finally, this chapter in its 
discussion of Gypsy responses argues that the distinction between informal and formal 
strategies is largely an artificial one. 
6.2 Informal Gypsy responses to the 'transition': Survival strategies 
During the transition Gypsies have faced more an intensification of existing problems, 
rather than the emergence of entirely new ones. At one level, Gypsies have been relying 
on traditional occupations in their adaptation to the changing situation. The preservation 
and functioning of a given group and the flexibility of their traditional occupations partly 
determine the successful use of such occupations as survival strategies. For example, 
metal working for the Burgudzii (gimlet-makers) who form part of the large 'Jerlii' 
community (a well defined and preserved group) has proved to be more adaptable during 
the transition period than such crafts as horse-shoe making, a tradition belonging to the 
Nalbanti (a less well preserved group). ' 
At another level, Gypsies are surviving by supplementing social assistance with 'wheeling 
and dealing' i. e. informal activities or casual work whether traditional or otherwise. 
These strategies range from collecting scrap metal and gathering wild berries to trans- 
border small scale trade and seasonal labour together with support from extended family 
network. As well as searching out new economic niches, Gypsies have also been 
surviving by using a variety of 'negative' strategies. These include crime, begging, 
scavenging, dropping out of school and claiming refugee status abroad. These are 
1 Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, Gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria, Studien zur Tsganelogi und Folklovistik 18, 
Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1997. pp. 105-122. 
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dismissed by wider society as irrational or scheming and as indicative of their "backward' 
or 'deviant' nature. ' 
Official and non-official statistics offer one source of information and can give some 
indication (albeit problematic) of the 'everyday responses' of Gypsies. This can include 
data on: suicide; migration; crime; begging; drop-out rates; and absenteeism. However, 
such statistics are either unavailable or not broken down into ethnic groups. Those 
statistics on Gypsies that do exist such as on migration, crime and absenteeism are based 
on a mixture of official and non-official sources and are distorted or at best limited. Yet, 
it is these statistics on which decisions and attitudes are formed. The following statistics 
on aspects of the Gypsy situation in Bulgaria are taken from a variety of sources. By 
revealing the difficulties outlined above they give us an indication of the leeway that 
exists for different interpretations to develop. 
6.3 Education 
According to the 1946 Bulgarian census, 81 per cent of Gypsies in Bulgaria at that time 
were illiterate. This timely indication of the 'Gypsy problem' provided the BCP with a 
specific agenda. It was their intention to turn around such figures in the interest of rapid 
modernisation and industrial growth. As a result, the BCP made it compulsory for all 
healthy children from 6-16 years, regardless of ethnicity, to attend formal schooling. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent the establishment of a separate schooling system for 
Gypsies. According to a survey on Gypsies carried out in 1992, one tenth of the 
respondents claimed to have been educated in a special boarding school during the 
1950s. ' It was hardly surprising therefore that some 30 years after the BCP came to 
power, Gypsies still had distinctively low literacy rates. In 1978, only 30 per cent of 
Gypsy children completed primary school and over 50 per cent of Gypsies aged more 
than 30 years were illiterate. 4 
2 Ilona Tomova, The Gypsies in the Transition Period, International Centre for Minority Studies and Inter Cultural 
Relations, Sofia, 1995. 
3 Ibid. 
4 These figures were taken from a Communist Party Document dated 1978, quoted in T. Zang, Destroying Ethnic 
Identity - The Gypsies ofBulgaria. A Helsinki Watch Report, New York, June, 199 1. p. 30. 
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Taken together, official and non-official sources confirm the existence of segregated 
schooling for Gypsies. The National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria estimates that in 
1992 Gypsies constituted less than 10 per cent of pupils in mainstream education, yet for 
segregated schools their numbers were much higher. Gypsies represented 32.1 per cent of 
pupils in auxiliary schools, 21.6 per cent of pupils in vocational schools and 29 per cent 
of pupils in schools for behavioural problems. 
Table 6.1 The structure of ethnic groups in Bulgaria according to education level completed, 
1992 and 1994 (%) 
Education Bulgarians Bulgarian Gypsies (1992 Ce Gypsies (1994 
Turks Survey)5 
Higher/College 20.2 2.0 0.9 0.3 
Secondary/ 54.0 24.6 7.8 8.5 
Special 
Elementary 22.6 55.0 46.2 40 
Primary 3.0 16.0 36.7 36 
Illiterate 0.2 2.3 8.5 16 
&o-urce: Census (1992), Tomova (1995) 
Data that rely entirely on registration figures are easily undermined when the factor of 
absenteeism or truancy is taken into consideration. According to a leading Gypsy linguist 
and NGO leader, of 800,000 Bulgarian Gypsies in 1992/93 only 120,000 were registered 
pupils, i. e. 15 per cent. ' The results of the 1992 Bulgarian census revealed that all those 
pupils who were registered with schools did not attend. This, coupled with Tomova's 
1992 survey, in which truancy rates were recorded as high as 70 per cent in some places, 
partly explains the continued high rate of illiteracy for Gypsies in Bulgaria! 
5 This survey (n = 1844) co-ordinated by the International Center for Minority and Intercultural Studies forms the 
basis to Tomova! s research on Gypsies in Bulgaria during the transition, op. cit. 
6 Hristo Kyuchukov, Romany Children and Their Preparation for Literacy: A Case Study, Tilburg University 
Press, Tilburg, 1995. 
7 Although she acknowledges that there is much variation between regions, no explanation is offered or factors 
considered (such as the prevalence of Gypsy teachers or lower poverty rates). The Foundation 'Women For Mercy 
- Rom; Y, a foundation led by two Gypsy women, was keen to search for reasons behind high truancy rates 
(Interview: A (9) 22.10.97). It had recently commissioned a team of psychologists to conduct a survey who 
concluded that the economic crisis was the main reason why children were currently not attending school. 80 per 
cent of the Gypsies in their survey gave the economic crisis as the reason for their truancy. The number of 
respondents and how they were selected, together with its exact methodology, were not revealed. Therefore, we are 
left to wonder how representative this survey was, how much scope the respondents had in explaining their 
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The high drop-out rate among Gypsies has also been a cause for concern and has attracted 
much interest among NGOs working with Gypsies. According to the National Statistical 
Institute for Bulgaria (1992), since 1989 26-33,000 children have dropped out of school 
every year (not including those who do not even register in the first place). That this drop 
out rate increases as they progress through the school system is evident in Tables 6.1 and 
6.2. In mainstream schools Gypsies constitute: 14.7 per cent in 1-3 class, 9.2 per cent in 
4-8 class and 0.9 per cent in 8 class upwards, which supports the idea that it is mainly 
Gypsies rather than Bulgarians who are dropping out. In 1992 it was estimated by the 
national census, together with surveys indicated by the International Center for Minority 
Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), that: first, 83 per cent of Gypsies in Bulgaria 
had completed schooling only up to the elementary or primary school level; and second, 
that the average school starting and leaving ages for Gypsies were considerably narrower 
than the national average attendance rate, standing at 8-9 years old and 13-14 years old 
respectively. " 
Table 6.2 The percentage of Gypsies in education according to education level completed, 1978- 
1994(%) 
% of Gypsies in mahalas and villages with: 
primary elementary secondary higher 
education education education education 
1978-80* 31.4 41 4.1 0.6 
1994* 36 40 8.5 0.3 
* Gypsy illiteracy rate: 11.1 % and 16 % respectively 
Source: NSI, 1992 and Tomova, 1995 
Tomova's survey gives us only some indication as to the possible motives behind these 
truancy and drop-out patterns, where nearly half of the respondents (48 per cent) 
interviewed said they did not have children of school age, although for more than half of 
these this was not the case. About 30 per cent of the respondents said that their children 
situation, and whether or not the respondents just gave the answers that they thought the interviewers wanted to 
hear. 
a These surveys were carried out in 1992,1993,1994,1997. 
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should go to school but did not and 24 per cent said their children attended regularly. ' 
Although the motives remained unclear, what is certain is that of the respondents, less 
than half attended school (978 out of 2,047 - 47.7 per cent). Likewise, the United Roma 
Union (URU) claimed that more than 50 per cent of Gypsies did not attend school. " 
On a local level, the problems of truancy and dropping out were equally evident. The 
number of students officially registered at the school in Faculteta, Sofia for the academic 
year 1996-97 was 1,200 (all of which were Gypsies). However, according to the Romani 
Bah Foundation, whose office is situated in Faculteta, this constituted only half of the 
children of school age who lived there. Furthermore, of these 1,200 children only half 
attended regularly. Only 51 pupils had finished primary school and of them only 36 had 
continued onto secondary school. " Likewise, the Mayor of Nadejda, a large Gypsy 
quarter in Sliven, said that of the 980 Gypsy children of school age in this quarter, only 
640 attended school, i. e. 65 per cent. The reasons he gave were vague and were based on 
the supposition that parents and children in carrying out seasonal work were not at home 
long enough to attend school. " 
In contrast, the Romani Bah Foundation identified in their report specific problems and 
factors that needed consideration. The report noted that the 10 year curriculum is 
vocationally based and consists of 2 years at pre-school, 6 years at primary and 2 years 
vocational training, which involves interior decoration for boys and sewing/dress design 
for girls. The school has 69 teachers and staff turnover is extremely high. During the 
1994/5 academic year 20 per cent of the staff left. Only four of the teachers were Gypsies 
and it was these classes that had the highest attendance. The vice-director of this school, 
according to this report, claimed that less than 10 per cent of the parents attended the 
parent-teacher meetings. 13 
9 The survey was not based on open-ended questions but the interviewees were given a selection of responses to 
choose from - there was no scope for them to give reasons for their children not attending school. 
10 Interview: A (6) 20.10.97. 
11 Romani Bah Foundation "Report", September 1997. 
12 Interview: 23.10.97. 
13 Romani Bah Foundation, op. cit. 
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In terms of higher education, the figures were even more stark. However, two separate 
NGOs proudly claimed that between 100 and 150 Gypsies had graduated from secondary 
and higher education in Sliven alone. "' Although such numbers were seen as a cause for 
celebration, we were left to guess at the time scale and, perhaps most importantly, at what 
had happened to them since. Perhaps most significantly, however, was the sense of pride 
that certain Gypsy leaders expressed when talking about Gypsy 'successes' in terms of 
achievement within the education system. It was generally the case that those Gypsy 
leaders who were most explicit in drawing attention to the existence of 'successful' 
Gypsies, were former leaders from the Soviet period and were of the opinion that the state 
had helped to preserve Romani culture. As with the two NGOs above, however, there 
was evidence of anti-BSP leaders being equally keen to elevate the status of 'successful' 
Gypsies. 
BSP Gypsy leaders (although not always officially defined as such) would correspond 
claims about the existence of Gypsy doctors, lawyers and scientists, with reports of 
increasing numbers of Gypsy students entering higher education. This promotion of 
academic and professional skills as authentic to Gypsy values reflected a continuation of 
a belief in 'Soviet' ideals. " This subtle championing of socialism emphasised free 
education, and other benefits that had characterised the former regime and which, they 
argued, had helped integrate Gypsies and nurture a Gypsy intelligentsia. " However, this 
clashed with stances taken by other key Gypsy leaders who, in contrast, saw the state as 
having destroyed Romani culture, where enforced sedentarisation and policies of 
assimilation had undermined vital elements of Gypsy survival. 
14 Interviews: A (6) 20.10.97 and A (5) 20.10.97. Both these NGOs expressed allegiance with the UDF, i. e. set 
themselves up in opposition to the former Soviet regime. 
15 For example, a Gypsy doctor who was also the Head of the Public Council (a body set up by the local 
Municipality aimed at representing Gypsies and co-ordinating Gypsy NGOs in the area) and had previously been 
an MP for the BCP during the Soviet era, was keen to report of 'successful' Gypsies in Bulgaria, and to enquire of 
how well Gypsies were doing in the UK. Interview: 23.10.97. 
16 Indeed, for many Gypsies, both within and without the NGO sector, the Soviet past represents an era of 
nostalgia, where Gypsies remember having equal access to a whole series of benefits, such as free education, 
employment and subsidised housing, that have now been taken away. 
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This debate reveals a number of interesting problems: The search for 'authenticity' on the 
part of Soviet style Gypsy leaders rested on a wish to become civilised, or to be accepted 
as such. However in the post-1989 context, this becomes complicated. 'Personal success' 
is still considered by Gypsy leaders and indeed wider society in terms of 'Soviet' values, 
e. g. level of integration in education, number of Gypsy doctors and so forth, which is a 
past that people in general are now, at best, ambivalent about. On the other hand, the 
stance taken by 'new' Gypsy leaders, i. e. those who are leaning towards, or who actively 
subscribe to the UDF, while critical of Soviet policy towards Gypsies, still rests on a 
search for authenticity. They do not deny the importance of Gypsies entering into 
Bulgarian public life, whether it be through university or the attainment of professional 
qualifications, but their emphasis is on nurturing an 'authentic' Gypsy culture that extends 
back beyond the Soviet era to a time immemorial. " Although politically divided, Gypsy 
leaders seem united by their implicit reliance on searching for the 'authentic' whether it be 
in terms of relaying facts about the high number of Gypsy graduates, or by stressing the 
innate value of Gypsy culture. " Confronted with this apparent paradox, whereby Soviet 
values are at once discredited, yet valued, it is clear that the search for authenticity serves 
to replicate ideological distinctions between Gypsies and non-Gypsies. 
6.4 Unemployment 
Most political and NGO leaders agree that the lack of education, coupled with the 
removal of traditional survival strategies, are the prime causes for the vast rise in 
unemployment rates for Gypsies. Although unemployment statistics are more readily 
available, their degree of reliability is highly questionable both at the national and local 
levels. Due to the problem of the lack of reliable data, problems of measurement and in 
particular ambiguity over how to distinguish clearly between employment and 
unemployment, it is difficult to assess the exact level of Gypsy unemployment in 
Bulgaria as indeed across Eastern Europe. Table 6.3 in its reliance on a variety of non- 
17 See Alaina Lemon's discussion on the negotiation of representation for Gypsies in Moscow Teatr Romcn. Alaina 
Lemon, "Hot Blood and Black Pearls: Socialism, Society, and Authenticity at the Moscow Teatr Romen", Theatre 
Journal, 48,1996. pp. 479-494. 
18 However, as pointed out by Lemon, ibid., it is important to note that not all Gypsies are concerned with notions 
of authenticity, and that they do not always fundamentally differentiate between themselves and non-Gypsies. 
233 
official sources illustrates the inadequacy of official data on Gypsy unemployment during 
the transition. 
Table 6.3 Unemployment of Gypsies in four East European countries during the transition 
Country Unemployment rate (%) 
Macedonia (2) > 80* 
Bulgaria (3) 76** 
Hungary (2) 65*** 
Romania(l)" 22.3 (men) 
70.8 (women) 
(1) 1993, (2) 1994, (3) 1995 
20 *According to Bakir Arif, President of the Progressive Democratic Party of the Roma (PDPR). 
*Overall percent of unemployed Roma ofworkingage takenfrom a nation-wide survey. 21 
* *Male Gypsies previously employedfor 10 yrs who lost theirjobs. 22 
On a more local level, the problem of accuracy increases. Although not based upon 
reliable sources, the perceptions expressed about local unemployment by NGO leaders 
were fairly consistent: One NGO put the unemployment rate for Gypsies at 80 per cent 
compared to the average of 13-14 per cent for the rest of Bulgaria, others at 90 per cent, 
and one even reported levels as high as 98-100 per cent in some areas. " According to one 
NGO, in Faculteta, of which the total working age is 00,000 only 500 had jobs with 
regular contracts, i. e. 95 per cent of those of working age did not have regular 
employment. " 
The semi-legal economy is very active in Bulgaria where for many families, both Gypsy 
and Gadjo, incomes are generated via informal means. This makes it very difficult to 
calculate exactly where to draw the line between employment and unemployment and 
19 The Centre of Economic Information and Documentation , Bucharest 1993, n=5,968. 20 Interview conducted by Zolton Barony 13.3.94 in, "The Roma in Macedonia: Ethnic Politics and the Marginal 
Condition in a Balkan state", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18 (3), 3 July, 1995. p. 519. 
21 Tomova, op. cit. p. 7 1. 
22 Kertesi Havas and Kemeny, "The Statistics of Deprivation: The Roma in Hungary", Hungarian Quarterly, 36, 
Summer, 1995. p. 71. 
23 Interviews: B (6) 20.10.97; A (1) 4.3.97; A (6) 20.10.97; A (7) 21.10.97. 
24 Interview: B (2) 17.9.97. Romani Bah Foundation, op. cit. 
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opens up further doubts about the accuracy of unemployment figures. Finding statistics 
that provide information on alternative sources of income, such as begging or scavenging, 
is also very difficult. 
6.5 Crime 
Whereas statistics on unemployment for different ethnic groups may be scarce, for crime 
figures the reverse is true. At one level, the identification of an ethnic element to crime 
represents a means for institutions to target and discriminate against certain minority 
groups. Although this is clearly unjust, it would also be misleading to dismiss the ethnic 
element altogether. Given that the reasons for crime are many and complex, it is 
important to explore how the factor of ethnicity interacts with other factors, such as of 
class and gender. For example, the 'villain! in the case of a 'robbery' may need a concise 
fear of the victim in order to carry out the crime 'guilt-free', hence, the Gypsy stealing 
from a Gadjo is more acceptable than stealing from a fellow Gypsy. " Of course, this is 
just one possible explanation, but it shows that any approach to crime that is governed by 
a 'political agenda!, whether it be to condemn or defend Gypsies, is at best limited in its 
scope. 
Nonetheless, the ethnic element is just one of many factors and not necessarily the 
guiding one in the carrying out of crime. For example, Daroczi, a Gypsy ethnographer at 
the Hungarian institute of Culture makes a point relevant to the general problem of so- 
called 'Gypsy crime' across Eastern Europe. She argues that although crime among 
Gypsies is high it is no higher than among non-Gypsies with similar levels of education 
and standards of living. " For her the factor of class presides over that of ethnicity. 
Likewise, Lemon argues that the crime rate among poor Gypsies in Eastern Europe is no 
higher than for poor non-Gypsies, ethnicity therefore is not taken as the determining 
factor. 27 
25 A comparable example would be the media hype of'black muggers', which peaked in London in the 1980s. 
26 Quoted in Paul Hockenos, Free to Hate: The Rise of the Far Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, 
Routledge, London, 1993. 
27 Alaina Lemon, "No Land, No Contracts for Romani Workers", Transition, 2 (13), 28 June, 1996. p. 29. 
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In Bulgaria in August 1992, the then Director of the National Police and later Minister of 
the Interior presented a report to the Regional Directors of Internal Affairs in which he 
claimed that for those crimes where the police have established the identity of the 
criminal, 37.5 per cent were Gypsies. According to this report Gypsies in Bulgaria make 
up 34.7 per cent of murderers, 31.9 per cent of rapists and 42.2 per cent of burglars. 
These figures were widely quoted and published by the media. 
Since 1993, the annual publications of the Bulgarian National Institute of Statistics 
"Crime and Sentenced Persons" has published detailed accounts of all sentenced people 
by ethnicity and by type of crime. The total number of Gypsies (adult and juvenile) 
sentenced for crimes in 1993,1994,1995 was 4,565. Table 6.4 shows a clear rise in crime 
committed by Gypsies between 1993-1995, but not to the extent of representing one third 
of all reported crimes. Indeed, the police now maintain that every fifth perpetrator of 
crime is a Gypsy rather than the previous claim of one in every three. " 
Table 6.4 The per centage of Gypsies sentenced for crimes (excluding juvenile convicts), 1993 - 
1995(%) 
Year in total crime in crimes against in crimes against 
persons property 
1993 6.8 3.3 14.6 
1994 14.4 8.0 19.4 
1995 20.2 11.7 26.2 
Source: NSL, 1995. 
This contrasts with the figures offered by Panev in his study of the 'crime explosion' in 
Bulgaria. " His overall findings suggest that crime increased more than threefold between 
1990-1994. He then argues that the majority of this crime is committed by Gypsies, using 
theft as an example. In 1994 the number of registered thefts committed by Bulgarians was 
287 per 100,000; for Turks it was slightly higher at 406 per 100,000. For Gypsies, 
28 TrUd, 10 July, 1997. 
29 Baicho Panev, "Vzriv na prestupnosta v Bulgaria" (The Crime Explosion in Bulgaria), Statistika, 4,1995. 
Figure 3, p. 34. 
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however, the figure for the same period reached 6,592 per 100,000. This seems to offer 
conclusive evidence that Gypsies are more likely than both Bulgarians and Turks to 
commit crime, or at least theft. However, the use of theft as an indicator of overall crime 
is misleading. A 1997 ERRC report on the state of Gypsies in detention in Bulgaria 
argues that crimes in which Gypsies are involved tend to be less sophisticated and easier 
to reveal, investigate and punish compared to crimes typically committed by members of 
other groups. " Therefore, the high numbers of Gypsies committing theft must be 
explained in the context of other crimes and in terms of the role of policing, whereby 
officials have a greater tendency to target, arrest and imprison Gypsies than with other 
ethnic groups. 
This range of official and non-official data give some indication, at least, of how Gypsies 
appear to evade all established norms, such as, by not attending school, and by 
committing crime. Given the scale of the 'problems' where drop-out, unemployment and 
crime rates are relatively high for Gypsies, it becomes easy for public figures, whether 
politicians or high-ranking police officers, to equate the anti-social behaviour of Gypsies 
with signs of 'inadaptability. However, conflicting rationalities have to be considered, 
where for some Gypsies these informal strategies may actually represent pivotal 
mechanisms for survival. For example, recent innovative strategies, such as open 
'wheeling and dealing', serve to complement, and in some cases are informed by 
traditional forms of survival, such as the use of horse-trading skills in the now more 
profitable trade of car-dealing. By securing the economic survival of a given community, 
such 'deviant' survival strategies, contribute to the maintenance of more general Romani 
traditional values, by promoting a sense of self-worth. In this way, Gypsy communities, 
which appear to be engaging in anti-social behaviour are indeed securing their own 
cultural as well as economic survival. 
30 European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), Profession: Prisoner - Roma in Detention in Bulgaria, Country Reports 
Series No. 6, December, Budapest, 1997. 
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Nevertheless, informal strategies are set up in contrast to those that are traditionally seen 
as formal strategies, such as participation and adaptation. Silverman, in her study on 
Gypsies in the USA in the late 1980s, shows that the distinction between informal and 
formal strategies are not so much separate as mutually supportive. " On the surface 
Gypsies may appear to be abandoning their Gypsy heritage in their adoption of formal 
strategies, yet it is the combination of appearing to assimilate and the continued practice 
of informal strategies that ensures the survival of Gypsies as an ethnic group. Any kind of 
change has often been misunderstood in Gypsy culture as a sign of assimilation and so 
potential disappearance. Silverman argues, however, that change represents to Gypsies 
one of their most significant sources of survival, 
Innovations in areas of culture such as housing, travel patterns, occupation, and acquiring 
non-Gypsy languages, signal creative adaptation to situations of perpetual cultural 
contact. [.. ]. Change occurs not only because it is inevitable, but also because it is the 
fundamental adaptive and creative strategy survival in non-Gypsy settings. 32 
The ability of Gypsies to appear assimilated yet remain distinct, manifests itself most 
clearly in their recent change of strategy of incorporating from below the NGO sector. 
Rather than 'selling out' on their part, this adaptation represents a new twist in their 
survival strategy. 
6.6 Formal Gypsy responses to the 'transition': The NGO sector 
In the light of these shifting dimensions in survival strategies I explore the complex world 
of Gypsy NGOs in Bulgaria. ' The move on the part of Gypsies to accept the influence of 
the NGO sector 'as a bonus rather than as a replacement' can be seen as a pro-active 
process of 'cultural adaptatioW. Acton in his study of Gypsy politics, suggested a possible 
typology of cultural adaptation: conservatism, where Gypsies minimise their cultural 
31 Carol Silverman, "Negotiating "Gypsiness" Strategy in Context", American Folklore, 101 (401), 1988. 
32 Ibid. p. 268. 
33 As explained in the first chapter, I explore only a certain strand of NGOs excluding those defined as businesses 
or those which work explicitly as part of any particular church. The focus of this study was on small to medium 
sized foundations or organisations that dealt with Gypsy issues and which were run either by Gypsies or Gadjos. 
My decision to focus on the more dynamic and visible NGOs was informed by a desire to unravel some of the 
criteria that were being applied to 'successful' NGOs. Problems associated with strategies of participation and 
community development are not necessarily due to the malpractice of a few ill-informed NGOs, but are 
representative of problems that go much deeper as evident in those NGOs that are judged as 'effective'. 
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contact; cultural disintegration, where Gypsies become impoverished and their will to 
resist dominant society is destroyed; cultural adaptation, where Gypsies accept 
influences, such as nationalist tendencies; and 'passing, where Gypsies conceal their 
origins and identity and integrate. ' Using this fourfold framework it is possible to see the 
participation of Gypsies within the NGO sector as a process of cultural adaptation, where 
it represents for many a means for seeking a new status within the host society, and 
securing a new legitimate space within which to politcally manoeuvre. 
In Bulgaria since 1989, due to shifting freedoms and constraints, there has been a sharp 
growth and subsequent decline in Gypsy political and cultural activity at the formal level. 
In the immediate aftermath of 1989, the spattering of illegal activity that had existed 
under Communism developed fast into formally organised political activity. The 
Democratic Union of Roma, ROMA in Sofia led by Manush Romanov, a prominent 
Gypsy leader from the Communist era, was the first major Gypsy political movement of 
its kind in Bulgaria. 35 Romanov was also a member of the Public Council in the National 
Question attached to the National Assembly in January 1990 and in an interview he 
stressed that ROMA was an independent organisation free from any attachment to 
existing political parties. " During its peak in the 1990 elections, ROMA represented 
approximately 50,000 Gypsies across Bulgaria. However, parallel organisations, such as 
the Socialist Democratic Union of Roma, later dropped the 'socialist' adjective but 
maintained its commitment to the 'moral progress of the Romanies, in the spirit of love 
for the Fatherland' coupled with breakaway factions such as "Alternative Movement for 
the Promotion of Gypsy Cultural and Social Life", soon served to undermine support for 
ROMA. 37 
34 Thomas Acton, Gypsy Politics and Social Change, Routledge, London, 1974. p. 35. 
35 According to a report on the founding of this union, Romanov had been one of the many Gypsy leaders 
persecuted during the Communist regime. Cited by Simon Simonov, "The Gypsies: A Re-Emerging Minority", 
Report on Eastern Europe, 25 May, 1990. p. 14. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid; Donald Kenrick, "The Gypsies of Bulgaria Before and After the 10th of November", paper presented to 
The Gypsy Lore Society Conference, July 199 1. 
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A disillusionment with politics on the part of Gypsies and society in general gradually set 
in. The form the interviews took with those Gypsy NGO leaders who had previously been 
involved in party politics was quite revealing in this sense. The interview was often 
transformed into either a platform for their political agenda or a session in which they 
could off-load their disillusionment with politics. Furthermore, their experience in formal 
politics had obviously had some impact on their use of rhetoric and grandiose statements 
in raising the issues and concerns of Gypsies in Bulgaria. One Gypsy NGO leader 
explained how his earlier political aspirations had been thwarted by a combination of 
internal and external barriers. These consisted of party political divisions between the 
'blues' (UDF) and the 'reds' (BSP), unfulfilled promises from the Government ("two 
presidents have been elected and both promised that we would have an office in Sofia, 
but we still donT'), and the realisation that their attempts at forming links with the 
government were naive and misguided ("We thought of only how to work from Sofia and 
how to influence parliament thereby neglecting problems of common people in the 
quarters"). " The constitutional reform of 1991 acted as a final impetus for many Gypsy 
leaders to withdraw from party politics, where Article 3 paragraph 2 of the Law on 
Political Parties, adopted by Parliament in April 1990, stipulated that "No Political party 
can be constituted [ ... ] on a religious or ethnic 
basis [ ... I". This was used to 
deny the 
registration of the Democratic Roma Union in 1991 in spite of Article 6 paragraph 2 
which guarantees that there is to be no "limitations of the rights or privileges based on 
ethnic belonging. "
The decline in the scope of political activity brought about by internal and external 
factors, together with an injection of Western finance into non-governmental and non- 
profit initiatives, led to a rapid growth in the NGO sector. With the collapse of welfare 
and the withdrawal of the once paternal state, coupled with restrictions on formal political 
activity, 'self-help' was seen by many Gypsy leaders and pro-reformers as the only way 
38 Interview with Peter Kostov (National Association of Roma Organisations and Foundations) B (6) 20.10.97 
Other leaders who expressed their disillusionment with persistently broken promises include, Gorgi Golov (URU) 
A (6) 20.10.97, and Denko Kumanov (Foundation'Hope') A (8) 22.10.97. 
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forward. " The self-organisation of Gypsies in the NGO sector, therefore, was a response 
to both the opportunities of the transition and its problems. Past political leaders and a 
new generation of educated Gypsies were leading the way in many aspects of this self- 
styled 'Third-Sector'. It was clear that the Gypsies I came into contact with represented 
only a small strand of their total population in Bulgaria. These educated Gypsies were 
'keying into' this NGO growth area and had begun work in numerous areas, such as 
education, employment, and legal advice. Gypsy-led NGOs, in carving out new methods 
of survival, were developing alongside and, at times, in competition with other NGOs. 
The daily obstacles that Gypsy NGOs faced were vast, from practical problems of 
electricity cut-outs to obvious reluctance on the part of local authorities to negotiate. 
However, Gypsy organisations managed firmly to establish themselves as a viable part of 
the NGO sector. Figure 6.1 shows the position and role of Gypsy organisations within the 
wider structure of the third sector and draws attention to the different types of NGOs that 
work with Gypsies. The chart tracks the evolution and spread of NGOs, with Gypsy 
NGOs forming at the tips of the family tree. The three roots that feed into the third sector, 
international, indigenous and government led initiatives, all in turn feed into those NGOs 
working with and/or led by Gypsies. In this way, it is possible to demonstrate that Gypsy 
NGOs were not some obscure separate entity but were tied into the very structure of the 
NGO sector. Although the repercussions of this were complex, the fact remained that 
Gypsy NGOs were just as part of the NGO structure, with its benefits and pitfalls, as any 
other type of NGO. 
NGOs working with and/or led by Gypsies came under a variety of names, including 
associations, unions, organisations, and foundations. Most of the NGOs called themselves 
foundations. These tended to be small-scale with short life spans, whose incomes 
depended entirely on securing funding for short term projects. 
39 Andreas Biro, champion of 'helping self-help' through his NGO, The Hungarian Foundation for Self Reliance, 
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Those NGOs which called themselves organisations were keen to stress that they were 
'more' than a foundation in that they had permanent fixtures that extended beyond the 
locality. One particular Gypsy organisation was very persistent in getting across its 
message that it was 'better' than other NGOs, in that it had a formal nation-wide 
membership based on a set of established criteria. Nevertheless, the differences in name 
did not necessarily translate into corresponding differences in agendas or programmes of 
action. The main thrust of those NGOs which I interviewed, whether they were 
foundations or organisations, were of a specific nature. They worked where processes of 
oppression and discrimination were most evident, i. e. with settled Gypsies and in 
particular with those living in Gypsy quarters. They did not have formal political 
aspirations although some did show support for a political party. " Likewise, although 
Orthodox/Muslim/ Evangelical fault lines were apparent between Gypsy organisations, 
most of the NGO members I had contact with were not formally working in the explicit 
interests of any one particular religion. Finally, unlike many other NGOs registered with 
the UBFA, the NGOs I interviewed all had at least either a team of staff, an office, and/or 
current work. 
The motivation common to all the Gypsy NGOs that I interviewed was the integration of 
Gypsies as a community into wider society. Contrary to popular belief, Gypsies in general 
did wish for some kind of integration, but on terms that respected their cultural identity 
and ensured their continued survival. The question of cultural survival was central to 
many of the approaches taken by Gypsy-led NGOs, as opposed to Gadjo-led NGOs 
which were more concerned with fitting the 'Gypsy question' into the wider agenda of 
human rights. Whereas some Gypsy leaders recognised the importance of their NGO in 
offering immediate practical help to their community, others also stressed its role of 
influencing wider societal and political structures. One Gypsy NGO leader was keen to 
challenge accepted notions of what the NGO stood for. He wanted his foundation to 
extend beyond the limited role of providing services to meet immediate needs. His 
concern was with longterm goals of empowering Gypsies so that they would be informed 
40 Confederation of Roma in Bulgaria - BSP, Roma Foundation'Hope'- BSP, United Roma Union - UDF- 
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and so better able to negotiate their own rights and terms of integration. His NGO could 
only ever be considered successful, he argued, if it was no longer required and ceased to 
exist. " Expressing the same sentiment, another Gypsy NGO leader stated that I dream of 
the day when my foundation is useless. "" Of course, this was not the view expressed by 
all those working within the sector whose NGOs were often their only source of income 
and livelihood. 
Nevertheless, some expressed frustration at the magnitude of everyday problems that 
hindered advancement at the wider level. For example, one leader spoke of the 
overwhelming response on the part of the local communities to the establishment of their 
organisation. He explained how daily they had people coming into the office seeking help 
in a whole variety of areas. These ranged from requests for help with funeral 
arrangements or money, to problems encountered with the police or factory mangers. 
Seeing such problems as ultimately the responsibility of state institutions, he was keen to 
reduce the amount of office hours available for such requests. "' 
In spite of differences in the organisation of priorities, there was a general consensus over 
the need for improving mechanisms for 'self-help'. Strategies of 'bottom-up participation' , 
in whatever forms, were typically adopted by Gadjo and Gypsy NGOs alike in Eastern 
Europe working with Gypsies. However, the premise for such strategies altered between 
the different types of NGOs, i. e. between those led by Gadjo and those by Gypsies. For 
one particular NGO, which had Gadjo only staff, this zeal for 'self-help' rested upon the 
view that Gypsies, had somehow 'forgotten' how to act for themselves. CEGA (Creating 
Effective Grass root Alternatives -a Bulgarian non-Gypsy NGO) and Novib (a Dutch 
grant-making foundation) in their introduction to Moving Beyond Walls: The Stolipinovo 
People Taking Charge of Their Community (1997) claimed that, 
0 Interview: B (2) 17.9.97. 
42 Interview: B (6) 20.10.97. 
43 Interview: A (6) 20.10.97. 
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The Stolipinovo Seýf-Help Bureau offered an alternative to inertia and dependency on 
mere expectations-it rests on two almostforgotten traditions: the setf-help inherent in the 
bonds of thefamily and kin, and the setf-reliance on own resources. 44 
Mikulas, Szodgayora and Polak made a similar point in their paper for the Council Of 
Europe, but placed more emphasis on the causes, 
the biggest mistake done in the past with the Gypsy population was the destruction of their 
responsibility for their own destiny. Systems of social care, financial subsidies, and 
insufficient education led to the situation we are facing today .. like most poverty groups 
accustomed to a day-to-day existence, Gypsies tend to be present-time oriented. 
45 
Within this ideological outlook, the adoption of 'community development' through 
'bottom-up participation' becomes an absolute necessity in order to overcome the 
perceived inertia associated with Gypsy communities. However, given the gravity of their 
analysis whereby Gypsies are seen as trapped by cumulative forces from without and 
within, even in their own terms the idea that NGOs alone offer the solution becomes 
increasingly implausible. 
6.7 Types of organisation, activity and development 
Although a number of important differences existed between the types of NGOs I 
interviewed, a general pattern emerged in terms of common emphases and approaches. 
First, they all promoted themselves to me as a working NGO by listing their various 
successful projects (even if later it was revealed that at present they have no work); 
second, they all explained to me the most important problems Gypsies faced in Bulgarian 
society as they saw it; third, they revealed to me some of the problems in terms of 
organisation (funding and/or politics); and finally, once problems of funding had been 
acknowledged, they would often appeal to me for any contacts in Britain that I could put 
them in touch with. 
44 Mariana Milosheva (ed. ), Moving Beyond Walls -The Stolipinovo People Taking Charge of Their Community, 
CEGA, Sofia, 1997. p. 8. 
45 Quoted in Mark Braham, The Untouchables, A Report to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 1992. p. 83. Although apparently sympathetic to the needs of Gypsies, it is important to note here the 
cultural values that are invoked by this particular view of Gypsies. Present-time orientation is one of the common 
ways in which outsiders interpret the lifestyle of Gypsies, and is not necessarily a true depiction. The cultural 
values that are then associated with this interpretation, i. e. primitivism and backwardness, serve to disqualify the 
lifestyle as lived by Gypsies. 
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This latter point often placed me in an awkward position. On the one hand, they were 
welcoming and keen to talk to me, on the other hand I was being presented with only the 
partial picture, given my ascribed status of a 'potentially useful contact'. As discussed in 
the introduction, my identity as a Westerner often, though not always, presided over my 
status as objective researcher. This posed certain obstacles, yet in so doing revealed 
interesting qualities inherent to the NGO sector. Ultimately, I represented to many NGO 
leaders a potential link to Western donors. While impacting upon the way in which 
certain NGOs chose to present themselves, this factor also served to reveal two 
interesting points: First, that these NGOs still had relatively little contact with people and 
institutions in the West, despite relying on them totally for their existence; and second, 
that they desperately needed more contact and funding. 
From this position I was also able to gain more of a general overview of Gypsy NGOs 
and their place within the overall NGO structure. This distance allowed me to identify a 
particular trend among these NGOs operating in Bulgaria. The extent to which the aims 
expressed by each of the NGOs were authentic draws attention to one of the main 
problems encountered in this type of research. While being alert to the facade they 
presented (normally reserved for donors), it was still difficult with brief encounters to 
gauge how far each NGO acted out in practice what they claimed to do in theory. 
Nevertheless, as set out in Table 6.5 closer contact with a number of these NGOs made it 
possible to observe that there were four different types of NGOs working with Gypsies: 
those NGOs run entirely by Gypsies; those by Gypsies but with a mixed ethnic team; 
those run by Gadjo that also employed Gypsy staff; and, finally, those run and managed 
entirely by Gadjo. 
Table 6.5 shows the ways in which different NGO compositions indicated different 
emphases in NGO design and strategy. The original premise, their links with external 
donors and the nature of their relationship to the Gypsy communities, all had implications 
for the types of strategies they adopted and for the degree to which they emphasised 
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Gypsy or Gadjo interests. We can see a pattern emerge whereby the four different types 
fall onto a continuum from type A to D on a number of levels: from direct to indirect 
approaches, from a view of Gypsies as social agents to Gypsies as marginalised, and from 
bottom-up to top-down strategies. 
Table 6.5 Gypsy NGOs in Bulgaria: A Typology. 46 
(n = number ofNGOs ofthis type that I interviewed) 
Type Description Relationship with Gypsy communities 
of NGO and aims 
A n=9 Gypsy led NGO with Gypsy only Direct based on short term, 
Staff immediate priorities. 
B n=6 Gypsy led NGO with Gypsy and GDirect based on long term objectives 
staff 
C n=3 Gadjo led NGO with Gadjo and Indirect based on abstract but 
Gypsy staff also immediate goals. 
D n=7 Gadjo led NGO with Gadjo only Indirect based on abstract and long 
Staff Term objectives 
The distinctions between NGO types, however, are far from absolute, as indeed there are 
exceptions. For example, Manush Romanov, a prominent Gypsy leader, works towards 
long term visionary political ideals, rather than with day-to-day issues as does the type A 
NGO Confederation of Roma in Bulgaria. Conversely, many Gadjo led NGOs, such as 
CEGA were engaged (albeit indirectly) in practical day-to-day projects as well as 
maintaining a commitment to more abstract ideals. Therefore it does not suggest that 
there is a direct causal link between ethnic composition and the chosen strategy of a given 
NGO, but that NGO strategies at this stage appear to have been shaped by the kind of 
relations held by NGO members with Gypsy communities. Rather than attempting to fix 
these NGO types as inevitable this typology describes an emerging trend, which is 
constantly changing and evolving. "' 
46 Based on interviews, see Appendices 2 and 3. 
47 For example, Dr. Antonii Galabov who is currently involved in a recent government roundtable on Gypsy 
issues, spoke of how in the last year there has been a growing trend of Gypsy NGOs joining their efforts and 
amalgamating. Radio Free Europe, Bulgaria, 14.1.99. 
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Perhaps the most fundamental distinction needs to be made between those NGOs that had 
originated from within the community and those that had essentially developed from 
outside it. By drawing attention to the origins of the NGO itself it is possible to make 
observations about its relations to the community or communities in question and 
conversely with wider institutional structures. Those NGOs that were composed entirely 
of Gypsies (Type A) and in particular had employees directly from within the community 
(even if they had gone away and come back) tended to have a more grounded approach 
based on direct links with local Gypsies. Their first priority was with dealing with and 
meeting the demands of Gypsies within their own community. The adoption of human 
and minority rights was therefore important insofar as meeting these objectives. 
Although in this respect they were closest to their community, at the same time they were 
most distanced from donors. As a result, they were not so heavily influenced by Western 
rhetoric. This type consisted of a variety of different NGOs, not all of which were born 
directly from within the community. Some had political roots that extended back into the 
Communist period and therefore their links with the community were somewhat severed. 
They were nevertheless well established even though the 1991 Law on Political Parties 
had rendered illegal their official political role. The Confederation of Roma in Bulgaria 
(CRB) founded in 1993 was a good example of this kind of NGO. "' 
Peter Gueorguiev, the official leader of the CRB, was one of the few Gypsy MPs to have 
had a seat in the Bulgarian parliament. " However, he began the interview by emphasising 
that this organisation was non-political, implying a sharp shift from his previous role in 
parliament to a more 'acceptable' approach of 'providing social, cultural and material 
support for the Gypsy population'. His responses still contained political rhetoric and he 
placed an emphasis on creating links with governmental institutions. Rather than taking a 
separatist approach as regards Gypsies, his work was more informed by a pro-Bulgarian 
48 Interview: A (1) 4.3.97. 
49 The other two Gypsy MPs were Dr. Saby Golemanov and Manush Romanov. 
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nationalism. Arguing that, "Roma are part of the Bulgarian people - Bulgaria is their 
homeland", he wanted to invest Gypsies with a 'civic duty' to participate. 
Other more recently formed NGOs were more concerned with the practicalities of 
everyday survival than with the pursuit of wider political ideals, in particular, those 
NGOs that had derived directly from and established themselves within their own 
community. 'Justice 96' Society based in Stolipinovo, Plovdiv, was one such NGO. It had 
only recently been established and its early aims were concerned primarily with local 
issues of improving basic living conditions, such as repairing the local kindergarten. " 
Their main areas of concern were with providing training for unemployed single mothers 
and offering advice in different social areas. Another such NGO was a foundation called 
'Women for Mercy-Roma' based in Sliven. Founded in Sliven by four Gypsy women, 
much of their work was also based on meeting basic needs, mainly through the co- 
ordination and distribution of humanitarian aid as donated by various Western bodies, 
such as the Danish Embassy. However they also expressed a wider vision above and 
beyond'such tasks, and in particular stressed the need for different ethnic groups to work 
together. 5' 
In contrast were those organisations whose roots lay not so much within a given Gypsy 
community, but in a commitment to the development of civil society or human rights. 
These NGOs were run and managed entirely by Gadjo and had developed from outside 
the community (Type D). They were more closely associated with donors and the 
Western framework of funding and Gypsies were simply incorporated into existinginter- 
cultural' or 'inter-ethnic' frameworks. " Consequently, their strategies regarding Gypsies 
were ones shaped by a top-down approach and a certain distance was maintained between 
themselves and Gypsy communities. They referred to themselves as mediator NGOs in 
that they saw their own role as mediating between Western donors and Gypsy NGOs 
and/or between state structures and Gypsy NGOs. However, in trying to get out of the 
50 Interview: A (4) 17.10-97. 
51 Interview: A (9) 22.10.97. 
52 For example, D (3) 16.9.97 and D (4) 18.9.97. 
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trap of being either too superficial or too localised, these NGOs often fell into a series of 
other traps; such as embarking on projects with long-term ideals but without the 
necessary groundwork having been completed or without having the resources available. 
Lying somewhere in between these were those NGOs that consisted of a mixture of 
ethnic groups. Those foundations that were led by Bulgarians, but which employed a 
mixture of ethnic groups including Gypsies (Type Q, had gone one step further than 
Type D NGOs. However, this was often only superficial and in terms of its starting point 
nothing had changed. Type B NGOs seemed to signal the most dynamic type of NGO. 
Led by Gypsies but working as part of an ethnically mixed team, these NGOs were able 
to maintain to varying degrees a balance between keeping close links with Gypsy 
communities and sticking to the criteria of wider conceptual frameworks associated with 
the NGO sector. While referring to the liberal rhetoric of human rights and integration, 
this type of NGO importantly had Gypsies as their starting point, not as a secondary 
asset. 
Many Gypsy-led NGOs were themselves catching onto the idea of mediation and putting 
themselves forward as 'mediatorNGOs, thus replacing Type C and D NGOs, which, until 
recently, had had an exclusive hold over this area. These Gypsy NGOs, which were 
mainly made up of Type B NGOs, mediated directly between donors/local institutions 
and Gypsy communities. The Foundation for Regional Development and their'Self-Help 
Bureau' set itself up as a direct link to the Gypsy community by representing all three 
major ethnic groups in the community. The staff consisted of 5 Bulgarians, 3 'persons of 
Turkish origin', and 3 'persons of Roma origin', all working under the leadership of a 
Gypsy. " The Romani Bah Foundation, a Type B NGO also saw their role as 
fundamentally a mediatory one, as explained by the leader himself, 
53 Foundation for Regional Development, 'REPORr. - Activities of the Stolipinovo Seýr-Help Bureaufor theperiod 
81h January-31 December, 1996. 
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There is a gap between the Roma community and local institutions, the only connection is 
NGOs - its normal - in the local community there are no Roma leaders and in local 
government there are no Roma representatives - the mediator is therefore the NGa' 
As well as mediation, Type B NGOs such as The Human Rights Project (HRP) in 
Bulgaria, carried out specific tasks of providing legal defence for those Gypsies who were 
prepared and able to put forward a case of either discrimination or violence. " These types 
of NGOs tended to have a more focused agenda, refraining from the hyperactive activities 
that seemed to characterise most other NGOs. As a result, they were more readily 
accepted as successful by social actors within the field. An article in the OSCE-CPRSI 
Newsletter, for example, was eager to praise NGOs such as the HRP for their ability to 
offer real, practical help while at the same time having possible wider implications for 
reform at the level of the judicial and the wider social system. " 
The question of survival was central for many NGOs regardless of their type. For some, 
survival referred to the lives of Gypsies, while for others, it also referred to the life of 
their own NGO. The Foundation United Ethnos (a Type C NGO), is an example of such a 
foundation whose prime objective, it seemed, was to sustain its own existence. 57 Seeking 
funding from abroad was their prime activity, leaving the objectives of working with 
Gypsies rather vague despite being 'co-run' by a Gypsy. " The Roma Foundation, in 
Rousse (a Type A NGO), was also concerned with everyday survival, but for them the 
emphasis was on the survival of the most impoverished Gypsies. " During this latter 
interview the two young wealthy Gypsy men who ran this small-scale foundation were 
keen to distance themselves from such NGOs as United Ethnos which, they argued, were 
concerned only with self-political gain. They claimed that such foundations only 
designed projects to promote themselves, in contrast to their own foundation, which was 
concerned only with offering immediate poverty relief. Although their objectives were 
54 Interview: B (2) 17.9.97. 
55 Interview: B (1) 17.3.97. 
56 Elizabeth Winship, "One Bulgarian NGO's Experience", OSCE - CPRSI Newsletter, Spotlight on Legal 
Assistance, 1 (3), December, 1993. p. 3. 
57 Interview: C (1) 11.3.97. 
58 Although their business cards put them down as equal managers it was clear in the interview that Jordan de Meo, 
who dominated the entire interview, was the one in charge. 
59 Interview: A (2) 12.3.97. 
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more direct, with sporadic funding and a limited vision, their work was not necessarily 
anymore effective. 
Both the United Ethnos Foundation and the Roma Foundation were keen to show me 
'what life was really like for Gypsies in Bulgaria. De Meo did this by reeling off statistics 
whereas the Roma foundation took me to see a Gypsy mahala on the outskirts of Rousse. 
In their car, a battered Lada, we went beyond the station to a hillside covered in tumbling 
houses and huts built around a myriad of mud streets. We slowly drove around, never 
getting out but occasionally stopping for him to talk to some of the people on the street. 
No one seemed to notice us sitting in the back. There were open drains, piles of rubbish, 
and no basic infrastructure. There was a high level of activity, women working (washing, 
drying clothes) and watching their children playing. On the way back he simply said, 'So, 
now you see'. 
On the other hand, some foundations were more reluctant to take me around a mahala. 
On one such occasion a trip around Stolipnovo was arranged with a foundation, which at 
the last minute they cancelled. After much discussion they decided it would be too 
dangerous for me and my interpreter to walk around. Their reasons were that we would 
look too conspicuous and would attract too much attention. Perhaps their reasons went 
deeper: to be seen showing 'outsiders' around the ghetto could undermine their claims to 
being part of the community. 
These examples show the ambiguous role Gypsy NGOs have played in the transition. On 
the one hand, there were NGOs who, on the surface, appeared well organised, such as 
with Type C NGOs which had a Gypsy member of staff, an office and ideas (this 
provides an impressive image for Western donors). " Yet, interviews and general 
observations soon revealed that this Gypsy member of staff was no more than a token 
gesture, that the office became less meaningful if useful activities were not taking place, 
60 De Meo, for example, appeared to be in demand, when later that year a representative of the Minority Rights 
Group told me they were considering his application for funding. 
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and finally ideas themselves were not always enough if not practical. " Likewise, Type D 
NGOs and their more overarching approach of working with all minorities and by 
offering themselves as mediators were often out of touch with the complexity of Gypsy 
needs. On the other hand, the more practical down-to-earth approach of immediate short- 
term objectives, as with Type A NGOs, failed to offer effective means for tackling the 
questions of institutionalised oppression. They did not make 'false' claims to promoting 
Gypsy interests on a nation-wide scale, yet, what they did offer was localised, small scale 
and in terms of improving the lives of Gypsies not always effective. 
The approach, activities and outcomes of Type B NGOs therefore, seemed to paint a 
more promising picture. Gypsy led NGOs who took on Gadjos as part of their team were 
importantly questioning the conventional relationship between Gadjos and Gypsies where 
the former tends to take on the role of leading the 'backward. Furthermore, Gypsies 
working in this type of NGO were more able to find ways of 'using' the NGO sector to 
enhance forms of everyday survival for Gypsies, if only to limited ends. This 'resistance' 
was exercised through a subtle interplay of Gadjo concepts with Gypsy culture where 
integration was not rejected altogether but redefined. 
6.8 The role of Gypsy NGOs within the social framework and Gypsy communities 
Among Gypsy leaders, competition for credibility and funding was rife. This often led to 
disputes over the morality of particular persons, however founded or otherwise they may 
have been. Although rivalry among leaders prevented many NGOs from coming together, 
the emphasis for NGOs at this level was not so much with resolving the tension between 
their visible enrichment and social welfare, but more with finding ways to overcome 
internal political and personal power struggles. The relationship between Gypsy NGOs 
and their communities, however, was precisely to do with the resolution of the conflict 
between the interests of the individual and that of the community. 
61 For example, De Meo discussed the possibility of convening an on-going seminar on a boat along the river 
Danube, picking up and dropping off Gypsy participants along the way. Although, this would undoubtedly be a 
pleasant trip for those concerned, its long-term, or even short-term effects for Gypsies in general would be 
minimal. 
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An article by Hart, which examined the relationship between individual enrichment and 
social welfare in the context of 1970s Ghana, contains many interesting parallels with the 
situation I observed in Bulgaria. " Although, Hart's focus was on the role of the 
entrepreneur, and by definition a NGO leader is not engaged in entrepreneurial activity, 
the effect is, I believe, very similar. Both consisted of charismatic individuals even when, 
in the case of NGOs, they were part of a team, and both involved the accumulation of 
money, whether it be for staff involved or for the community. Ultimately, tensions were 
manifested in different ways according to the actors involved, whether it be between the 
NGOs themselves, NGOs and their community, or NGOs and local authorities. Both in 
Hart's example and in mine there was evidence that a key concern for the actors involved 
was to resolve the dialectic of individual enrichment and social welfare, that is, the 
tension between private interests and the public good. 
On several occasions, workers remarked how the notoriously tight grapevine of the 
Gypsy mahala could be relied upon to carry important news, such as changes in social 
assistance. 63 Despite the advantages of having such a speedy outlet for information, 
Gypsy NGOs still struggled to gain the trust of their communities, especially when it 
came to the implementation of longer term projects. According to the type of organisation 
it was, each NGO had to find different ways of convincing Gypsy communities that they 
had the community interests as their priority. 
For Types A and B NGOs, although in general directly derivative of their community, the 
adoption of outside mechanisms to help their communities immediately served to push 
them away. As a result, Gypsy NGOs had to seek ways of counteracting this outward 
direction by finding ways to re-secure a place within the community. They used such 
strategies as locating their office within the ghetto and/or employing or taking on as 
62 Keith Hart, "Swindler or Public Benefactor? The Entrepreneur in His Community. " In Jack Goody (ed. ), 
Changing Social Structure in Ghana, International African Institute, London, 1975. 
63 For example, B (2) 17.9.97. On one of the days at the RBF office I was able to witness myself the repercussions 
of this. Within half an hour of the office receiving application forms for winter aid, a huge crowd of Gypsy 
women had gathered outside waiting to collect them. 
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volunteers local Gypsies. ' Some Gypsy-led NGOs had offices or advice bureaux that 
were not located within the mahala. For example, the main offices for the Human Rights 
Project was situated in central Sofia. However, this in itself did not seem to pose a major 
obstacle to their relations with Gypsy communities, in that they maintained regular 
contact on the ground level through regional offices and fieldworkers. 
Other less well organised NGOs faced a barrage of criticism from other NGOs and from 
representatives of the Gypsy communities, who saw the absence of an office within their 
mahala as anoiher example of failing to meet the real needs of the community. One of the 
workers for the URU, for example, defended the location of its Bureau in the town centre 
and away from the mahala, by arguing that their aim was to help Gypsies integrate: by 
being in the town centre, it was hoped that their Bureau would encourage Gypsies to 
leave the mahala more often. In other areas, this NGO had managed to forge better links 
with one of the Gypsy communities. A Gypsy woman and mother of five children, had 
recently been beaten to death by four white youths all of whom were still at school. " A 
local journalist and supporter of Gypsy rights explained to me that this had had a deep 
impact on the local Gypsy community. The URU had responded to this by setting up a 
fund-raising project to pay for the funeral and help with supporting the remaining family. 
They had taken on as helpers the widower and her eldest son, who had been forced to 
leave school in search of work. 
For Gadjo NGOs, already outsiders, they did not have this insider's position to work 
from. Their strategies were therefore more tentative and involved either taking on Gypsy 
staff, or more commonly adopting Gypsy led NGOs to act as their mediator. Unlike most 
Gypsy led NGOs their offices were always located away from Gypsy areas based in the 
city or town centre. The Open Society was a classic example of this. Although its 
64 E. g. A (4), B(2), B (3), B (4). 
65 This attack occurred on 20 July 1997 and when one of the attackers were asked why they had done this, he 
replied that he wanted to kill her because she was a Gypsy. Two of them, both aged 16 years, were sentenced to I 
and 6 months imprisonment on probation, respectively. The other two who were both aged 13 years could not be 
tried since they were too young. U. S. Department of State, Bulgaria Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
for 1997, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 30 January, 1998. 
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headquarters were situated in high rise offices in the centre of Sofia, the Open Society 
had clearly attempted to forge closer links with the recipient communities by setting up a 
national network of Open Society Clubs. However, these clubs still remained at a safe 
distant from Gypsy quarters, instead often placed within the town centre. Therefore, 
although the activities of the Open Society may have on the surface appeared fruitful and 
innovative with the funding of various 'grass root' projects, its own direct links with the 
community remained elusive. 
Despite such attempts, it was still generally the case that, given the urban based nature of 
NGOs as a whole, Gypsies, and especially those living in rural areas, were not always 
aware of such NGOs. " The complex and often conflicting network of family and clan 
groups that make up the Gypsy population in Bulgaria, as outlined in Marushiakova's and 
Popov's work, coupled with the NGOs' inability to understand or work effectively with 
such complexities, served to make relations between NGOs and communities at times 
somewhat fraught. By identifying the complex and hierarchical set of relations among 
Gypsy groups, Marushiakova and Popov served, in their own words, to "reduce to 
absurdity the thesis about the unity of the Gypsy ethnos" that underpins national policies 
and most NGO strategies. Popov refers to Gypsies as an "inter group ethnic community" 
characterised by a unique, hierarchic ethnic self-consciousness. Likewise, 
Marushiakova! s work draws attention to the many divisions that exist among Gypsies not 
just in terms of cultural practices, religion and lifestyle, for example, but also in terms of 
the internalisation of Gadjo stereotypes. She gives various examples, such as the'Turkish 
Gypsies', who, in the town of Razlog, speak of their 'Bulgarian Gypsy' neighbours as 
"uncivilised, backward people who can only play and trade" and, "the settled Gypsies 
[who] accuse the 'kardarash' (former nomad tribe) of lying, stealing and having money to 
bum. "' The conflict element to these divisions posed a particular set of problems for 
those NGOs trying to find ways to represent all Gypsy interests. 
66 In most cases the NGOs themselves (particularly Gypsy-led ones) were ready to acknowledge this. For example, 
interview: B (3) 29.9.97. 
67 Elena Marushiakova, "Relations Among the Gypsy Groups in Bulgaria". In Project on Ethnic Relations 
(ed. ), The Ethnic Situation in Bulgaria, Club '90 Publishers, Sofia, 1993. 
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As a result, sceptics from outside the NGO sector often argued that Gypsy leaders within 
the NGO sector did not represent the interests of local communities. " One example of 
this was with those NGOs trying to work with entire Gypsy quarters, some of which 
contained a multitude of different ethnic groupings. This was something I saw for myself 
during a pre-arranged 'excursion' to Nadejhda. This was the largest Gypsy mahala in 
Sliven consisting of approximately 10,000 inhabitants. The URU, the main Gypsy 
organisation in the area, arranged my visit to Nade da. With my interpreter, together with 
two staff members from the URU, we were driven by Petko (a Gypsy businessman 
working with URU) to the Mayor's office situated just inside the gates of Nadejda. " We 
drove through the main entrance, clearly demarcating the mahala from the surrounding 
industrial estate and parked up next to the social services building. " I was ushered into 
the Mayor's office, where I met Nikolai Hubanov, the Mayor of Nadejhda. I was also 
introduced to the rather more hostile Nikolai Kostov, a local representative for the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). Having sat down around a large table Gorgi 
explained to them the purpose of our visit. Immediately the Mayor was on the offensive 
arguing that this was 'his territory' and demanding to know what right the URU had to 
bring foreigners to Nadejda. The Mayor believed that the URU simply wanted to show 
foreigners 'the misery' so that they could then request money which they then kept for 
themselves (that we had arrived in a yellow Mercedes seemed to reinforce his point). The 
Gypsy communities themselves, he argued, did not see any of this money and as far as he 
was concerned this organisation had done nothing for Nadejda. (When this was relayed to 
me by either Vesselina or Maria they seemed to rebuff his comments as nonsense). 
Despite reasoning from Vesselina who asserted that as a citizen of Sliven she had the 
68 For example, Major Krastyo Karadev, a policeman who had worked his entire career in Nadejda believed that 
the views expressed by Gypsy leaders did not necessarily correspond with those of the various Gypsy 
communities. Interview: 21.10.97. 
69 Vessilina was a joumalist, working for Radio-Frce Europe and the daily newspaper Trud, and long-time activist 
for Gypsy rights. She had just recently presented a paper at a conference in Budapest on the Psychology of 
Intolerance, entitled "Who is (not) tolerable, who is (not) tolerant? " - her argument, she explained, is that 
intolerance is rooted in fear and that the Bulgarians' hatred of Gypsies is a defence mechanism, 'we are intolerant to 
others to make ourselves tolerable to ourselves. 
70 A crowd was gathering outside waiting to collect their social security, the sight of which later scared off the TV 
crew who were scheduled to do a news item here. Although the crowd were oblivious to us, Vesselina was still 
nervously concerned for our safety. 
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right to walk in the streets of her town, he stubbornly refused to co-operate. It was 
becoming increasingly clear that each party had its own agenda. 
Gorgi persisted in trying to persuade the Mayor to give us permission to see the quarter - 
now a matter of principle for the URU. For a NGO which prides itself on working 
directly with Gypsies they could not be seen to have been turned away from Nadejda. 
Finally, Gorgi was granted permission to take us around the mahala. However, as we set 
out, the Mayor decided, significantly at the last minute, not to accompany us. Gorgi 
believed that the Mayor did not want to be seen by the 'naked Gypsies' as they had been 
promised basic infrastructural development and as yet nothing had been done. Perhaps 
this shed light on the Mayor's own agenda: by attempting to refuse permission for our 
visit he was protecting his own interests. 
Nadejda was not homogeneous but made up of distinct and sometimes conflicting groups 
in terms of religion as well as socio-economic status. Although he was not an inhabitant 
of Nadejda, Gorgi seemed knowledgeable and showed me the different ways in which the 
mahala was divided. First he took me to the 'worst part', which was inhabited by so- 
called'naked Gypsies'. Situated at the far end of the mahala under the towering industries 
that overlooked it, they were visibly much poorer in that their homes were in a more 
severe state of dilapidation and children could be seen playing in extreme conditions of 
poor sanitation. I was told that a boundary existed between this part and the rest of the 
mahala, essentially a 'ghetto within a ghetto'. Inhabitants from other parts of the mahala 
rarely entered this part and those within it rarely ventured out. 
I was then taken to the Gredeshka. part of the mahala, which was inhabited by Gypsies 
whose identity was rooted in their common town of origin, Gredeshka. Judging from the 
general state of the buildings and sanitation, although still in poor condition was 
relatively better than the area inhabited by 'naked Gypsies'. One difference was that there 
were people in groups on the road side doing work of some variety, such as shelling nuts. 
The Musicians' quarter in which lived those Gypsies whose traditional occupation was 
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music performance, showed a marked difference in that it was quieter and less crowded. 
Finally, there was the Turkish quarter where those who defined themselves as either 
Turks or Turkish Gypsies lived. This was by far the best area with houses that were in 
relatively good condition and with little activity on the street. Although there were no 
physical boundaries between these quarters, each area was distinct in terms of housing 
structures, sanitary conditions and level of activity on the street. Despite the differences 
within this mahala, many NGOs in the Sliven region claimed to be working for the 
development of Nadejda as a whole. This led to problems of ineffectiveness and the kind 
of open resentment towards NGOs as explained above. " 
On returning to the office in the town centre, the URU treated me to lunch in a nearby 
restaurant. I was then subject to an emotional plea by Maria asking for my collaboration. 
In the face of such misery, she asked how I could refuse. They were employing the very 
tactic that they had been accused of by Hubanov and that they had dismissed as nonsense. 
This almost aggressive tactic, while illustrating Hubanov's point, also served to show the 
level of their desperation in trying to find sources of help for the vast expanse of Gypsy 
deprivation. 
6.9 NGO dynamics: The self-limitations of the NGO sector in Bulgaria 
For those Gypsies and Gadjos formally involved within the NGO sector, whether as 
employed staff or as volunteers, there were a series of agendas in operation at any one 
time. Whereas for some, it was a question of acquiring an income, for others it was a 
means of professional advancement. A female Gypsy employee of a Type B NGO, for 
example, often referred to her role within the NGO as a means of professional 
advancement. 72 This was well illustrated when she continued working there, against her 
family's wishes, for a period of four months when there were no wages. Another motive 
was an earnest belief in their NGO as a means of putting something back into their own 
71 Marushiakova, "Relations arnong the Gypsy groups", op. cit., and Vcsselin Popov, "Bulgarian Gypsies (Ethnic 
Relations). " In Project on Ethnic Relations (ed. ), The Ethnic Situation in Bulgaria, Club '90 Publishers, Sofia, 
1993. 
72 Participant observation between 3- 14.11.97. 
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communities. For example, the co-ordinator of the Roma programme at the Open Society 
expressed how much she liked her job, not just for the money but because she felt she 
was doing something for her own community. 73 
Ultimately, however, both Gypsy and Gadjo NGOs were operating within three different 
structures: ideological, formal and informal, which either inhibited or enhanced the 
effectiveness of their activities. 
Ideologically, they had to conform to the criteria set out by Western donors which 
shaped their activities towards embracing abstract ideals of integration, democracy 
and civil society. 
The formal structure of the NGO sector and its need for quick tidy results required 
that they treat Gypsies as a homogenous group. This often led to problems of under- 
representation and ineffectiveness. Many Gypsy NGOs were trying to overcome this 
by finding ways to have more control over their projects, such as by seeking direct 
links with the financiers and avoiding the mediator. 
Finally, the informal network of relations and contacts that underpinned the NGO 
sector meant that power politics and personal conflicts tended to reign. The other 
aspect, of course, was that at the informal level they had the potential to manipulate 
key concepts associated with the NGO sector in their search for new survival 
strategies. 
Most of the NGOs I met with in Bulgaria had unstable incomes and future plans were 
based on hopes rather than concrete objectives. This instability underpinned the dynamics 
of Gypsy NGOs. Leaders, faced with limited funding and restricted institutional support, 
often found themselves in competition with each other. A pattern soon emerged where a 
set of core NGOs could be identified as interconnected either directly or indirectly. These 
NGOs could be identified as core based on the following criteria: extensive working 
contacts; considered as most credible (measured by level of support from external 
73 Interview: C (3) 31.10.97. 
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donors); most active (measured by the quality of their projects rather than their quantity). 
The other NGOs were either spin-offs of these NGOs, or were entirely independent of 
them. United Roma Union, Sliven, for example, had links with all three elements of the 
third sector: international NGOs; government-led initiatives; and other indigenous NGOs. 
Within the framework of Gypsy NGOs, the URU also had links with all the types of 
NGOs, from A to D. 
Figure 6.2 Network of core Gypsy-led NGOs 
United Roma Union JýSelf Help Bureau 
A' 
Human Rights Project 
Romany Bah Foundation Diversity 
The Foundation for Regional Development was one of its key links, which, in turn, had 
widespread connections. They helped up and coming Type A NGOs, together with 
building on existing projects with Type D NGOs, a part of which involved extensive 
contact with international grant making foundations. Ultimately, it was the Human Rights 
Project and its nation-wide structure that provided the links for all these core NGOs. The 
Romany Bah Foundation was a core NGO mainly linked with the Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee, but which was also in contact with other well established Type B and D 
NGOs, and had formal links with Gypsy NGOs abroad. However, it was mainly due to its 
links with the Human Rights Project a Type B NGO, that put the Romany Bah 
Foundation in the same network as the above mentioned NGOs (see Figure 6.2). The 
central role taken by type B NGOs indicates the way in which both Types A and D view 
links with these NGOs as important for different reasons: for Type D establishing links 
with a type B NGO means forging closer relations with Gypsy communities; for Type A 
NGOs it means increased contact with donors and more prosperous NGOs. 
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Major rivalries however, were characteristic of the NGO sector in Bulgaria especially 
among Gypsies. These antagonisms were rooted in a mixture of political and personal 
hostilities that had lingered from the Communist period, which during the transition had 
been fuelled further due to an increase in competition for scarce resources. Fully funded 
projects, therefore, become precious possessions that NGOs tended to guard close to their 
chest. "' Accusations often ranged from incapacity, and illegality, to political and 
economic corruption. This rivalry was particularly striking when on a number of 
occasions I interviewed former NGO partners who had subsequently split. In all the cases 
with which I was familiar, they had set up an NGO together, fallen out and then gone 
their separate ways. They continued to work in the same area, however, both claiming 
that they were the inheritors of the original NGO. This was evident in my meetings with 
two separate NGOs in Plovdiv. Although neither explicitly acknowledged the situation to 
me, it was obvious from what each of the leaders had said that they had in the past 
worked together (i. e. they spoke of the same projects, and then a change in direction). " 
Other sources from within the NGOs, also revealed to me that there was some 
antagonism between these two leaders, but regardless of what each claimed, it was clear 
that there had been a winner and a loser. One of the NGOs had become a core NGO, with 
multiple donors and numerous projects underway. The leader of the Foundation for 
Regional Development (FRD) talked of his plans to make a Gypsy film in Italy, to go to a 
Gypsy conference in Romania, start an English course, and to set up a small library with 
support already from UNICEF, UNESCO, Novib, Phare/Tacis and others. The other 
NGO, in contrast, was in a markedly more drab office setting and currently out of work. 
Non-Gypsy led NGOs (Type D) tended to form more of an inclusive group that 
collaborated exclusively together in their general operations. For example, members of 
the International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), such as 
74 During my fieldwork, I was often confronted with antagonism between NGOs. On revealing the names of other 
NGOs that I was due to meet, I would lay myself open to attack. I was often warned by one NGO to be cautious of 
what thc'othce NGO would tell me. For example, when a leading NGO in Sliven Icarnt of my meeting with a key 
rival, two of its members took me aside to'brief me. They warned me to be cautious, for this NGO, they claimed, 
was totally invalid. 
75 Interviews: B (3) 29.9.97 and B (4) 1.10.97. 
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Dr. Bobby Bobev (member of the Historical Experts Council for IMIR) were involved in 
the work of the Inter Ethnic Initiative for Human Rights (IEI). These two NGOs were 
connected via other NGOs too, such as the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. In the 
implementation of specific projects however, their links tended to be with NGO types 
other than their own, which given their self-proclaimed function as mediators was 
understandable. The bulk of their work was with Type B NGOs more so than with other 
Type D NGOs, and hardly at all with Type A NGOs. This revealed to some extent that 
there were divisions among non-Gypsy NGOs, however subtle they may have been. 
These divisions were played down and acknowledged only in terms of "seeking to 
specialise in order to avoid overlapping" " or as Bossanyi (IEI) carefully put it, in his 
justification for not having worked with other similar NGOs up until now, "we 
thematically overlap with [ ... ] but geographically we dont. 
"' Their almost exclusive 
relations with Type B NGOs (who also defined themselves as mediators) also 
undermined their own claim that they served a mediatoral function. What has often been 
conceived of by Type D NGOs as forming direct links with Gypsies, has in fact been no 
more than another link in the chain. This has led to the peculiar situation, also noted by 
Marushiakova and Popov, that Type C and D NGOs are now having to compete with 
Type B NGOs for links with Gypsy NGOs. ̀ 
6.10 The NGO hierarchy 
Type D NGOs were at the 'top' of the NGO sector, rather than at its centre, in that they 
were closer to those giving out money, but not to the relevant communities. These NGOs 
had greater resources, contacts and bargaining power, which was made possible by them 
being the most popular choice for investment among Western donors. They had an almost 
exclusive hold over decision making despite their emphasis on bottom-up initiatives. 
Continuing with this hierarchical analysis, we can argue that Type A NGOs were situated 
76 Interview: D (3) 16.9.97. 
77 Interview: D (4) 18.9.97. 
78 Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, "Gypsy Minority in Bulgaria - Literacy, Policy and Community 
Development (1985-1995)", Alpha, UNESCO, Institute for Education, 1997. 
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at the 'bottom' of the NGO sector. They are defined as such in terms of their relation to 
the source of funding, i. e. they were the furthest away. They had to negotiate and seek 
helP up though the hierarchy in order to get funding. Having the right connections with 
already successful NGOs was vital for their survival and for the growth of NGOs in 
general. Those who became successful were those who dominated the NGO sector and 
although the most able were the least willing to challenge the hierarchical structure. 
This top-down hierarchy was beginning to change, however, as external donors were 
becoming aware that Type D NGOs were not necessarily the most appropriate NGOs for 
meeting the needs of Gypsy communities. This was primarily fuelled by a concern with 
accountability and leaking of funds. By creating more direct links with Gypsy-led NGOs 
they hoped to cut out some of the 'middlemen' and so some of the expenses. On their part, 
Gypsy-led NGOs were equally concerned with forging more direct relations with donors 
as it was also in their interest to avoid the middlemen. In this way, they could gain more 
control over the designs and implementation of projects. One of the negative 
repercussions of this squeeze however, was the tightening up of the application 
procedure. Applying for project funding has become an incredibly lengthy and 
complicated process, which serves to discourage many new NGOs from applying. 
The hierarchical structure which arose from this reliance on external funding was 
particularly evident in the land project being co-run by the Self-Help Bureau at the 
Foundation for Regional Development, Plovdiv. This project, aimed at giving land to 
landless Gypsies in the Plovdiv region, was originally set up in 1993. This project arose 
out of extensive research carried out in 1993 with over 70 villages which, together with 
meetings with local authorities, identified the main problems with current land law. From 
this they formed a lobby at the Ministry of Agriculture, the Council, the Presidency and 
the Parliament. By the beginning of 1995 amendments were made concerning the 
regulations for the giving of land to the landless. The most important was the initial 
payment required to purchase land was reduced from 20 per cent to 2 per cent of the total 
cost of the land. While allowing for more families to acquire land, it opened up a series 
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of new problems. Money was still needed for equipment and seeds in order to cultivate 
the land. This led to the development of the current land project. 
Chalakovo was one of the villages with which they were working and lies to the north 
west of Plovdiv. This village is one of a distinctive few that has a Gypsy majority (due to 
the urban migration of Bulgarians during industrialisation under Communism). I was 
taken there one day by some of the workers from the Self-Help Bureau in a four-wheel 
drive jeep. Just before entering the village, we veered off the road and on to what could 
barely be called a track across fields towards some distant figures. They turned out to be 
the local co-ordinators of this land project that SHB, CEGA and Novib were currently 
involved on. Nasko, Angul and his wife were tending to their field of tomatoes when we 
reached them. We then continued on into the village centre taking Angul and his wife 
with us. When we got there Nasko (my interpreter), Angul and I went in search of the 
Mayor. He was not there so instead I talked to Angul about life here in the village and his 
work. " He explained to me some of the problems they were currently having. He had just 
learnt that their 3 year contract of material support was being cut short without his prior 
consultation. Plans to introduce a credit system to replace funding were to go ahead 
based on the argument that Gypsies have to stop depending on hand-outs regardless of 
the farmers' claims that most families would be prevented from continuing and that if the 
agreed time-scale of three years had been kept to then such families would in the end 
become self-sustaining. 
This land project was made possible by funding from the Phare-LIEN programme and 
Novib (a non-Gypsy Dutch Foundation). This was then allocated to CEGA (a non-Gypsy 
Bulgarian 'mediator' organisation - Type D) which distributed it according to how it saw 
fit. They chose to give money to Foundation for Regional Development (FRD) (a Gypsy 
foundation - Type B) who co-ordinated this land project at the local level. The last in the 
chain of these NGOs had the least control and say and it was this latter NGO that the 
farmer was working with (see figure 6.3). Having spoken with members from each of 
79 Interview: 9.10.97. 
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these levels in the chain, it was possible to observe how the problems identified by the 
local co-ordinator did not necessarily originate in their relations with the FRD but in the 
nature of the hierarchical structure. 
Figure 6.3 Hierarchical chain of NGOs 
I Foreim financiers - Phare-LIEN I 
I Dutch co-ordinators - Novib I 
I Bulgarian mediator NGO - CEGA I 
Gypsy Foundation - Foundation for Regional I 
Development'Roma' 
I 
I Local co-ordinator I 
Various FRD reports marked the development and progress of the land project, both in 
Chalakovo and in a number of other villages. In January 1996 it was agreed by 
councillors from Rakovski, the Mayor of the Municipality, the Mayor of Chalakovo and 
the Chair of the Land Commission in Belozem to give 1,200 decares of Municipal land to 
158 landless families in Chalakovo. This amounted to 3 decares per family. " This was 
further increased to 1,333 decares for a total number of 221 families. It was envisaged by 
the FRD that there would be a three year scheme for material support for those renting the 
land: "In the first year funding will be secured for machines, seeds, chemicals, fertilisers 
and irrigation. This funding will be repaid by 10 per cent from the harvesting of the crop. 
In the second year 30 per cent of the funding will be repaid, and in the third year 50 per 
cent will be repaid. From the fourth year onwards the families need to be self-sufficient in 
their agricultural activities. "" Although it was unclear at what point the decision was 
taken in the chain to withdraw this agricultural support before the agreed three year time 
scale, the fact that this remained vague was some indication of the lack of transparency in 
80 1 decare equals 10,000 square mares. Foundation for Regional Development, 'REPOR77. - Work Done and 
Results Achieved in the Project "Land Settlementfor Landless Roma Families", 1996. 
a' Foundation for Regional Development, Project Land Report, Plovdiv, Bulgaria, 1997. p. 3. 
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the decision-making. In contrast, the FRD report explicitly stated that all of the financial 
support for families renting the land must be repaid, and that families must become self- 
sustaining. "' 
This highlighted one of the main problems with this type of structure. The mediator Type 
C NGOs set themselves up to ease the flow of communication between the donors and 
the recipients with the aim of conducting a two way relationship. However, these 
mediator NGOs were in danger of serving only to widen the gap between these two 
actors, whereby decision making was diffused but at the same time lost along the way. 
This leads to the situation outlined above whereby workers at the ground level may have 
had an input into ideas about project implementation, for example, but were the last to 
know about ma or decisions on funding. i 
6.11 A case study: A NGO seminar 
The complexity of NGO dynamics and its constraints was illustrated well in the case of a 
seminar organised by CEGA concerning their project with FRD and Novib (25-26.9.97). 
There was a representative present from the Novib headquarters in the Netherlands, but 
no-one from Phare-LIEN, who had been the overall donors of this project. It was a 
seminar aimed at assessing the successes and failures of the Self-Help Bureau, a project 
which had been set up 2 years ago and had now reached its 'completion'. The seminar was 
held at the Open Society Club situated in central Plovdiv. The Dutch representative and I 
shared an official interpreter who had been hired specifically for his purposes. " Craft 
work, traditional clothing, metalwork and tools coupled with a photo exhibition displayed 
around the room set the formal atmosphere. 
There was a large turn out consisting mainly of NGO members from regions throughout 
Bulgaria. Together with the SHB staff, there were NGO leaders from: Sofia (Stefan 
82 Foundation for Regional Development, op. cit. p. 7. These reports were produced for their donors, so one has to 
consider that the foundation must show efficiency in their accounting for funding. The extent to which these 
targets were realistic was of second priority. 
83 This had the interesting effect of giving the impression I was also a representative of Novib. As a result a few 
members of the audience approached me in the break asking me very graciously if they could talk to me. 
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Stefanov); Sliven (URU); Lom; Veliko Turnovo; and Stara Zagora. School teachers, 
Gypsy 'experts', educational specialists, and representatives from the Government 
Employment Bureau were also present. This cross-section of people provided a very 
promising picture of established relations between local govenu-nent, non-Gypsy NGOs 
and Gypsy NGOs. However, as the debates grew more heated, it became apparent that 
there were many undercurrents and fundamental problems still to be resolved. As we 
watched the film that CEGA had produced telling us about Stolipinovo and their project, 
and as we listened to their presentations and words of thanks, there was a bitterness that 
simmered throughout. 
One of the main issues raised was that there were no official state representatives present, 
which, many felt, made this whole seminar pointless. CEGA, forced to explain this 
absence, claimed that they had been invited but that the state officials had declined. Most 
of the representatives present were reluctant to speak of this project as a victory - 
recognising failures as well as successes. There was a general consensus that links with 
state institutions needed to be developed in order to achieve sustained change. Kris, the 
Novib representative, in contrast, stressed the importance of mediator NGOs in forging 
links with Western donors. He explained that he chose to fund CEGA because they 
worked with Gypsies rather than on their behalf. But no-one broached the obvious 
question of why he had not sought direct links with the Gypsy organisations themselves. 
The feedback session provided a forum for the participants to speak out. Gypsies and 
non-Gypsies alike made the most of this opportunity, and a significant number expressed 
angry, if not passionate sentiments. Gadjos who had featured on the film and who had 
developed close links with the SHB over the course of the 2 years reaffirmed their 
support for such ventures, such as an officer from the Employment Bureau, a nurse from 
the regional hospital, teachers, and other Gypsy NGO leaders and project workers. A 
Professor of Sociology from the University of Plovdiv was invited to speak. He too 
placed the solution to the'Gypsy problem! as lying with the development of relations with 
the state, without which, he argued, there was no chance of any real improvement. Ideas 
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were discussed as how best to nurture such relations. Suggestions were proposed, such as 
co-ordinating their work with the state, bringing state institutions more into the process, 
showing initiative before asking for money, involving Gypsies at the fundamental evel, 
and uniting Gypsy NGOs to form a cohesive force. 
The organisation of the second day was quite different. Set in a school in Stolipinovo, 
away from the centre, the atmosphere was less formal and more relaxed. Having arranged 
a lift to the school with a CEGA co-ordinator to Stolipinovo I was able to catch a glimpse 
of some of the subtle tensions that existed between the partner NGOs themselves. It soon 
became obvious that this particular CEGA co-ordinator did not know the way to 
Stolipinovo, the Gypsy mahala in which the Self-Help Bureau (SHB) was situated. This 
revealed that her contact with the project on a practical level had not been as extensive as 
we had been led to believe. Indeed, a report written by a colleague from India who visited 
the SHB in June 1997 to offer advice on how best to structure and develop their land 
projects, put down as one of his recommendations "CEGA to visit the villages more 
often. ""' Kris too, picked up on this and made a few ironic comments to the effect that, "if 
the organiser of the project does not know the way, the NGO has obviously not been 
involved much. " 
The school was large and appeared to be in no worse condition than other schools I had 
seen. " There was a series of working groups based around some of the issues raised the 
previous day. There were three parallel sessions available to choose from: Education, 
Social Problems and Unemployment/Economic Development, held in three separate 
classrooms. I chose to partake in the discussion group on education. A woman from 
Plovdiv University led our group and was already familiar with most of the people there. 
There were many young people there from the Youth Club (SHB), as well as teachers, 
directors, education specialists and NGO leaders/workers (about 20 altogether). We 
84 Foundation for Regional Development, 'Memo. Meeting between Sam and the people from the villages of 
Mominsko and Borets, 1997. 
85 What I saw of Stolipinovo at this stage was very different to the mahalas I had visited in both Rousse and Sofia. 
In terms of what I saw on the outskirts, it was more built up with blocks of flats and more infrastructure including 
a bus route. 
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started off with an open circle - introducing ourselves and explaining who we were and 
why we were there. We then split ourselves into groups based on our role in education, 
i. e. according to whether you were a student, teacher, mediator, or NGO. The CEGA 
representative chose to go in the mediator group, and the Gypsy leaders were split 
between the NGO and mediator group. I joined Kris and his interpreter in one of the 
NGO groups. 
In this group there was Stefan Stefanov, a Gypsy NGO leader, a Gypsy head teacher, and 
some young Gypsy women. Within each group we were asked to discuss past problems 
and achievements in terms of this project and others. Kris took it upon himself to lead our 
discussion through his interpreter by asking the people in our group questions. A young 
Gypsy woman first spoke, talking about her experience as a teacher at the Summer 
School in Stolipinovo. It ran for 10 weeks and was held at the kindergarten. She saw it as 
successful in that they helped children with basic Bulgarian and maths by playing games 
and learning songs. She explained that although it was difficult at first to get the support 
of parents, meetings between teachers and parents gradually turned this around. The 
purpose of this summer school, as she saw it, was to build up self-esteem and make the 
children feel proud of who they were. A NGO leader from Sofia then spoke up of the 
problems of education which they still had to deal with. He reeled off various figures on 
the high drop out and absenteeism rates. Then a director of a Gypsy school in Veliko 
Tumovo undercut these sweeping figures with the claim that in his school the drop out 
rate was very low - lower than in Bulgarian schools. " 
Before lunch, the three groups reconvened and a representative from each gave a report 
back of their main findings. The most important issues that needed considering, as 
agreed upon in our group, included educating the teachers, problems of the language 
barrier, and the need to making school more interesting and relevant with better facilities. 
86 Vassil Chaprazov (URU) had an ominous presence in the working group and kept on abruptly correcting people 
with 'Roma! when they said 'Cigani. ' During the small break Kris (Novib) was saying how unimpressed he was 
with Vassil Chaprazov and that he would not be giving him any more funding. The interpreter also was offended 
by him and said "his anger only builds walls" and that he served only to disrupt the session. 
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The tension between teaching of Bulgarian or Romany was a theme that underpinned the 
general debate. Attention was dwindling by his time, and the numbers present were 
considerably reduced from the morning and more so from the day before. No firm 
conclusions were made, nor specific strategies discussed. However, that such a vast array 
of divergent social actors had been brought together, was celebrated as a major 
achievement in itself 
Many of the complaints raised during the seminar reflected wider concerns within the 
Gypsy NGO sector. The most common being that the state not only neglected Gypsy 
interests but actively put up obstacles to them. Yet, the state relied on the NGO sector to 
'solve' the problems brought about by its own withdrawal, such as welfare provision. 
Rather than taking direct action against the government and demanding that Gypsies be 
put on the political agenda, however, Gypsy leaders continued to put most of their efforts 
into seeking funds from abroad. Using external funding allowed for a certain freedom in 
devising projects for promoting Gypsy interests. But, this outward looking approach 
allowed for the government's continued campaign of neglecting Gypsy interests, and at 
the same time helping to boost their own claim that, they, the government, were nurturing 
a civil society. As Marushiakova and Popov argue, the NGO sector remains a closed, 
small stratum. This not only questions the extent to which NGOs are helping to create a 
civil society, but also whether or not they represent for Gypsies real and effective agents 
of social change. " 
6.12 Conclusion 
There are two types of problems associated with those NGOs in Bulgaria working with 
Gypsies. First, the nature of the NGO sector itself and secondly the complex nature of the 
various Gypsy communities living in Bulgaria. The NGO sector with its community 
development approach rests on the idea that Gypsy communities are 'underdeveloped. ' 
The underlying principle is therefore that the NGO sector can solve the 'Gypsy problem' 
by civilising them. This top-down approach is said to be challenged by participatory 
87 Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma), op. cit; and "Gypsy Minority", op. cit. 
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methods but it still remains that Gypsy interests often remain underrepresented. " 
Marushiakova and Popov take a very cynical view towards the NGO sector making the 
point that Gadjo led organisations who claim to work on behalf of Gypsies in the 
interests of furthering civil society have very little, if at all, in-depth or first hand 
knowledge of Gypsy life. " 
Almost all of the newly emerged non-governmental organisations rushed to solve the 
problems of Gypsies, to help them and defend their rights, to build civic education, 
community development, conflict resolutions and others. This simple phraseology has 
proved to contain the magical words that can provide financial aid from abroad 
regardless of the actual activities of the organisations and howfar they have any vague 
idea about Gypsies and Gypsy problems. " 
Within the context of such problems that permeate the NGO sector, the following chapter 
critically examines two alternative readings of Gypsy responses during the transition: 
first, the accepted view that unless Gypsies participate in democratic institutions, such as 
the NGO sector, they are subject to forces that make their behaviour deviant, or at best 
backward; and second, the alternative view that anti-social behaviour associated with 
Gypsies, far from representing sips of deviancy, instead indicates rational resistance 
strategies. Ultimately, the discussion draws elements from both and recognises that the 
NGO sector represents to Gypsies a new form of incorporation. Rather than an indication 
of their total compliance with mainstream nonns, both their participation and leading role 
in the NGO sector can, instead, be seen to reveal a concern with finding a balance 
between articulating Gypsy interests in the formal sphere on the one hand and enhancing 
'hidden resistance' in the informal sphere on the other. 
88 The gap between rhetoric and practice in the world of NGOs is not exclusive to Eastern Europe and Gypsies but 
have been identified in other countries and contexts. E. g. Rachel Hinton "NGOs as Agents of Change? The Case of 
the Bhutanese Refugee Progranime", Cambridge Anthropology, 19 (1), 1996. 
89 Marushiakova and Popov, "Gypsy Minority", op. cit. 
90 Ibid. p. 5. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INTERPRETING THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 
7.1 Introduction 
Thus far, two levels of responses on the part of Gypsies have been described: informal 
everyday survival strategies and the more formal NGO response both at the national and 
international levels. This chapter sets out first to address the question of whether these 
responses indicate that Gypsies are suffering from 'social exclusion', and second to test 
what we will argue is the 'Achilles heel' of social exclusion theory, that is, its NGO 
strategy of inclusion. ' In order to carry out these tasks, we must first examine the 
different ways in which Gypsy responses can be interpreted. However, this is not a 
simple issue as the very process of interpreting the responses of oppressed groups to 
wider society inevitably has ideological and political implications. 
At one end of the scale is the view that the oppressed group in question is totally trapped 
within an 'oppressed mentality. ' This assumption has informed underclass, culture of 
poverty and marginality theses and now to some extent that of social exclusion. Jenkins, 
for example, argues that when a minority group is publicly and institutionally 
categorised as bearers of negative traits, it directly intervenes to shape their aspirations. 
The oppressed minority, therefore, comes to think of itself in the language of the 
oppressor and any response on its part is inevitably shaped by this. ' Conventional 
interpretations of Gypsy responses during the transition have tended to fall into this 
1 For example, when President of the Commission, Delors spoke out at a conference entitled, "Combating Exclusion, 
Promoting Integration" (2-3 April 1992) against the fact that millions of EC citizens lived in poverty and a state of 
social exclusion. I [is response was to combat social exclusion by encouraging the improvement of NGO participation 
in official programmes. Marielle Danbakli, On Gypsies: Texts Issued by International Institutions, Gypsy Research 
Centre, CRDP Midi-Pyrdndes, Paris, 1994. p. 19. 
2 Richard Jenkins, "Rethinking Ethnicity: Identity, Categorization and Power", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 17 (2), 
April, 1994. 
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camp, resting on a set of assumptions about their 'backwardness' and 'deviancy' that serve 
to reinforce rather than question existing prejudices. The most common liberal view 
tends to dismiss informal survival strategies as'anti-social behaviour' instead focusing on 
the benefits of formal participation, especially that of the NGO sector. 
At the extreme other end of the scale are interpretations which see the oppressed as 
conscious of their oppression and as capable of finding ways to not only articulate a clear 
response to it, whatever form this may take, but of finding ways to actively resist it. This 
is the stance taken by James C. Scott, who, in his studies of peasant resistance, rebuts the 
postmodern rejection of social agency. ' His view of 'everyday resistance' offers an 
alternative reading to the conventional approach that views the oppressed as either 
'deviant' or 'backward. By recognising the obstacles that prevent subordinated groups 
from genuine formal participation, this approach injects positive values into so-called 
negative anti-social behaviour. It does so by referring to the very same popular Gypsy 
stereotypes as focused on in the liberal approach, but instead turning them on their head. 
Within this framework I critically examine both these readings of Gypsy behaviour. 
Problems with both the liberal interpretation and that of resistance are revealed in order 
to demonstrate those elements which must be extracted in order to understand fully the 
context in which Bulgarian Gypsies must operate. While recognising that formal 
strategies of integration are not the answer, it is still an inescapable survival strategy for 
many Gypsies active within the NGO sector. Likewise, although informal everyday 
resistance has been central to the survival of Gypsies as an ethnic group, it is not always 
been recognised as such by themselves or others, nor is it always immediately 
productive. Ultimately, the emerging NGO sector in Eastern Europe does not necessarily 
3 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985; The Xforal Economy of the 
Peasant, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1976; Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Ifidden Transcripts, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, London, 1990. 
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represent for Gypsy leaders a process of inclusion, but a site of conflict through which 
attempts are made at incorporation from below. Within this realm, resistance in its many 
forms is still a relevant strategy, not so much in terms of articulating resistance to the 
NGO structure itself, but by incorporating the structure in order to enhance resistance at 
a more general level, such as with the promotion of Gypsy culture and language. 
7.2 The liberal interpretation: The 'positive response' 
The liberal approach to problems of the transition in Eastern Europe is not uniform, but 
made up of a complex array of actors. Nevertheless within this it is possible to identify 
broadly two camps, those with an explicit agenda of liberal imperialism and those with a 
genuine concern for securing rights within a social democratic vision. Although they do 
differ in their use of liberal frameworks, in that the latter may be more subversive in their 
concerns for enhancing resistance potential, in terms of the following the implications of 
both for shaping conventional views of Gypsies during transition are essentially the 
same: First, there is the general view that the countries in Eastern Europe need to 
undergo a learning curve with the guidance of Western institutions. The EU, for 
example, as part of its wider concern with 'preparing' countries for accession defines its 
own role as central to the process of "[helping] along in the process of economic 
restructuring [ ... ] and to encourage the switch to a market economy. "" 
Second, and as discussed in chapter 6, participating in the NGO sector, and so 'civilised 
life', is commonly seen and taken as the 'proper' and 'right' response to the transition. 
This is evident in the way that many Western institutions are channelling their East 
European funding into the NGO sector. The European Commission through Phare and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been very 
4 Eurostat, Europe in Figures, 4th edition, 1995. p. 18. 
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explicit in their financial support of NGOs defining them as necessary, progressive and 
democratic. For example, a project funded (US$698,000) and directed by USAID to 
Bulgaria, entitled Bulgarian Associationfor Fair Elections and Civil Rights (BAFECR), 
was carried out between 1993 and 1995. Its project description read as follows: "[to] 
strengthen citizen participation in Bulgaria through civic participation; through National 
Democratic Institute grant activities; increase the management leadership and 
organisational capabilities of BAFECR leaders at the national and local level, resulting 
in a strong and sustained nation-wide non-partisan advocacy organisation. "' Although 
NGOs are not referred to explicitly, the emphasis on building civic participation is 
clearly the thrust behind their support. 
Third, it is generally believed that the participation of Gypsies within the NGO sector 
signals the way forward for both themselves and for society as a whole. This is informed 
by the view that Gypsies in Eastern Europe are socially excluded and unless integrated 
pose a threat to stability. Dr. Saby Golemanov, a Gypsy, who, at the time was an MP in 
Bulgaria, sums up the rationale of many Gypsies involved in the NGO sector, 
Gypsies have intellectual capabilities and can take part in the political, economic, and 
cultural life here. The problems with Gypsies and their tragic fate is not due to genetics. 
Gypsies are Homo Sapiens and have the possibility to have a civilised life. ' 
Taken together, these three elements reveal how the promotion of Gypsy NGOs in 
Eastern Europe by dominant institutions in the West is rooted in a series of connected 
assumptions: the West is the only social and economic model to follow: NGOs are 
democratic institutions that can enable the equal participation of 'excluded' groups; and 
5 USAID, Bulgarian Associationfor Fair Elections and Civil Rights (BAFECR), 1996. 
6 Quoted in T. Zang Destroying Ethnic Identity - The Gypsies of Bulgaria. A Helsinki Watch Report, New York, June, 
1991. p. 19. The use by Golemanov of the word 'Gypsy', as opposed to'Rom', reveals how Vignani' is still used by 
Gypsy leaders in Bulgaria despite it being a pejorative term. Indeed, Marushiakova and Popov highlight that Vigani' 
is still used informally by many Gypsies in local languages amongst themselves. They give one example whereby in 
Bulgaria and Romania, the generic self-appellation of a Kalderash group is'Roma Ciganiaka'. 
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Gypsies need to be provided with a mechanism for participation, in order to progress out 
of their 'exclusion'! Those who persist in the use of concepts such as 'social exclusion', 
even those who do not hold such a naive liberal view and whose work rests on a more 
earnest belief in social rights ultimately help to sustain rather than challenge these 
assumptions. 
As part of their contribution to civil society, NGOs are given a pivotal role in the fight 
against poverty and social exclusion. Gypsy activists, keying into this social exclusion 
debate, are just as keen as any other group to find out exactly what this programme 
entails. For example, in a written question (no. 15 62/92) to the European Community (16 
June 1992) (92/C 285/97) Mr. Juan de Dios Ramirez-Heredia, a Gypsy representative, 
enquired as to what concrete measures the Commission were intending to take regarding 
NGO participation. The reply re-emphasised the EC's pledge to combat social exclusion 
by developing a permanent dialogue with NGOs engaged in combating poverty, and by 
building on existing financial support provided for a European Anti-Poverty Network. 
However, specific details extended only so far as to describe the holding of regular 
meetings. ' 
Within this rather general framework of NGO funding, there has been an equally vague 
interest in Gypsy causes. Nearly all of the NGOs working with Gypsies in Bulgaria that I- 
interviewed have been recipients of Phare related funding, however the extent to which 
7 This idea that the answer to the 'Gypsy problem' lies with their integration was demonstrated in a national debating 
competition held in Bulgaria for university undergraduates (28-30 November 1997) aimed at promoting civil society. 
One of the titles offered read: "The greatest obstacle to the integration of Roma into Bulgarian society is the attitude 
of the Roma themselves. " The wording and pitch of this statement discriminated against Gypsies on three levels; first, 
it took as it starting point the presumption that Gypsies were not integrated, second, it assumed that the integration of 
Gypsies into Bulgarian society was what both they and Bulgarians wanted, and third, that it was Gypsies alone who 
were ultimately responsible for integration. 
8 Danbakli, op. cit. 
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this reflects a structured and in-depth knowledge on the part of the donors is 
questionable. Perhaps, as Fine argues, Gypsies have simply become the new'buzzword', 
By now [.. ] almost everyone in ECE knows that projects structured round the needs of 
Roma, or containing elaborate plans for reeducation containing the catchwords "Civil 
society", or "rights", or "democracy" will receivefunding. ' 
However, there is more to it than just being a simple case of complying with popular 
catchwords. For, with funding comes an attached set of expectations, based on a series of 
assumptions. In designing projects, NGO leaders have to certify that they will ensure 
some contribution to civil society and the process of democratisation. In this way, the 
actions of Gypsies are judged and interpreted through an explicit liberal filter. By 
validating formal NGO responses informal responses of day to day survival are distanced 
further from what is defined as 'acceptable' behaviour. 
Figure 7.1 Seeing Gypsy responses as a continuum 
NEGATIVE POSITIVE 
school: 
suicide scavenging absenteeism Gypsy political CD* 
migration crinne begging dropping out culture participation NGO C, Zý 
*Community development and non-governmental organisations 
The liberal approach tends to see Gypsy responses during the transition on a continuum. 
Figure 7.1 shows how, according to this perspective, there is a 'progression' from 
'backward' (negative) behaviour to democratic (positive) action: the more Gypsies get 
involved in the non-profit sector, become more integrated and make use of their rights, 
the closer they get to 'our' way of doing things. Thus, as Sinead ni Shuindar writes in a 
9 Keith Sapsin Fine, "Fragile Stability and Change. " In Abraham and Antonia Hundler, C. I layes (eds. ), Preventing 
Conflict in the Post-Communist World, Washington Brookings Institute, Washington D. C., 1996 
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similar discussion on relations between Gadjos and Gypsies in Ireland, "[giving] 'us' a 
feeling of satisfaction, since this just proves that we were right all along. "" 
A revealing comment made by John Penny who is responsible for democracy projects in 
Eastern Europe, inadvertently suggests the 'Western agenda': "NGOs are now seen as 
partners, but it will take time for the structures and institutional mechanisms to be put 
into place to handle this relationship. [ ... ] There is a different situation in each country, 
but on the whole, they are all moving our way. "" The implication, of course, is that the 
overall aim on the part of Western led democratic projects is to see the development of 
NGOs within the Western model, whatever that may be. 
Within this implicit 'Western agenda! there are many different actors as discussed in 
chapter 6. Soros' Open Society for example is often heralded as more progressive than 
most in its approach. Its underlying premise of equating civil society (the liberal ideal) 
with 'the development of non-profit organisations, the social integration of minority 
groups and the protection of minority rights', however, is no different from programmes 
run by Phare which see NGOs as at once saviours of civil society and mechanisms for 
meeting the needs of the most impoverished, 
By stimulating the NGO sector the ahn is to reinforce the foundations of civil society and 
encourage civilian initiatives, proinote democratic values, tolerance and mutual assistance 
and step up aid to the poorest sectors of the population. " 
10 Sinead ni Shuindar, "Why Do Gaujos Hate Gypsies So Much, Anyway? A Case study. " In Thomas Acton (ed. ), 
Gypsy Politics and Traveller Identity, University of Hertfordshire Press, Hatfield, 1997. p. 31. 
11 (My emphasis) Colin Norman Walker (ed. ), "NGOs Have a Role to Play in Building a Civil Society", European 
Dialogue, The European Commission bi-monthly magazine for Central Europe and the Baltics, March-April, No. 2, 
1998 <http: //europa. cu. iny/en/comm/dgi 0/infcom/eur-dial/fraineset- backlist. html> (accessed May 1998). 
12 European Commission, Digest of community resources available for financing the activities of NGOs and other 
governmental andlor decentralised bodies representing civil society in the fields of development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid. V111/207/97 EN, 1997. . 
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Both these approaches, therefore, are typical of NGO approaches in general across 
Eastern Europe, and have helped shape conventional views of Gypsy responses during 
the transition. " 
7.3 The liberal view of Gypsies during the transition 
Both conventional wisdom and liberal theory tells us that 'negative behaviour' is not 
necessarily indicative of an inherently deviant Gypsy nature (in that all creatures are 
rational beings), but that Gypsies are 'underdeveloped' in their enforced reliance on 
'deviant' activities. Beck and Paun, for example, in their study of consumption patterns of 
Gypsies in post-1989 Romania argue that their preference for a nomadic existence, 
"restricts educational and occupational possibilities, further marginalises and 
impoverishes Gypsies, and makes deviant behaviour more necessary for survival as well 
as more likely as an outlet for frustrations. " They go on to claim rather dramatically that, 
"Gypsies flaunt their differences, cling tenaciously to their ethnic identity and castigate 
the non-Gypsy oppressor as gadjo. "" From this premise they argue that, Gypsies have 
dehumanised the dominant culture, for example, seeing it as polluting, in order to 
preserve their own dignity. The implication of such an argument of course is that it is 
ultimately Gypsies, in the pursuit of their own lifestyle, who fundamentally deviate and 
so exclude themselves from the rest of society, or 'the norm'. " Elena Zamfir, Vasile 
Buttea and Catalin Zamfir, also in reference to Romania, implicitly reinforce this idea, 
777e traditional occupations of gypsies [sic], which have survived to an important extent, 
are in themselves afactor leading to marginalisation. On the one hand, many of them have 
the distinctive signs of the ethnic groups and are socially stigmatised: on the other hand, 
13 Open Society Foundation, Programs '97, OSF Press, Sofia, 1997, 
14 Russell W. Beck and Magda Paun, "Ethnicity and Consumption in Romania. " In Janeen A. Costa and Gary J. 
Barmossy (eds. ), Marketing in a Multicultural World, Sage Publications, London/New Dheli, 1995. p. 200. 
15 Ideas of deviancy and 'self-exclusion' have in some cases become internalised within Gypsy communities, as 
evident in the sentiments expressed by some Gypsy leaders (observed through discussions on the world-wide email 
discussion group, Romnet). Compelled to counteract harmful Gypsy stereotypes, certain leaders have been keen to 
deny traditional cultural devices of Gypsies. 'Anti-social' features associated with Gypsies are seen as having to 
undergo change in order to adapt to the acceptable criteria of wider society. 
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most of them offer only minimal earning possibilities, leading to a rather poor standard of 
16 living.. 
This ambivalent treatment of Gypsies is equally evident in Bulgaria. A little more 
sensitive to the complexities of Gypsy traditions, Naoumova argues that ethnic and 
cultural differences should be accounted for in the development of post-1989 Bulgarian 
family law in terms of attitudes towards family issues such as marriage, divorce, 
adoption, alimony and property relations. " This promising start, however, soon gives 
way to the reproduction of stereotypes, where Gypsies are the only ethnic group who are 
subject to a classification that includes 'dependency' and 'deviancy': 
1. those that have employment and are not engaged in any criminal activities; 
2. those who are seeking employment but are unable to get it; 
3. those dependent upon social assistance; 
4. persons engaged in the deviant activities who are divided into two groups: 'dzhebchite' 
(i. e. pickpockets) and 'niafiotite' (i. e. Mafia people), who enriched themselves in the last 
few years thanks to the development of the numerous new structures of organised heavy 
crime. 18 
However "progressive" these studies may claim to be, the assumption is the same: 
Gypsies themselves are at least partly to blame for their disproportionate suffering of 
material and physical hardship. The causes of inequalities for Gypsies have been 
distorted in other ways too. During an interview with Transitions in 1998, for example, 
Nicolae Gheorghe highlights the dangers of defining problems for Gypsies as primarily 
lsocial'ones, 
When we complain about discrimination against Roma and poverty and unemployment 
being a result of past and present discrimination, the governments answer with the so- 
called social problem approach: there is poverty because Roma are not educated 
16 Quoted in OECD, Alain Reyniers, "Gypsy Populations and their Movements within Central and Eastern Europe 
and Towards some OECD Countries", International Migration and Labour Market Policies - Occasional Papers, No. 
1, OECD/GD(95)20, Paris, 1995. p. 8. 
17 Stefk-a Naoumova, "Ethnicity and Family: The Context of Family Law in Bulgaria. " In J. Kurczewski and M. 
Maclean (eds. ) Family Law and Family Policy in the New Europe, The Onati International Institute for the Sociology 
of Law, Dartmouth, 1997. 
18 Ibid. p. 78.300 people were interviewed: 109 Christian Bulgarians; 97 Turks; 50 Gypsies; and 44 Ponnaks. 
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[because] they are not skilled, and so on. As long as they formulate policy in such terms 
there will be no solution. 19 
For some, the disadvantaged situation of Gypsies is a product of modemisation, where in 
line with technological development traditional sources of income for Gypsies have 
become defunct. This, it is argued, is further undermined by an inadequate supply of 
valid alternatives. Together with the long term decline of traditional resources, their 
'backwardness' has led to them having no other choice but to practice in ways of making 
a living that contradict accepted norms. This informs such attitudes as expressed by 
Professor Ilya Konev, a Member of Parliament and the former Bulgarian Minister for 
Higher Education. He argues that it is a case of Gypsies having to simply 'catch up' with 
their Bulgarian counterparts: "Children should not be segregated at an early age. It is my 
opinion that Gypsy and Bulgarian children should go to school together. Then the Gypsy 
children will pick up good habits from the Bulgarians. "" Ilona Tomova, a self- 
proclaimed champion of the 'Roma cause' and former Bulgarian Presidential advisor on 
minority issues displays a similar attitude in her study of Gypsies during the transition, 
At the moment, hardpressed by the crisis andpoverty, a mentality is beingformed among 
the Roma which can be summarised in the following typical strategies-to lookfor any kind 
of work which provides some kind of income - if no such work can be found, to resort 
without any particular qualms to income generating activities which are deviant in the 
context of society as a whole, but 'normal' in this particular environment (theft, begging, 
concealing income etc). 21 
Her argument begins with an acknowledgement of the problems for Gypsies brought 
about by the economic crisis, but takes a significant turn when she describes how they, as 
in the above quotation, "resort without any particular qualms to income generating 
activities which are deviant. " It is this precise terminology that serves to fix Gypsy 
19 Jeremy Druker, "Romani Rights" in Transitions, 6 (1), January, 1999. pp. 14-15. 
20 Quoted in Zang, op. cit. p. 33. 
21 Ilona Tomova, The Gypsies in the Transition Period, International Centre for Minority Studies and Intcr Cultural 
Relations, Sofia. 1995. p. 74. 
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responses as inevitable, but negative in such circumstances. Her assumption is that 
everyone has the same potential given the right circumstances, i. e. when certain rights 
such as schooling or work are restricted for certain groups and individuals they are 
forced to act in ways that are'deviant', butjustifiably so. The argument assumes that tile 
answer lies in making these institutions equally available to all (or imposing them by 
making them obligatory). But assuming that everyone could start from a level playing 
field and taking it for granted that social institutions are neutral, fails to address the real 
causes of underlying economic and social inequalities inherent in both the transition and 
the society in which it is taking place. 
Lidgeois in his analysis of the didactic nature of Gadjo-Gypsy relations reveals the 
danger of this kind of interpretation. In his discussion on the relations between 
governments and Gypsies, he argues, 
legislation compels [Gypsies] to live in instahility, then he is hranded as unstahle; it 
compels him to live in an unhalanced state; then he is qualified as unhalanced. His 
dynamic strategies of adaptation in the political and economic spheres lose their value in 
the image and are considered artificial, or superficial. " 
The liberal belief in the superiority of the settled over the nomadic, has invested itinerant 
work patterns with a negative connotation, not least of which has been its apparent 
criminal element. Lucassen identifies various reasons for the association of an 'alleged 
innate criminal behaviour' with 'the wandering poor', which he tracks through Western 
historiography. " In particular he notes how some historians in the West have defined 
Travellers, including Gypsies as a 'disease of the national community' whose behaviour 
is explained mainly in biological terms. " A distinction is drawn between sedentary and 
22 Jean-Pierre Lidgeois, "Governments and Gypsies: From Rejection to Assimilation. " In A. Rao (ed. ), The Oiher 
Nomads, B6hlau Verlay, Germany, 1987. p. 370. 
23 Leo Lucassen, "A Blind Spot: Migratory and Travelling Groups in Western European llistoriography", 
International Review ofSocial History, 38,1993. 
24 This was according to Hermann Arnold as quoted by Lucasscn, ibid. p. 212 
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nomadic populations, the latter of which are seen as unproductive, primitive and 
criminal: "Just as nomadic hunters and gatherers they only 'find' things and produce 
nothing, thus remaining on the lowest level of human civilisation. "" 
Crime itself when committed by a Gypsy is also then 'ethnicised' into 'Gypsy crime', 
which has been the case not only in the West but throughout Europe including Bulgaria. 
This has meant that Gypsy leaders within the Bulgarian NGO sector were very cautious 
about promoting only certain aspects of Gypsy survival, for fear of reproducing negative 
stereotypes. Just as the association of the NGO sector with civil society compels those 
within it to collude with its norms for fear of confirming the stereotype that they are 
backward and uncivilised, so too are they keen to disassociate themselves from other 
stereotypes, such as criminality. During my interviews with Gypsy NGO leaders, Gypsy 
stereotypes were often frowned upon and dismissed, and many were reluctant to 
acknowledge that 'anti-social' survival strategies were a reality for most Gypsies, as they 
were were for many citizens in Bulgaria. The denial of certain aspects was seen by most 
Gypsy leaders as a necessary public stance to take, if they were to gain credibility among 
their peers and donors. 
Whether it be in terms of 'deviancy', such as crime, or in terms of 'progress', such as with 
the NGO sector, the liberal view of Gypsy behaviour fails to fully appreciate the 
complex dialectical relationship between the oppressed and the oppressors, which shapes 
the behaviour patterns associated with Gypsies. The active participation of Gypsies 
within the NGO sector does not necessarily represent a victory for Gypsies as a whole 
nor a sell-out. Instead, it represents a space within which many 'Romani patriots' can be 
at once 'Romani', 'Bulgarian' and even 'aspiring Western'. This 'playing with' identities, is 
25 Lucassen, op. cit. 
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one that permeates both everyday life and life within the world of NGOs. By unravelling 
Gypsy stereotypes and looking at features of their everyday survival from a bottom-up 
perspective, it is possible to reveal the difficulties that arise when attempts are made to 
departmentalise Gypsy behaviour into one of either outright resistance or total 
compliance. Although, these are both realities, the various shades that exist in between 
these are far more common and can be detected within the activities of Gypsy 
foundations. 
7.4 Interpretations 'from below. 
In order to contextualise my discussion on the dialectic between resistance and 
compliance within the NGO sector on the part of Gypsies, I refer back to the question 
raised in section 7 of Chapter 2, of to what extent we can interpret the everyday survival 
strategies of oppressed groups as resistance at a more general level. As identified, the 
emerging trend in the 1960s and 1970s of examining 'history from below' opened up 
possibilities for a more sympathetic approach towards oppressed groups in the analysis 
of their contribution to social structures and processes . 2' By re-focusing the discussion 
onto the oppressed, rather than the oppressors, scholars concerned with 'reclaiming the 
subject'hoped to reveal some of the fundamental problems attached to liberal claims that 
we as citizens have equal stakes in society's structures and its shared culture. 
For some, this has led to the task ofreclaiming', or 'recuperating' the oppressed group as 
a'conscious human subject-agent'. " This however, led to a whole series of problems. In 
the search for the authentic 'history of the people', i. e. that which had not been imposed 
by an ethnocentric historiography, scholars were confronted with "an area of darkness 
26 Alex Callinicos, "Marxism and the Crisis in Social History. " In John Rees (ed. ), Essays on Historical Malerialism, 
Bookmarks, London, 1998. 
27 See for example Rosalind O'Nanlon, "Recovering the Subject in Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in 
Colonial South Asia", Modern Asia Studies, 22 (1), 1988. 
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which the dominant modes of historical discourse have failed to penetrate", that is, an 
area which, by definition, is closed off from them. " This has been the essence of most 
attacks waged against the history 'from below' approach. The contradictions and 
problems within this 'new' approach is encapsulated in the journal Subaltern Studies, 
established in India in 1982. Its original premise was to directly challenge the top-down 
view of the anti-colonial struggle as put forward by both nationalist and Communist 
historians. However, in so doing it has increasingly leaned towards post-modern 
tendencies. Gyanendra Pandey, a leading member of the Subaltern Studies group, in her 
'defence of the fragment' illustrates this well, 
What the historians call a fragment' -a weaver's diary, a collection of poems by an 
unknown poet (and to those we might add all those literatures of India that Macauley 
condemned, creation myths and women's songs, family genealogies and local tradilions) - 
is of central importance in challenging the state's construction of history, in making other 
histories and marking those contested spaces through which particular unities are sought 
to be constituted and others broken up. " 
This shift in direction marked a departure from a structural analysis of inequality to one 
that considered only the possibilities of subjective realities. In the words of Patrick 
Joyce, a leading post-modernist, "it is very difficult to conceive of a structure of social 
relationships, or a structure of any 'social variables (occupations, incomes etc. ) as lying 
objectively outside the agent or the observer". " Indeed, in Democratic Subjects, Joyce 
explicitly argues that society, poverty and so on are determined by language, culture and 
imagination, not by experience. " The implications of such an argument is that the 
subordination of a given group is only a subjective reality; that is, people are not really 
poor, they only think they are. 
28 O'Nanlon, op. cit. p. 195. 
29 Gyancndra Pandcy "In Defence of the Fragment", Economic and Political Weekly, 26 (11-12), 1991. Quoted in 
Callinicos, op. cit. pp. 32-33. 
30 Patrick Joyce, "The End Of Social History? ", Social History, 20,1995, quoted in Chris I larman, "I listory, Myth 
and Marxism", in Rees, op. cit. pp. 17-18. 
31 Cited in Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History, Granta Books, London, 1997. p. 277. 
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In contrast to the post-modem approach has been the work of those who do not fall into 
the trap of dissolving power of all agency. As discussed in section 7 of Chapter 2, James 
C. Scott is an important scholar in this respect. His work has been concerned with the 
idea that the ideological superstructure of class society is one reproduced through a 
power struggle between the dominators and the subordinated acted out through an 
interplay of public and hidden discourses. He defines the hidden transcript as 'a host of 
practices devised to exercise [.. ] rights in clandestine ways', acted out by the oppressed 
and shielded by their public transcript of compliance. " "The practice of domination", he 
argues, "creates the hidden transcript" whereby both transcripts come to represent realms 
of power and interest. " Labelled as the "infrapolitics of the powerless", Scott injects the 
discourse of a hidden transcript with subversive tools for ideological resistance. "' 
In Domination and the Arts ofResistance: Hidden Transcripts, Scott extends his original 
emphasis on two transcripts to encompass four, where a public and hidden transcript can 
be found in both the everyday existence of the dominant and the subordinate, 
Every subordinate group creates, out of its ordeal, a "hidden transcript" that 
represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant. The 
powerful, for their part, also develop a hidden transcript representing the practices 
and claims oftheir rule that cannot be openly avowed" 
He goes on to argue that, "virtually all ordinarily observed relations between dominant 
and subordinate represent the encounter of the public transcript of the dominant with the 
public transcript of the subordinate", i. e. it is the public transcript by which these groups 
communicate and judge each other, yet the hidden transcript where the 'real' action takes 
32 SCOtt, Op. Cil. 1985. p. 189. 
33 Ibid. p. 27. 
34 Ibid. p. 183. 
35 SCOttý Op. Cit . 
1990. P. Xii. 
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place. " This added dimension rests on the conviction that the oppressed have not entirely 
succumbed to the hegemonic strategies of dominant society. It also implies that the 
dominant are equally clear about how and why they take on the role of oppressors. In the 
words of Yee, "In short: conformity is calculated, not unthinking, and beneath the 
surface of symbolic and ritual compliance there is an undercurrent of ideological 
resistance. "" 
Scott's clear conceptions of historical agency and power relationships puts his work in 
most explicit opposition to the arguments of those theorists who have tried to dissolve 
these concepts. His explanation of a'hidden transcript' has therefore been attacked most 
sharply by scholars from the post-modernist camp. " They see the 'hidden transcript' as 
an 'invention', which rests on a search for authenticity and so some kind of objective 
truth, which, for them is nothing more than a fruitless search for a chimera. The idea of a 
hidden transcript, however, does have real empirical meaning if we acknowledge its 
place within the framework of society's structures. For example, it is possible to observe 
in real terms the defensive reaction that this hidden transcript incurs on the part of 
dominant society, where, in the words of Scott, "by virtue of [the peasants'] institutional 
invisibility, activities on anything less than a massive scale are, if they are noticed at all, 
rarely accorded any social significance. "" The systematic dismissal of resistance as 
irrational, or at best irrelevant, coupled with attempts to control or abolish potential sites 
of resistance indicates that there is a sense of threat felt by those within positions of 
power. 
36 Scott, op. cit., 1990. p. 13. 
37 Danny Yee, A Book Review: lVeopons of the Weak Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, 1994, web site 




html> (accessed June 1997). 
38 See for example, Timothy Mitchell, "Everyday Metophors of Power", Theory andSociery, 19,1990. 
39 Scott, op. Cit., 1985. p. 35. 
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Even with Scott, however, there are certain problems. First he can be seen to be part of 
the post-Vietnam tradition in the USA of 'peasant studies', which, influenced by Marxist 
studies in Europe at that time, tended to 'romanticise' peasants. Second, in his restoration 
of peasants as social historical agents, he has had to rely on finding evidence of hidden 
(or undeclared) resistance, the very nature of which, he acknowledges, is that it is 
disguised and lies behind the screen of formal activity. But, Scott's point is that "the 
discourse of the hidden transcript does not merely shed light on behaviour or explain it; 
it helps constitute the behaviour. "" Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Scott's 
emphasis on the rationality of hidden forms of resistance evades important questions of 
'false consciousness, as pointed out by White, who in her discussion on peasants and 
resistance in Vietnam argues that, 
the tricks of adding stones, straw, etc. to increase the weight of the landlord or the tax 
collector's share of the harvest can perhaps give peasants the illusion of having more 
power and manoeuvrability than is actually the case - that is, these ineffective but 
psychologically satisfying forms of resistance could in fact contribute to false 
consciousness, blinding people to the painful reality of the extent of their powerlessness 
and exploitation. 41 
This is indeed a valid point to consider. However, rather than using it to dismiss 
resistance altogether, the possibility that resistance can incorporate elements of 'false 
consciousness' highlights the need to be more careful in how we choose to define it. 
Scott, by rejecting the usual emphasis on false consciousness and hegemony, stresses the 
role that material circumstances play in limiting opportunities for conventional 
resistance. This emphasis on material circumstances, according to Scott, leaves the 
oppressed groups with a relatively clear understanding of the source and nature of their 
oppression. "' In this way Scott's argument offers an alternative means for exploring in 
40 SCotý Op. cit., 1990. P. 188. 
41 Christine Pelzer White, "Everyday Resistance, Socialist Revolution and Rural Development: The Vietnamese 
Case", Journal of Peasant Studies, 13 (2), 1986. p. 56. 
42 The focus for many Scott critics has been the implications of his argument for the meanings of individual and 
collective action. See for example: Charles Tilly, "Domination, Resistance, Compliance ... Discourse", Sociological 
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more depth Gypsy responses, that, otherwise, are taken only as evidence that Gypsies, 
using Foucault's terminology, are the 'principle' of their own 'subj ection'. "I 
In adopting Scott's thesis as the conceptual framework for this analysis, it is vital to note 
obvious differences as well as similarities that exist between his analysis of peasants in 
Malaysia and my analysis of Gypsies in Bulgaria. In general terms, peasants are defined 
as such by their specific function within the structure of work relations, whereas Gypsies 
are traditionally seen as standing outside of wage-labour settings. However, Gypsies 
world-wide have increasingly become integrated into the wage-labour structure, and in 
Bulgaria this was certainly the case under Communism. For the purpose of this study, 
what is perhaps most important, is that, like the peasants in his study, a tension between 
the public and hidden transcripts exists for Gypsies in Bulgaria, which, within the NGO 
sector they have been able to manipulate as central to their survival strategies. 
7.5 Gypsy survival as resistance 
With the dismantling of Soviet style regimes, formal policies of aggressive assimilation 
for Gypsies have become distinctively less explicit. Clouded in the rhetoric of 
democratisation, integration and civil society, measures of assimilation are now 
embodied in new programmes for an integrated education, but also in the very workings 
of the NGO sector itself. This new 'democratic' environment has made it increasingly 
difficult for Gypsies to articulate any formal resistance to emerging institutions without 
fear of reproach. If Gypsies do not at least give the impression of conforming to ideals of 
Forum, 6 (3), 1991, which addresses the implications of Scott's work for the role of ethnography in discerning 
resistance to cultural hegemony; Susan Gal "Language and the 'Arts of Resistance' - Review Essay", Cultural 
Anthropology, 10 (3), 1995, which addresses the need for an understanding of the role of peasants in rural 
development; and White, op. cit. 
43 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1975, quoted by Mitchell, ibid. Although for 
many scholars, Foucault's work represents a fruitful line of enquiry, in the particular context of this discussion I find 
that ultimately it is a nullifying argument. In refusing to acknowledge the structural and institutional elements to 
oppression, the idea that we are the principle of our own subjection, renders at once everyone and no-one responsible. 
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civil society or integration they run the risk of being labelled as uncivil and anti- 
democratic. It is therefore fundamental to our understanding of Gypsies in Bulgaria and 
their responses to the transition that we re-examine their behaviour and observe that in 
many ways their responses are political not only by virtue of their subordinated position 
but importantly by their struggle to live their own way. 
As discussed in section 2 above, the responses of Gypsies during the transition can be 
interpreted as lying on a continuum from 'negative' responses of migration and crime to 
more 'acceptable' responses of promoting their own culture and/or participating in the 
NGO sector. However, if we take resistance to refer to the different ways in which 
subordinated groups, and in this case Gypsies, do not conform to or actively counteract 
the 'norms' imposed on them by wider (or Gadjo) society (through such institutions as 
formal schooling, wage labour, or small family units), it is possible to identify resistance 
to varying degrees in all of these response types. The idea that Gypsies must resist Gadjo 
attempts at their assimilation, if they are to ensure their own cultural survival, is certainly 
not a controversial one. " The idea that resistance is inscribed into everyday activities of 
Gypsies, however, is more problematic. Perhaps, a more useful approach would be to 
recognise the context in which Gypsy survival strategies operate. Thus it could be argued 
that programmes of assimilation, in whatever form, aimed at the disappearance of 
Gypsies have over time shaped a context in which survival strategies are transformed 
into resistance strategies. 
Gypsies face a very specific form of oppression that many see as all-pervasive. Lidgeois, 
for example, writes that, "Between exclusion and assimilation, through confinement and 
integration, there is no middle course. The Gypsy problem has always brought solutions 
44 K. W. Lee and W. G. Warren, "Alternative Education: Lessons from Gypsy Thought and Practice", British Journal 
of Educational Studies. 39, (3), 199 1. p. 315. 
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which are synonymous with the Gypsies' disappearance. "" Although Gypsies are subject 
to systematic attempts at their 'disappearance', they continue to survive within the 
structures of Gadjo society. The resources for this survival, however, depend on Gadjo 
society and therefore on their goodwill. In the words of Stewart, this has led to Gypsies 
being "caught in a endless oscillation between [the] two visions of their world", i. e. 
between living with the Gadjos or separately among the Gypsies. " 
To balance this contradiction of Gypsy survival and collusion with Gadjo society has 
required the avoidance of open conflict on the part of Gypsies themselves. Indeed, Scott 
argues that the very nature of everyday resistance is that it is backstage, there are no 
public demonstrations or riots, rendering it almost invisible. For him the lack of any 
collective public facade however does not remove the intention to resist or as the 
dictionary definition specifies "to withstand or counteract the force or effect of 
oppression. "" In this sense it could be argued that the goal of Gypsy survival, as with 
most oppressed groups, is not to overthrow the system but to survive within it or, as 
Hobsbawrn writes in reference to peasants, "working the system to their minimum 
disadvantage. "4' This perhaps, is where ideas of hidden resistance play a part in 
unravelling the more subtle elements of Gypsy survival. Using Scott's terminology, their 
various cultural networks could be seen as having provided one of the ways through 
which a 'hidden transcript' can be exercised. 
An ancient story belonging to a particular group of Gypsies in Bulgaria which has, 
through generations, been passed on orally and recorded in a book edited by 
45 Lidgeois, op. cit. p. 370. 
46 Michael Stewart, Brothers in Song. The Persistence of (Vlach) Gypsy Identity and Community in Socialist Hungary, 
PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, London, 1987, quoted by Andrzej Mirga, "Roma Territorial Behaviour 
and State Policy: The Case of the Socialist Countries of East Europe. " In Michael J. Casimir (ed. ), Mobiliiy and 
Territoriality, Aparno Rao, Berg. New York/ Oxford, 1992. p. 264. 
47 Scott, op. Cit ., 1985, p. 289. 
48 Eric llobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics". Journal of Peasant Studies, 1 (1), 1973. p. 7. 
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Marushiakova, and Popov gives us a flavour of the Gypsy attitude in Bulgaria to Gadjo 
49 
society and the ambiguous relationship that exists between them. It explains how a 
Gypsy in response to a Gadjo's 'stinginess' reacted in a deliberately anti-social way in 
order to retrieve money which was rightfully his. Rather than directly confronting and 
attacking the Gadjo he scared off the Gadjo so leaving the money behind for tile Gypsy 
to take. This story shows one of the ways in which Gypsies are willing to take on iloll- 
Gypsy stereotypes by creating stories and legends around them. This 'rhetorical' 
celebration of 'economic cunning' is important in the 'moral elevation' of their survival 
strategies whether it be in terms of portraying their methods of trading as light work or in 
terms of showing off about how they benefit from the Gadjo even in those cases when it 
is not true. " 
Silverman in her extensive fieldwork carried out with Gypsies in Bulgaria between 1972- 
1995 explored various aspects of cultural resistance on the part of Gypsy communities 
and in particular women. " Although Gypsies to varying degrees have maintained such 
devices as music, language, dress and occupation, both under Communism and since its 
collapse, problems soon arise when attempts are made to fit them into civil society 
theory. The nature of this kind of resistance is that it operates outside the legal 
framework and away from the public eye. Her study of music performance among 
Gypsies in Bulgaria and Macedonia suggests a clear support for ideas of resistance. 
49 Elena Marushiakova and Vesslin Popov, Studii Romani Vol. I and I/, Club '90 Publishers, Sofia. 1994/5. See 
Appendix 4 for full version. 
so Stewart tells of how a fellow anthropologist asked Stewart's host, an old Gypsy woman. how Gypsies lived. She 
replied through cunning and trickery and implied that theft was Gypsy work. Stewart, however, knew that this was not 
really the case and that most of the inhabitants of this settlement were not 'predators on the undeserving wealthy' but 
were semi-skilled workers in the local factory. Michael Stewart, The Time of the Gypsies, Westview Press, Oxford. 
1997. pp. 7-19. See also, Michael Stewart, "The Puzzle of Roma Persistence: Group Identity Without a Nation. " In 1'. 
Acton and G. Mundy (eds. ), Romani Culture and Gypsy Identity, University of I lertfordshirc Press, I latfield, 1997. 
51 Carol Silverman, "State, Market and Gender Relations among Bulgarian Roina 1970-90". East Luropean 
Anthropology Group, Autumn, 14 (2), 1996. 
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Traditionally she notes that music has been an important political force for subversive 
and formal processes in the Balkans, whether it be for celebrating ethnic identities or for 
promoting national identities. Music has been especially significant for Gypsy cultural 
survival. From the 1970s in Bulgaria only Bulgarian music was permitted to which all 
ethnic groups had to comply. Unofficially however, Gypsy music thrived. In Communist 
Bulgaria wedding music was a viable niche in the second economy, especially for 
Gypsies, which with its, "daring speed and technique, rock and jazz influences", was, and 
still is, associated with newness and openness. The implications therefore are far 
reaching and indicative of the kind of influence Gypsies had, and continue to have, 
through their unofficial cultural practices. Whereas the constraining ideology before 
1989 was that of State-Communism, since 1989, Gypsies must now operate within the 
constraints of a market economy. In this new situation, wedding music has continued to 
prove a vital source of income for many Gypsy families. Songs in tile Romany language, 
however, are also important in that Bulgarian Gypsies can immediately identify with 
them, which is especially important given the hitherto suppression of Gypsy MUSiC. 52 
Although Gypsy music provides a very specific example of what Silverman refers to as 
'mobilisation and resistance' for Gypsies, it does also point towards more general features 
of Gypsy culture as a form of survival. Barany, for example, has observed that, 
In Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the Roma have been surrounded by a hostile social 
environment which has compelled them to follow strategies, such as ý)relending' 
assimilation by conforming to the dominant groups' demands, assuming lifestyles and 
customs alien to them, even denying their ethnic identify in censuses, eic., while conserving 
their culture and traditions. 53 
52 Carol Silverman, "Music and Marginality: Roma (Gypsies) of Bulgaria and Macedonia", in Mark Slobin led. ) 
Retuning Culture - Musical Changes in Central and Eastern Europe, Duke University Press, Durhain/London. 1996b. 
pp. 239-242. 
53 Zoltan Barany "Living on the edge: The East European Roma in Post Communist Politics and Societies", Slavic 
Review, 53 (2), 1994. p. 323. 
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He too draws on the importance of Gypsy culture in resisting assimilation in terms of'. 
"antagonistic attitudes towards non-Roma, close ties within the Roniani community, 
adherence to traditions, values and customs, etc. " "' In particular, Barany takes tile 
resurgence of Romani nationalism in Eastern Europe as an explicit manifestation of their 
resistance, especially since 1989. Therefore, one of the main ways in which Gypsies have 
survived within a world antithetical to Gypsy values has been through tile active 
preservation of their language, customs and beliefs. In a similar vain to Barth's idea of 
'boundary maintenance', Gypsies can be argued to have taken on various survival 
strategies (stricter for some groups than for others) that implicitly involve sonic kind of 
resistance to assimilation, whether it be through endogamous marriages, the belief that 
the Gadjo world is unclean, or the continued use of the Romany language and its various 
dialects. 
As well as resistance through proactive measures of cultural survival, their indirect 
influence on wider culture, coupled with their own constantly changing culture, have 
also enabled them to resist external attempts at their disappearance. The important role of 
Gypsy culture in their own survival is a subject Popov deals with in terms of both its 
fusion into traditional Bulgarian culture and its self-modifying form. " Ile explores traces 
of Gypsy cultural influence within the more conservative elements of traditional 
Bulgarian culture. In Bulgarian beliefs, superstitions, festivals, rituals and folklore, 
Popov observes the appearance and imposition of the 'Gypsy' figure. Although often 
used to denote supernatural and essentially negative features such as the plague, their 
appearance does indicate a specific role for Gypsies in Bulgarian society. Most 
54 Zoltan Barany, "Protracted Marginality: The East European Roma. " In Sarn C. Nolutshungu (ed. ). Alargins of 
Insecurity - Minorities and International Security, University of Rochester Press, New York/Suffolk, 1996. p. 86. 
55 Vesslin Popov. "The Gypsies and Traditional Bulgarian Culture", Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, Series 5.3 
(1), 1993. 
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significantly, the fusion of Gypsy and Bulgarian folklore reveals the common heritage of 
many customs practised by both Gypsies and Bulgarians. " 
In terms of explaining the survival of the overall Gypsy ethnocultural system, Popov, 
following Ldvi-Strauss's terminology, defines it as a 'hot' culture in order to express its 
innovative and constantly changing character. " Although he gives various examples of 
certain Gypsy rituals and customs which have been abandoned or forgotten, lie also notes 
the importance of the flexibility of Gypsy culture, for example with religion: 
The Gypsies rapidly replace one religion with another [.. ] Once adopted, the new religion 
can become a characteristic of the respective group, at least in the conditions of the 
Balkan peninsular [.. ] Their spiritual life [.. ] represents a syncrelicformation on a grand 
scale, which includes elements of different religions and cultures which would otherwise be 
in total opposition and this is reflected correspondingly in the feats, rituals and customs of 
the GypsieS. 58 
The persistence of Gypsy communities as rooted in their inherently flexible form is also 
evident in terms of the fact that in Bulgaria there are no formal Gypsy leadership 
positions at a national level to which all Gypsies aspire. Nor indeed are there legal 
households for state officials to get their hands on. Most Gypsies are scattered 
throughout rural villages and even those found in clearly defined huge ghettos on the 
outskirts of cities and towns form numerous smaller groups within them. " Although tile 
degree of movement for Gypsies in Bulgaria is practically very low, keeping a low 
56 Popov gives the example of the celebration of 'St. Athanasius' Day by Gypsies in Vidin. A ritual is still performed 
by Gypsies there for'the exit of the plague'. In Bulgarian folk culture, this day is also important and tied directly to 
the beliefs of the plague. op. cit. p. 29. 
57 Ldvi-Strauss distinguishes between 'hot' and 'cold' culture types, where the former is used to denote all those 
cultures which transform over time and the latter all archaic types of cultures, Popov therefore sees Bulgarian cultures 
as a'cold' analogy and Gypsy cultures as a'hot'analogy of Lcvi-Strauss's model. 
58 Popov, op. cit. p27. 
59 Stewart also draws on their lack of formal cultural institutions in his study of Rom ill I [Ungary. I le notes that there 
is no 'objectivised' communal life, i. e. no religious or secular leadership or other institutionalised forms. Instead, it 
was (and still is) interaction at the family level that bound the community together which meant that under 
Communism there was 'nothing there' (not even households in the conventional sense) for the state 'to get their hands 
oil'. Stewart. The Time of the Gyl)sies, o/i. cit.. p. 72. Lee and Warren in the British context also draw oil this idea of 
how the way in which Gypsy settlements are small and scattered enables them " [to avoid] direct confrontations with 
authority, preferring evasion, [and] movement. " Lee and Warren, op. cit. p. 315. 
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public profile has been central to their cultural survival and has been one of the ways in 
which they have been able to resist total cultural assimilation. 
The identification of their culture as a site for resistance is particularly significant given 
that the celebration of Gypsy cultures is viewed as a relatively positive response on the 
part of Gypsies to the new democratic freedoms of post-Communism. Their responses to 
formal education, however, such as high absenteeism and drop-out rates, have not been 
welcomed so gladly. This has been evident partly in the overt strategy on the part both of 
governmental and non-governmental organisations to find ways to encourage their 
participation in formal education despite obvious inequalities in the existing structure. It 
also has been evident in the distinct lack of any discussion at the formal as well as 
informal level on the intrinsic value of such a response for securing their own economic 
as well as cultural survival. 
7.6 Resistance to formal education 
The spectrum of Gypsy responses as set out in section 7.2 shows how the clash between 
Gypsy forms of education and Gadjo schooling in Bulgaria is one example of the way ill 
which Gypsies' resilience to assimilation is interpreted by Gadjos as an obstacle to their 
own well-being. This fails ultimately to acknowledge that the experience of schooling for 
Gypsies is quite different to that of their Bulgarian counterparts. As well as having to 
confront direct discrimination in the classroom, Gypsies are not supported academically 
and in many cases actively discouraged from learning. That schooling is a difficult and 
often painful experience for Gypsies in Bulgaria was a point raised time and time again 
during a seminar on education consisting of both Gypsy and Gadjo practitioners ill the 
field. " Both Gypsy teachers and NGO leaders present argued that Gypsies were, in most 
60 The Concluding Seminar on the Project, "Self-lielp Bureau". organised by CEGA. Plovdiv, Bulgaria . 25-26 September 1997. 
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cases, subject to an education quite different to their Bulgarian counterparts where tile 
nurturing of vocational skills are prioritised over the acquisition of academic knowledge. 
Not only were these vocations often outmoded, but they sometimes posed real health 
risks. The emphasis on vocational education, in their view, served to exploit Gypsies and 
deny them access to more important areas of learning. 
These 'push' factors are compounded by further external factors. Poverty and 
unemployment made everyday survival a priority for most Gypsy families. The need to 
find work and provide basic needs created a set of objectives that inevitably conflicted 
with the demands and expectations made on them by the schooling system. According to 
the National Statistical Institute for Bulgaria, between 1989-1992,26-33,000 children 
dropped out of school every year (this is not including those who do not even register in 
the first place). Furthermore, this drop out rate increased among Gypsies as they 
progressed up through the school system. In mainstream schools Gypsies constituted 
14.7 per cent in classes 1-3,9.2 per cent in classes 4-8, yet only 0.9 per cent in classes 8 
upwards. As already detailed in the previous chapter, it was estimated that in 1992 
Gypsies constituted less than 10 per cent of pupils in mainstream education, yet for 
segregated schools their numbers were much higher: 32.1 per cent of pupils in auxiliary 
schools, 21.6 per cent of pupils in vocational schools and 29 per cent of pupils in schools 
for behavioural problems. " 
High absenteeism or dropping out rates however are rarely analysed in such a way as to 
consider both push and pull factors. Instead they are interpreted as unintentionil 
consequences of the 'Gypsy way of life'. " The problem is identified with the group 
61 Source: The Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, 1993. 
62 This attitude that Roma absenteeism is rooted in their own culture was expressed by the director of Dont Uchilishtc 
"Sv. Sv. Kiril i Metodii", Rousse, who referred to early marriages and heavy parental demands of itinerant work as the 
main obstacles to their education (Interview: 10.3.97). 
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themselves, rather than with the social structures that impinge upon them. Tile 
implication is that the existence of inequality or of disadvantaged groups represents just 
an 'aberration' to a system that otherwise is fair and just. According to this argument, 
social inequality occurs through the inadvertent exclusion of certain groups or 
individuals. The solution therefore, lies in the acquisition of key skills, resources, and 
confidence on the part of the 'socially excluded' in order that they are better equipped to 
become 'included'. In the specific case of education it is with finding ways to help them 
overcome the problems associated with their lifestyle. 
The so-called emphasis on 'social agency', through which it is ultimately tile groups, or 
individuals in question who can bring themselves out of poverty and isolation, has 
reinforced the view that by not actively subscribing to established nornis and 
conventional life skills, groups are deviant and are themselves the course of their own 
'exclusion'. In this manner, Rossitza Ivanova, a pedagogical consultant for tile Bulgarian 
NGO, CEGA, argues that, 
The people [Gypsies] need help, hut they also have to learn and ahide to sonle hasic rules 
of hehaviour. Rronia [sic] children, oil their part, need extra leaching to heller integrate ill 
the overall educational process [.. ] They are very vividpeople and if couched rightly, they 
will integrate their resources in society, yet preserve their identity. 63 
The preservation of their identity is almost tagged on at the end, in all attempt, perhaps, 
to avoid accusations of promoting 'assimilation'. Nevertheless, it does not deflect from 
her emphasis on 'Roma' having to 'abide to some basic rule of behaviour. ' Within this 
outlook, education is seen by national and international policy makers, together with 
supporters of the 'Roma cause', as the best strategy for Gypsy integration into wider 
63 Quoted by Mariana Milosheva (ed. ), Aloving Beyond 11"alls -The Stolipinovo People Taking Charge of 77teir 
Community, CEGA, Sollia, 1997. p. 84. 
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society. " There is a school of thought, however, that regards the institution of schooling 
as it stands as a specific tool of assimilation, working in the interest of majority society. 
Okely, a proponent of this view, argues that rather than as acting as a neutral tool for 
bringing together different cultures, government policies directed towards Gypsies' 
schooling are largely aimed at incorporation and ignore existing forms of education 
within Gypsy cultures. 
Gypsy children are seen as 'innocent'and 'wild'because they are deprived of the domillant 
society's culture. Little attention is paid to the Gypsies' own non-literate, but coherent, 
culture and identity. The nation-state, charities and international units such as the EU and 
UNESCO finance educational programmes, for overt or covert assimilation, or fi)r the 
construction of exotic tradition. 15 
It must be considered that the integration of Gypsies into mainstream schooling is often 
based on a disregard for other methods of learning that minority groups have themselves 
developed. The extended family within the Gypsy community, for example, has been a 
vital source of learning for children. In this respect, it is no less significant than the 
formal institution of school (albeit in different ways), where traditional occupational and 
survival skills are passed on through the family through demonstration and the active 
participation of the child. The reluctance on the part of funding bodies and national 
64 Some studies have expressed a more in-depth concern with the complex relations between Gypsies and non-Gypsy 
children once in school. For example, Pavel Rican in his study of the extent to which Gypsy and non-Gypsy pupils 
reject or accept members frorn the other group in the Czech Republic is keen to promote school education as "one of 
the most important ways to help the quickly growing Gypsy population to share the chances ofTered by democratic 
society". I lowevcr, beyond the reproduction of the liberal view, he also stresses that schooling is important "to teach 
both Gypsy and majority children how to live together in peace, solidarity, and friendship". Pavel Rican, "Sociometric 
Status of Gypsy Children in Ethnically Mixed Classes", Studia Psychologica, 38 (3), 1996. p. 177. 
65 Judith Okely, "Non-Territorial Culture as the Rationale for the Assimilation of Gypsy Children". Childhood -A 
Global Journal of Child Research, 4 (1), 1997. p. 79. Arguing along similar lines. Gnielch's UK study of Gypsies 
over a decade ago draws many parallels with Current attempts in Eastern Europe to include Gypsies into the schooling 
system. She argues that the tendency of mainstream education to 'help' and 'teach' Gypsies is essentially paternalistic 
and "poses a far greater threat to group identity and autonorny than mere settlement ever could, " Sharon Bohn 
Gmelch, "Groups That Don't Want In: Gypsies and Other Artisan Trader, and Entertainer Minorities", Annual Review 
ofAnthropology, 15,1986. pp. 324-5. Likewise, the argument made by Lee and Warren in their discussion on Gadjo 
education in the UK has many important parallels with the situation in Bulgaria, as indeed elsewhere. They argue that 
formal schooling is totally antithetical to "Romani values" in that their culture is orally based, it poses a threat in that 
formal education is 'geared towards the inculcation of new values'. and that the main objective in the classroom is to 
separate the Gypsy from the Gacýjo. Lee and Warren. ol). cit. pp, 315-16. 
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policy makers to acknowledge existing methods of learning and the structural limitations 
to creating a 'positive vector' reveals that cultural assimilation, which lay at tile heart of 
schooling under Communism, has yet to be tackled. Attempts at encouraging the 
inclusion of Gypsies into formal schooling, cloaked as it may be in the terminology of 
integration and equality of opportunities, are therefore futile and restrained by 
assimilative undercurrents. 
The overwhelming solace found by policy makers in school education since 1989 seems 
increasingly implausible against the backdrop of a declining education system in 
Bulgaria as indeed across Eastern Europe: the costs to families of educating children 
have gone up; the quality of schooling has fallen; enrolment and attendance rates have 
dropped; social support provided by schools is down; selectivity and competition has 
grown; and many people now face unemployment on leaving. " Rather than encouraging 
increased investment, spending in this area has decreased, which in line with an already 
declining GDP further exacerbated the problem. In Bulgaria, public expenditures on 
education as a percentage of GDP declined from 5.0 per cent in 1990 to 3.5 per cent in 
1996, where GDP itself declined during this period by nearly 30 per cent. " 
The Bulgarian school system is a highly centralised one where the Ministry of Education 
determines basic school policies, administrative arrangements and the appointment of 
head teachers. There is some leeway for teachers to choose from a range of approved text 
books within the core subjects. However, the degree of autonomy in terms of teaching 
minority languages and cultures is extremely limited. Any potential redirection in 
minority teaching can only come from above. In 1991, for example, the Council of 






Ministers passed an ordinance that restored minority language education by allowing 
selected grades to partake in four optional classes a week. However, this was not 
obligatory, and therefore failed to have a significant impact at a nation-wide scale. " 
in spite of the obvious contradictions in formal schooling the liberal assumption dictates 
that, as it stands, school is open to Gypsies if only they show enough commitment to 
'proper' values and hard work. Attempts at encouraging Gypsies to attend school 
therefore have not ceased, but in fact multiplied. This encourages, rather than 
challenges, many existing problems within the schooling system such as: split schooling; 
discrimination within the classroom; absence of subjects that deal with Gypsy culture; 
and subsequently low attendance and success rates for Gypsy pupils. In Bulgaria, as 
elsewhere, teachers are often ill-prepared and head teachers are reluctant to accept Gypsy 
pupils in the first place. If Gypsy pupils are allowed into mainstream schooling, they 
often have to partake in segregated classes; if not, they are expected to slot into the new 
and often unfamiliar environment with as little disturbance as possible. When the case is 
otherwise the children are criticised and rejected. As discussed earlier this often results in 
teachers sending Gypsy pupils to 'special schools'. Repeated failures at mainstream 
schools are taken as an indication of inherent learning difficulties, rather than as 
indicators of structural inequality. For many therefore, enrolment in the current 
Bulgarian education system does not help, but often hinders Gypsy wider survival in 
economic, social, and cultural terms. 
In spite of this, the Commission of the European Community in their document on 
school provision for Gypsies in Europe (1996) claims that, "education is a link to the 
future, a positive vector, which enables us to get out of the rut of thinking in ternis of 
68 Minority Rights Group, Education in Afulli-ethnic Societies of Central and Eastern Europe. MRG Workshop 
Report, London, 1998. 
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'problems' linked to an approach from a 'social' or 'marginal' angle. "" The context of a 
collapsing education system, a hostile school environment and the problems inherent to 
the Bulgarian institution of schooling itself are seemingly ignored. But it is this very 
context that informs the attitudes and behaviour of Gypsies towards schooling. But how 
far is it then feasible to interpret behaviour such as absenteeism or dropping-out as 
evidence of resistance? 
Scott argues in reference to his own research that the intentions of peasant resistance are 
inscribed in the very actions themselves. This could also be argued in the case of Gypsies 
in Eastern Europe. A Gypsy child who helps at home with the family rather than attend 
school is 'saying' that his/her need to make a living takes precedence over the formal and 
fruitless constrictions of school. The problem with this type of analysis, however, is how 
to 'prove' such a statement within the given limits of this study. Perhaps it would be more 
useful then, simply to recognise that there are various explanations for Gypsies not 
attending school, not least of which is that, as it stands, schooling does not always offer 
Gypsies the most direct and effective means for short and long term survival. This then 
enables us to go beyond the popular argument that Gypsies are simply not equipped for 
successful schooling, or that their ill-informed parents disallow their children to attend 
formal schooling. Although it is difficult to 'prove' that by not attending school Gypsies 
are putting up some kind of resistance, at the same time, it would be misleading and 
demeaning to dismiss this as a possibility. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The example of schooling and the response of Gypsies to it reveals the complex 
relationship that exists between majority institutions and minority populations. The idea 
69 Commission for the European Community, School Provision for Gypsy and Traveller Children. Brusscls, COM 
(96) 495 final, October 1996. p. 88. 
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that 'excluded' groups can and do resist, whether openly or otherwise, offers scope for 
new insights into this relationship, which goes above and beyond the liberal social 
exclusion analysis. This has therefore not earned it wide appeal. Scott, in his articulation 
of 'hidden' resistance, has been accused of merely partaking in the use of "positivist 
essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest. "" Indeed, the exploration of 
resistance strategies as rational responses for oppressed groups to situations of 
oppression or exploitation has been taken by some to suggest that the group in question 
has a history of its own. 
However, the recognition of specific historical experiences for different oppressed 
groups does not necessarily entail sealing off their history from that of their domination. 
Indeed, this distinction is largely an artificial one, in that it would be false to separate the 
evolution of a particular Gypsy tradition within Bulgaria from the surrounding social 
forces and structures that have directly, and indirectly shaped it. Vice versa, the cultural, 
economic and political development of the majority population has been influenced to 
varying degrees by the role of Gypsies within it. 
By recognising this, we open up for discussion the possibility that 'anti-social' behaviour 
associated with socially excluded groups is not necessarily a sign of 'deficiency' or 
'backwardness'. Instead, such behaviour could, in real terms, represent attempts at 
carving out strategies of survival in a world intent on their assimilation. My critique of 
social exclusion rests on the idea that no group is entirely cut off from, or immune to 
society and its functions. Building on the preliminary discussion of possible resistance as 
identified in the cultural practices of Gypsy groups and their tendency to reject 
schooling, the following chapter explores further possibilities of resistance on the part of 
70 G. G. Spivak, "Discussion: Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing I listoriography". Subaltern Studies, 4,1985, quoted 
by O'Nanlon, op. cit. p. 196. 
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Gypsies within the Bulgarian NGO sector. The thesis, therefore, suggests that Gypsies, 
like all other groups, are intertwined into the very structures of society, both positively 
and negatively, whether it be in the form of their collusion or resistance: the history and 
experiences of Gypsies is as much a story about wider society as it is about themselves. 
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CHAPTER 8 
GYPSY COMPLIANCE AND RESISTANCE WITHIN THE BULGARIAN NGO 
SECTOR: A CASE STUDY 
8.1 Introduction 
If the complex position of Gypsies in and their ambivalent relations to wider Bulgarian 
society are revealed in the problems and possibilities of both compliance in and resistance 
to society's structures then an examination of their specific role within the NGO sector 
can provide us with a further means to explore the two interconnected processes within 
this analytical framework. At one level, an exploration of the NGO sector simply allows 
us to critically examine one particular dimension of Gypsy responses in Bulgaria during 
transition defined by liberal wisdom as formal and progressive. Second, and most 
importantly, as a popular strategy of inclusion for socially excluded groups, the NGO 
sector offers an important site of investigation for analysing the role of Gypsies in 
Bulgarian society in terms of their status as 'excluded. Rather than NGOs simply 
empowering Gypsies to include themselves, the case study reveals that the use of this 
sector by many of those Gypsies active within it rests to varying degrees on the tension 
between compliance and resistance. ' While revealing some of the problems inherent to 
the NGO sector as it stands, it also opens up for discussion the dimension left out by 
social exclusion theory; that is the complex dialectic that exists within and between 
Gypsies and society as a whole. 
A case study of a Type B Bulgarian Gypsy-led foundation forms the empirical core to 
this analysis in which the everyday workings and rationale of Gypsy participation within 
this sector and wider society are explored. This chapter first examines more generally the 
ways in which Gypsies in Bulgaria have been playing the 'NGO game'. The case study 
1 It is important to note here that it is not only Gypsy groups in Eastern Europe who have been caught up in the 
dialectical tension of compliance and resistance and who have used conceptual frameworks such as that of human 
rights for their own purposes. It has also been observed in different contexts and with different groups. See, for 
example, Marta Bruno, "The Impact of Foreign Aid and Businesses on Women in the Moscow Labour Market", paper 
presented to the Seminar, Transformation, Geography and Identity, School of Geography, University of Birmingham, 
II June 1996. This paper addressed the different adapative strategies, patterns of resistance and work cultures that 
Russian women adopted in response to foreign models of aid and commercial organisation. 
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then allows us to explore more closely the intricacies of this 'game' and how different 
identities are 'played with'. An exploration of the extent to which such strategies support 
or are informed by more general strategies of survival as outlined in previous chapters 
forms the premise of this discussion. It reveals how there is a contrast between the 
orienting concepts used at the national and international level by governments and NGOs, 
and the concepts and objectives which are salient at the local level for the various Gypsy 
groups. 
Ultimately for Gypsies, there is much overlap between the two seemingly distinct spheres 
of formal and informal activity; that is, between their involvement within the NGO sector 
and their pursuit of everyday survival strategies. As the case study will reveal, rather than 
one undermining the other, the informal and formal strategies employed by Gypsies work 
together as mechanisms for their survival. By breaking down the dichotomous view of 
Gypsy responses in this way, we can also question more rigorously the dichotomy of 
in/out that structures the rhetoric of social exclusion. As a result, it becomes apparent in 
the course of this discussion that the use of social exclusion theory to describe and 
explain the situation of Gypsies is not only misplaced in terms of its starting point, but 
also potentially very damaging in its restricted support of formal strategies at the expense 
of an understanding of this hidden dimension and its roots in existing survival strategies. 
8.2 Gypsies and the INGO game' 
The growing role of Gypsies within the Bulgarian NGO sector is partly a product of the 
attractiveness of Gypsy issues in gaining funding, and partly a product of the new 
Bulgarian constitution that has outlawed political parties based on ethnic grounds. As 
outlined in chapter 6, those NGOs working with Gypsies have tended to come from two 
different premises. First there were those NGOs whose roots lay not so much within a 
given Gypsy community, but in a commitment to the development of civil society or 
human rights. These NGOs then took on issues to do with Gypsies as part of their wider 
concern with representing and promoting these rights. The other type of NGOs were 
those that had grown out of Gypsy communities and whose first priority was with dealing 
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with and meeting the demands of Gypsies within their community. The adoption of 
human and minority rights frameworks were important insofar as meeting these 
objectives. Given that Gypsy communties and their interests have conventionally stood 
outside of party politics, Gypsy NGOs represented to political actors a new and important 
means for articulating these demands and interests. 
While human rights were important to both types of NGOs, each used human rights for 
different ends. For example, a Type D NGO (i. e. one run entirely by non-Gypsies), while 
working under its previous name of the Committee for the Defence of Minority Rights, 
set out as its objectives the promotion of human rights: 
-to try systematically to mouldpublic opinion in the light of ethnic tolerance 
-to support minorities in community building 
-to take action to prevent any ethnic tensionsfrom turning into destructive conflicts 
-to monitor the work of the State for guaranteeing the rights of members of ethnic 
communities. 2 
Their emphasis on promoting human rights rested upon ideas of 'ethnic tolerance' and the 
avoidance of 'destructive conflicts. ' This revealed that rather than being central, issues of 
minority rights were more subsidiary. The implicit agenda was ultimately one of 
'inclusioW in that the minimisation of ethnic tensions would rest upon the insertion of 
minorities into the existing umbrella of rights. This contrasts sharply with those strategies 
adopted by Gypsy led NGOs. Rather than using Gypsy issues to promote human rights, 
their work rested upon a subtle interplay of human rights with Gypsy rights. In the words 
of Gheorghe and Acton, the human rights framework offered to Gypsy activists in 
Eastern Europe an effective means of ensuring a moral legitimacy for sustainable Gypsy 
political action without necessarily suppressing their diversity. ' For example, the Human 
Rights Project in Sofia (a Type B NGO) used the human right discourse as their 
framework, but with the specific intention of targeting human right abuses of Gypsies. By 
monitoring and publicising police brutality against Gypsies, coupled with promoting 
2 Kaline Bozcva (ed. ), Minority Groups in Bulgaria in a Human Rights Context, Committee for the Defence of 
Minority Rights, Sofia, 1994. p. 1. 
3 Nicolae Gheorghe and Thomas Acton, "Dealing with Multicultural ity: Minority, Ethnic, National and Iluman 
Rights. " In Council of Europe (ed. ), Gypsies in the Locality, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 1994a. 
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Gypsy rights in other spheres of social and political life, they were able to use human 
rights as a means of actively resisting growing anti-Gypsy violence in Bulgarian society. 
Gypsy NGO leaders whose roots lay in Gypsy communities were finding other ways 
subtly to 'play the NGO game'. The process of registration, whether it be under the Union 
of Bulgarian Foundations and Associations (UBFA), or just through the courts, proved 
for many a useful way of broadening their chances of receiving funding. This was 
especially important given that donors tended to restrict their funding for a given 
foundation to one time only. As observed during my fieldwork, therefore, and also noted 
by Marushiakova and Popov, many NGOs registered themselves under different names 
and addresses. " In this way it soon became apparent that seemingly distinct NGOs were 
interconnected, whether financially or in terms of their day-to-day running. For example 
the foundation called 'Roma - Women for Charity' based in Sliven, run by Mrs. Tanja 
Archikova and the foundation called'Women for Charity "Roma" ', also based in Sliven 
and run by Mrs. Pepa Pehlivanova were in fact one NGO despite being registered 
separately. The'Union of Romani Women and Children'led by Mrs. Penka Karagiozova; 
the Roma Youth Club led by Stefan Yugov and the 'Roma- Foundation for Regional 
Development' led by Mr. Anton Karagiozov were all registered separately although 
operating on the same premises and as one NGO. Another example is with the 'United 
Roma Union' directed by Vassil Chaprazov and the 'Roma Bureau for Mutual Support' 
led by Georgi Golov. These two NGOs were registered separately but in fact were 
mutually supportive, as a result of which the latter enabled the continued existence of the 
former. There were also NGOs who were registered using the same names, but who had 
no formal connections. For example, although there were two NGOs registered under the 
name of Confederation of the Roma Population, one was a local organisation quite 
distinct from the nation-wide organisation led by Peter Gueorguiev. This complex 
network revealed not only the overlap that characterised many of the NGOs working in 
4 Elena Marushiakova and Vessclin Popov, "Gypsy Minority in Bulgaria - Literacy, Policy and Community 
Development (1985-1995)", Alpha, UNESCO, Institute for Education, 1997. 
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this field, but also how even the process of registration could be manipulated as a tool for 
increasing funding possibilities. 
The use by Gypsy-led NGOs of mainstream institutions for their own advantage could 
also be found in other more subtle spheres of NGO activity. Organising seminars and 
conferences seemed to be one of the main activities of NGOs, including those run by 
Gypsies, whether they be training seminars, feedback seminars or international 
conferences. Common to all was the 'cocktail evening' with plentiful food and Rakia and 
a fusion of traditional Bulgarian and Gypsy live music. This was where you saw the side 
that the formality of the NGO sector concealed - yet the side Gypsies in particular wanted 
you to see. An international conference organised by a leading Gypsy intellectual about 
Gypsy children and education held at the end of November 1997 provided a good 
illustration of how, during the 'cocktail evening', they were keen to play up the romantic 
Gypsy ideal of being care-free and exotic in a dazzling display of colourful Gypsy 
costumes and belly dancing for the mixture of international, Bulgarian and Gypsy guests. 
In this way they were playing with 'oue myth of the 'genuine' Gypsy and turning it back 
against 'ourselves' in order to promote themselves in a way we found pleasing, thereby 
securing some kind of credibility and sympathy with the audience. ' 
8.3 Sites of conflict and resolution 
Although able in many cases to play the 'NGO game', Gypsy-led NGOs more than most 
were constrained within a particular context of structural inequality shaped by persistent 
institutionalised discrimination. The reluctance of local authorities to work with Gypsy 
NGOs was one such example of this. I met with many examples of this during my 
5 This is not unusual and is a strategy adopted by Gypsies in a wide range of different fields. The fortune teller and the 
hawker for example use this strategy, by presenting themselves to us in the way that they have Icamt we find pleasing. 
A similar observation was drawn by Lemon who, in her discussion about the ways in which Gypsy actors in Russia 
negotiated their representation in the theatre, both under the Soviet regime and since, raises some interesting questions 
about the use of 'real' Gypsy actors and images in order to portray 'authenticity'. Her observations of the Moscow Teatr 
Romen, revealed that contrary to the intended outcome, performances were far from authentic, instead displaying 
traditions that only the Gadjo director, and Gadjo audiences perceived as 'authentic'. Although completely different 
settings, the implications for the interplay of public and hidden transcripts were the same: the public transcript was the 
Gadjo myth of the Gypsy; the hidden one was their use of it for their own purposes. Alaina Lemon, "Hot Blood and 
Black Pearls: Socialism, Society and Authenticity at the Moscow Teatr Romcn", Theatre Journal, 48,1996. pp. 479- 
494. 
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fieldwork in Bulgaria. The Foundation 'New Life For Bulgarian Roma, in Sliven 
explained to me the nature of their current project and its problems. They had organised a 
series of training seminars for 12 Gypsy NGOs involving speakers from the police, the 
prison, the courts and municipalities. However, as yet none of the invited guests from 
local authorities had turned up to any of these seminars. " Another NGO receiving similar 
messages from its local authorities acknowledged that the apparent lack of interest on the 
part of state officials encouraged NGOs to seek 'alternative' means of helping Gypsies. 
They stressed, though, that ideally the role of NGOs should be to mediate between the 
state and Gypsy communities! 
Within other spheres of NGO-local authority relations, however, some Gypsy NGOs 
were a little more successful in building up a positive rapport, although the situation in 
general remained poor. It was no secret that Gypsy NGOs were generally resented by 
local authorities in terms of their relative prosperity. In contrast to the police force in 
Bulgaria, for example, which since 1989 has suffered from a major decline in resources, 
wages and morale, " NGOs have expanded benefiting those traditionally seen as being at 
the bottom of the pile. In some regions the local police have been as a result openly 
hostile to such NGOs. However, I was able to witness the way in which one NGO had 
managed to turn this situation around. This NGO had offered to local police officers the 
use of their equipment in the office when necessary, such as photocopying and printing. 
At least at a surface level, this had led to the forging of good relations with the local 
police. ' 
While some NGOs had attempted to turn the change in fortunes to their own advantage, 
others were keen to play up the possibility of 'ethnic conflict' erupting between Gypsies 
and Bulgarians, if only at the level of aggression and civil protest. " Both these types of 
6 Interview- B (7) 21.10-97. 
Interview: A (6) 20.10.97. 
Interview with Inspector Richard Groves, 2.9.97. See also, R. Groves "Development Within Policing and the Roma 
Community in Nadejhda, Bulgarie, OSCE - CMINewsletter, 3(2), April, 1997. 
9 This was observed during one of my visits to the NGO B (3). 
10 Interview B (7) 21.10.97. 
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responses by Gypsy NGOs to their hostile surroundings reflected a different picture to 
that painted by a somewhat pessimistic NGO leader, who bemoaned the high level of 
apathy that plagued Gypsy communities: 
Roma are not interested in who is ruling the country, their only goal is physical survival. 
Prisons arefull ofRoma, many seek to enterprison as it represents a safe place - they can 
getfood, even ajob, so is better than the ghetto. ' 1 
The complex mixture of apathy and frustration, the ambiguity of portraying Gypsy 
culture as valid, yet colluding with Gadjo ideas of what it is to be a Gypsy, and the use of 
human rights within the specific context of securing Gypsy rights are all displayed in the 
following case study of the Romani Bah Foundation. A combined method of interviews 
and participant observation formed the basis of this case study, as discussed in the 
introduction. This foundation was situated in Faculteta which, with an estimated 
population of between 25-30,000, was one of the largest Gypsy mahalas in Sofia, the 
Bulgarian capital. The location of the office actually within 'the ghetto' allowed for the 
observation of both the internal operations of the office, and their direct relations with the 
local community on a daily basis. While offering many insights into the complex and 
often inconsistent world of NGOs, this case study also allows for a discussion on some of 
the benefits and difficulties of my methodological approach. 
8.4 The Romani Bah Foundation: A case study 
The Romani Bah Foundation represented a type B NGO in that it was run by and 
employed Gypsies from within its community, yet also employed those from outside, 
including both Gypsies and Gadjos. This foundation was fairly well established and had 
its roots in an existing human rights foundation, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. It 
was generally well respected by credible scholars, other NGOs and to a large extent by its 
surrounding community. Like many other Gypsy-led NGOs that I had contact with, it had 
as its basis a form of advice bureau, a semi-permanent status, a mixture of Gypsy and 
Gadjo staff, currently active projects and some kind of political background. However, as 
with all case studies, there were certain factors that differentiated this NGO from others. 
" Interview B (6) 20.10.97. 
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For example, unlike some, this foundation did not place any emphasis on a nation-wide 
structure of membership and network of organisations. Also, this foundation although a 
product of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, was a registered NGO in its own right and 
did not have any other foundations registered within it. 
By revealing the strategies employed by Gypsy led NGOs, this case study makes a series 
of observations at a number of levels. First, it explores the extent to which the NGO 
encouraged compliance, yet at the same time offered scope for reinforcing different 
elements of resistance within the wider aim of Gypsy survival. Second, it explores the 
kind of benefits and drawbacks experienced by those Gypsy leaders who, for whatever 
reason, appropriated conceptual frameworks of human rights or community development. 
Third, and underpinning both of these, was a concern with describing what happened in 
terms of the time of day, setting and sequence of events. This part of the anlysis was 
based on the following working questions: "What is going on in these NGOs? "; "what do 
people in this setting have to know (individually and collectively) in order to do what 
they are doing? "; and "how are skills transmitted and acquired? ". 
The case study therefore worked at both a descriptive and analytical level, providing a 
clear picture of the daily and long term problems and aspirations that characterised such 
NGOs. The case study first of all details the history of the foundation. It then offers an 
overview of the current activities with a special focus on its main project, the 'Godi e 
Romenge Project', coupled with the on-going procedures of project application. The 
nature of the relations that form the working essence of this foundation both internally 
and externally are then addressed in terms of Gypsy/Gadjo and insider/outsider dynamics. 
Finally the idea of there being a hidden dimension is explored in terms of the use of wider 
survival strategies in the articulation of their work within the NGO. 
Regarded as a 'good' NGO by the likes of Marushiakova and Popov, the Romani Bah 
Foundation offered a compromise between co-operation with Gadjo NGOs, yet a 
Commitment to Gypsy interests. It displayed a down to earth approach, that was informed 
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by both a recognition for long term goals, yet also a commitment to helping with the day 
to day struggles of their local community. 
8.5 History 
The Romani Bah Foundation was set up in 1995 as a spin-off from the Bulgarian 
Helsinki Committee (BHQ, a human rights organisation. " The BHC, in its published 
newsletter 'Obketiv', defined itself as an independent non-governmental organisation for 
the protection of human rights. It was founded on July 14 1992 and initially set up office 
in Faculteta. The members of BHC included Antonina Zhelyazkova (The International 
Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations), Dimitrina Petrova (previously 
Chairperson of the Human Rights Project and now of the European Roma Rights Centre, 
Hungary), Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov (leading Gypsy specialists), Kalina 
Bozeva (Inter Ethnic Initiatives for Human Rights) and Vassil Chaprazov (United Roma 
Union). Although formally based on a commitment to human rights, the BHC situated in 
Faculteta had at its heart Gypsy issues with contribution from a range of activists. 
In August 1995 the BHC launched a project supported by the Dutch Foundation 
CEBEMO for renovating "75th School Todor Kableshkov" in Faculteta. Mihail 
Gueorgiev, a local Gypsy who co-ordinated this went on to form a new organisation in 
conjunction with the activities of BHC, which would later become the Romani Bah 
Foundation. The office for this new foundation was also set up in Faculteta. In line with 
the BHC, the original aim of this foundation was to try and resolve the most extreme 
problems of Gypsies by linking human rights with those of minorities. The original 
project of constructing new classrooms and a canteen area for the school in Faculteta 
indicated that the emphasis would be on direct action regarding the local community. 
This project was proving to take longer than had been anticipated and was still underway 
at the time of my visit in 1997. The kind of reasons given by the leader as to why it had 
12 1 gathered details about the Foundation's short history mainly from their most recent report: Romani Bah 
Foundation "Report" September 1997, and also from the interviews and general conversations. The purpose of the 
report was to show 
iheir 'results' to the donors concerned. Copies would then be issued to any interested parties, 
including local officials, for example, during meetings. 
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yet to be completed ranged from factors of bad weather conditions to a lack of materials. 
At this point no references were made to wider structural problems within the NGO 
sector or indeed institutional obstacles posed by local authorities. 
In August 1996, with the support of BHC, Gueorgiev and those involved in the original 
project extended their activities through the realisation of a parallel project. The aims, this 
time, were to provide, free of charge, legal and administrative consultation. The 1997 
Report stated that the creation of this project was seen as a necessary response to the 
needs of the surrounding Gypsy population, who were largely unfamiliar with Bulgarian 
legislation and had no means by which to pay for legal services. This consultancy 
required engaging the support of professional lawyers. A Gadjo lawyer was subsequently 
employed setting the precedent for inter-ethnic, or inter-community co-operation. At 
first, the lawyees role was only at the level of consultation. It was soon realised, however, 
that this status needed to be expanded to allow for active intervention in judicial 
problems. This project was called Godi e Romenge (Help for Roma) and was financed by 
the European Roma Rights Centre, Hungary. The existence of these two projects 
forinalised the establishment of the Romani Bah Foundation. 
When the legal consultation got underway paid staff were gradually taken on, which at 
the time of my visit included the following (all were Gypsies except Betty and the two 
lawyers): Gueorgiev (Executive director), Maria (Administrative Director), Metodi 
Majarov (Technician), Betty (Social Assistance Project Leader), Bistra (Accountant), 
Yanush (collaborator, not officially on the pay roll but took a percentage from the 
lawyers fees) and Metodi Dimitrov (Life Saving Vouchers Scheme Project Leader). On 
average they earned about US$ 100 per month except Yanush whose wage as a percentage 
of the lawyers was smaller. Extra staff included builders and security men, who were 
employed from the local community, as well as two practising lawyers. Their wages 
come out of the funding provided for the Godi e Romenge Project. This formed a steady 
base from which the foundation could appeal for more funding, employ more people and 
get more equipment, which they saw as an ongoing process. 
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8.6 Current activities 
The glamour and prestige associated with the American way of life is synonymous with 
that of the West for many people in Eastern Europe. Just as people living in the West 
have misconstrued pre-conceptions about Eastern Europe, so do those in the East have 
about the West. This office, however, was far from glamorous. Instead, it was 
industrious, sometimes unpredictable and like with any other office it was, at times, 
rather dull. 
The first time I visited their office I was met by Maria at the end tram-stop nearest to 
Faculteta. She had phoned me the day before to arrange for me to come. It seemed that an 
entire afternoon had been put aside for my visit. With Maria and my interpreter, we were 
then driven the rest of the way by Gueorgiev, the 'executive director. Gueorgiev had 
ensured that all the staff were present. Including my interpreter and me, there were eight 
people present for the interview. Gueorgiev's status became clear in the course of the 
interview, in which he took the leading role either giving information, or allocating 
someone else to. From the beginning, Gueorgiev made it clear that I had to co-ordinate 
any future visits to Faculteta through him. My immediate status as Gadjo indicated to 
Gueorgiev that I was to be 'controlled' to some extent. This was typical of most of my 
contact with Gypsy led NGOs throughout Bulgaria, most of whom were insistent on 
taking charge of my visits to Gypsy mahalas. 13 Such power politics among Gypsy leaders 
towards Gadjos, whereby they are keen to exert some kind of social control in order to 
protect the interests of Gypsies as a group, have also been observed in other contexts, 
showing that this was not something peculiar to this foundation. 14 
The relaxed and informal nature of the initial meeting was typical of all my subsequent 
meetings with them and contrasted sharply with the tendency on the part of Gueorgiev to 
13 E. g. The URU in Sliven, the FRD in Plovdiv, and the Roma Foundation in Rousse. 
14 Sutherland, for example, discusses it in her study of Gypsy politics in the United States. While acknowledging that 
one of the most apparent characteristics of the politically active Rom in the USA is that they are almost constantly 
involved in conflict with each other. Sutherland also makes the point that they have an equally strong sense of 
solidarity as a group. Ann Sutherland, Gypsies: The Hidden Americans, Tavistock, London, 1975. pp. 97-138. 
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control me. They had laid on food and drinks with traditional Gypsy music playing in the 
background. Later, they referred to the music and asked if I liked it. Laughing, they then 
joked that they were'setting the right atmosphere'. This seemed to signal, however subtly, 
one way in which a 'public transcript', i. e. popular Gypsy music, was used to assist in 
their hidden one, i. e. their task of enlisting support. The popular face of Gypsy culture 
was again being self-consciously played back to the Gadjo in order to engage their 
support (which in this case was me), or as in their own words 'to set the right atmosphere'. 
This atmosphere was further enhanced by a spacious, well equipped and thoughtfully 
decorated office. There were plants and traditional Gypsy crafts, such as baskets and 
dried flowers displayed around the room. They were all obviously proud of their office, 
which was demonstrated in their dedication to its cleanliness and upkeep. 
Gueorgiev and Maria were clearly the most prominent actors within this NGO. Gueorgiev 
had been instrumental in setting it up and Maria shortly followed. As a result, both came 
across as the most confident and informed. Although my first meeting with Maria had 
been rather short, my second meeting with her, 6 weeks later, got off to a more promising 
start. In my absence, she had read an article about me in '24 Chasa', a Bulgarian daily 
tabloid. It had stated that I had been attacked by a group of Gypsies in Stolipinovo (the 
main Gypsy mahala in Plovdiv), who had stolen US$5,000 from me. On my return I 
explained to her, that, although I had had some money stolen from me (US$60), it was in 
the city centre and I had never identified the thief, never mind claimed it to be a Gypsy. 
Our agreement about the ludicrous nature of the story formed some, albeit tentative, 
common ground. It was during the course of my participant observation that we became 
closer. With my entering into a world unfamiliar to me, and with her excessive workload 
and stress, we found much solace and enjoyment in each other's company. 
A few days after my initial meeting I returned to the office as arranged for a closer look 
around the district of Faculteta. During this visit Gueorgiev invited me to come back and 
'work! with them for a couple of weeks, in order that I gain more of an idea about what 
the foundation was really like. He also invited me to a wedding that evening, which he 
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himself was attending with his family in the city centre. Welcoming opportunities as they 
arose, I accepted his invitation for both. We met in the reception as planned, where he 
introduced me to all his family. While waiting to enter the main hall, he advised me that 
later I would be expected to give some money to the bride's mother, a tradition that every 
guest was expected to carry out to help with expenses. In much the same manner I was 
included into all the various proceedings that typified such an event, whether it be 
dancing, eating or drinking. A live Gypsy band provided the music, which played a 
mixture of Bulgarian and Gypsy music. His delight in showing me this other side of 
Gypsy life embodied Gueorgiev's whole approach to his work. In their work they were 
encouraged not to differentiate between NGO work and everyday living; each was to 
inform the other. Staff members would partake in celebrations in the office or at each 
other's homes. One day, for example, I, along with Gueorgiev, Maria, Bistra and Yanush 
were invited to Metodi's house for lunch. His wife had cooked a huge meal, during which 
they seized the opportunity to find out more about me. Not restrained by office structures, 
and within a more informal setting, they felt at ease to question me about myself and my 
family. This more relaxed, open approach fed into their work and provided a friendly, 
although at times volatile base. 
A sense of good hurnour permeated the office punctuated by intermittent outbursts from 
Gueorgiev. A day of celebration, for example, with the marriage of one of the lawyers, 
would be followed by a day of tense relations. The level of activity would also shift 
dramatically from one day to the next depending on external developments such as new 
announcements on social assistance, or the supply of electricity. In these circumstances 
much of the time was spent either frantically filling out forms, or sitting around waiting 
for the electricity to come back on. On a number of occasions we were plunged into 
darkness without warning for indefinite periods of time. 
There was a sense that everyone had their own tasks. This was demonstrated in the initial 
introductions, in that each member of staff was defined according to their 'position'. 
However, in reality, their roles often overlapped, where for example, filling out social 
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assistance forms for the local inhabitants demanded the help of everyone in the office at 
that time regardless of their ascribed status. " On another level, and typical of all project- 
based, donor-dependent NGOs, all employees were driven by at least one motive, that is, 
to keep the NGO alive. Work for everyone would grow more hectic as new projects 
needed to be designed and proposals polished up. This meant having to pool efforts in the 
devising of new projects, an endeavour which Gueorgiev was keen to encourage, even 
with me. Wanting to make the most of my presence, Gueorgiev asked me to assist 
Majarov and Maria in putting together those proposals that needed to be composed in 
English. While being of help to him, such interaction was also of great benefit to me and 
my own agenda. I was able to forge closer links with other members of the staff and get a 
sense of how projects were composed and how NGO workers viewed them. 
8.7 The 'Godi e Romenge' Project 
This project formed the central pillar to this foundation and was based on the provision of 
a legal consultancy. Held three times a week at set times, two practising Bulgarian 
lawyers would come at their allotted time to give feedback on on-going cases or take note 
of new ones. This project was aimed specifically at offering a legal mediator between the 
communities in Faculteta and the local state institutions. At first it provided help with a 
variety of urgent cases. Gradually, however, the emphasis shifted towards cases that were 
tied to wider issues of human rights. Representing Gypsies in criminal cases constituted a 
substantial part of their work with the foundation. One of the lawyers had just settled a 
case for one of her clients, who, charged with stealing 500 pairs of shoes, was at risk of 
being imprisoned for a large number of years. " However, she had managed to get a 
reduced sentence of 18 months, with the possibility of early release on the payment of a 
fine. In most cases the defence of criminal cases involved a lengthy preliminary 
investigation and detention and court hearings could be delayed for over a year, during 
which the client would be forcibly detained. " 
15 However, this did not tend to include Gueorgiev. 
16 In Bulgaria, sentencing criteria still rests upon the former system, which, the lawyer acknowledged, was totally 
outdated. 
17 See for example, European Roma Rights Centre (ed. ), Profession: Prisoner - Roma in Detention In Bulgaria, 
Country Reports Series No. 6, December, Budapest, 1997. 
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While part of their work was defending people in criminal cases, an equally common 
legal problem that they had to deal with was the legalising of newly built houses. A 
substantial number of the houses in Faculteta were built on either state or municipal land 
without planning permission. As this was in breach of the Territorial and Urban 
Development Act, the municipality had the right to confiscate these plots without 
compensation. The foundation recognised the potentially disastrous implications of this, 
especially in light of a new regulation plan drawn up in 1993 which required that 30 per 
cent of housing in Facultata be forcibly purchased. The need for inhabitants to become 
legal owners of their own homes was therefore all the more urgent. This involved 
intervening and speeding up the process of acquiring the necessary title deeds, which at 
best could take up to two to three months. Three witnesses are needed to testify that the 
person in question had lived in their property for at least ten years. On one occasion a 
local elderly man came to seek advice concerning his on-going problem with legalising 
his house. He wanted to ensure that before he died he became the legal owner of his 
home, thereby keeping it within the family. Although he had the necessary witnesses, in 
order that the title deed be granted, a state representative had to come and view the 
property. However, despite promises from the department concerned, no such 
representative had yet come. In the meantime he could do nothing but wait. This was 
typical of many of the cases that the lawyers at this foundation had to deal with. 
The legal registration of children was another key issue for the Godi e Romenge Project. 
For a marriage to be legally valid in Bulgaria it had to go through the proper channels as 
set out by state law. Many marriages, however, within Gypsy communities were carried 
out according only to Gypsy traditional law. " As a result many marriages within Gypsy 
communities were not legally recognised. As a consequence, children born of Gypsy 
parents were often defined as 'fatherless'. Gypsy parents therefore had to go through a 
legal process of registering the father of the child in order that they be defined as the 
18 Stewart discusses in his book on the Rom in Hungary that, in Gypsy culture it tends to be only birth and death 
ceremonies which require the church, and that marriage ceremonies remain a private affair insofar as they are not 
legally recognised by the state. Michael Stewart, The Time of the Gypsies, Westview Press, Oxford, 1997. 
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rightful guardians. This was important for gaining access to rights otherwise denied to 
them such as certain state allowances. 
During my stay, a young couple came in seeking advice on this very issue having just had 
a baby. Although they had had a Gypsy wedding it had not been carried out according to 
Bulgarian state law and so their marriage was not legally recognised. They therefore had 
to fill out a special form that would register the father of the child. This marked the 
beginning of a fairly simple process which required the writing and signing of a 
declaration. There would be no need for court proceedings. However, advice on and 
support for filling out the form was necessary, with which only Betty was directly 
familiar having previously worked for the Social Services. 
Tied in with this were implications of securing child maintenance for those mothers who 
did not have a father registered for their child. The payment of child allowance and 
benefits for single mothers was therefore another major issue. Although by law single 
mothers were eligible for social security, in most cases those single mothers who were 
Gypsies were denied payments on the basis of discrimination. The lawyers, in such cases, 
had specific roles to play in pursuing these claims. While illustrating the kind of direct 
work this foundation was employed in, it also served to highlight the importance of 
having outsiders' "expertise". 
8.8 Project proposals 
One of the issues that dominated their work during my stay was a concern with finding 
ways to stretch funding to meet unanticipated costs. This had direct implications for the 
payment of wages, which was the cause of much tension within the office, although not 
expressed formally. It also affected the payment of the high legal fees, and those wages 
needed for the extra security guards, which was a new requirement given that interior 
development on the school was about to begin. 
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One of the main concerns for the NGO during my stay was the need to create new angles 
on the main existing project, Godi e Romenge, in order to extend its rapidly expiring 
funding beyond its original time limit. However, it was not possible to return to the 
original donors, the ERRC, as it was stipulated that they could only fund a NGO once. 
This meant that the Romani Bah Foundation had to look elsewhere. The last resort was 
Phare. There was a genuine fear that they may not have work in 6 months time. The 
parallel development of entirely new projects was therefore also actively encouraged. 
There was an awareness on their part of having to use a particular language when 
applying for funding. " Not only was it necessary to comply with the criteria set out by 
the donors, but it was essential that the correct terminology was adopted. For example, in 
their description of those Gypsies living within 'Cambodia' - the name given by residents 
to the 'ghetto' within Faculteta - the foundation used terms of 'social isolation! and 
problems of 'integration'. 
People here are illiterate and unemployed, hence it is dijfIcult for them to maintain their 
families and look after their children, who are forced, from a very young age, instead of 
attending school, tofind a way ofmaking a living. This condemns them to total isolation in 
future and it is impossiblefor them to be integrated socially. " 
These references to ideas of 'total isolation' and difficulties of 'integration! do not add 
anything to their point about illiteracy and unemployment, and therefore act as a 
rhetorical device. The deployment of such terminology is a deliberate response to the 
expectations placed on them as a NGO. However, by doing so they did not necessarily 
fall into the trap of laying the blame with these particular Gypsies themselves, for 
elsewhere structural obstacles were explicitly identified. For example, they cite, "the 
numerous instances of refusal on the part of the Social Security Service [ ... ] to receive 
applications for children allowances and benefits for single mothers" as an important 
source of poverty for many families. " 
19 Again this is not peculiar to Gypsy NGOs in Eastern Europe and has been noted in other similar contexts. For 
example, Bruno, op. cit. 
20 Romani Bah Foundation "Report", September 1997. p. 6. 
21 ibid. 
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It was often the case that concepts of 'integration' and 'civil society' would be 
appropriated even in those cases when they were not directly relevant. Their proposal for 
the carrying out of a socio-demographic survey of Faculteta was one example of this 
process. Combining Betty's knowledge of the social services and Majarov's 'knack' at 
composing the appropriate language, ' and in co-operation with the Democracy Center, it 
was hoped that they would be able to secure funding from Phare for a period of at least 6 
months. Based on a genuine commitment to securing reliable data for this particular 
district it was hoped that much needed accurate information would be made available to 
policy makers. It was also hoped that employment opportunities would be created for 
local Gypsies in terms of the task force that would be required. In their application for 
funding, however, their emphasis was expressed not so much in terms of providing vital 
employment for local residents, but more in terms of Western concepts of participation 
and civil society: 
This socio-demographic survey of Faculteta will be carried out by a Romani foundation 
which in itsetfstands testimony to the increased social role Roma are playing in Bulgarian 
society. That such organisations are participating in the search for solutions to important 
questions is a sign ofthe development ofa civil society. " 
After submission it was returned soon after with the request to to provide a more detailed 
breakdown of costs, CVs of all those involved and a letter from the Democracy Center. 
Most significant, however, was their request for an expansion of the section on 
democracy and civil society in terms of how exactly this project would contribute more 
profoundly to the work of the Democracy Centre. In compliance with the donor's 
stipulations these tasks were carried out without delay. 
Another example was a proposal for a project concerned with improving residential 
policies towards Gypsy homes. The long term goals of their project were to improve the 
conditions for the Gypsy population, in terms of education and health. Real and practical 
22 In the words of the secretary, MaJarov was renowned for his ability to come up with all the right 'bullshit'. 
23 Romani Bah Foundation and Centre for the Study of Democracy, "Project: Socio-Demographic Survey of the 
Population of Tacultela'Distria"t 1997. 
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objectives were established in terms of changing legal structures, improving 
infrastructure and tackling poverty. Within the framework of their project proposal, 
however, they stated that this would, "improve the economic status of all Roma in 
Bulgaria and thereby help smooth their integration into macro-society. 1,24 Again, we can 
see the subtle insertion of NGO rhetoric as shaped by the liberal discourse of 'integration. ' 
Using this particular frame of reference NGOs like the Romani Bah Foundation could 
place into mainstream discussion more radical proposals for improving the situation of 
Gypsies. 
Using a similar framework, they also formulated a proposal for the British Embassy 
based on education. They asked for funding to carry out a comparative survey of two 
different schools in a nearby district. One would be a school that was composed entirely 
of Bulgarian pupils, and the other of Gypsy pupils. The aim would be to compare 
attendance, teaching methods, success rates and problems. The findings would then be 
published and presented to state bodies. As part of the overall project, they also asked for 
further funding on their existing project to renovate the local school, in terms of 
providing basic materials, such as books and computers. The agenda of the project was 
ultimately direct and practical, yet also had long term implications for drawing attention 
to and enabling further research into the ethnic dimensions of schooling. 
Their proposals for education reform and their focus on improving local schools were 
rooted not so much in improving the vocational curriculum in order that Gypsies become 
more interested (often the focus of other NGOs), but in redressing the imbalance in 
education that systematically discriminated against them. Through demonstration (they 
were partaking in university courses themselves) as well as through concrete project 
proposals such as this, this foundation showed a commitment to promoting education not 
just as a tool for Gypsy survival, but for their equal participation in formal as well as 
informal societal structures. 
24 Romani Bah Foundation, "Project: Territorial Structure of Roma Regions and Residential Policy of the Roma 
Community"I 1997. 
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Finally, although they did not discuss participation as a methodology, the aims and 
strategies of this foundation were clearly concerned with finding concrete ways to 
encourage greater Gypsy participation. One of the ways they were doing this was by 
bringing representatives from the Gypsy community into processes of decision-making in 
the form of a Community Council. This council consisted of nine members, all of whom 
were Gypsies 'with a good reputation' who lived in Faculteta. Decisions would normally 
be taken twice a month by this council at sessions chaired by one of the lawyers. Various 
issues would be discussed, such as what legal cases would be taken up and who was 
eligible for receiving legal aid. Representatives from the Community Council would also 
be present during NGO meetings with outside bodies, such as the electricity board. 
Therefore rather than arguing that foundations like Romani Bah did not believe in 
principles of democracy and participation it is possible to see that by taking Gypsies as 
their starting point they were more concerned with using such concepts in order to 
promote the rights of Gypsies. This stood in contrast to those NGOs that held human 
rights as pivotal to their work. They tended to use the degree of Gypsy integration as a 
yardstick by which to measure the extent to which democracy or civil society had 
developed. The activities of these types of NGOs in the field of Gypsy rights therefore 
represented more a means to an end rather than a vital strategy in its own right. 
8.9 Internal Relations 
As with all office politics, there was a mixture of simmering tension and strong 
friendships within the workplace. Daily meetings were held either at the beginning or at 
the end of each working day in which every member of staff attended including, when 
convenient, the two lawyers. Led by Gueorgiev, these staff meetings were important for 
discussing and evaluating problems and progress, as well as pooling ideas. Tasks would 
be allocated and roles within the foundation confirmed. For example, Gucorgicv was 
keen to stress to one of the lawyers present during one such meeting that, as a legal 
representative for this foundation, her presence at official meetings was vital. 
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Those within the foundation saw the relationship that had been forged with the lawyers as 
having strengthened their credibility with other NGOs and most importantly with local 
authorities. However, Gueorgiev's hiring of a Gadjo employee from Social Services, had 
not been so warmly welcomed. As the only non-Gypsy Bulgarian full time member of 
staff, her role within the foundation was the cause of underlying tensions. Gueorgiev had 
hired Betty without the consent of the rest of the staff, who, on their part, initially 
resented his decision. The conflicts that surrounded this Bulgarian member of staff 
pointed towards a number of interesting points. She had only recently just begun, having 
started just a few months before my arrival, and was finding it difficult to fit in. The first 
time this became obvious was during my flrst meeting with them. When I had taken a few 
moments to absorb the breadth of infonnation that had been delivered to me, Betty 
openly empathised with me. She said that she understood the difficulty of grasping 
everything at first, a comment that would grow in significance during the course of my 
stay there. 
Due to close contact with one of the staff members and observations of my own, it 
became clear that Betty was perceived by most of the staff as some kind of threat. Maria, 
in justifying her own remarks about Betty being an outsider, explained how Betty acted 
and how she was at first received by the other members of staff. Much to everyone else's 
amusement Betty had at first apparently 'clucked' around Gueorgiev, asking if he wanted 
a cup of tea, or needed any help. This confirmed to the others that she was an outsider, 
not so much because Betty had somehow mistook Gueorgiev as the leader, for he clearly 
was, but because her behaviour displayed a lack of awareness about how to behave within 
a Gypsy NGO. According to Maria, she treated Gueorgiev as the boss, rather than a team 
leader. Despite her comments about feeling over-worked and under valued by Gueorgicv, 
who contrary to earlier promises had failed to promote her to the status of co-director, 
Maria strongly maintained that this foundation did not run on a hierarchy. 25 
25 Maria told me of how her mother had come into the office on a number of occasions to complain to Gucorgiev about 
working her too hard. Maria had used to work seven day weeks, but this had recently been reduced to six days. 
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This comical view of Betty being 'out of touch' was quickly replaced by feelings of 
frustration on the part of Maria, and according to her, the others too. She argued that 
Betty often referred to Gypsies as 'your people' and always claimed to know more than 
'them', i. e. the Gypsy members of staff. However, Gueorgiev had employed her precisely 
because she had experience with Social Services, a major component of their work, and 
according to a reliable colleague, she had always displayed a healthy attitude towards 
Gypsies. It was clear that Gueorgiev could offer her more money working for him, and in 
return he could benefit from her insider's knowledge of the Social Services. 
Despite (or because of) this obvious tactic of employing a Gadjo, not only in an attempt 
to build Gypsy and Gadjo relations, but also to have some expertise in the otherwise 
hostile sphere of social services, Betty was ultimately received as an outsider, who would 
always be an outsider. Although the lawyers were also Gadjo, they were not treated by 
the others with as much suspicion, rather they were welcomed. The status of the lawyers 
was markedly different from that of Betty. Betty was employed full-time and her work 
was fully integrated with the others. The boundaries of her work were therefore not 
clearly marked out. In contrast, the lawyers came to the office only for three set periods 
per week and were employed on negotiated terms that clearly defined their specific tasks 
of representing Gypsies in the Gadjo world. This subtle distinction in terms of the 
grounds on which they were employed shaped their status within the foundation and how 
they were received by the existing NGO staff members. 
Maria, herself, was an 'outsider' to some extent in that she had been brought up on a 
mixed estate on the other side of Sofia. She distuingushed herself from her co-workers 
and from the'ghetto mentality' in general. She believed that those who lived in Faculteta 
were trapped by their circumstances to a large extent and could not see a world beyond 
their own. For her, though, it was different. She had gone to university, she now had a 
Gueorgiev remained firm on other grounds, however. He still refused to pay her social security and was reluctant for 
her to study for a degree while working for him. 
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job, she was fluent in another language, and she wanted more. Her determination to 'do 
something'with her life contrasted sharply with some of the other members of staff Not 
all the members of staff were educated to her level. Most of them lived and had been 
brought up in Faculteta. Two of them in particular were more comfortable speaking 
Romani rather than Bulgarian. Indeed, the language spoken when dealing with 
inhabitants from the quarter was nearly always Romani. Furtherstill, the participation in a 
Public Administration course at the New Bulgarian University, was proving to be hard 
and far from stimulating for certain members of the staff. 
Maria often expressed frustration with what she saw as time wasting on the part of some 
of her colleagues. Embroiled in the gossip of everyday life in Faculteta, these members of 
staff held themselves back from pushing themselves professionally within the foundation, 
therefore imposing the bulk of the workload on her. In turn, she was increasingly aware 
of how such apathy reflected poorly on the foundation as a whole, undermining the trust 
that she and Gueorgiev had found so hard initially to build with the community. During 
the daily staff meetings, the imbalance of input soon became apparent, where some were 
clearly more willing than others to contribute. 
8.10 External relations 
Maria, as one of the original employees of this foundation, had spoken of early 
difficulties with building up trust with local communities. However, their relations with 
the surrounding community at the time of my visit seemed productive and stable. The 
employment of locals by the foundation, coupled with the provision of a friendly legal 
and social service in terms of advice and practical help made the foundation immediately 
accessible to the surrounding inhabitants, who on their part seemed to be making 
effective use of it. The relationship of this foundation with other NGOs was also fairly 
strong, based on existing networks carved out by BHC. Through their Godi e Romenge 
Project, for example, the Romani Bah Foundation organised in co-operation with the 
BHC, CEGA and the Inter Ethnic Initiative for Human Rights, a conference aimed at 
tackling problems of infrastructure and town planning associated with Gypsy urban 
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settlements like Faculteta. The conference, which took place on 25-26 June 1997, 
involved representatives from the parliament and Council of Ministers as well as from 
local authorities and NGO members from across Bulgaria. 
However, the foundation had to contend with wider problems inherent to the NGO 
structure. An example of this was with the types of problems they encountered with 
their life saving vouchers scheme. This scheme, aimed at meeting the costs of medical 
care for those who could not afford it and working in co-operation with the BHC, was 
funded by the Foundation Aid to Charity in Bulgaria. The Romani Bah Foundation had 
agreements with the Fifth City Clinic and Hospital and the Third United Regional 
Hospital. There were numerous examples of patients who had so far benefited from this 
scheme. However, administrative problems had soon begun to arise. The donors, as part 
of their conditions for funding, were demanding weekly reports from the hospital 
administrators. However, the hospitals involved claimed that they could not produce their 
reports so quickly. Therefore, the Romani Bah Foundation had to negotiate with both 
parties to try and find a solution. This was one illustration of the kind of problems that 
existed in terms of the conflicts between the expectations of the donors and everyday 
demands that workers faced at the ground level. 
The foundation also had to face obstacles put up by local authorities; by being included 
into the NGO sector they were effectively being cut off from real decision making at 
governmental levels. NGOs were accepted by the government at a formal level insofar 
as they relieved some of the responsibilities of the state. However, at the ground level 
anything beyond this formal recognition was underpinned by a general sense of 
uneasiness towards NGOs on the part of local officials. This was evident in the types of 
relations maintained by Gypsy NGOs and various state bodies at the local level, the 
nature of which depended on the type of state body and its place within the overall 
hierarchy. 
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First there were those state bodies that were more distanced from central control, which 
included, for example, telephone companies and emergency services. The problems faced 
by this foundation in attempting to co-operate with these particular local authorities were 
made explicit when their services were required in Faculteta. It seemed the case that those 
Gypsies living in Faculteta could not rely on local emergency services if taken seriously 
ill. Even when help was sought from the NGO in terms of making the necessary phone 
calls, which during my stay happened on two occasions, the line was either cut, or the 
ambulance simply refused to come. 
Slightly higher up in the hierarchy were those bodies involved in official state business, 
but which also had some degree of autonomy. This included, for example, the Statistical 
Institute of Bulgaria. The foundation had written to this institute asking for data to be 
gathered in the region specifically on Gypsies. They received a lengthy reply that 
explained how this would not be possible given that they were short of available 
resources and such a project would be very costly. They claimed that a broad survey of 
the whole of Sofia was being planned for 1999 and that ultimately it was not just Gypsies 
who were suffering but the entire population of Bulgaria. Gueorgiev and the others were 
very cynical about this response, seeing it as yet another 'brush off. While relatively 
powerless in these cases, in others, the Romani Bah Foundation were finding ways to 
actively resist the tendency for Gypsy NGOs to be pushed out of decision making bodies. 
Their persistence in organising meetings with different members of the local authority 
was one of the ways they used their NGO to lobby state bodies and put pressure on local 
authorities. One such meeting was organised during my visit to the Foundation's office 
and was concerned with the question of electricity supply in Faculteta. This provided an 
example of their interaction with institutions which were more closely connected with 
state structures. Although the Electricity board had installed two transformers, Faculteta 
was at that time experiencing severe problems with electricity supply, with frequent 
power cuts. The meeting that the foundation had initially arranged never took place; the 
state representatives imply had not turned up. Gueorgiev therefore rescheduled it for the 
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following week. A day before this meeting they received a phone call from the 
Municipality of Sofia, who explained that they themselves could not be present, and that 
they would instead send over a representative from the International Department, who, of 
course, had no direct interest or influence in this matter. 
Despite these obstacles, the meeting went ahead with members of the foundation, the 
Electricity Board, representatives from the International Department of the Municipality, 
Social Services and members of the Community Council. Its aim was to find ways of 
solving the problems of electricity in their quarter that would be mutually beneficial. 
However, it was made largely ineffective by the overall reluctance to co-operate on the 
part of the local authority representatives. They attempted to justify their refusal to 
provide an improved service by their claims that the inhabitants did not pay their bills. 
The foundation however, made the point that many houses in Faculteta were not fitted 
with electricity meters, which meant that inhabitants were often over-charged. But claims 
such as these were dismissed. It was obvious that the official representatives were not 
taking this meeting seriously, they were ill prepared, their contributions were superficial 
and they were eager to leave as soon as it was over. The other participants could not hide 
their frustration including the Bulgarian lawyer, who, together with Gueorgiev, felt it had 
been a total waste of time and believed that it may have caused more damage than good. 
Finally, there were those actors who were much higher up within the state hierarchy, and 
in this case included the Chief of Social Services. A special meeting was arranged with 
the Chief of Social Services, which involved the director of the foundation, one of the 
lawyers and two other employees. It took place in the foundation's office, which in itself 
marked an important step towards encouraging greater co-operation between state 
officials and Gypsy communities. However, in this case this was as far as the co- 
operation went. The meeting was gridlocked by the stubborn refusal of the Chief of 
Social Services to co-operate. During the discussion he simply kept on repeating "I do not 
want to work with you". Given his relative importance within the state hierarchy such 
comments carried with them considerable weight. He explained that he had only come 
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here as a favour to the Gypsies of Faculteta, and had no intentions of negotiating any joint 
project with their foundation. He saw NGO projects as causing more harm than good in 
that they raised high expectations that could never be met. Nevertheless, those present put 
forward proposals such as the setting up of a bureau for Social Services in Faculteta. 
Complaints were also made about the high level of discrimination in the Social Services 
experienced by Gypsies. The Chief of Social Services however, declined any proposals 
and denied the existence of any major discrimination. As a result, no concessions were 
made on either side. 
These relations with state officials at the various levels give some indication of the nature 
of the obstacles that this foundation as one concerned with Gypsies had to face. 
Relations with external bodies tended to rest upon the tension between, on the one hand, a 
new legal obligation on the part of state authorities to at least give the impression of co- 
operation with Gypsy communities, yet on the other hand, continued institutionalised 
discrimination and deep rooted prejudice. This was apparent across the board from high 
up within the state structure down to the attitudes of emergency services. NGOs like the 
Romani Bah Foundation, however, had no choice but to work within this new, albeit 
limited, scope for articulating social, cultural and political demands. The problems that 
this gave rise to were illustrated in the types of conflicts that emerged in response to the 
device of employing both Gadjo and Gypsy staff (seen as necessary for forging links with 
both sets of communities), as well as the complex mixture of compliance and resistance 
that characterised NGO-donor relations. 
8.11 The hidden dimension 
Rather than simply presenting evidence of 'good practice', the focus on this particular 
foundation offered a means to explore the hidden dimension lcft out by social exclusion 
theory. This did not always entail 'good practice' but, instead, consisted of a dual process 
of compliance and resistance in the articulation of evolving rights and changing identities 
on the part of those active within it. This case study is therefore important insofar as 
providing an example of how one particular type of Gypsy-led NGO worked. 
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Nevertheless, as part of the broader analysis it also gives some indication of the ways in 
which NGOs in general have been appropriated by the 'Gypsy elite' and extended to 
include local Gypsies from a variety of backgrounds. Furthermore, it highlights some of 
the ways in which social exclusion theory fails in its task of helping us to understand the 
core processes or situations it identifies. 
The case study revealed a number of interesting questions about the extent to which 
different degrees of resistance and compliance could be detected in the day-to-day 
activities of a Gypsy-led foundation, most notably in terms of their project proposals, the 
organisation of conferences and meetings and their internal and external relations. These 
all point towards interesting sites of conflict, that far from indicating passivity, or 
isolation, represent the very stuff of proactive interaction between Gadjo and Gypsies, 
and between NGOs and state structures. This in itself highlights some of the difficulties 
that exist with the use of social exclusion theory, for such an approach can easily fail to 
account for the complex relations that tie groups dismissed as socially excluded to wider 
society and vice versa. 
It was possible to argue that those Gypsies working for the foundation carried with them 
an awareness of and willingness to use existing strategies of survival within a public 
discourse of Western democracy. It was hoped that this would enhance moves for 
improving their position in society, whether it be through the promotion of social, human 
or employment rights. First, there was the employment of local Gypsies, such as the 
security officers who were known as the eyes and ears of the foundation. Together with 
builders and other members of staff, these locals worked alongside Gadjos and Gypsies 
from other neighbourhoods. This created the necessary direct link between the foundation 
and the community in terms of being able to tap into the 'grape vine' of the community, 
vital for the broadcasting of new information and for general awareness raising. The links 
were also important for the community members themselves who on a professional basis 
were in regular contact with 'outsiders'. The building of the foundation on existing 
community structures was therefore vital for both parties involved. 
333 
Second, were the politics of disguise and anonymity that oflcn characterised Gypsy 
survival strategies in respect of community leadership and which were also a feature of 
this foundation. Gypsies in Bulgarian society as elsewhere are viewed as an 
indistinguishable mass. Indeed at a surface level and according to Bulgarian newspapers, 
there were very few discernible individuals within the Gypsy community who stood OUt. 26 
Although not formally referred to as such, directors of Gypsy NGOs such as Gueorgiev, 
however, were proving to be important political leaders. 
While constrained within the apolitical world of NGOs, Gypsy leaders were in real terms 
taking on broader political issues of Gypsy survival, which had no place in decision 
making in any formal sense. They could lobby and try to influence, but they did not 
necessarily have the legal basis or support to push this further. Resting on informal 
mechanisms of leadership was therefore paramount for NGO directors, such as 
Gueorgiev. This meant that those working for a NGO could pursue political interests 
without necessarily breaking legal codes. However, in Gueorgiev's case, his position as 
Gypsy leader was somewhat ambiguous. The location of his office in Faculteta and his 
concern with projects aimed directly towards it had, to a large extent, reinforced 
Gueorgiev's leader status within this community. However, at the same time his close ties 
with Faculteta served to weaken his position as leader among state officials. His 
'anonymity' in this case proved an important source of self-protection at one level, yet at 
another hindered his credibility within official realms. 
Third, was that despite the use of Bulgarian and English in more formal situations, they 
actively used the Romany language (or more specifically the Romany-Erlides dialect) in 
everyday transactions within the foundation and in communications with community 
members. This ran parallel with an overt expression of pride in Gypsy traditions of 
26 Such as Manush Romanov, a prominent Gypsy leader from the Communist era; Peter Gueugiev a BSP politician; 
and the Tsar Kiro (the Gypsy King). Reports of Tsar Kiro's activities are often found in Bulgarian newspapers, most 
of which paint a negative picture of him. For example "Gonyat Tsar Kiro ot kmetstvo v Plovdiv" (The persecution of 
Tsar Kiro by Plovdiv Municipality), Standart. 18 March 1997, which tells of his involvement in a semi-legal alcohol 
production 'scarW. Although he is far from a credible figure among the Gypsy communities in Bulgaria, he is still 
taken by the media as representative of them. 
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marriage, celebrations, music and skills, such as basket making. These were all features 
found in the office setting and incorporated into the working day. " This would become 
especially important when meetings with officials were held at the office. %ile they 
were there to discuss issues raised by the foundation, these state officials would also be 
confronted with popular images of Gypsy traditions. As discussed above this has 
implications for our understanding of their use of a public transcript to promote a hidden 
one; that is, of gaining support. Therefore it was possible to observe that traditional 
aspects of Gypsy cultural survival were placed alongside proposals that drew on liberal 
concerns of improving education and employment opportunities. 
While not denying the importance for greater formal integration, their main concern was 
with finding ways to improve directly the living conditions and cultural autonomy of 
surrounding Gypsy communities. For example, their proposals for education reform and 
their focus on improving local schools, were rooted not so much in improving the 
vocational curriculum in order that Gypsies become more interested (often the focus of 
other NGOs), but in redressing the imbalance in education that systematically 
discriminated against them. This was evident in the type of proposals they put forward, 
such as a comparative study of schools in the locality. Through demonstration (they were 
partaking in university courses themselves), as well as through concrete project 
proposals, this foundation showed a commitment to promoting education not just as a 
tool for Gypsy survival, but for their equal participation in formal as well as informal 
societal structures. 
The development of existing community networks, political anonymity, coupled with the 
persistence in the use of their own language and cultural traditions, helped to embrace 
more effectively interests and rights of Gypsies and in turn enhanced their work as a 
Gypsy-led foundation. Exploring the hidden dimension of the persistence of everyday 
survival strategies within the workplace, however, also had to account for the morc 
27 On a number of occasions at the end of a working day Gypsy employees would turn up the music and start dancing 
and singing. 
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restrictive elements of various traditions. Maria, for example, had a very clear idea about 
the foundation and her role within it. She explained to me that in her view there were two 
main problems affecting Gypsies in Bulgaria. First, they did not know their rights, and 
that simply explaining these rights to them was not enough. Second, various traditions 
practised by Gypsy communities served to prevent many from demanding these rights. In 
particular, women were held back by expectations of marriage and family demands, 
which she herself had had to struggle with. " She saw the role of Gypsy NGOs as 
therefore being only ever limited. Even if Gypsy organisations were to all join together, 
they alone would not be enough to break the 'vicious circle'. Her own experience of 
having broken the mould at one level, yet still restrained at another, informed this rather 
more pessimistic perspective. One of the lawyers too, expressed that, in his experience, 
the problems faced by Gypsies were twofold, where he believed that factors specific to 
Gypsy traditions were just as restrictive as the structures within Bulgarian society. 
The director however took a more optimistic view and believed that this foundation 
would be just one of the initial stages of a process that would end with the empowertnent 
of Gypsy communities. Rather than merely an administrative service, he wanted this 
foundation to act as a transient mediator between Gypsy communities and local 
authorities, which in time would be rendered redundant. This was something he explicitly 
expressed and was also evident in his organisation of meetings and conferences involving 
both Gypsies and state representatives. While stressing the importance for increased co- 
operation between Gypsy communities, NGOs and state institutions, he also felt 
passionately about keeping alive the different cultural traditions among Gypsies. His 
work was therefore equally concerned with supporting various festivals and celebrations. 
By carrying through existing survival strategies, adopting such mechanisms as the human 
rights approach and by leading a team of both Gypsies and Gadjos, this foundation was 
2'3 The gender constraints within Gypsy communities particularly for women in terms of marriage, the family and the 
taboo of menstruation have been explored by a number of scholars. See for example, Judith Okely, "Gypsy Women: 
Models in Conflict", in S. Ardener (cd. ), Perceiving Women, Malaby, London, 1975; Carol Silverman, "State, Market 
and Gender Relations among Bulgarian Roma, 1970-90", East European Anthropology Group, Autumn, 14 (2) 1996; 
Stewart, op. cit. 
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helping in the process of making the NGO sector as useful a tool for Gypsies as it was for 
policy makers. Those active within it, whether they be the locals, or the Bulgarian 
lawyers, were increasingly forcing Gypsy issues onto the public agenda. At the same time 
the close co-operation between community members and outside actors as worked 
through by this foundation served to question fundamental assumptions about Gypsy- 
Gadjo relations. This rested on the use of Western oriented concepts, interpreted in such a 
way as to draw attention to structural obstacles to equality and which were then played 
back to the donors and wider society in an acceptable format. Rather than denying that 
Gypsies were marginalised per se, they used this terminology to address explicitly 
questions of poverty and official policy by challenging the usual premise of placing 
responsibility ultimately with Gypsies themselves. The overall emphasis was on building 
two-way relations between Gypsies and Gadjos. Although at a personal level this was 
posing some problems, at a symbolic and political level it seemed to represent an 
important breakthrough, most notably in terms of their relations with the lawyers. 
8.12 Conclusions of the case study 
This case study explored the extent to which there was compliance and resistance on the 
part of those involved in the NGO. It also addressed the nature of both the benefits and 
drawbacks experienced by those who appropriated conceptual frameworks such as human 
rights. It was possible at a number of levels to observe the interaction of informal wider 
survival strategies with the types of strategies adopted within the formal NGO sphere. 
Explicit examples were noted such as the employment of locals and the continued use of 
Romany language, coupled with more subtle strategies of playing up traditional Gypsy 
images. There was also an awareness on the part of the relevant staff of the need to 
deploy the correct terminology when applying for funds. 
The use of the correct terminology went beyond just superficial insertion of phrascs, 
however. Conceptual frameworks of human rights and integration fcd into projccts and 
into the very working ethos of the foundation. In the project 'Godi e Romcnge', for 
example, human rights were adopted as a specific tool for providing infon-nation on 
337 
rights, legal advice and in many instances representing criminal cases. In this casc, the 
recognition of Gypsy rights alongside those of human rights was of central importance. 
Likewise, the adoption of ideas of integration helped inform the working prcmise of 
having both Gypsies and Gadjo work together under a Gypsy leadership. Although thcre 
were problems at a personal level, symbolically at least this represented an important 
strategy for Gypsy survival in formal and political spheres. 
The drawbacks of using such concepts, although less explicit, were of equal importance. 
In having to shape project proposals to suit specific agendas important elements of direct 
intervention could be lost. It was often the case that initial requests were asked to be re- 
worded or toned down. Ultimately, this case study showed that although foundations such 
as these were being used by its members in productive and challenging ways they were 
still having to operate within a particular framework shaped by the concerns of its donors. 
Therefore, although at one level it could be argued that like all those groups working 
within the NGO sector, Gypsies had access to a new set of potentially productive 
relations, at another level this foundation was not immune from the conflicts and the 
practical problems that underpinned it. 
8.13 Problems of 'inclusion' and implications for social exclusion theory 
The insights into some of the problems and prospects of Gypsies working within the 
NGO sector shed considerable light on to the complex question of social exclusion 
theory, and in particular its policy response of 'inclusion'. While the growing involvement 
of Gypsies in the Bulgarian NGO sector gives some indication of the extent to which this 
minority is already integrated into mainstream ideas of Bulgarian society, the nature of 
this involvement as one characterised by a small number of educated Gypsies, illustrates 
the way in which certain strands of Gypsy communities are more 'integrated' than otlicrs. 
Integration is not a static, nor indeed a linear process; it can take many forms according to 
position and context. It is certainly not a process to which only groups dismisscd as 
'excluded' or 'powerless' aspire. 
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Integration is a process that all members of society wish to partake in and oflcn do so to 
varying degrees. Therefore, to see NGOs as an important means of 'inclusion' for groups 
traditionally defined as living outside of or detached from Bulgarian society scrvcs to 
oversimplify and render meaningless this complex process. The instances of conflict and 
of co-operation that exist within and between Gypsy communities and NGOs show that 
this sector of Bulgarian society are very much intertwined into the complex dialectic of 
compliance and resistance that permeate societal relations in general. 
Only a certain strand of Gypsies in Bulgaria had the inclination or ability to incorporate 
themselves into the NGO sector. Therefore it would be misleading to argue that all 
Gypsies were actively participating in formal aspects of transition. However, it would be 
equally dangerous to dismiss altogether the role of Gypsy survival strategies in formal 
processes. As with all members of society the degree and scope of participation for 
Gypsies as a whole is not uniform, and is at least partly determined by opposing factors 
of privilege and disadvantage. At the same time, this foundation employed inhabitants of 
Faculteta whose upbringing had been far from privileged. Employing locals was 
important for the foundation in ternis of finding its place among the community and for 
tapping into traditional modes of communication. It was also important for the locals 
themselves, in that they had the opportunity to gain experience in and contact with formal 
state institutions. In this respect, the foundation represented a two-way process. 
Rather than simply a means of inclusion, or integration for Gypsies the NGO sector can 
act as political shield for national and international policy makers to disguise the lack of 
adequate state policy in this area. The NGO rationale and structure in Eastern Europe 
therefore carried with it certain constraints and obstacles that prevented its use within the 
given context from penetrating too deeply the structural elements to inequality. 
Therefore, while it provided a legitimate space within which Gypsy actors could extend 
and develop existing survival strategies, at the same time its potential for radical change 
remained limited. 
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Ultimately, one of the main pivots of social exclusion theory is that groups like Gypsics 
are socially excluded because they lack for whatever reason the necessary criteria for full 
participation in mainstream society. These criteria range from, to name but a few, an 
education, a job, and good health, to a stable home and lifestyle. Their inclusion thcrcforc 
requires that they learn the skills necessary for this criteria to be achieved, such as literacy 
or economic self-sustainability. This would then entail that they be better cquippcd to 
participate in and become accepted by mainstream society. However, it has bccome 
increasingly evident that the acquisition of such skills is not always a fair process nor 
does it achieve the intended results. 
The adaptation of Gypsy communities to formal social structures has been central to their 
survival, whether it be in terms of securing wage based employment or a fixed abode. 
However, this has not always secured Gypsies automatic acceptance by dominant society. 
This was evident during the Soviet era, where the settlement and involvement of Gypsies 
in wage labour did not always translate into their harmonious integration. This is also 
proving to be the case during the transition, where 'new' entrepreneurial skills normally 
praised as important for an evolving market economy, are criticised when practised by 
Gypsies and taken as evidence of their corrupt nature. " Likewise, the participation of 
Gypsies in the NGO sector, and all the necessary skills associated with this, has not in 
itself always secured an acceptance on the part of local authorities to co-opcrate with 
them. The attitudes of Bulgarian citizens in general remained largely cynical of such 
NGOs, in that NGOs were seen as another example of a means of self-aggrandiscment for 
the Gypsy elite. Popular stereotypes about 'rich Gypsies' were abundant and many people 
saw such stereotypes as confirmed by the growth in visible wealth associated with these 
NGOs. 
The failure of Gypsies in general to fulfil the necessary criteria for inclusion is oflcn 
interpreted as a product of their own 'backwardness', or 'deviancy'. This is a mcssage 
29 For example, Yulian Konstantinov, "Hunting for Gaps Through Boundaries: Gypsy Tactics for Economic Survival in 
the Context of the Second Phase of Post-Totalitarian Changes in Bulgaria (1994-)", Innovation, 7 (3), 1994. 
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expressed not only through the media and on the street, but in professional situations, of 
which the meeting held between the Romani Bah Foundation and the Electricity board is 
just one example. Ultimately, the acquisition of the necessary skills are in themselves not 
always enough for those groups who are subject to structural and institutional oppression. 
Rather as a result of their own deficiencies, their deprivation is more a product of the 
structures of inequality that penetrate areas of schooling, work and cultural freedom, and 
that go much deeper than the symptoms relied upon in social exclusion theory. The idea 
of an at least partly self-induced phenomenon of social exclusion conveniently fixes 
Gypsies in their place and makes attempts at tackling poverty within this framework 
superficial. Ultimately, strategies of inclusion promote mainstream interests at the 
expense of more subtle but equally important survival strategies. Therefore, they not only 
fail to go far enough in tackling the causes of social inequality, but by doing so run the 
risk of reinforcing them. 
The problems of inclusion as identified in this case study draw attention to some of the 
difficulties that exist with social exclusion theory. First of all, it was not apparent that 
groups who were defined as 'excluded' attached this label to themselves. Those working 
within the foundation for example recognised the self-perpetuating problems of the 
'ghetto', but did so in specific terms that articulated the structural causes'of such 
problems. Ultimately, references were made in project proposals and reports to ideas of 
social isolation and conversely participation in civil society, but as a necessary response 
to the use of these terms by national and international policy makers. 
Second, the level of involvement of Gypsies in the NGO sector, coupled with the nature 
of their involvement, indicated that Gypsies during the transition were not necessarily 
isolated in the way that 'social exclusion' implies. Their concerns, like everyone else's, 
were with finding work, looking after the family and so forth. Third, and tied in with this, 
was the possibility of a 'hidden resistance' within the NGO sector, however subtle it may 
have been. This suggested that existing survival strategies were being used in such a way 
that contradicted ideas of 'social exclusion'. Isolated elements of resistance could easily 
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go unnoticed, such as their manipulation of certain concepts, or their playing up of 
popular Gypsy images. However, taken collectively and in conjunction with the formal 
defending of Gypsy rights, these apparently detached elements of resistance came 
together to form a coherent survival strategy of both compliance and resistance 
incorporated into the very ethos of the foundation. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that this type of analysis carries with it a series of 
problems. In identifying realms of hidden resistance, one is forced to re-address accepted 
theories of power and hegemony. Tied in with this is the problem of to what extent it is 
justifiable to attach a label of 'resistance' to behaviour that is not acted out with any 
conscious intent to resist. The practical difficulties of outsiders gaining access to some 
authentic site of resistance has further undermined scholars to fully and conclusively 
resolve this theoretical dilemma. However, if we failed to recognise the resisting potential 
of Gypsies, in whatever form, then their contribution to and survival within wider society 
would be reduced to nothing more than mere passive and inconsequential, which, as this 
thesis clearly demonstrates, is not the case. 
8.14 Conclusion 
The case study, in conjunction with the wider analysis of the NGO sector in Bulgaria, 
helps us to take a step back from accepted wisdom and to identify the flawed assumptions 
that underpin current ideas and uses of social exclusion as a descriptive and analytical 
tool. Ultimately, the identification of a hidden dimension, whereby those within the 
foundation were playing with concepts imposed by the NGO structure and using them for 
practical ends, served to undermine the established view of Gypsies as victims and NGOs 
as the saviours. 
Ultimately, for many NGOs led by Gypsies, there is a general cynicism expressed by 
members about application procedures, where a concern with abstract ideals of 
democracy and other similar values have to be clearly expr . essed in order to receive 
funding. Yet, they do have a genuine interest in promoting democracy and civil society, if 
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it means improving the lives of Gypsies. Resistance, therefore, is not explicit, but more 
implied through a general flexibility in cultural adaptation. It is also manifested in their 
commitment to basic Gypsy rights, such as persisting in the use of Romani language and 
promoting different aspects of Gypsy culture. 
The participation of Gypsies within the NGO sector therefore represented a new form of 
'incorporation' from below in that members of Gypsy NGOs may have complied with 
Western ideals at one level, but resisted them at another. The multiple identities that 
Gypsies have simultaneously taken on, as indeed everyone does, became particularly 
apparent within the NGO sector, where they were at once, 'Cigani, 'Romani' 
'Bulgarian'/'TurkisW and 'aspiring Western'. Many NGOs were keen to promote civil 
society, democracy, and human rights in the Western sense, but the way in which these 
principles were interpreted and put into practice went beyond the limited Western NGO 
vision. Gypsy foundations incorporated 'Western' values but in such a way as to make 






Given the huge scale of resources and energy being injected into policies aimed at 
tackling social exclusion at national and international levels, the thesis suggests the need 
for a more rigorous analysis of social exclusion theory. Fears over the increasing number 
and range of those experiencing poverty in all parts of Europe, especially since 1989, and 
its apparent manifestation in a cluster of certain 'social groups', have reinvested with a 
new sense of urgency and legitimacy once discredited ideas of deviancy and dependency. 
It has been argued in this thesis that the new concern with social exclusion is a product of 
such fears. In particular, it seems that social exclusion theory has come to represent the 
modem day catch-all euphemism for the 'dangerous classes' that have reappeared 
throughout modem history. '
The thesis, therefore, has attempted to critically'examine the ideological roots to and 
implications of social exclusion theory in conjunction with NGO and resistance theories. 
It began by noting the rise in popularity and usage of social exclusion in national and 
international policy making, while at the same time observing its theoretical similarities 
to concepts of underclass, marginality and culture of poverty. In order to test the validity 
of social exclusion theory, the thesis then explored its 'Achilles heel', the NGO strategy of 
inclusion and, in particular, the emerging NGO sector during transition in Eastern Europe 
with special reference to Gypsies in Bulgaria. An analysis of the use of NGOs by Gypsy 
activists to enhance existing survival strategies formed the empirical core to my research. 
The results of the fieldwork indicated the possibility of a hidden dimension in which 
Gypsies both complied with and resisted to NGO and wider'structures; a dimension Ica 
out by the dominant social exclusion approach towards Gypsies. 
1 Lydia Morris, Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship, Routlcdge, London, 1994. 
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9.2 Problems of social exclusion theory 
The thesis has argued that the redefinition of social inequality from an up-down analysis 
to one based on an in-out dichotomy has been in itself a top-down process whereby social 
policy makers and those in positions of power have shaped a new language of social 
exclusion. As a result, class analysis and its implications for understanding power 
relations, has not been replaced but subsumed into a broader social exclusion analysis 
based on a dichotomy of 'in/out'. This has had fundamental implications for the analysis 
of 'poverty groups' and questions of social agency. One of the main implications of 
adopting a one-dimensional framework in analysing severe cases of deprivation has been 
that it has often precluded a more thorough examination of the subtleties and causes of 
social inequality in both general and specific terms and has therefore proved conducive to 
generalisations implicit in government policy especially for those groups traditionally 
targeted such as Gypsies. 
Expressed in neutral terms and framed within a 'politically, correct' discourse of 
'integration', 'human rights' and ̀ bottom-up participation', social exclusion as a policy 
oriented concept has successfully entered and taken a strategic place in mainstream social 
analysis and policy debate. As with existing theories of marginality, the underclass, and 
culture of poverty, dominant ideas within social exclusion theory are used to refer 
primarily to the results of a process, or the situation of those who are excluded, with little 
indication from what, or by what (or whom) they are excluded. Thus, as in the words of 
Messu, "making [exclusion] a quality in itself, a subjective characterisation, [which] is in 
a way to shift from the accident to the essence while at the same time erasing the 
circumstances which make the accident possible. "' Strobel similarly argues that talking 
about social exclusion, is 'an old rhetorical device' that serves to naturalise the 
phenomenon and keep the poor quiet. ' This is illustrated in the u, se of neutral or passive 
language to describe social exclusion as a phenomenon, or a combination of phenomena 
2 Messu, "Der6gulation et R6gulation Sociales: Contribution A I'Analyse Sociologique des Politiqucs Sociaics", Cahier 
de Recherches. 5 1, CREDOC, 1993, quoted by Pierre Strobel, "From Poverty to Exclusion: A Wage Earning Socicty 
or a Society of Human Rights? ", International Social Science Journal, 48 (2), 1996. p. 174. 
3 ]b1d. Pierre Strobel is head of the research division of the Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales and a mcmbcr 
of the European Observatory on National Family policies. 
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that has arisen from a series of external factors, such as the rapid pace of industrial and 
technological change, the evolution of changing family structures, or ncw forms of 
migration. " 
The focus of social exclusion theory on a 'residual category' has allowed certain policy 
makers to deflect attention away from structural causes of inequality in othcr ways too. 
Although in many cases, measures of income inequality and poverty are still uscd for 
presenting levels of social inequality at the household level, ' some critics have bccn alcrt 
to the dangers of social exclusion theory arguing that it is nothing more than "thc latcst 
euphemism for poverty. "' The emphasis of social exclusion theory on 'new' povcrty is 
especially problematic in the context of the 'transition' in Eastern Europe, whcre 
entrenched and rapidly expanding patterns of social inequality are dismissed as temporary 
or at best superficial. 7 
For users of social exclusion theory, solutions are sought more within the confines of the 
group in question and less so in terms of the societal context in which they exist. 
Explanations go so far as to identify a certain deficiency on the part of the group in 
question, such as a lacking in relevant life skills, legal rights, sclf-motivation, and so 
forth. In this way, disadvantaged groups, including ethnic minorities, are not only 
enclosed within a primarily social definition, but as a result are subject to a greater risk of 
stigmatisation. At the formal level, the deficiencies identified by policy makers arc not 
necessarily portrayed as a direct fault of the group in question. However, tile emphasis oil 
social factors serves to deflect from focus possible causes of say class, race or gcndcr 
inequality. Rather than directly challenging or attempting to dismantle such oppressive 
4 Katherine Duffy, Social Exclusion and Human Dignity in Europe: Background Reportfor the Proposed Iniflatim by 
the Council of Europe, Activity 11 lb, Steering Committee on Social Policy, CDPS (95)1,1995. p. 9. See also 
Commission of the European Communities, "The Community's Battle Against Social Exclusion", European File, 4, 
1992. 
5 Such as R. Simpson and R. Walker, Europe: For Richer or Poorer?, Child Poverty Action Group, London, 1993; 
and Duffy, ibid. 
6 Q. Oliver (Secretary of the European Anti-Poverty Network) in the forward to Simpson and Walker, ibid. p. viii. ix. 
See also Strobel, op. cit. This was also a view widely expressed by members of the audience during a conrcrence 
dedicated to the subject of social exclusion: Social Exclusion and the City, convened by Professor Chris I lamnett, 
Kings College London and the Royal Geographical Society, 29 October 1998. 
7 The rhetoric of 'transformation traps' is a classic example of this. Richard Portes, "Transformation Traps", Vie 
Economic Journal, 104, September, 1994. 
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structures, responses to social exclusion tend to rest upon the principle of finding ways to 
equip 'socially excluded groups' with the necessary skills for self-intcgration. This focus 
on social agency has most significantly informed NGO strategies of 'community 
development', 'bottom-up participation' and 'self-help', most prominently in the contexts 
of the 'developing' countries and most recently in the 'transition' countries. 
An examination of the role of Gypsies within the Bulgarian NGO sector raised important 
points about both its possibilities and its detrimental implications for improving living 
conditions and legal rights of Gypsies as a whole. At one level, the simple inclusion of 
Gypsy rights into legal frameworks has yet to secure any profound social change. Simply 
including previously excluded groups into existing legal frameworks, without a radical 
re-working of existing assumptions, has not in itself served to liberate them, nor has it 
automatically secured them an equal status within society. Furthermore, as discusscd in 
section 8 of Chapter 4, the concern on the part of Western policy makers in securing 
improved rights for Gypsies in Eastern Europe can be seen to be a product of much 
deeper fears about immigration. " 
At another level, the creative use of human and minority right frameworks by Gypsies 
within the NGO sector indicates the potential that does exist within the NGO sector for 
'bottom-up' contribution. However, the hidden dimension of compliance and resistance 
which characterised both the wider survival strategies of Gypsies and most notably their 
use of them within the NGO sector, suggest that the relationship between Gypsy NGO 
members and donors and in turn wider society is a vastly, complex one, and one that 
remains unaccounted for in social exclusion theory. Ultimately, by removing from focus 
concepts of class inequality and poverty, national and international policy makers. when 
using social exclusion theory, run the risk of minimising the centrality of the context in 
which Gypsies operate. Therefore those who rely on ideas of social exclusion arc Icss 
equipped to answer the question of why groups such as Gypsies remain worse off, yet 
8 See for example, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), "Roma (Gypsies) in the CSCE 
Region", Report ofthe High Commissioner on National Minorities, Meeting of the Committee of ScniorOfflcials, 21- 
23 September 1993. 
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organised, and why remedies, such as those proposed by NGOs, may at a surfacc lcvcl 
appear effective, but in reality serve only to negotiate rather than rcsolvc a whole scrics of 
structural inequalities. 
9.3 Methodological reflection 
The distinct lack of reliable empirical data, the complexity of Gypsy problems and their 
responses, coupled with the unstable nature of the NGO sector, indicated to me the need 
to carry out fieldwork from the inside rather than relying solely on external methods of 
research. More specifically, the inside approach took a top-down perspective in that its 
prime focus was on the affluent and accessible world of NGOs. The complexities of this 
approach, however, coupled with the closeness of Gypsy communities, presented a series 
of methodological problems. Most significant was that, as a young Gadjo woman from 
the West, I was entering into a set of relations from primarily an outsider's position. In 
some circumstances this proved problematic in very explicit ways, in that I would be 
judged by some as primarily a non-Gypsy Westerner. 
In other situations, however, my position as outsider was less problematic and at times 
even beneficial. On many occasions my investigation of NGOs at the ground level 
threatened to pull me into the politics and emotions that characterised this sector. 
However, as an outsider I could more legitimately than most remove myself from the hcat 
of conflicts without undermining my own position. A clear example of this was when an 
argument concerning my arrival at a large Gypsy mahala broke out between the Mayor 
and my escort, a NGO leader. As discussed in section 9 of Chapter 6, the Mayor was 
reluctant for the NGO to intervene and disliked the fact that this NGO was showing me 
around. Rather than the blame being laid on me, 'howevcr, the conflict essentially 
remained between themselves. 
Ultimately, the juxtaposition of problems and benefits served to shed light on a nunibcr 
of important questions. First, there was the question of authenticity. In addrcssing the 
idea of both resistance and compliance on the part of those Gypsies working within the 
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NGO sector, it was necessary to question how far it was possible for me to gain acccss to 
this 'hidden dimension'. Carrying out formal and informal face-to-face intcrvicws, 
coupled with participant observation in a number of settings, enabled me to a largc cxtcnt 
to go beyond the 'NGO song' normally reserved for donors. However, whcn carrying out 
fieldwork by participant observation one must, of course, acknowledge the limitations to 
the depth of insight that is achievable at this level. Nevertheless, through cxtcndcd 
contact I was able to get a sense of the overall expectations, hopes and fears of thosc 
working within the NGO sector. More specifically, this approach opened up potential for 
triangulation and the gathering of normally inaccessible documentation which, in 
conjunction with the use of existing data, enhanced rather than diminished the validity of 
this research. 
Second, was the question of to what extent cultural practices, such as the use of the 
interview either constrained or opened up my research approach. The sometimes 
conflicting goals present at any one time during the interview, as well as the possible 
implications of my own particular status were factors that I explicitly considered during 
the analysis of my findings. The interviews were deliberately open-ended and loosely 
structured in order to allow for the interviewee to contribute to the form it would take. In 
some cases this led to a fruitful exchange, while in others it simply provided the 
interviewee a platform with which to report their 'successes'. -I was therefore careful 
throughout to recognise the different contexts in which the interviews took place and to 
consider the implications this would have for its analysis. 
Ultimately, the fieldwork and its use within a wider analytical framework opcncd up to 
question the extent to which statistics, whether they be qualitative or quantitativc, wcrc 
indeed reliable or valid for such a study. However, by explicitly combining the usc of 
both official and non-official statistics with my own findings, the thesis aimcd to prcscnt 
focused data within the wider context and to apply them to ideas of social cxclusion, 
resistance and NGOs. 
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9.4 Summary of main findings 
Taking these methodological reflections into consideration I return to the questions poscd 
in chapter I as a means to summarise the main findings of this thesis. First, how 
successfully does social exclusion theory help us to understand the core proccsscs or 
situations it identifies, i. e. has it been correct in its prognosis that groups will perpctuatc 
their own poverty and isolation if not given access to mainstream societal institutions? 
Second, does social exclusion theory account for the contradictions that are emerging in 
terms both of resistance and participation on the -part of those groups defined as 
excluded? 
An analysis of the function of NGOs for Gypsies in the Bulgarian context was central to 
both these questions. In seeking to explain and account for the existence of a 'residual' 
minority, and by not recognising the important role 'socially excluded', groups play in 
their own survival (however far from the 'norm' such strategies may be), social exclusion 
theory helps us to understand only to a limited extent the core process and situations it 
identifies. In contrast to ideas of 'isolation' and 'detachment' that underpin the use of 
social exclusion theory, my findings show how Type B NGOs in particular were keen to 
use the evolving third sector for specific ends. In Bulgaria it was generally educated and 
already politically active Gypsies who were taking the leading role in their niche of the 
NGO sector. However, there was also evidence that local Gypsies were being cmploycd 
and so drawn into the process both separately and in partnership with non-Gypsics. 
Therefore, in spite of the constraints inherent to the donor framework-, these NGOs 
seemed to have taken the third sector as a tool for both compliance and resistance in order 
to maximise its benefits for both short term relief and more sustained strategies of long 
term improvement. 
Within their overall strategies, ideas of integration were not rejected per se but rcdcrined. 
Human rights for example were taken on board not so much as the answer but as a means 
to pursue political ends, such as awareness raising or highlighting and bringing to justicc 
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perpetrators of institutionalised anti-Gypsy violence. Yet, underpinning this discussion 
has been the recognition that the NGO sector as a strategy of inclusion is bcsct with 
problems both in general terms and with specific reference to Eastern Europe. White 
revealing flaws in the NGO structure, the problems experienced by Gypsies in terms of 
their relations with the donors and state actors also highlights the problematic 
assumptions that underpin it. First, there is its contradictory claim on the one hand of 
providing a viable alternative to state structures, yet on the other offering only limited 
funding. Second is its claim of representing and including the interests and rights of 
minority groups, yet still at the most basic level operating within, rather than against the 
constraints of continued structural inequality. 
The evolution of the NGO sector in post 1989 Bulgaria, as indeed across Eastern Europe, 
has therefore been swift but shallow. Whereas the number of registered foundations and 
organisations have increased dramatically, the figures for those in receipt of regular 
funding is less impressive. Furthermore, the high participation rate of ethnic minorities 
has been taken as an indication of the importance of NGOs despite the fact that the 
composition of those groups involved tends to be restricted to a certain strand of 
individuals. Ultimately, the nature of the relationship that has subsequently been forged 
between the international donors and the Gypsy related foundations at the ground level 
indicates how the NGO sector for Gypsies is at once restrictive and enabling. That the 
NGO sector during the transition has developed into a site of both conflict and 
incorporation for many Gypsies raises the possibility that 'incorporation from below' has 
formed an important post-1989 Gypsy survival strategy both within this sector and the 
wider context. 
Given these findings, it is therefore possible to substantiate the hypotheses proposed at 
the beginning of the thesis. First, the overall continued survival of Gypsies as a distinct 
ethnic group, coupled with the active self-organisation of educated Gypsies within the 
NGO sector, reveals that Gypsies are not by definition isolated, passive nor dc- 
politicised. Second, the strategy of inclusion for Gypsies in Eastern Europe through the 
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NGO sector is a vastly complex procedure, which at the formal level holds within it botli 
the potential for effective bottom-up integration as well as continued top-down 
assimilation. Third, those Gypsies involved within the NGO sector have bccn ablc to 
'manipulate'NGO rhetoric and develop strategies for survival that rest on aspects of both 
compliance and resistance. Finally, theories of social exclusion do not adequatcly account 
for the experiences of Gypsies in Bulgaria. The latter point in particular was taken as of 
central importance given that the purpose of the thesis was to test the validity of social 
exclusion theory in addressing questions of inequality and resistance for Gypsies in 
Bulgaria. 
9.5 The implications of this critique for the model of social exclusion itself 
This thesis, by showing how Gypsies are not only intertwined into the very workings of 
wider society, but that society itself is built on a series of fundamental inequalities reveals 
how ternis of 'integration', 'community development' and 'human rights' as used in NGO 
and social exclusion theories are more problematic than they may appear at first sight. In 
many respects these primarily Western discourses serve to shield the often ethnocentric 
and ideological biased interpretation of Gypsy responses during the transition. The use of 
the social exclusion framework to analyse inequality fails to challenge the popular held 
view that those groups or individuals who do not collude with accepted ideas of 
behaviour and work patterns must somehow be deviant, or at best deficient. 
Both the informal and formal responses of Bulgarian Gypsies during the 'transition' 
demonstrate that as a group they occupy a specifically disadvantaged place within 
society. As we have seen Gypsy populations on the whole do experience highcr levels of 
poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and ill-health than their co-habitants. But is it a 
question of social exclusion? At one level their condition as a whole could be describcd 
as isolated, in that they do not in general comply with, nor indeed have access to formal 
societal institutions, whatever form they may take. However, at another level thcrc arc a 
number of problems with the social exclusion approach. 
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First, it fails to address the complexity of Gypsy cultures and ethnic groupings in that 
some are clearly more integrated than others. Gypsies in Bulgaria, like all groups in any 
given country, are made up of a multitude of different communities and are part and 
product of the society they live in. Second, the idea of social exclusion fails to 
acknowledge that Gypsies have influenced and been influenced by their society to 
varying degrees in terms of economic activities, politics and culture. 
Ultimately social exclusion theory can be used to address spccific cxanipics of 
exclusionary policies in terms of denied access to different arenas of activity, wlicdicr it 
be decision-making or legal rights. However, to argue that reversing thcsc spccific 
processes will solve the entire problem of poverty and inequality through strategics such 
as those proposed by the NGO sector is missing the point. The label of social exclusion 
therefore does not necessarily help explain the reason for their predicament and allows us 
to only go so far in our analysis and understanding of social inequality. Ultimatcly, for 
those groups who are subject to'varying degrees of institutional ised oppression, the 
condition of isolation or 'social exclusion' may be just one of a whole series of symptoms 
that they experience, not necessarily the definitive one. If social exclusion is tak-cn, 
therefore, as a general theory of inequality, those who use it serve only to limit thcir own 
analysis. 
9.6 The implications of this critique for Gypsies and the NGO sector In Eastern 
Europe 
Ultimately, social exclusion and its strategy of inclusion can, like similar theories before 
it, serve to negate 'other' values and cultures. The main implication of this critique for our 
understanding of Gypsies therefore is that individually, or as a group, they arc not 
necessarily, nor want to be labelled as socially excluded. In terms of their role within the 
NGO sector, the critique of social exclusion draws attention to some of the more 
fundamental problems associated with the strategy of 'inclusion'. Problems associated 
with Gypsies and the NGO sector (especially during the transition in Eastcrn Europe) arc 
acknowledged to some extent by some Western commentators and NGO leaders 
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themselves, insofar as to address problems with NGO practice. Rather than leading to a 
useful re-evaluation of the basic premise of 'inclusion', however, such problems arc 
discussed at only a surface level and in terms of having to undergo a leaming curvc. - 
In contrast, the thesis demonstrates that the problems encountered by Gypsies in the NGO 
sector are not so much a product of factors such as under-funding, but are tied into the 
very assumptions that underpin it, in terms of its own role and that of Gypsies. This is not 
to deny that the NGO sector, both as an alternative to the state in, tcrms of welfare 
provision, and as a source of bottom-up agency, is plagued with structural and 
organisational problems. Instead it suggests that what should be most significant is die 
question of its strategy of inclusion, in that it rests upon the assumption that there arc 
'excluded' groups waiting to be 'included'. This assumption fails to recognise the 
persistent and creative range of survival strategies on the part of Gypsies which 
demonstrate their implicit unwillingness to accept the logic of social exclusion theory 
(i. e. that they are powerless and isolated). 
The identification of a possibly hidden transcript within the Bulgarian NGO sector that 
corresponds with wider survival strategies for Gypsies, reveals the dimension that social 
exclusion theory fails to consider. The case study described in Chapter 8, as part of the 
wider analysis, showed that the label of 'social exclusion'. for Gypsies in Bulgaria is 
inappropriate and misguided in that like any other members of society during transition, 
Gypsies are trying to make the most of what little they have. In the case of Bulgaria 
during the transition, the NGO sector is one of the few resources open to Gypsies, who, 
on their part, have been finding ways where possible to take full advantage of it. Whether 
or not we attach the label of resistance to the activities of Gypsies within the NGO scctor, 
does not detract from the reality that they arc creatively using existing survival stratcgics, 
in spite of the constraints imposed on them by wider society and the NGO scctor itself. 
The NGO sector should not be taken as a solution to problems of 'social exclusion, for 
its emphasis on participation and inclusion as a source of empowerment prccludcs the 
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tackling of deeper structural cases of inequality, such as the unequal distribution of 
resources. Strategies of inclusion therefore only go some way to dealing with problems of 
poverty and deprivation. Rather than proposing that it be abandoned altogether, however, 
this thesis suggests that the NGO strategy should be recognised for what it is: one type of 
policy response open to a limited sector of society that is dominated by external donors. 
A fair and useful analysis of Gypsies during the transition needs to begin with the 
dimension that social exclusion leaves out, that is, Gypsies both in wider society, but 
most significantly within the NGO sector, simultaneously comply and resist. This 
dialectical tension that Gypsies and wider society maintain with each other demonstrates 
that far from being passive victims, Gypsies are agents of their own survival, not of their 
own oppression. 
Ultimately, the theory of social exclusion needs to be radically re-worked and its 
limitations acknowledged if it is to be of any use for our understanding of social 
inequality. Rather than as a generic conceptual tool, social exclusion should instead be 
used for a specific analysis of certain symptomatic aspects of structural inequality. In 
addressing the causes of social inequality even in terms of its broader aspects of 
deprivation and in articulating a subsequent course of action, a focus on the systematic 
reproduction of the forms of class inequality and traditional measurements of poverty are 
just as vital today as they ever have been. 
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APPENDIX1 
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN BULGARIA 1989-1997 
10 November 1989 Zhivkov and the Bulgarian Communist Party removed from 
power. Introduction of democratic elections. 
1990 Formation of ROMA and establishment of 3 Gypsy MPs 
within the BCP. 
10 June 1990 Reformed Communists won overall majority in national 
elections. 
July 1990 The Democratic Roma Union, an organization which defends 
the social, cultural and political rights of Gypsies, was denied 
recognition as a political party. The Supreme Court upheld the 
decision. 
1991 Changes introduced in Constitutional law and introduction of 
the law on Political Parties, which prohibits the establishment 
of political parties based on religious or ethnic grounds. 
Freedom of expression, including in the media, has been 
guaranteed in Articles 39,40 and 41. However stringent 
restrictions remain. 
November 1992 A police attack on a Gypsy neighbourhood in Pazarzhik 
occurred. Medical professionals refused to provide Gypsies 
with the documents they needed after the attack to substantiate 
their injuries, making it difficult for the victims to seek redress. 
Gypsies also found it impossible to obtain lawyers to plead 
their cases. 
April 1993 More than 50 police officers forcibly entered a number of 
houses without search warrants in the Gypsy community in the 
town of Novipazer in search of suspected criminals. Witnesses 
reported that the police indiscriminately beat men, women and 
children of the Gypsy community. 
February 1994 The 1993 U. S. State Department's Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices reported an increase in human rights 
violations, xenophobia, nationalism and anti-ethnic expression 
against Gypsies in Bulgaria in 1993. They also reported that 
there were few government investigations of these incidents. 
These incidents included: Gypsies being beaten by skinheads 
and other racist groups; unsubstantiated reports of police 
sexually abusing Gypsy minors; and difficulties for Gypsies in 
applying for social benefits. '
'Jonathan Fox, Roma (Gypsies) in Bulgaria, web site <http: //www. bsos. umd. edu/ cidcrn/rnar/buIrorna. htrn>, (106) 
1/10/95, update 12/4/95, (accessed June 1997). 
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1994 The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a political 
party that unofficially expresses the interests of Bulgarian 
Muslims and Turks, was the third largest party represented in 
the Bulgarian parliament. 
October 1994 The National Assembly was dismissed and parliamentary 
elections were prepared for December. 
18 December 1994 Parliamentary elections: Bulgarian Socialist Party (a reformed 
BCP) won an overall majority - led by Mr. Zhan Videnov. He 
remained in power throughout 1995. During this time there 
were no changes made to the constitutional or political 
framework. 
1995 No international human rights instruments were ratified during 
1995. The BSP refused to sign the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities. They justified this, 
unofficially, with the impermissibility of the use of a minority 
language during contacts with the administrative authorities 
(under Art. 10, part 2 of the Convention), as well as the 
inadmissibility of the option to re-name traditional areas, 
streets and other landmarks in the language of the minority in 
areas where they constitute a substantial number (guaranteed 
under Art. 11, part 3 of the Convention). 
March 1995 The only discriminatory law on 'decommunization' was 
repealed. This law had been introduced to expel certain 
individuals from the managing bodies of academic and 
research institutions on grounds of links with former regime. 
15 March 1995 The 1994 U. S. Department of State's Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices noted that in Bulgaria: there were 
allegations of police abuse of Roma during 1994; there was an 
increase in attacks against Roma by private citizens, especially 
skinheads; the government's Ministry of Education continued 
its programme to introduce Roma language textbooks and 
provide Roma language training for teachers in schools with 
Roma children; and some Roma policemen were hired in some 
villages. 
May 1995 Amendments were made to the Penal Code and Penal 
Procedural Code. The Penalty 'life imprisonment' was 
introduced (but without abolishing capital punishment). 
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June 1995 The government issued a decree to close down the 
Interdepartmental Council on Ethnic Affairs - the only state 
body that represented issues concerning ethnic minorities. It 
was replaced by the National Council on Social and 
Demographic Issues. This is a consultative body which brings 
together issues of ethnic minorities with those of women, 
pensioners, invalids, and the disabled. Only those organisations 
with structures in more than a third of the municipalities across 
Bulgaria were recognised as having access to this council. 
29 October 1995 Local government elections - BSP gained majority. 
October-November Peter Stoyanov elected as President. 
1996. 
January 1997 Student protests against the BSP. 
April 1997 Parliamentary elections, UDF won overall majority. 
9 October 1997 The UDF signed the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (ETS No. 157). It had been open for 
signature from 1 February 1995, and so represented one of the 
few countries left within the Council of Europe to reach this 
stage. However, by the end of 1997, the government had not 
yet ratified it. Furthermore, the Bulgarian government, unlike 
in Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, had yet to sign the 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ETS 




NGOS IN BULGARIA AND INTERVIEWS 
Composition of NGOs registered with Union of Bulgarian Foundations and Associations 
(March 1997) 
Field of interest Number % 
Culture 148 13.5 
Professional Associations 122 11.2 
Education 98 9 
Health 95 8.7 
Nature/Environment 91 8.3 
Miscellaneous 85 7.8 




Foreign Relations 68 6.2 
Economic/Busmess 44 4.2 
Youth 35 3.2 
Gypsies/Roma 30 2.7 
Regional development 36 2.7 
Social/political research 29 2.7 
Minorities 23 2.1 
Women 21 1.9 
NGOs 17 1.6 
Anti-Drugs 7 0.6 
TOTAL 1094 100 
Examples of NGOs in Bulgaria working with Gypsies: Date of registration and of 
interviews (based on interviews carried out in 1997) 
NGO Type A 
(1) Confederation of Roma in Bulgaria, Sofia (1993)* 4.3.97 
(2) Roma Foundation, Rousse (1996) 12.3.97 
(3) Balkan Foundation for Cross Cultural Education and Understanding Diversity, Sofia 
(1997) 17.3.97 and 11.9.97 
(4) "Justice 96" Society, Plovdiv (1997) 17.10.97 
(5) Youth Initiative for Tolerance, Sliven (1997) 20.10.97 
(6) United Roma Union, Sliven (1992)* 20.10.97 
(7) Foundation "New Life for Bulgarian Roma" Sliven (1994)* 21.10.97 
(8) Roma Foundation 'Hope', Sliven (1996) 22.10.97 
(9) Foundation "Women for Mercy - Roma", Sliven (1995) 22.10.97 
NGO Type B 
(1) Human Rights Project, Sofia 17.3.97 
(2) Bulgarian Helsinki Committee - Foundation Romani Bah, Sofia (1995) 17.9.97 
(3) Foundation for Regional Development - Self Help Bureau 'Roma', Plovdiv (1995)* 
29.9.97 
(4) Social Foundation 'Roma', Plovdiv (1992)* 1.10.97 
(5) 'Roma' Women Association, Plovdiv (1995)* 18.10.97 
(6) National Association of Roma Organisations and Foundations, Sliven (1997) 20.10.97 
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NGO Tjpe C 
(1) Foundation "United Ethnos", Rousse (1996) 11.3.97 
(2) Partners for Democratic Change, Sofia 18.3 97 and 23.10.97 
(3) Open Society Foundation, Sofia (1990) 31.10.97 
NGO Type D 
(1) CEGA (Creating Effective Grass roots Alternatives), Sofia (1995) 18.3.97 
(2) Free and Democratic Bulgaria, Sofia 19.3.97 
(3) The International Centre for Minority Studies and Inter Cultural Relations, Sofia (1992) 
16.9.97 
(4) Inter Ethnic Initiative for Human Rights, Sofia (1994) 18.9.97 
(5) Bulgarian Red Cross, (1878), Sofia: 19.9.97, Plovdiv: 7.10.97 
(6) Journalists for Tolerance Foundation, Plovdiv (1996)* 8.10.97 
(7) Foundation 'Understanding', Plovdiv (1995) * 16.10.97 
* Those registered with the Union ofBulgarian Foundations and Associations 
Other interviews: 
G. Ivanova, Director of Special School 10.3.97 
A. Kememedchiev, Prison Officer 21.10.97 
R. Ninchova, Social Services 24.10.97 
Major K. Kararadev, Police Officer 21.10.97 
D. Dobdrev, Secretary State of the Municipality 22.10.97 
The Head of the Public Council, Sliven 23.10.97 
N. Hubanov, Administrative Representative for Nadejhda 23.10.97. 
Angul, farmer and project coordinator, 9.10.97 
Marushiakova and Popov, first interview 19.3.97 and many others thereafter. 
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APPENDIX 3 
A TABULATION OF GYPSY RELATED NGOS 
Table I Type A 
Airns Approach Rep- 
] 
Sources of 
or vs funding 
NGO Type A 
1. To pro\ ide ýocial, cultural and Nurturing Gypsy No Council ofFurope, 
material support. representatives, promotion of OSCE 
cultural events. 
2. To offer immediate relief to Charitable: donating money No Private sources 
pm, ertv. and clothes. 
3. To include Gypsy children into Working with schools, Yes A Dutch 
Bulgarian schools; to strengthen comparing results and Foundation 
bilingual abilities of minority publishing findingsý 
childrm to strengthen NGO developing and publishing 
links nationally and Gypsy centred textbooks and 
internationally. teaching manuals. 
4. To treat all ethnic groups equally Repairing the local No Novib 
to bring tot, , cthcr all 
NGOs kindergarten; help pay taxes; 
working with minoritiesý to training single mothers (in 
target children and help them go retailing etc. ) gi,. ing advice in 
to school. different social areas; 
organising seminars. 
5. To support young people of all Apply for funding; training for No Potential: OS, 
ethnic groups, their talents and foundations, help pay taxes, Democratic 
educatim for Gypsies to enter encourage learning of Network, Foreign 
schools equally. Bulgarian, involve parents as Embassies, Fergo, 
volunteers; provide text books, Union of Bulgarian 
I breakfasts. Foundations. 
6. To safeguard rights and interests Est. of Bureau for Mutual Help: Yes Novib, Soros, 
of Gypsies; to support the creating employment Programme 
integration of Gypsies into wider opportunities; encouraging Democracy 
societyý to change thinking of children to attend school; Nct\vork, 
Gypsies and of the majority; distributing food at schools; Foundation for the 
priority is education and to celebrating Gypsy cultural Dev. of Civil 
prevent discrimination. events, publication of Gypsy Society, GB 




7. To support Gypsies in all fields Organising mutual training No Sponsored by the 
and their integration as an ethnic seminars in human rights for Furo Commission, 
group into wider society; all minorjticsý acting as a Union of Bulgarian 
emphasis on children. mediator bet. police /exec. Foundations, also 
power and Gypsies; working Soros, Open Educ, 
,, vith the media; providimý Democratic 
textbooks, clothes. Network. 
8. To help Gypsies who have Improving learning facilities No International 
suffered most by working in for Gypsies, providing books/ Minority Centre 
every field, to set up an office food, running seminars, 
like the Bureau for Mutual Help. making existing social clubs 
function. 
9. To support families and children Improving qualifications and Charity Know flow 
in the areas of health, education employment opportuniticsý proi Danish Filibassy. 
and social support, to fight for emergency relief not just for G) 
the Nvomen's spirit, to understand carrying out research, organisin ,,, 
reasons behind low school meetings bet. NGOs, specialists 
attendance. state structures. 
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J s 0 t  funding 
1VG0 Type B 
1 To monitor human rights abuses. I Offering legal adý ice, Yes Sponsoiship from 
cmpoý% cr G\ psies to protect their pro\ iding and. or hiring of Phare and L'uronia 
and political rights. lawyers to defend Gypsy for specific projects 
clients. Training Gypsies for Individuals, US 
journalism and management, N/GOs, German 
publicising HR abuses. Marshall Fund. 
2. To provide information to Promotion of education and Yes Bulgarian Helsinki 
Gypsies so they can act for improvement of local school; Committee, 
themselves, to ). -. in the legal consultation; advice and Charities and 
confidence of community and help with social assistance; life Foundations, 
de% elop relations ý% ith state saving vouchers for medical ERRC; 
institutions. costs. The American 
Center, GB 
Embassy. 
3. To proý ide social assistance and Fund raisingý prioritisation of Yes Novib, CEGA, 
protect civil rights of Gypsy education; setting up a Soros, American 
populatiom raise social status of collective bank; operation of 3 Cultural Center. 
Gypsies; to attract children back sections: women, youth and 
to school and help everyone social work. Offering moral 
within community regardless of and financial support to single 
ethnicity. unemployed mothers; paying 
kindergarten fees, providing 
food and clothing, running 
youth club. 
4. To help those Gypsies most in Help with securing land at a - Democratic 
need, to preserve self-a,. Nareness, lower price, putting sustained Committee of US 
to fight discrimination. Major pressure on local authorities; Embassy. 
issues are land, housing, and providing admin., legal and 
advocacy of civil rights. technical help, helping new 
NGOs. 
5. To provide a bridge between Providing food at local - Red Cross, Inter- 
Bulgarian and Gypsy women; to nursery, giving advice on Ethnic Initiative, 
support disadvantaged families health, social and legal Factories in 
and talented children. problems, working with drug Plovdiv and Sofia 
addicts and glue sniffers, or. g. regions, 
of preparatory class. Democracy 
Network, US 
N/GOs. 
6. To unite Gypsy NGOs and work Training seminars on how to No GB Embassy, 
together to so]% e bigger \vrite projects and lead NGOs, Union of Bulgarian 
problems building network between Foundations, OS, 
foundations. St. C and T 
Foundation, 
Association of 
Children at Risk. 
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Table 3 Type C 
I 




NGO Type C 
1. 1o pro\ ide support Lind asýistancc 1-niphasi,, e education, No Sponsorship 
to 6ýpsics and other ethnic groups, promotion ot'cultural cý crits, from international 
a%% areness, help develop Gy , psies ocational 
training, liaise with organisations. 
ia education and cultural projects. govemment and state 
institutions. 
2. To integrate minorities among Conflict resolution and Yes US funding. 
themsekes and into mainstream business mediation setting up 
society. to promote civil society. community dialogues, with 
participation from all ethnic 
groups; co-operation with state 
authorities. 
3. Fo support ci% il societý in Bulgaria Facilitate intemational and Yes Soros. 
promote cultural % alues of different educational contacts; support 
ýroupsý i ntegrate the Gypsy education (special classes); 
communin, into modem Bulgarian cultural, economic 
ýocrety and to protect the rights of development, institutional 
its members. support for Gypsy NGOs, 
University grants for Gypsy 
students, regional information 
and advisory centres: Open 
Society clubs. 
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Table 4 Type D 
Aims Approach Rep- Sources of 
orts funding 
A'G0 T3, pe D 
Týfo, 
, %oi, ra, _, c : i% 
d pjýiicirition oikinL, %% iih G\ ps,, NGOs. Yes No% ib. 
tor all minoritics, to idcntitý needs, not directlý ýN ith Gý psy 
funds and offer proposals for communities; setting up self- 
projects " ith partner Gypsy help groups, training 
organisations. programmes and legal advice 
centres. 
2. To facilitate the establishment of a Establishment of a street Yes Pm ate, ' 
C1% I] socletý children project, providing international 
immediate relief, a day centre sources, EC Phare- 
and night shelter, offers also Lien, Soros. 
counselling and schooling. 
3. 1o be a research centre for al I Working from pre-school age Yes Centre for Study of 
minorities, to %% ork %% ith Gypsy up to higher education and Christian- 
NGOs. main concern is education, providing grants in all fields, Muslim Relations 
to create a Gýpsý intelligentsia, to enabling Gypsies to study U, Centre for 
promote GN ps), culture. abroad, special classes in Research in Ethnic 
drama etc.; paying taxes, Relations, UK, 
giving aid to kindergartens; Soros, UNESCO, 
publishing Gypsy poetry and UK Foreign Office, 
newspapers. 
4. Promotion of education. culture, Sustainable local development, Yes Bilance (a Dutch 
tolerance and respect for ethnic design and publication of foundation funded 
groups, to contribute to Gypsy textbooks, teaching by Dutch 
harmonious inter ethnic relations manuals and tapes, seminars, government and 
% ia participation of excluded anti-ghetto projects, content Catholic Church), 
groups in human rights and the analysis of media, launching, Phare, Westminster 
1 de%elopment process. of magazine and radio for Democracy, 
programme, training police. MRG. 
Io rehe\ e the most N, ulnerable of Charity activities, e. g. Yes Red Cross 
those neglected by state provision of soup kitchens for international 
institutions: the elderly and pupils with coupons, framework, 
disabled. student familim distribution of clothes and Individuals, 
minorities. Toad% ance democratic shoes, working through Gypsy Bulgarian and US 
% alues and ci% il de\ clopment. NGOs, organising public N/GOs. 
events, support of social 
welfare institutions. 
6. To raise a\s areness and promote Publication of newsletter with Yes Novib, Netherlands 
tolerance. articles on minority issues, the Organisation for 
setting up of a radio station on Intemational 
minoritv issues. Development 
Co-op, Democracy 
Network. 
7. To search for solutions for all Intercultural understanding, Yes Soros, Phare, 
sociallý disadvantaged groups conflict resolution, Foundation for the 
through cross cultural consultancy; advice on social Development of 
ý: o-operation services; seminars for y. p., Citizens (Bulgarian 
encouraging newspapers to INGO), Pew 
publish positive features on Charitable trust 
minorities, cultural events. (US), Red Cross. 
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APPENDIX 4 
AN ANCIENT STORY 
Once upon a time there was a Rom. He wanted to become rich. One day he arrived in 
town. He walked and walked, he sought and sought, but nowhere was there any good 
work He was seized by a great hunger, because he had not eaten since morning. He 
sees: [a] Gadjo is selling loaves offlat bread, and the people have stopped buying 
them. He went to the Gadjo and told him: 
- Listen to what I tellyou. I will start calling and urging thepeople and when they buy 
all yourflat bread. I will have oneforfree. 
- Very well - said Gadjo. 
And he was able to shout very loudly. Yhe people started buying theflat bread and it 
sold quickly. Yhe Gypsy looked - only one was left. 
- Mell, look here - he said - all bread has been sold, one is left and I will take itfor 
free. 
But Gadjo is very stingy. 
-I will not give you aflat breadforfree, get out ofhere! 
- E-e-e - the Gypsy thought -I will give you a lesson. 
He turned hisfur coat with the lining out, blackened hisface, put horns on his hair. 
And he went down the road to the Gadjo and began to shout, to bleat like a he-goat, to 
bark like a dog, to crow like a rooster, to grunt like a sow. Yhe Gadjo was seized by a 
greatfear. He threw away his money bag and ran away. And the Gypsy took the 
money, and went back home and became rich. 
This is a story recorded in its original folklore forin. by Elena Marushiakova and 
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